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The title and subtitle of this book need some decipherment in order to 
focus and limit expectations regarding its contents. What is here meant 
by the mundane yet historically slippery word “information”? Within 
that, what is implied by the phrase “mechanisms of communication” in 
the subtitle? Easiest to locate should be the “empire” in question: it is 
Russia. However, the Russian state was formally designated an empire 
from 1721 to 1917, a period which does not at either end coincide with 
the chronological boundaries of the present volume, ca.1600–1850. This, 
too, will require prefatory explanation.
The study of information and communication has become central 
to our understanding of the world in which we live. However, this 
truism of modernity also has implications for our understanding of 
pre-modernity. The means and the mechanisms change, but systems 
of information and communication have always been central to the 
ways in which humans operate in societies and states. All ages are, in 
their own ways, “information ages”. Therefore, prompted in part by 
discussion of the significance of information in the present and future, 
historians have increasingly turned to investigating the mechanisms, 
functions and significance of information in the past. Or so it appears. 
In fact, of course, historians have been doing so for far longer than 
is sometimes assumed or claimed. The study of information, of its 
organisation, encoding, storage, retrieval and uses, is integral to well-
established fields such as the history of the book, libraries, archives, 
intelligence and espionage, or structures and methods of governance 
© 2017 Simon Franklin, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0122.13
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and administration. At the more general level, influential modern 
studies of the social, cultural, economic and political implications of the 
major pre-modern technologies of information—writing and printing—
have long been established without necessarily labelling them as such.1
What is, perhaps, relatively new is the focus on the word and the 
concept of “information” itself. Often the word provides little more than 
new packaging for, or a new angle of vision on, quite traditional types 
of granular study.2 More substantive, however, is the foregrounding or 
upgrading of claims for the importance of information as a key (for some, 
the key) to understanding major cultural phenomena and historical 
processes. For example, Jacob Soll titles his study of Louis XIV’s Minister 
of Finances, Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619–83), The Information Master, 
arguing that Colbert, with his almost obsessive appetite for acquiring 
and ordering information of many kinds, played an important role 
in the development of the modern bureaucratic state.3 Similarly, for 
Edward Higgs the history of the “information state” tracks the ways 
in which the state has gathered information on its citizens (although 
Higgs stresses consensual aspects of the process).4 By contrast, Steven 
G. Marks proposes that an “information nexus” was a major factor in 
the rise of capitalism.5 Away from such large-scale conceptualisations, 
there is also a new interest in the micro-mechanisms and manipulations 
of information, as, for example, through rumour and gossip.6
In the wake of information in history comes the history of 
information. Does information as such have a history? Does the 
1  Among the seminal works (prompting discussion and modification as well as 
agreement) see, especially, Jack Goody, The Domestication of the Savage Mind 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); and The Logic of Writing and the 
Organization of Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Elizabeth 
L. Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change (New York and Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979).
2  E.g., in a medieval context, Emily Steiner and Lynn Ransom, eds., Taxonomies 
of Knowledge: Information and Order in Medieval Manuscripts (Philadelphia: The 
University of Pennsylvania Libraries, 2015).
3  Jacob Soll, The Information Master. Jean-Baptiste Colbert’s Secret State Intelligence 
System (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009), p. 12.
4  Edwards Higgs, The Information State in England: The Central Collection of Information 
on Citizens since 1500 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
5  Steven G. Marks, The Information Nexus: Global Capitalism from the Renaissance to the 
Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
6  David Coast, News and Rumour in Jacobean England: Information, Court Politics and 
Diplomacy 1618–1625 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014).
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accumulation of particular studies feed into a synthetic discipline, 
a historical phenomenology of information? The transition sounds 
obvious but is not straightforward. In the first place, no less obviously, 
if we want to deal with the thing itself rather than with diverse aspects 
of its functioning, we have to be clearer about what the thing is. The 
broadest definitions are far too capacious to be historically useful.7 
Almost anything can be deemed a container or bearer of information. 
Some objects that are deliberately used for information storage are 
designated through natural metaphors—books have always had leaves, 
computing now has clouds—but non-metaphorical leaves and clouds, 
on plants and trees and in the sky, can also be deemed to be rich sources 
of information, whether for botanists and climate scientists, or for 
anybody out for a walk or looking through a window. And that is before 
we begin to think of the almost mythically complex information stored 
chemically in the double helices of deoxyribonucleic acid. Adding to the 
potential confusion, there is the contiguous or overlapping but far from 
identical field of informatics, or information science.
It helps a little, but not enough, to apply a common distinction 
between information and mere data.8 Data simply exist, information 
is determined by human agency. Information consists of those data or 
combinations of data which people choose to regard as informative. It 
is the “deeming” that turns data into information, not any feature of 
content or mode of organisation. Data become information in the process 
of being observed. From this point of view, information is something 
that is created, not just something that is. Information, to put it glibly, 
is a cultural construct. However, this still does not take us very far 
from the all-encompassing concept. Is Information History the study of 
changing criteria of informativeness and/or of the nature and functions 
and uses of the things deemed to be informative? The scope remains 
daunting, the opportunities for multi-disciplinary dialogue are legion, 
and the likelihood of unforced, persuasive theoretical cohesion seems 
low. It may be no accident that a collection of studies on Information 
7  For a succinct overview of a range of approaches to the notion of information see 
e.g. Toni Weller, Information History—An Introduction: Exploring an Emergent Field 
(Oxford: Chandos Publishing, 2008), pp. 11–22.
8  Here, too, there is scope to make an ostensibly simple contrast complicated: see 
the discussion of various approaches to information and data in Jennifer Rowley, 
‘What is Information?’, Information Services and Use, 18 (1998), 243–54.
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History, edited by one of the pioneers and advocates of the field, was 
reckoned by reviewers to be, despite the framing discourse, more like a 
collection of studies on—once more—information in history.9 The filter 
is disciplinary and the argument is circular. 
All this is by way of an excuse, not entirely disreputable, for the 
lack of an overarching theoretical framework, or, if one prefers a more 
fundamental metaphor, for the lack of a solid theoretical base, for the 
chapters in the present volume. They are “aspects of…”, “studies in…”. 
However, to abjure cohesiveness and comprehensiveness is not the 
same as to accept (let alone justify) randomness or amorphousness. The 
studies here have a context and focus. While not being consistently or 
explicitly comparative, they can add to the wider discussion.
The chronological scope of this book reflects, approximately, what 
tends to be termed Russia’s Early Modern period: that is, the period 
covering the territorial and institutional expansion of the Muscovite 
state and its transition to (and the further growth of) empire. Here, too, 
we enter a potential quagmire of questionable concepts and definitions. 
The label “Early Modern” is derived from conventional periodisations 
of the history of Western Europe. As usual, the attempt to apply a West 
European conceptual template to Russia is problematic.10 Over the past 
couple of centuries the pendulum of interpretation has swung several 
times between emphasis on Russian equivalence and insistence on 
Russian difference. We cannot here be concerned with the theologies 
of Russian identity: the extent to which Russia, though individual, 
was essentially European, or essentially Asiatic, or whether it was 
entirely distinctive, sui generis, a “Eurasian” phenomenon all of its 
own. Comparative studies of empires have brought a more nuanced 
appreciation of multiple affinities and differences.11 Notwithstanding, 
in the present context the principal area of comparison, both implied 
and, in places, explicit, is Western Europe. Many of the information 
9  Weller, ed., Information History in the Modern World. Histories of the Information Age 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011): see the reviews by Colin Higgins in 
Journal of Librarianship and Information Science, 43.4 (2011), 271, and by Anne Welsh 
in Rare Books Newsletter, 92 (July 2012), 26–27.
10  On approaches to “modernity” in relation to Russia see Simon Dixon, The 
Modernisation of Russia 1676–1825 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
pp. 1–24.
11  See esp. Dominic Lieven, Empire. The Russian Empire and its Rivals (London: John 
Murray, 2000).
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structures and practices here explored were to varying degrees 
expressly derived from West European models. This does not mean 
that information practices in Russia straightforwardly mirrored their 
putative prototypes. In several cases the process of “translation” 
entailed quite radical functional transformations. The mutations of 
cultural transfer are as informative as the ostensible equivalences.
As an exercise in very crude modelling, we can imagine two types of 
information flow in relation to the state. One type of information flow 
involves information gathered to or emanating from the state, the other 
type involves information travelling between points within the state (or 
across borders at the non-state level). The first type might be visualised as 
vertical, or as radial, depending on whether one chooses to see the state 
as the summit or the centre. The “radial” notion better accommodates 
cross-border information flow to or from the state, since the relevant lines 
can simply be continued outwards. The second type—information flow 
contained within the state—can be seen as lateral, horizontal. Broadly 
speaking, when Soll discusses information in relation to the emergence 
of the “modern administrative state”, he is dealing predominantly with 
vertical or radial flow, whereas Steven Marks’s notion of an “information 
nexus” in the rise of capitalism is concerned predominantly with lateral 
flows. Variations in the nature of each and in the balance between the 
two may reflect and/or contribute to distinctive features of information 
structures and communicative mechanisms in a given society. Again at 
the level of very crude generalisation, in Russia the dominant mode was 
vertical or radial for most of the relevant period. Horizontal information 
flow, though not entirely negligible, began to develop rapidly only from 
the end of the eighteenth century. 
Some of the nuances and manifestations of this changing relationship 
emerge from the case studies in the present volume. However, two 
contextual points should be signalled in advance. One of them relates to 
space and geopolitical structures, the other relates to technology.
The geopolitical aspect is the formation and growth of the Russian 
Empire. From the mid-sixteenth to the mid-nineteenth century Russia 
was transformed from the moderate-sized, land-locked Muscovite 
principality into the largest empire on earth, or at any rate the largest 
to be based on a continuous land-mass, without overseas territories 
or colonies (except for Alaska). As one would expect in an expanding 
12 Simon Franklin
state, the same period saw the growth of an administrative apparatus. 
From the late fifteenth century to the end of the seventeenth century 
the administrative functions were allocated to chanceries (prikazy). 
Overall a total of some 150 chanceries were founded. Some were short-
lived, others became permanent institutions. Over the course of the 
seventeenth century there was an average of around sixty to seventy 
active chanceries at any given time. Hardy perennials included those 
responsible for gathering census data (the earliest of which date from the 
late fifteenth century) and the Diplomatic Chancery (or “Ambassadorial” 
Chancery—posol′skii prikaz). The chanceries varied hugely in size and 
in specificity of function. For example, in the late seventeenth century 
the Apothecary Chancery (aptekarskii prikaz) employed, apart from its 
medical specialists, just two clerks, while the Service Land Chancery 
(pomestnyi prikaz) employed almost five hundred clerks.12 In a series 
of measures between 1717 and 1720 Peter I streamlined the structure 
of Imperial administration by setting up, in place of the chanceries, a 
far smaller number of “colleges” (initially nine, then twelve). In 1802 
Alexander I replaced the colleges with ministries. The case studies in 
the present volume consider aspects of the functioning of all three—
seventeenth-century chanceries, eighteenth-century colleges, and 
nineteenth-century ministries—in the dynamics of information in the 
service of the state.
As regards the technologies of information, Russia lacked, or failed 
to make equivalent use of, some of the tools often associated with the 
emergence of the empires of Western Europe. In Russia there was no 
early modern “print revolution”. The complex and far-reaching cultural, 
economic and social phenomena associated with the proliferation of 
printing presses across Europe in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth 
centuries have no equivalent in Russia. Although printed books were 
imported and used in Russia at least from the late fifteenth century (for 
example, as sources for the creation of the first full Slavonic text of the 
Bible, completed in Novgorod in 1499), Muscovite printing did not begin 
until the 1550s, and it remained sporadic until the early seventeenth 
12  See the tables in Peter B. Brown, ‘How Muscovy Governed: Seventeenth-Century 
Russian Central Administration’, Russian History, 36 (2009), 459–529 (pp. 496–501). 
For an overview of the chanceries see D. V. Liseitsev, N. M. Rogozhin, Iu. M. Eskin, 
Prikazy Moskovskogo gosudarstva XVI–XVII vv. Slovar′-spravochnik (Moscow and St 
Petersburg: IRI RAH; RGADA, Tsentr gumanitarnykh initsiativ, 2015).
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century. However, the disparity of chronology is not the main point. 
A major factor, perhaps the major factor, contributing to the disparities 
between the spread and impact of print in Russia and in Western Europe 
can be traced to differences not in chronology but in structure. The 
extraordinary proliferation of printing presses across Western Europe 
was market-driven: driven, that is, not by a market for any particular 
products (few could have afforded Johannes Gutenberg’s Bibles, even 
if they had desired to possess one), but by a market in the technology 
itself. The skills of printers were available for hire, whether to ambitious 
patrons or to any client prepared to pay for a job, however small. In 
contrast, in Muscovy, and in the Russian Empire almost until the end of 
the eighteenth century, there was a market in some of the products, but 
not in the technology itself. Presses were subject to financial constraints, 
but not to market forces. The means of production were in monopoly 
ownership.
From the mid-sixteenth century until the early eighteenth century 
there was, for most of the time, just one printing house in Muscovy, 
owned by the state, subject to a chancery, producing materials almost 
exclusively for the Church.13 Between the 1720s and the 1770s a handful 
of additional presses were licensed to institutions—the Academy of 
Sciences, the Holy Synod, the Senate, various cadet corps, Moscow 
University—but market-driven proliferation only began when the 
restrictions on ownership were relaxed in the 1780s.14 The issue here 
is not censorship. On the contrary, regular and regulated institutions 
of censorship only developed after the end of monopoly ownership.15 
The issue is structural. Although handwriting was, of course, available 
13  See e.g. A. A. Sidorov, ‘Rukopisnost′—pechatnost′—knizhnost′’, in Rukopisnaia 
i pechatnaia kniga, ed. by T. B. Kniazevskaia et al. (Moscow: Nauka, 1975), pp. 
227–45 (p. 231). For a range of perspectives on early Muscovite printing see e.g. I. 
V. Pozdeeva, ‘The Activity of the Moscow Printing House in the First Half of the 
Seventeenth Century’, Solanus, 6 (1992), 27–55; Edward L. Keenan, ‘Ivan the Terrible 
and Book Culture: Fact, Fancy, and Fog: Remarks on Early Muscovite Printing’, 
Solanus, 18 (2004), 28–50; Robert Mathiesen, ‘Cosmology and the Puzzle of Early 
Printing in Old Cyrillic’, Solanus 18 (2004), 5–27. See also the essays in Canadian-
American Slavic Studies 51 (2017), 173–408.
14  See esp. Gary Marker, Publishing, Printing, and the Origins of Intellectual Life in Russia, 
1700–1800 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).
15  On censorship initiatives in the late eighteenth century see Marker, Publishing, pp. 
212–32; on formal censorship before the mid-nineteenth century see G. V. Zhirkov, 
Istoriia tsenzury v Rossii XIX–XX vv. (Moscow: Aspekt Press, 2001), esp. pp. 7–64.
14 Simon Franklin
and not susceptible to the restrictions of monopoly ownership, the lack 
of a market in the technology of print had implications for the balance 
between vertical and horizontal information flow in Muscovy and the 
Russian Empire. In France, for example, nearly six thousand printings of 
royal acts have been identified from the period before 1600, a substantial 
proportion of which were produced on the initiative of commercial 
bookseller-publishers rather than through the royal printers.16 In Russia 
before the early eighteenth century the Moscow Print Yard issued just 
one compilation of laws and just one separate governmental decree 
(on customs dues), in 1649 and 1654 respectively.17 In this aspect of 
its information resources, despite the leitmotif of contacts with and 
borrowings from Western Europe, Russia was generically closer to other 
empires which had extensive territory without distributed technology, 
such as the Ottoman Empire or China.18 Therefore, although several 
of the studies in the present volume highlight printed materials, the 
history of print as such does not figure as a major theme. 
The case studies in this book mainly consider aspects of the vertical 
or radial flows of information—information to, from and for the 
state—although they also explore areas where the balance to some 
extent shifted, areas in which, rather late in the narrative, patterns of 
horizontal information flow began to become established. Apart from 
the direction, the particular focus of the volume is on the means: on 
mechanisms of communication. Like “information”, the notion of 
“mechanisms of communication” needs parameters in order to be 
useful in this context. For the most part, the “mechanisms” here are 
the institutional and procedural structures through which information 
was conveyed: the bureaucratic structures charged with the task 
(chanceries, colleges, ministries), the infrastructural networks set up for 
16  Lauren Jee-Su Kim, French Royal Acts Printed Before 1600: A Bibliographical Study 
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of St Andrews, 2008), p. 115 ff.
17  The 1649 Ulozhenie and the 1654 Tamozhennaia ustavnaia gramota. On the latter see 
Simon Franklin, ‘K voprosu o malykh zhanrakh kirillicheskoi pechati’, in 450 let 
Apostolu Ivana Fedorova. Istoriia rannego knigopechataniia v Rossii (pamiatniki, istochniki, 
traditsii izucheniia), ed. by D. N. Ramazanova (Moscow: Pashkov dom, 2016), pp. 
428–39.
18  For the supposition that in China the arrested development of printing with 
moveable type (and of other technologies) is attributable to the role of the state, see 
Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture. Volume I, The Rise 
of the Network Society, 2nd ed. (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), pp. 7–10.
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the purpose (postal services), the outward-facing media distributed or 
displayed for the purpose (newspapers, signboards). The underlying 
questions are simple. How did the growing state inform itself about 
itself—its physical and human geography, its economic activities? What 
mechanisms did it establish, when and how, for the flow of information 
from beyond its borders? When and how did it develop procedures 
for projecting information from or about itself, both internally and 
externally? How and when did autonomous (non-state) means emerge 
for the communication of information? What was the relationship 
between institutional structures and more traditional, informal modes 
of gathering and disseminating information?
The studies in this volume are organised into five sections. Section I 
charts the history of mapping. The first chapter (by Valerie Kivelson) 
considers the early and often informal attempts at map-making 
during the period of Russia’s expansion across Siberia, and analyses 
their implications for the way the nascent empire envisioned itself. 
These were not maps for publication and distribution, but mainly 
for reconnaissance and intelligence, and to clarify claims to property. 
The second chapter (by Aleksei Golubinskii) considers the next phase, 
imperial map-making from the mid-eighteenth century as an official 
enterprise, using scientific methods and instruments. The central 
episode, symbolically and practically, was the systematic import, and 
then the local manufacture, of West European (principally English) 
geodesic astrolabes (graphometers, semi-circumpherentors), the 
instruments reckoned essential for the first projected large-scale survey 
of the empire.
Section II explores the flow of information from and to Western 
Europe. In Chapter 3 Daniel C. Waugh and Ingrid Maier consider how, 
over the seventeenth century, a system emerged for the regular import 
of Western (mainly German and Dutch) newspapers. This was not in 
order to feed any public demand for the acquisition and dissemination of 
news, but rather the opposite. As they crossed the borders into Muscovy, 
the imported papers changed their function and their genre. Instead of 
broadening access to information, they were narrowly channelled into 
providing material for intelligence reports for the tsar. In Chapter 4 
Maier introduces a case-study in the movement of information in the 
opposite direction, examining how Western reports of the insurrection, 
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capture and execution of the infamous Cossack rebel, Stepan (“Stenka”) 
Razin, were, to an appreciable extent, informed by quite effective 
Muscovite propaganda.
In Section III the focus shifts to internal networks of news and 
communication. John Randolph examines the development, expansion 
and thickening, over the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, of 
Russia’s postal system, by horse relay. Apart from its principal function 
as the transport network that enabled communication of, and travel on, 
state business, the chapter highlights an aspect that has tended to receive 
little attention. The postal relays were supported through obligations 
imposed on local communities along the routes. There were social costs 
in the development of an information infrastructure. In Chapter 6 Alison 
K. Smith picks up the story of newspapers within Russia—that is, of 
Russian papers designed to disseminate “news”, rather than of foreign 
papers used as intelligence sources. The chapter highlights ways in 
which, especially as printing and publishing became more diffuse and 
more commercially orientated, successive governments tried to maintain 
the view that newspapers should “play roles in policing information”. 
In Chapter 7 Daniel C. Waugh steps back from the analysis of formal 
institutions, networks and publications. What sorts of information did a 
broader public consider to be newsworthy, and what were the informal 
means of transmission—including, for example, gossip and rumour—
through which such unofficial “news” was disseminated? The chapter 
concludes with a study of how, once more in relation to the Razin revolt, 
the government investigation itself relied on such informal sources. 
Here again it becomes hard to draw a meaningful distinction between 
news and state information gathering or intelligence.
The three chapters in Section IV consider aspects of the bureaucracy 
as a medium for the gathering and/or dissemination of information. 
In chronological sequence, Clare Griffin (Chapter 8) shows how the 
Apothecary Chancery in the seventeenth century, though primarily 
serving the tsar and his family and entourage, also played a role in the 
creation and dissemination of medical knowledge in Russia. In Chapter 9 
Elena Korchmina turns to the Imperial finances in the mid-eighteenth 
century. Through a detailed study of sources relating to the collection 
of the poll tax in the 1730s, she shows that the Imperial government 
was woefully under-informed about the dispersed processes and details 
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of collection, but that this does not necessarily imply that Russia was 
“undergoverned”, since local cash-flows could nevertheless appear to be 
adequate. The study by Ekaterina Basargina (Chapter 10) is again about 
the dissemination rather than the gathering of information. Her subject 
is a remarkable journal, issued by the Ministry of Public Education 
(or, as one might more tendentiously translate it, the Ministry for the 
Enlightenment of the People). For a while in the second quarter of the 
nineteenth century, under the editorship of Count Sergei Uvarov, the 
Journal of the Ministry of Public Education extended its role beyond that 
of a repository of official information and discussion about education 
in Russia. Its mission to “enlighten” meant also conveying the fruits 
of learning, reflecting and publicising the scientific and scholarly 
preoccupations of the time. 
Section V turns from networks and institutions to public space, and 
asks the question: what kinds of information were communicated through 
open display in the urban environment? The “public graphosphere” of 
my contribution (Chapter 11) is formed by the writing visible in the 
outdoor spaces of the city, from tombstones and inscribed monuments 
to street signs and shop signs. The chapter surveys the emergence 
and growth of a public graphosphere in Russia and considers some of 
the main institutional impulses for its various stages of development 
from the mute spaces of the later Middle Ages to the relatively dense 
graphosphere of the mid-nineteenth century. In the final chapter 
(Chapter 12), Katherine Bowers moves from broad processes to the 
exploration of a specific graphospheric location at a particular time: 
Nevskii Prospekt, in St Petersburg, in the 1820s and 1830s. Based on a 
close reading of a contemporary lithographed “panorama” of Nevskii 
Prospekt, she sets out on a “virtual stroll” along St Petersburg’s most 
fashionable thoroughfare, taking in the shop-front information as part 
of the urban experience.
It would be premature to convert these few case studies into an 
integrated chronological narrative. Gaps gape. The sample analyses of a 
few administrative structures for information fall a very long way short 
of “coverage”. The surveys of postal systems presuppose the existence of 
the relevant roads, but otherwise lacking is any discussion of the physical 
infrastructures that enabled (or hindered) the movement of people 
and hence of information: rivers, roads, eventually railways. Because 
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of the emphasis on “mechanisms of communication”, institutions 
for information storage and organisation (archives, libraries) do not 
figure, nor do changes in methods of recording, storage and retrieval 
such as the shift from archival scrolls to codices.19 The history of print 
is briefly summarised only in these introductory remarks, not backed 
up with a case study of its own. The history of handwriting—still the 
most common medium for the storage and distribution of non-spoken 
information right through to the mid-nineteenth century—is barely 
mentioned. 
Nevertheless, some potential patterns suggest themselves. Until 
the end of the seventeenth century the organised mechanisms of 
communication were designed to gather, organise and convey 
information almost exclusively inwards and upwards to and for the 
state. This was a principal function of the chancery system. During 
this period the authorities paid relatively little attention to establishing 
means for channelling information outwards or downwards, apart from 
traditional modes of projection through images (as on coins, for example) 
and public ritual. The only institution with a network or locations and 
personnel geared to directing verbal messages outwards was the Church. 
Indeed, the one state chancery whose specific purpose was ostensibly 
the production and dissemination of information—the Print Chancery 
(prikaz knigopechatnogo dela), in charge of the Moscow Print Yard—in fact 
operated almost exclusively on behalf of the Church. Chanceries were 
not hermetically sealed, so some outward and downward seepage did 
occur, whether from the narratives in the kuranty or from the expertise 
of the doctors at the Apothecary Chancery, for example, but this tended 
to be a by-product of the institutional structure, not a consequence 
of consistent policy and focussed efforts. More research is needed 
on the extent to which the Ambassadorial Chancery engaged in the 
manipulation of information sent abroad, but Maier’s investigation of 
the reports of the Razin rebellion raises intriguing possibilities.
Mechanisms to enhance the downward flow of information on the 
vertical axis from state to people (or, if one prefers, the outward flow on 
the radial axis) began to be developed from the early eighteenth century: 
through the institution of an official printed bulletin or state newspaper, 
19  See e.g. V. N. Avtokratov, ‘K istorii zameny stolbtsovoi formy deloproizvodstva— 
tetradnoi v nachale XVIII v.’, Problemy istochnikovedeniia, VII (1959), 274–86.
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through the prescribed printing and public posting of laws, through the 
systematic production of engravings illustrating state occasions and 
achievements, through the lavish staging of public state celebrations 
along with printed commentaries on their meanings, and more widely 
with the expansion of print into the non-ecclesiastical sphere (while 
maintaining a tight control on ownership). As for lateral information 
flow, structures of communication that had been established in the 
service of the state—in particular, the postal system—came to serve 
also as networks linking and serving a wider population. Autonomous 
structures of communication from and for non-state actors (aside from 
traditional informal means) developed quite intensively from the very 
end of the eighteenth century or the turn of the nineteenth century: 
newspapers whose principal purposes were not linked to official 
announcements; commercial signage; commercial and provincial 
publishing.
None of the studies in the present book strays much beyond the 
middle of the nineteenth century. This cut-off point, ca.1850, is not 
justified with reference to any particular event or set of events that 
mark a conventional division between epochs. Nor, however, is the 
break entirely arbitrary. In the first place, the main emphasis here is 
on emergence and establishment rather than on continuation. In the 
mid-nineteenth century the empire reached pretty much its maximum 
size, especially with its expansion into Central Asia. The mechanisms 
of communication that had accompanied, facilitated and been 
stimulated by its growth were structurally embedded. Secondly, and 
more pertinently for the theme of the volume, in the middle decades of 
the nineteenth century new technologies, structures and mechanisms 
of communication were emerging, with far-reaching implications: 
infrastructural innovations such as railways, technical transformations 
of traditional technologies such as steam-driven rotary presses, plus the 
fundamentally new technology of the telegraph. Taken together, these 
phenomena can indeed be seen as providing impetus for a fresh phase 
in the history of information and mechanisms of communication in 





1. Early Mapping:  
The Tsardom in Manuscript
Valerie Kivelson
In some ways, the maps produced in Russia from the mid-fourteenth 
to the early eighteenth centuries fit uncomfortably in a volume devoted 
to the study of information and mechanisms of communication. To a 
modern viewer, or even to an educated European of the early modern 
period, the expected cartographic formulae are distinctly lacking, 
replaced by colourful drawings of little houses, churches, and trees. The 
maps’ visual vocabulary is more pictorial than graphic, their content 
more fanciful than informative. Not anchored by unified perspective or 
scale, often without a fixed point of orientation, they show a topsy-turvy 
landscape of villages and forests pointing up, down, and sidewise. On 
first impression, these maps strike the eye as childish and naïve, a far 
cry from the cool abstractions that we tend to associate with cartography 
today. The information they contain would seem, therefore, to be 
minimal. As a mode of communication, early modern Russian maps 
were even more severely limited. Appropriately called “sketches” 
(chertezhi) rather than “maps” in Russian, these hand-made drawings 
were never printed and were not created with any view toward wide 
dissemination. For example, only one map of the city of Moscow was 
printed in Russia prior to 1741, and that was a small map included in 
the frontispiece to a 1663 Bible. This experiment in publication inspired 
© 2017 Valerie Kivelson, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0122.01
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no imitators.1 Rather than print and circulate maps, Russian authorities 
understood maps as potentially dangerous and militantly controlled 
their production and distribution. 
Isaac Massa, a Dutch merchant who lived in Moscow in the early 
seventeenth century, reported that although he was eager to obtain 
a map of the city, he would never have dared ask for one, “because 
they would have quickly seized me and delivered me over for torture, 
thinking that in making such a request I must be contemplating treason. 
This people is so suspicious in this regard that nobody would have been 
so bold as to undertake the task”. A Russian friend explained the risk 
involved in sharing cartographic information, telling Massa: “I would 
be in danger of my life if anyone knew that I had made a drawing of 
the town of Moscow, and that I had given it to a foreigner. I would be 
killed as a traitor”.2 With this story of punitive state censorship, Massa 
reinforces one of the most persistent ideas about Russia, enduring 
powerfully until today; that is, rather than encourage the collection and 
circulation of information, the Russian state preferred to monopolise 
both of these spheres of activity and to quash communication.
At the same time, however, Massa’s saga exposes the limits to 
this picture of state censorship: in spite of the obvious risks involved, 
Massa ultimately succeeded in gathering a good deal of cartographic 
information from his Russian contacts and his fellow expatriates. He 
even prevailed on the same fearful Russian friend to draw a map for 
him, though on condition of utter secrecy. The Dutchman is associated 
with four splendid maps of Russia: the one of the city of Moscow that 
his friend entrusted to him; one of the Southern regions of Muscovy 
reaching down to the Crimea and the Northern coast of the Black Sea; a 
general map of all of European Russia; and a particularly valuable one 
of the Northern coast of Russia and Siberia, which retained its value as a 
reference to this little known region into the eighteenth century.
1  Simon Franklin, ‘Printing Moscow: Significances of the Frontispiece to the 1663 
Bible’, Slavonic and East European Review, 88. 1/2 (2010), 73–95, esp. pp. 93–94.
2  The map drawn by Massa’s friend survives and is reproduced from the manuscript 
in G. Edward Orchard’s English translation of Massa. Isaac Massa, A Short History 
of the Beginnings and Origins of These Present Wars in Moscow under the Reign of Various 
Sovereigns down to the Year 1610, trans. and intro. by G. Edward Orchard (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1982), p. 130.
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Figure 1: Willem Janszoon Blaeu, Tabula Russiae (1635). Map and inset of 
the city of Moscow based on Isaac Massa’s maps.
Figure 2: Isaac Massa, Russiæ, vulgo Moscovia, Pars Australis  
[The Southern part of Russia, called Muscovy] (1645).
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Figure 3: Isaac Massa, Caerte van′t Noorderste Russen, Samojeden, ende Tingoesen 
Landt: alsoo dat vand Russen afghetekent [Map of the northern-most Russian, 
Samoyed, and Tungusic land, as copied from the Russians] (1610).
Two of the maps of Russia most frequently reprinted in European atlases 
of the early modern era bear his name. Novissima Rvssiae Tabula and 
Rvssia vulgo Moscoviae Pars Avstralis are both clearly attributed to him: 
“Auctore Isaaco Massa”.3 Richly populated with Russian toponyms, the 
maps confirm Massa’s acknowledgement of the generous contributions 
of Russian informants to his sense of the local geography. 
Massa was not alone in suggesting that, regardless of the fearful 
punishments they might incur, Muscovites and foreigners exchanged 
geographic information at a considerable rate. The Habsburg envoy 
Sigmund von Herberstein reported a parallel experience during his two 
visits nearly a century earlier. Unlike Massa, he was unable to convince 
his friends to provide him with actual maps—none would dare—but 
with the assistance of knowledgeable Russian and European informants, 
he accumulated the geographic information that made possible the 
publication of his map of Muscovy in copper engravings accompanying 
his Notes upon Russia in Vienna in 1549. In subsequent decades, the work 
appeared in multiple editions and translations, and adaptations of the 
map were included in various world atlases.4 
3  Although Leo Bagrow suggests that none of the maps were actually Massa’s work: 
A History of Russian Cartography up to 1800, ed. by Henry W. Castner (Wolfe Island, 
ON: The Walker Press, 1975), pp. 51–58.
4  Leo Bagrow, ‘The First Russian Maps of Siberia and Their Influence on West-
European Cartography of North East Asia’, Imago Mundi, 9 (1952), 83–95; A. V. 
Efimov, Atlas geograficheskikh otkrytii v Sibiri i v severo-zapadnoi Amerike XVII–XVIII 
vv. (Moscow: Nauka, 1964), pp. vii–viii; Carl Moreland and David Bannister, 
Antique Maps: A Collector’s Guide, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Phaidon Christie’s, 1989), p. 
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Figure 4: Map of Moscovia, Sigismund von Herberstein (1549).
These foreigners’ travails, just two of many tales of cartographic 
adventure, illuminate the complexities involved in tracking the flows of 
cartographic information and communication in early modern Russia. 
Their reports demonstrate that, already by the time of Herberstein’s 
visits in the early sixteenth century, Muscovites had developed a strong 
and effective cartographic sensibility and had collected a cache of 
geographic information sufficient to support the production of maps. 
Further, foreigners recognised the value of Muscovite geographic 
knowledge and of the maps themselves. Russia’s pictorial sketches 
followed different models than the scientific survey mapping beginning 
to characterise European cartography in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, but nonetheless they conveyed valuable spatial information 
much sought after by both the tsarist state and the foreigners interested 
238; A. V. Postnikov, Karty zemel′ rossiiskikh: ocherk istorii geograficheskogo izucheniia 
i kartografirovaniia nashego otechestva [also in English as Russia in Maps: A History 
of the Geographical Study and Cartography of the Country] (Moscow: Nash dom and 
L’Âge d’Homme, 1996); A. I. Andreev, ‘Chertezhi i karty Rossii XVII v., naidennye 
v poslevoennye gody’, Trudy Leningradskogo otdeleniia Instituta istorii AN SSSR, no. 
2 (Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1960), 88–90; W. E. D. Allen, ‘The Caspian’, in The Hakluyt 
Handbook, vol. I, ed. by David B. Quinn, issue 144 (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 1974), 
pp. 168–175.
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in it.5 Far from dismissing the funny little drawings, foreigners scrambled 
to get their hands on them, with some success. Although maps were 
a controlled substance and publication remained out of the question, 
this information circulated widely and built cumulatively on the pooled 
knowledge of diverse contributors. 
This chapter draws on my previous work on Muscovite maps but 
with a quite different analytical focus.6 Where my earlier cartographic 
research primarily explores Muscovite political and religious culture, 
this chapter pursues the themes of this volume: information and 
communication. In this context, the following pages investigate the 
kinds of information conveyed in Muscovite maps, the ways the 
maps communicated meaning, the interplay of Muscovite and foreign 
cartographers and informants, and the ways these precious documents 
circulated in the politically charged climate of the seventeenth century, 
when publication was not an option.
Muscovite Sketch Maps and  
How to Read Them
Maps as physical artefacts, schematic representations of the world in 
two dimensions, are not inevitable or natural correlates of a geographic 
sensibility or awareness of one’s place in the world relative to other 
locations. Maps remained exceptional in most parts of Europe, for 
instance, until the fifteenth century, when they began to catch on, 
although the Chinese already could boast an established mapping 
tradition perhaps as early as the second century BCE. In Russia, 
researchers have discovered a single rough sketch of the layout of the 
compound of the Kirill-Belozerskii Monastery from the 1360s and rare 
5  Of course, pictorial mapping was never eradicated in Western Europe or elsewhere, 
but in the context of official, state mapping or publication, scaled survey mapping 
became the norm in most places by the seventeenth century. See for instance, 
discussions and illustrations in Roger J. P. Kain and Elizabeth Baigent, The Cadastral 
Map in the Service of the State: A History of Property Mapping (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992); Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the 
Pyrenees (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989). 
6  Valerie Kivelson, Cartographies of Tsardom: Maps and their Meanings in Seventeenth 
Century Russia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007).
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mentions of maps surface in texts from the fifteenth century,7 but they 
do not appear to have been made with any regularity until the late 
sixteenth century, and they do not survive in significant numbers until 
the seventeenth century. When they show up, they fall into two general 
categories: sketches of very local terrain, drawn up to establish property 
lines or chart the state of military defences; and depictions of great 
swaths of the tsardom drafted for diplomatic, military, and strategic 
use. Since the local maps appeared earlier, we will begin with those and 
then move to the more comprehensive maps of the realm.8 
One of the very earliest surviving maps illustrates the nature of the 
local property maps. A few lines scratched in ink on paper documents a 
sale of land transacted in 1533. 
Figure 5: Drawing of the Lands of the River Solonitsa.
7  Entsiklopediia russkogo igumena XIV–XV vv. Sbornik prepodobnogo Kirilla Belozerskogo. 
Rossiiskaia Natsional′naia Biblioteka, Kirillo-Belozerskoe sobranie, no. XII, ed. by G. M. 
Prokhorov (St Petersburg: Izd. Olega Abyshko, 2003), pp. 19–26; map on p. 19. 
8  Maps on icons form a subset of local maps beginning in the late sixteenth century. I 
will not address these fascinating maps here, but they are discussed in V. S. Kusov, 
Kartograficheskoe iskusstvo Russkogo gosudarstva (Moscow: Nedra, 1989), pp. 43–56. 
On the history of early mapping in Russia, see Leonid A. Gol′denberg, ‘Russian 
Cartography to ca. 1700’, in The History of Cartography, vol. 3, pt. 2, Cartography in the 
European Renaissance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), pp. 1852–1903. 
For a valuable catalogue of Russian maps with important commentary, see: V. S. 
Kusov, Chertezhi zemli russkoi XVI–XVII vv. (Moscow: Russkii mir, 1993).
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A double line indicates a road transecting a semi-circular arable field 
that abuts a river. Text on the obverse side describes the purchase of the 
field in question by the Trinity St Sergius Monastery. Unimpressive in 
its degree of cartographic expertise, the sketch nonetheless conveys all 
the information relevant to the exchange. The drawing situates the field 
in question along the appropriate river (the Solonitsa) and relative to 
the road; it notes the positioning of fields and meadows; and it records 
the value of the land with a terse reference to “a crop of 100 haystacks”.9 
Efficient and unpretentious, the sketch demonstrates a command of 
relative positioning and cartographic vision fully adequate to the needs 
of the moment. 
Written sources record little about the early development of visual 
mapping, but the few early surviving mentions in official documents 
suggest that officials of the grand prince initiated the gradual 
incorporation of maps as an administrative and juridical tool and as 
a supplement to their abundant textual records. Fleeting references in 
administrative records demonstrate that the initiative came from above 
in pursuit of entirely practical ends. For instance, orders were sent from 
Moscow to provincial officials in 1534 and 1535 instructing them to 
study the conflicting claims of rival litigants and to send maps of the 
properties in question back to the authorities in the Kremlin. In the 1534 
case, an order issued in the name of the grand prince (the four-year-
old Ivan IV) required a local official in Beloozero Province to examine 
the lay of the land in connection with a suit between the same Kirillov 
Monastery, mentioned earlier, and two peasant brothers. He was to 
“sketch a map of the disputed land, and having written up his judgment 
and the results of his investigation truthfully and having sketched 
the map, report to me, the grand prince, and bring before me both of 
the litigants for a face-to-face [literally, eye-to-eye] confrontation”.10 
9  First reported by S. M. Kashtanov, ‘Chertezh zemel′nogo uchastka 16 v.’, Trudy 
Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo istoriko-arkhivnogo instituta, vol. 17 (1963), 429–36; 
reproduced in high quality colour in Postnikov, Russia in Maps, pp. 11–12. 
10  Sanktpeterburgskii filial Instituta rossiiskoi istorii RAN, coll. 41 [Collection of N. 
Golovin], no. 56. A second order to draw up a map was sent to the same official 
the following year. Ibid., coll. 41, no. 57. A copy of the same document is preserved 
in the Russian National Library, in a Kirillov copybook: Rossiiskaia Natsional′naia 
Biblioteka, St Petersburg, Manuscript Division, the Collection of St Petersburg 
Spiritual Academy [Dukhovnaia Akademiia], A. I/16, fol. 495–495v. I am grateful to 
M. M. Krom for these citations.
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Although the officials’ handiwork does not survive, they presumably 
produced sketch maps similar to the surviving 1533 map, the precursor 
of the more elaborate and numerous property litigation maps of the 
seventeenth century.
In the seventeenth century, and particularly the final third of that 
century, the production and use of maps proliferated, along with 
a generalised expansion of administrative record-keeping and 
increasingly dense webs of interaction between state officials and 
society. As the tsars extended their military lines to the South and East, 
the Chancery of Military Affairs ordered maps prepared to identify the 
most effective placement of fortresses. Maps were used for the extensive 
projects of town planning undertaken in the seventeenth century by 
the Muscovite state.11 Sketch maps became fairly standard elements in 
the lawsuits over real estate that filled the tsars’ courts. Sometimes the 
litigants would take the initiative and produce their own rival maps in 
support of their opposing claims, leaving the officers of the court to sort 
out the contradictions. More commonly, the courts would commission a 
city clerk or retired soldier, any passably literate man of good reputation, 
to go out to the land in question and make a map. 
The men entrusted with the job were not formally trained in 
cartography, and the fruits of their labour display a variety of approaches, 
but they all share a pictorial vision rather than a geometric one, and 
a sense of orientation rooted in the embodied presence of a human 
passing through the landscape rather than an abstract, homogeneous, 
planimetric or “god’s eye” view from above. A few examples will give a 
sense of this embedded vision and picture-book aesthetic. A vivid map 
from Aleksin Province, in the far South, dated 1671, situates the viewer 
in space by sketching out a rough framework of rivers (in green) and 
roads (in brick red). 
11  A. P. Gudzinskaia and N. G. Mikhailova, ‘Novye materialy po istorii drevnerusskikh 
gorodov’, Istoriia SSSR, 1970, no. 4, pp. 199–202; G. V. Alferova, Russkie goroda 
XVI–XVII vekov (Moscow: Stroiizdat, 1989); Bagrow, History of the Cartography 
of Russia up to 1800, pp. 1–17; N. F. Gulianitskii, ed., Gradostroitel′sto Moskovskogo 
gosudarstva XVI–XVII vekov (Moscow: Stroiizdat, 1994), passim; A. V. Postnikov, 
Razvitie krupnomasshtabnoi kartografii v Rossii (Moscow: Nauka, 1989), pp. 5–10; B. 
A. Rybakov, Russkie karty Moskovii XV-nachala XVI veka (Moscow: Nauka, 1974), pp. 
7–20; Leonid A. Gol′denberg, Russian Maps and Atlases as Historical Sources, trans. by 
James R. Gibson (Toronto: B. V. Gutsell, Dept. of Geography, York University, 1971).
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Figure 6: Map of Aleksin (1671).
Two little villages are indicated by tiny houses. One village is surrounded 
by a walled enclosure; a colourfully striped church distinguishes the 
other. Uninhabited arable fields (pustoshi) are drawn in as rounded blobs 
distributed unevenly along the rivers and roads, and each landmark is 
labelled with clarifying text. The bulk of the artist’s work, however, 
was devoted to filling the page with a forest of fantastic trees, painted 
in riotous colours.12 The trees point this way and that, most angling 
woozily to one side, but others radiating out from roads and rivers, 
following along a navigable itinerary and reflecting the vantage point 
of a human traveller. It places human incursions as insignificant traces 
within an exuberantly wooded landscape.
This lavishly decorated cartographic painting was made by or on 
the order of Lazar Lavrov, Governor of Iaroslav-Maloi, for the practical 
purpose of determining ownership of some uninhabited fields claimed 
by two local landholders, and yet its visual composition seems engaged 
with an altogether different, perhaps more fantastical or metaphysical 
plane. It is hard to recognise in this work of art a pragmatic piece of 
legal-bureaucratic documentation. Nonetheless, it is a map, and a fully 
serviceable one at that. Through the distracting exuberance of irrelevant 
and eye-catching embellishment, the mapmaker conveyed enough 
12  RGADA, coll. 1209, Aleksin stlb. 31 494, fol. 115.
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information about relative locations to allow the courts to decide who 
should rightfully control which plot of land.
Like all the sketch maps, this one lacks geographic precision and 
the structuring geometry that European maps of the same era would 
likely contain: latitude or longitude markers, grid layouts, wind roses 
(although it should be noted that through the sixteenth century, 
European map makers still oriented their maps in a variety of directions, 
not only with the North at the top). 
Among historians of cartography, the question of orientation of 
Muscovite maps is disputed, with each scholar asserting his or her 
position with great certainty. Leo Bagrow declared authoritatively that 
seventeenth century Russian maps were “always” oriented to the South; 
V. S. Kusov noted significant variation, with the majority oriented to the 
East, followed by a significant minority oriented to the South, and only 
a few oriented to the North. S. I. Sotnikova also allowed for a degree of 
arbitrariness in orientation, although from a small sample she identified 
a preference for a Northern orientation, with a minority oriented to the 
South.13 As this cacophony indicates, no consensus has been achieved. 
That fine scholars could reach such disparate conclusions suggests that 
perhaps they are asking the wrong question. As medieval historian 
Carol Symes points out, documents can coach us in how they want to be 
read. Sometimes, she says, they scream out their instructions. The maps 
themselves tell us that they care very little about orientation. In this case, 
the sketch maps urge us to set aside our presumption that documents 
necessarily have a clear up and down, a right and wrong way of viewing 
them.14 They invite us instead to delight in their pictured landscape in 
any direction we choose, and in multiple directions at once. 
13  Bagrow, History of Russian Cartography up to 1800, p. 34; V. S. Kusov, Kartograficheskoe 
iskusstvo Russkogo gosudarstva, p. 27; S. I. Sotnikova, ‘Pamiatniki otechestvennoi 
kartografii XVII v.’, Pamiatniki nauki i tekhniki, 1987–1988, 1989, no. 6, pp. 176–201 
(pp. 181, 186, 196, 198). Also, Franklin, ‘Printing Moscow’, p. 87. On chertezhi, 
see also Lutz Häfner, ‘Europa ohne Grenzen? Zu Wandel und Funktion der 
russlandbezogenen Kartographie vom Moskauer Reich bis zur Mitte des 18. 
Jahrhunderts’, in Osteuropa kartiert—Mapping Eastern Europe, ed. Jörn Happel 
(Münster: LIT, 2010), pp. 87–112.
14  Carol Symes, ‘The “Desire of Deeds”: Sensuality, Nostalgia, and the Affective 
Effects of Medieval Documentation’, talk presented at the Eisenberg Institute for 
Historical Studies, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1 October 2015. The talk 
comes from her current project, The Mediated Text: Documentary Initiatives and Their 
Agents in Medieval Europe.
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This invitation is underscored by the fact that cardinal directions 
usually (though not always) go unmarked in the maps. More 
frequently, Muscovite chertezhi took their structure from the landscape 
itself and from the human itineraries that passed through it, orienting 
more to the courses of major rivers or paths of important roads than to 
abstract compass points. This is not to suggest that Muscovites had no 
understanding of the cardinal directions, quite the contrary, but rather 
to note that they chose not to indicate them in any way on their maps. 
The makers and viewers would have had no difficulty knowing which 
way was North.15 Still, many of the maps would have presented them 
with the same conundrum we face in trying to resolve how they were 
meant to hold the map, in other words, which way was up. 
The polyphonic impulses of the mapmakers come through when one 
attends to the visual evidence of the maps themselves, with their jumble 
of orientations of images and textual annotations. The point of view of 
the traveller along the road is signalled by the trees bristling outward; 
the horizontal span of the paper accommodates the flow of a river; 
the layout of a village around a nodal focus such as a church or a path 
determines the splayed depiction of houses with their roofs pointing 
out from the centre. Mixed perspective presents architectural complexes 
from multiple viewpoints simultaneously, suggesting the movement of 
the human viewer around the walls of a building or compound.16 The 
visual impact of mixed perspective is augmented in large maps, where 
the artists or scribes faced the purely logistical problem of the limited 
reach of the human arm. Oversized maps composed of multiple sheets 
glued together required the mapmaker to circle around and work from 
different sides of the paper.
It is true that sometimes the artefacts themselves provide clues to 
their intended orientation. Occasionally, maps make some effort to 
15  It is worth noting that magical spells, an illicit but popular genre, invoked the 
cardinal directions as part of their ritual, evidence that the points of the compass 
were part of common knowledge, even if the compass was not.
16  Gottfried Hagen identifies similar practices in seventeenth-century Ottoman 
cartography, which assumes “an observer in motion along the surface of the earth, 
and renders his dynamic and contextual perspective”. Like Muscovite chertezhi, 
Ottoman maps are easily “derided as an ‘abyss of cartographic barbarity’”, but, 
Hagen shows, they should be read in their own terms. ‘Kātip Çelabi’s Maps and 
the Visualization of Space in Ottoman Culture’, Journal of Ottoman Studies, 40 
(2012), 283–93 (289; 285); quoting Hans von Mžik, ‘Ptolemaeus und die Karten der 
arabischen Geographen’, Mitteilungen der geographischen Gesellschaft Wien, 58 (1915), 
152–76 (p. 168).
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indicate direction themselves by the placement of the rising or setting 
sun, as in a lively map of Borovsk, where a summer sunrise to the right 
and a summer sunset to the left indicate a Northern orientation.17 Some 
sketch maps, particularly the small ones contained on a single piece of 
paper, declare an unambiguous directionality by showing all the trees 
pointing in a single direction consistent with all the text. Others show 
a preponderant orientation, with most of the trees and text pointing in 
a single direction. Signatures collected from local witnesses, or from 
the mapmaker himself, may appear on the back of a map to add to 
its veracity and documentary power, and Leonid Chekin stresses that 
they march along the back of the page in horizontal lines, obeying a 
disciplined sense of up and down.18 
Figure 7: Signatures on obverse of a map of lands along the Kamenka 
and the Urshma rivers in Suzdal Province. The signatures are aligned 
horizontally across the page, indicating a clear orientation for viewing. 
The document dates to 1688 or 1689.19
17  RGADA, coll. 192, descr. 1, Kaluzhskaia guberniia, no. 1. Leonid S. Chekin corrects 
my discussion of the orientation of this map, which he dates to 1675, in ‘Russian 
Maps and Spatial Thinking in the Seventeenth Century’, The Portolan, 68 (Spring 
2007), 51–58 (p. 56). This is an interesting though uncharitable review of my book, 
Cartographies of Tsardom.
18  Chekin ‘Russian Maps and Spatial Thinking in the Seventeenth Century’, p. 56. 
19 RGADA, coll. 1209,  Suzdal′ stlb. 27955, ch. 1, l. 73b.
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This is sometimes the case (in other cases signatures run every which 
way), but did that regulated linearity on the back determine how 
Muscovites read the looser structures of the pictorial front? 
These highly localised sketch maps were not concerned with 
situating their position in a broader world, relative to an abstract pole, 
an international border, or a metropolitan centre; that was not their 
purpose. They were created to illustrate the location of a great double-
headed pine with a state agent’s official boundary mark or blaze, a 
dark X, burned into it, or the place where a church used to stand or a 
graveyard lay in ruins, in order to clarify particular property lines.20 
Figure 8: Map of the lands along the river Lakhost near the village of 
Tolstikova in Suzdal Province. The sketch documents the mapmaker’s 
concern with the details of the local landscape and the official markers 
that register property lines.  It demonstrates little concern with orientation 
or with situating the local in a broader world.21
The particularity of their focus is evident in the plethora of minuscule 
details that they record. On a map from Iurev Polskoi from 1672, a 
textual label above the two dark circles just right of centre notes: “In 
20  RGADA, coll. 1209, Murom, stlb. 36032, fol. 182; 183; 184; RGADA, coll. 1209, 
Uglich, stlb. 35730, Ch. 1, fol. 57.
21 RGADA, coll. 1209, Suzdal′ stlb. 28043, ch. 1, fol. 142.
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the uninhabited arable field Tiapkova are two pits, and raspberries and 
nettles are growing in them, and around them is the ploughed land of 
the uninhabited arable field Tiapkova”.22 
Figure 9: Map of the land along the river Sem Kolodezei in Iurev Polskoi Province, 
1670-72. “The ploughed land of the uninhabited arable field Tiapkova”. Like the 
previous map, this one focuses exclusively on local landmarks.23
These were the facts that would determine the outcome of a case 
and would allow the tsar’s officials to resolve questions of boundary 
lines and ownership claims. The idiosyncrasies of the local landscape 
served the purpose far more usefully than did any abstract, generalised 
orientation. Modern scholars may be convinced they know the “right” 
way to orient these maps, but in their handiwork, seventeenth-century 
mapmakers show themselves to have been supremely uninterested in 
the question. 
The sketches may have served their purpose in helping judges 
to issue their rulings, but that does not necessarily mean that the 
information they provided was accurate. A colourful sketch map drawn 
22  RGADA, coll. 1209, Iur′ev Pol′skoi, stlb. 34253, Ch. 1, fol. 132. 
23 RGADA, coll. 1209, Iur′ev Pol′skoi, stlb. 34253, Ch. 1, l. 132.
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up in connection with a dispute over property in the neighbourhood 
of Borovsk, a town to the Southwest of Moscow, provides surprising 
evidence in support of the claim that these amusing little pictograms 
conveyed locations quite reliably. 
Figure 10: Borovsk.24
The map shows a network of implausibly sinuous rivers snaking 
through the region. Oversized vegetation edges the rivers. Little houses 
line the roads and nestle in small settlements. All in all, it looks again 
like an illustration from a book of folk motifs rather than a document 
capable of conveying practical information. 
Yet, as Chekin points out, a close comparison with a satellite photo 
available through Google Earth proves that our man in Borovsk knew 
his business. 
Figure 11: Borovsk, satellite view from Google Maps (2017).
24 RGADA, coll. 192, descr. 1, Kaluzhskaia guberniia, no. 1.
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The topography of the region and the location of identifiable landmarks 
line up with an impressive degree of accuracy. Chekin deduces that 
the mapmaker began with the town of Borovsk as his main point of 
reference and then worked his way through the region, dividing the 
territory into “manageable segments”, and then using the intricate 
grid of rivers and roads to “further subdivide the area”. He placed 
landmarks close to Borovsk quite accurately, while places farther afield, 
presumably less immediately relevant to the task at hand, were placed 
in the general vicinity of their actual location.25 Untrained in Western 
scientific cartographic practices, unacquainted with the techniques of 
mathematical surveying, the Muscovite men who were haphazardly 
rounded into service as mapmakers nonetheless succeeded remarkably 
well in putting on paper usable guides to the natural and built landscape 
they inhabited. 
State Mapping Projects: The Great Sketch Map  
and Atlases of Siberia
If Muscovite mapmakers could capture the fine-grained topography of 
small areas, how did those working on a larger canvas fare? For maps 
of the tsardom writ large, two major sets of sources survive: a set of 
documents related to the Book of the Great Sketch Map (Kniga Bol′shomu 
chertezhu); and a sizable collection of maps of Siberia composed from the 
1660s through to the early 1700s.26 
At the very end of the sixteenth or beginning of the seventeenth 
century, Tsar Boris Godunov ordered the production of a great map, the 
Bol′shoi chertezh, of the lands of the tsardom to the West of the Urals. In 
preparation, reports were sent to Moscow from the localities, drawing 
on local informants with knowledge of the major landmarks, rivers and 
25  Chekin, ‘Russian Maps and Spatial Thinking in the Seventeenth Century’, 56–57. 
The map in question is RGADA, coll. 192, Kaluzhskaia guberniia, no. 1. A. P. 
Gudzinskaia and N. G. Mikhailova make an equally compelling argument for 
the precision and accuracy of architectural representations on chertezhi. See their 
‘Graficheskie materialy, kak istochnik po istorii arkhitektury pomeshchich′ei i 
krest′ianskoi usadeb v Rossii XVII v.’, Istoriia SSSR, 5 (1971), pp. 214–27.
26  I will not address here B. A. Rybakov’s not entirely convincing argument for 
the creation of a map of Muscovy in the fifteenth century. See his Russkie karty 
Moskovii XV-nachala XVI veka and his ‘Russian Maps of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth 
Centuries’, trans. by James A. Gibson, The Canadian Cartographer, 14 (1977), 10–23.
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roads, forts, lookouts, wells and supply-points. The welter of strategic 
information was collated into a single book, the Book of the Great Sketch 
Map. From the reports, regional maps were drawn up and then pasted 
together into a single huge wall map. By 1627 Kremlin scribes reported 
the original map was “dilapidated, it was no longer possible to see 
landmarks on it, it was all worn out and falling apart”.27 To address 
the problem, in that same year Tsar Mikhail Romanov commanded his 
scribes to make a copy of the book and to recreate the map itself on 
the basis of the information it preserved. He added that a supplemental 
map should be made showing the territories to the South, the Ukrainian 
borderlands and the dangerous routes that the Tatars followed to and 
from the Crimea. The new Great Sketch Map seems to have followed its 
predecessor to oblivion, but the map of the Ukrainian lands survives in 
multiple later copies made by foreigners and circulated abroad.
This brief history of the fate of the Great Sketch Map further supports 
the notion that neither Moscow’s protective monopoly on cartographic 
information nor its preference for manuscript over printed formats 
precluded active use or even dissemination. The map had been 
consulted frequently in the Kremlin chanceries, becoming dog-eared 
and faded through constant use. It had passed through many hands 
in the decades since it was compiled.28 Further, we know the sketch 
map of the Ukrainian lands from copies made and circulated outside 
of the tsardom by Germans and Swedes. Their ability to find and copy 
such a strategic and closely held asset demonstrates beyond a doubt 
that, however much the Kremlin wished to hoard its cartographic 
information, the pressures of dissemination were greater. Classified 
information leaked out, then as now, and the forces of communication 
overrode the pressure for secrecy.29
27  Kniga Bol′shomu chertezhu, ed. K. N. Serbina (Moscow: AN SSSR, 1950), p. 49 (fol. lv 
of reproduced text). Some scholars date the original map to the reign of Ivan IV.
28  Simon Franklin provides a model of how to read manuscripts for material traces 
of reading practices. See his “Dirty Old Books”, in Picturing Russia: Explorations in 
Visual Culture, ed. by Valerie A. Kivelson and Joan Neuberger (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2008), pp. 12–16.
29  On the Bol′shoi chertezh, and for reproductions of some late copies of the Ukrainian 
maps, see Bagrow, History of the Cartography of Russia up to 1800, pp. 4–12; Serbina, 
Kniga Bol′shomu chertezhu; Postnikov, Razvitie krupnomasshtabnoi kartografii v Rossii, 
pp. 20–22; Kusov, Kartograficheskoe iskusstvo Russkogo gosudarstva, pp. 75–77.
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Similar dynamics emerge in the arc of Siberian mapping. Muscovites 
first crossed the Ural Mountains and clashed with the Tatars of Western 
Siberia in the early 1580s, under Ivan IV. Half a century later, they had 
reached the Pacific Ocean. As they explored, conquered, and attempted 
to exploit and rule the populations and resources of their vast new 
holdings, they recognised the importance of mapping the terrain. They 
had little cartographic tradition to build on in Siberia.
The Eastern reaches of Eurasia had appeared on European world 
maps since the revival of Ptolemaic geography in the early fifteenth 
century.30 Martin Waldseemüller’s famous wall map, Universalis 
Cosmographia of 1507, for instance, labels both “Tartaria” and “Sarmatia 
Asiatica”, though not Muscovy, in its largely fanciful sweep across the 
continent to the Pacific. A Ptolemaic framework and a set of classical 
toponyms still shaped Waldseemüller’s vision of Eurasia, even though 
he knew they were outdated and despite his pioneering revision of the 
world with his inclusion of America, the land of Amerigo Vespucci, as a 
new and separate continent. 
Figure 12: Martin Waldseemüller, Universalis Cosmographia (1507), detail. 
The Hyperborean Mountains run horizontally across this section of the 
map. “Paludes Meotides,” at the bottom left, is an oversized Sea of Azov.
30  The rediscovery of the work of the ancient geographer, astronomer, and 
mathematician, Claudius Ptolemy (100–160 CE), revolutionised European 
understandings of cartography. His Geography set out principles of measurement of 
latitude and longitude and methods for calculating the diameter of the globe.
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As Katharina N. Piechocki points out, the classical misconception about 
the Riphean and Hyperborean mountain ranges that purportedly ran 
East-West across the narrow belt of land imagined as the limit of the 
earth to the North of the Black Sea remained in place until dispelled 
by the Polish scholar Maciej Miechowita in his 1517 Tractatus de duabus 
Sarmatiis Asiana et Europiana, “the first European treatise to overtly 
challenge the existence of the Riphean mountains”. Countering ancient 
mythology with up-to-date reports, Miechowita declared, “We know 
for certain and have seen that the Hyperborean, Riphean, and Alan 
mountains do not exist”.31
Miechowita stresses the corrective power of first-hand, eyewitness 
accounts, and the maps produced by Europeans in the following 
centuries benefited from precisely this kind of information, drawn 
together from the travel reports of foreign merchants and envoys 
and from conversations with geographically savvy Russians. In 
the geographic descriptions in his Notes Upon Russia, Herberstein 
acknowledged the crucial information divulged by Russian contacts. 
For instance, under the rubric “The Navigation of the Frozen Ocean”, he 
noted that when he was at the court in Moscow, “there happened to be 
there Gregory Istoma, the interpreter of that prince, an industrious man, 
[…] and as he had been sent by his prince in the year 1496 to the King of 
Denmark, [….] he gave me a short account of his journey”.32 On the basis 
of many such reports, once back at home, Herberstein commissioned a 
map of Muscovy. A form cutter named Augustin Hirsvogel produced 
an early version in 1546. It was reprinted in 1549 in a smaller format 
to accompany the first edition of Notes Upon Russia, and from there it 
“went viral”, enjoying an active afterlife in subsequent editions and 
reprintings in atlas compilations.33 
31  Katharina N. Piechocki, ‘Erroneous Mappings: Ptolemy and the Visualization of 
Europe’s East’, in Early Modern Cultures of Translation, ed. by Karen Newman and 
Jane Tylus (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), p. 86. Piechocki 
notes that Miechowita never travelled to the lands he described but drew on 
interviews with people who had been there. On Waldseemüller and the Ptolemaic 
model, see also John W. Hessler, The Naming of America (Washington, D.C.: Library 
of Congress, 2008), pp. 18–25. 
32  Sigmund Freiherr von Herberstein, Notes Upon Russia, 2 vols, Elibron Classics 
Reprint of the 1852 publication by the London’s Hakluyt Society (Adamant Media, 
2005), vol. 2, p. 105, https://archive.org/details/notesuponrussiab02herbuoft
33  Leo Bagrow, History of Cartography up to 1600, ed. by Henry W. Castner (Wolfe 
Island, ON: The Walker Press, 1975), p. 60, pp. 70–72. 
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Herberstein was one of the early contributors to a sixteenth-century 
boom in European mapping of Muscovy and Western Siberia, generally 
designated Tartaria or Asian Scythia.34 Muscovites contributed to 
this boom by sharing geographic information with their Western 
acquaintances, but in their own cartographic work, they adopted a 
distinctive approach. As Alexey Postnikov and Marvin Falk write, “the 
early charts of the territories of Siberia and the Northeastern regions of 
Eurasia produced cartography outside the Western European scientific 
framework of the time. Even in their appearance the Siberian charts 
of the seventeenth to early eighteenth century sharply differed from 
contemporary maps created within Ptolemy’s paradigm that was then 
dominant in European geography”. Visually distinctive in style, often 
oriented to the South rather than the North, and sometimes composed 
with the help of compass readings and chain measurements of distance, 
but without the benefit of a “geographic net and consistent scale and 
projection for all parts of the cartographic image”, these Russian maps 
were nonetheless packed with valuable information and accompanied 
by textual descriptions that filled in additional context.35
The first map of all Siberia known to have been made within the 
tsardom by Russians is known as the Godunov map of 1666–67. As with 
the maps produced in conjunction with the Book of the Great Sketch Map, 
the Godunov map itself does not survive or has not yet been found, but 
its imprint is detectable in later renditions, drawn by Russians following 
in Godunov’s tradition and by foreigners who copied it in secret. A 
textual lozenge appears on later copies informing the viewer that the 
map was made “In the year 1666–67 by order of Great Sovereign, Tsar, 
and Grand Prince Aleksei Mikhailovich, Autocrat of all Great, Small, 
34  Among the earliest in this boom was a map made by Battista Agnese on the basis 
of information provided by the Russian ambassador to Rome, Dmitrii Gerasimov, 
in 1525. Gerasimov was a source for Herberstein as well. Another early map was 
made by Ivan Liatskoi in 1542. See for instance, discussions in Bagrow, History 
of Cartography up to 1600, pp. 61–135; Krystyna Szykuła, ‘Anthony Jenkinson’s 
Unique Wall Map of Russia (1562) and its Influence on European Cartography’, 
Belgeo (2008), pp. 3–4, http://belgeo.revues.org/8827; Samuel H. Baron, ‘The Lost 
Jenkinson Map of Russia (1562) Recovered, Redated and Retitled’, Terrae Incognitae: 
The Journal of the Society for the History of Discoveries, 25. 1 (1993), 53–66. 
35  Alexey Postnikov and Marvin Falk, Exploring and Mapping Alaska: The Russian 
America Era, 1741–1867, trans. by Lydia Black (Fairbanks: University of Alaska 
Press, 2015), pp. 17–18. See also Leonid A. Gol′denberg and A. V. Postnikov, ‘The 
Development of Mapping Methods in Russia’, Imago Mundi, 37 (1985), 63–80.
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and White Russia” and composed “with great care” by Governor Petr 
Ivanovich Godunov from information collected in Tobolsk, the capital 
city of Western Siberia. 
Figure 13: S. U. Remezov’s copy of the Godunov map of 1666–67, from 
his Chorographic Sketch Book. The map is oriented to the south: China is 
indicated by concentric curves of the Great Wall in the top left corner and 
the Pacific Ocean frames the map at the left margin. The Arctic Ocean 
runs along the bottom.
Along with the textual cartouche, the surviving copies include a 
compass rose, underscoring the use of this directional technology 
in the map’s composition. Named for this Siberian administrator 
(and not the more famous Tsar Boris Godunov), the map reflects the 
governor’s on-going work with maps. In 1661 Godunov oversaw the 
construction of fortifications along the River Tobol, following “a map 
and description provided by well-informed people”.36 The input of 
36  Leo Bagrow, ‘Semyon Remezov: A Siberian Cartographer’, Imago Mundi, 11 (1954), 
111–25 (p. 112); cites N. N. Ogloblin, comp., Obozrenie stolbtsov i knig Sibirskogo 
prikaza, 1592-1768, book 2, in Chteniia v Obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh 
pri Moskovskom universitete (Moscow, 1895), vol. 173, p. 249; and S. V. Bakhrushin, 
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“well-informed people” contributed to this first map of all of Siberia 
as it had for the mapmakers back in central Russia as they laboured to 
sketch the bounds of landholders’ estates by drawing on the expertise 
of “long-time residents”.37
Given the crudeness, in terms of scientific measurement, of Godunov’s 
sketch, one might wonder why foreigners would take the risks involved 
in attempting to purloin copies. The answer points precisely to the 
nature of the information it conveyed and the value that contemporaries 
put upon it. Knowledge of river routes and linkages offered the key to 
travel and transportation. Henry R. Huttenbach explains the simplicity 
of the map’s content and the emphasis on rivers to the exclusion of other 
features of the landscape: “For the most part these chertezhi resemble 
road maps that show points of interest on or near the road. What lies 
off the highway is not shown; similarly the chertezhi of Siberia virtually 
ignore the interior other than in terms of the course of the river”.38
The same hydrographic grid characterised the work of the 
extraordinary Siberian cartographer of the end of the seventeenth and 
beginning of the eighteenth century, Semen Ulianovich Remezov.39 In 
creating his three atlases and many maps of Siberia, Remezov drew on 
the same kind of pooled knowledge that had allowed his predecessors to 
chart the territory. He was responsible for drawing the earliest surviving 
Ocherki po istorii kolonizatsii Sibiri v 16-om i 17-om vv. (Moscow: Izd. M. and S. 
Sabashnikovykh, 1927), 17–19 ff. Bagrow notes that Godunov supervised another 
ambitious mapping project in 1668, ‘Information on the Land of China and on the 
Depths of India Provided by Petr Ivanovich Godunov’. 
37  Khorograficheskaia kniga Sibiri [Chorographic Sketch-book of Siberia], MS Russ 72 
(6). Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, ff. 5v-6, https://iiif.
lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:18273155$10i. On Petr Godunov’s cartographic 
work and on this map, see Gregory Afinogenov, ‘The Eye of the Tsar: Intelligence-
Gathering and Geopolitics in Eighteenth-Century Eurasia’ (Ph.D. dissertation, 
Harvard University, 2016), pp. 40–45.
38  Henry Huttenbach, ‘Hydrography and the Origins of Russian Cartography’, Five 
Hundred Years of Nautical Science, 1400–1900, Proceedings of the Third International 
Reunion for the History of Nautical Science and Hydrography held at the National Maritime 
Museum, Greenwich, 24–28 September 1979, ed. by Derek House (Greenwich: National 
Maritime Museum, 1981), pp. 142–52 (p. 148).
39  On Remezov, see L. A. Gol′denberg, Izograf zemli sibirskoi (Magadan: Magadanskoe 
knizhnoe Izd., 1991); and his Semen Ul′ianovich Remezov, sibirskii kartograf i geograf, 
1642-posle 1720 gg. (Moscow: Nauka, 1965); Kivelson, Cartographies of Tsardom; A. V. 
Postnikov, ‘Kartografirovanie Sibiri v XVII–nachale XVIII veka. Semen Ul′ianovich 
Remezov i ego rukopisnye atlasy’, in Chertezhnaia kniga Sibiri, sostavlennaia tobol′skim 
synom boiarskim Semenom Remezovym v 1701 godu, ed. by A. A. Drazhniuk, et al., 2 
vols, vol. 2: Issledovaniia (Moscow: PKO ‘Kartografiia’, 2003), pp. 7–19.
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Russian copies of the 1666–67 Godunov map, and he laboured to update 
and enrich it. A mid-level servitor, icon-painter, and administrator in 
Tobolsk, Remezov fulfilled increasingly ambitious orders from Moscow 
to map first the region around Tobolsk, then a broader swath of the 
surrounding steppe, and finally, in 1698, to create a new map of all of 
Siberia. In order to do so, he was to explore and map on his own, and he 
did so extensively, noting “directional measurements from a compass”,40 
but he was also instructed to gather reports and maps from anyone 
who might have useful knowledge. His own explanation of his work 
acknowledges that maps and reports came to him from all over, from 
Russian and Cossack trappers and traders, explorers and adventurers, 
from military men, and from native peoples. He questioned travellers 
about their journeys to determine “the dimensions of lands, the route 
distances of towns and their villages and districts, about rivers, streams, 
lakes, bays, islands, and fishing, about mountains and forests, and about 
all landmarks that have not been plotted on previous maps”.41
As his preface to the Working Sketch-book (Sluzhebnaia chertezhnaia 
kniga Sibiri), one of his three atlases of Siberia, explains, he and his 
sons were ordered by the head of the Siberian Chancery to compile 
their atlas from “pictures of twenty-three Siberian towns brought to 
the Siberian Chancery in Moscow”. In the Chorographic Sketch-book 
(Khorograficheskaia chertezhnaia kniga) he explains that he used “many 
town maps, whatever had been sent over the years to Moscow”.42 
Remezov, thus, did not work in isolation, and the resulting atlases are as 
much cobbled together from earlier Muscovite efforts as representative 
of his own, individual inspiration.43 Notably, all of these varied people 
40  Rossiiskaia gosudarstvennaia biblioteka, Moscow, Rukopisnyi otdel, coll. 256, 
Rumiantsev Collection, no. 346; published in a facsimile edition as Chertezhnaia 
kniga Sibiri, sostavlennaia tobol′skim synom boiarskim S. Remezovym v 1701 godu, 2 vols 
(Moscow: FGUP, PKO Kartografiia, 2003), p. 10.
41  Chertezhnaia kniga Sibiri, 4; discussed in V. N. Fedchina, ‘Central Asia on Russian 
Maps of the Seventeenth Century’, The Canadian Cartographer, 10. 2 (1973), 95–105 
(102).
42  Rossiiskaia natsional′naia biblioteka, St Petersburg, Ermitazhnoe sobranie, no. 237, 
Sluzhebnaia chertezhnaia kniga Remezova, fol. 1; Remezov, Semen Ul′ianovich, 1642-
ca. 1720. Khorograficheskaia kniga, f. 1v. 
43  On the gathering of maps from many mapmakers, see, for instance, Chertezhnaia 
kniga, fol. 3, which explains that the tsar ordered the mapping of Siberia in 7177 
(1668–69), and maps were collected between that year and 7209 (1700–01). Some maps 
in the atlas acknowledge their original authors, as, for example, Khorograficheskaia 
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had sufficient geographic interest and cartographic understanding to 
make important contributions to the Siberian mapping project, and the 
state and its delegates recognised the value of their knowledge. Some 
of Remezov’s maps acknowledge his sources by name; others simply 
draw on the reports that flowed into Moscow and Tobolsk. The first 
map of Kamchatka, commissioned by the governor of Iakutsk, Dorofei 
Traurnicht, and brought back by the intrepid explorer and vicious 
conqueror Vladimir Atlasov, made its way into one of Remezov’s 
atlases, with full attribution.44 
Figure 14: Kamchatka. Map of Kamchatka included in S. U. Remezov’s 
Working Sketch Book. Remezov attributes the map to Dorofei Traurnich. 
kniga, f. 147, which credits Lieutenant of the Daur Regiment Afonasii Ivanov syn 
Baikov with a sketch of the Amur River, China, Nerchinsk, and Irkutsk.
44  Sluzhebnaia chertezhnaia kniga Remezova, fol. 102v.
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In his depiction of the hydrographic features of the Far East, Remezov 
drew on information provided by Nicolae Milescu Spathary (or 
Spafarii), who described and mapped the Sino-Siberian frontier in 
the course of a diplomatic mission to China in 1675–76 on behalf of 
the Muscovites.45 Spafarii’s work in turn relied heavily on the work of 
Jesuits, from whom he freely plagiarised, as well as on Chinese, Kazakh 
and Manchu informants. As Gregory Afinogenov writes, “These texts 
were the product of networks ensnaring Junghars, Kazakhs, Mongols, 
Manchus, Chinese, and even the Jesuits themselves, and as such 
reveal the delicate interdependencies and striking human stories that 
characterized Russia’s presence in this borderland”.46
With all of these streams of information flowing into his workshop 
in Tobolsk, Remezov and his assistants were able to create a far more 
densely annotated version of the Godunov map that identified hundreds 
more Siberian locales and refined his sense of geography, culminating 
in his large, stand-alone Map of All Siberia. 
Figure 15: Remezov, Map of All Siberia.
45  Marina Tolmacheva, ‘The Early Russian Exploration and Mapping of the Chinese 
Frontier’, Cahiers du Monde russe, 41. 1 (2000), 41–56 (pp. 44–46).
46  Afinogenov, ‘Eye of the Tsar’, pp. 47–51 (on Spafarii); p. 8 (quotation). Afinogenov 
reconstructs the Eastern contributions to the communications networks through 
which information on Siberia and China circulated and explores the world of 
intelligence gathering in which Russia played a part.
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In the bulk of his work, he followed the same general template as 
that used in the local real estate maps. He employed the branching 
network of rivers and mountains to provide the basic scaffolding, and 
then introduced pictorial elements to indicate Russian cities, fortified 
outposts, native settlements, and natural features of the landscape. 
Remezov abjured use of scale or precise direction, providing instead a 
functional itinerary, indicating which river to follow and which branch 
to take to a specific endpoint. Annotations on the maps augmented their 
practical application. Distances between set points might be indicated 
in versts47 or days and nights. Travel between one outpost and another 
would take three days by ship or ten days on land. Travel to another 
destination would take a week by river and would be impossible by 
land. Although Remezov’s atlases were not published until centuries 
later and survived as unique exemplars, he created them with the idea 
that they could be of practical use to travellers crossing Siberia’s endless 
landscape. In the terms of this volume, although it is difficult to trace 
direct avenues of communication and dissemination, his hand-drawn 
atlases nonetheless both drew on and influenced a lively Eurasian 
exchange of critical geographic information.
Circuitous Borrowing: Information Flows  
and Communication in the Clandestine World  
of Early Modern Cartography
The familiar themes of cartographic secrecy and clandestine exchange 
that we have encountered before run through the story of Siberian 
mapping as well. The Godunov map, for instance, survives not only 
in the multiple copies by Remezov but also in at least three separate 
copies smuggled out by foreign diplomats. A recent book by Postnikov 
and Falk catalogues the circulation of the Godunov map through 
unlawful back channels. Lieutenant Colonel Fritz Cronman, Swedish 
ambassador to Muscovy, purloined a copy when he was in Moscow in 
February 1667. Cronman wrote to his monarch, Charles XI, “The map 
of all these Siberian lands up to China, which recently was sent here 
47  A verst is roughly equivalent to a kilometre; see Chapters 5 and 11 for more 
information.
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on His Majesty’s orders by Tobolsk commander Godunov, was shown 
me and having received permission to keep it over night, I copied it”. 
Cronman’s countryman Claes Johanssen Prytz made another copy. 
In his report on his mission, Prytz wrote, “The appended land map 
of Siberia and adjacent lands I copied 8 January 1669 from a poorly 
preserved original which was loaned to me for a few hours by Prince 
Ivan Alekseevich Vorotynskii on the condition that I may examine it but 
under no circumstances copy it”.48 The report makes one wonder if the 
prince issued his warning with a knowing wink, creating for himself a 
cover of plausible deniability.
The Swedes were particularly assiduous and particularly successful 
in their efforts to obtain secret cartographic documents, but they were 
not the only ones who reported access to the Godunov map. Nicholas 
Witsen, a Dutchman with extensive experience in Moscow and with 
highly placed contacts at court, also obtained a copy of the Godunov 
map, together with a map of Novaia Zemblia, from one of those Kremlin 
insiders. Witsen with some pride wrote that he had “assembled volumes 
of diaries and notes in which are the names of mountains, rivers, cities 
and towns, together with a magnitude of drawings executed by my 
order”.49 In 1991 Postnikov identified the Carte générale de la Sibierie et la 
Grande Tartaria, a French map in the collection of the Newberry Library 
in Chicago, as a copy of a Russian original drawn in the mode of the 
Godunov map, dating to the late 1670s or early 1680s.50
The spiral of creation and copying, the back and forth between 
Russians and foreigners, continued apace throughout the century. An 
updated version of the Godunov map enjoyed a similar international 
transmission. Postnikov and Falk say this map was composed under 
the auspices of Metropolitan Kornelii in Tobolsk in 1673. It bears a close 
resemblance to Remezov’s Map of All Siberia, although the dynamics 
of the relationship remain unclear. It survives in at least three copies. 
48  Postnikov and Falk, Exploring and Mapping Alaska, p. 19.
49  Ibid. Witsen’s source was Stanislav Loputskii, described by Postnikov and Falk 
as “an artist at the court of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich”. Witsen created his own 
quite extraordinary map of Siberia. See Johannes Keuning, ‘Nicolaas Witsen as a 
Cartographer’, Imago Mundi, 11 (1954), 95–110.
50  Newberry Library, Chicago, ‘Carte générale de la Siberie et de la Grande Tatarie’, 
in Cartes Marines, Edward Everett Ayer Collection; discussed in A. V. Postnikov, 
‘Russian Cartographic Treasures of the Newberry Library’, Mapline, 61–62 (1991), 
6–8.
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The sole extant Russian version has annotations in both Russian and 
Latin, suggesting the cooperation of locals and foreigners. The Swedish 
representative Eric Palmquist managed to make a copy in that same year, 
as did his countryman Johann Gabriel Sparwenfeld, another Swedish 
chargé d’affaires who spent time in Moscow as part of a later mission. 
Palmquist collected a valuable set of documents pertaining to Russia, 
“among them sixteen geographic maps and plans of cities, including the 
general Siberian charts of 1667 and 1673”. He echoed the earlier reports 
of the covert nature of his work, stressing the “effort and difficulties” 
involved, and he wrote that “I personally observed and drew maps 
in various places, risking my life, and also received information from 
Russian subjects in return for money”.51 The foreigners’ reports confirm 
both the obstacles and the possibilities of obtaining maps and geographic 
information from Russia, and incorporating that knowledge into their 
own pictures of the world.
Adding more evidence of covert borrowings and circulation, Bagrow 
identified a German manuscript map entitled Abzeichnung der gantzen 
Nord- und Ost- gegend von den Moschovischen grentzen durch Sibirien biss 
zu dem grossen Reich Kitai sonst China at the Westdeutsche Bibliothek, 
Marburg/Lahn, as a copy of Remezov’s Map of All Siberia, indicating 
another mysterious incident of copying and transportation, perhaps 
smuggling, of this hand-drawn translation.52 All of these cloak-and-
dagger escapades show that the highly classified Godunov map and 
its later derivatives were hotly sought after in Europe. In spite of the 
close guard kept on the manuscript exemplars, maps of Siberia escaped 
the confines of Muscovite control and circulated in a broader world of 
cartographic information.
Information flowed in multiple directions. At the same time that 
Europeans obtained classified maps through subterfuge, bribery, 
and friendship and set them loose in manuscript and in print abroad, 
51  Postnikov and Falk, Exploring and Mapping Alaska, 19. See also Leo Bagrow, 
‘Sparwenfeld’s Map of Siberia’, Imago Mundi, 4 (1947), foldout plate following p. 
68; J. G. Sparwenfeld’s Diary of a Journey to Russia 1684–1687, ed. by U. Birgegard 
(Stockholm: Kungl. Vitterhets Historie och Antikvitets Akademien, 2002); and 
Erich Palmquist, Zametki o Rossii, sdelannye Ėrikom Pal′mkvistom v 1674 godu, ed. 
by Anatolii Sekerin and Gennadii Kovalenko, English trans. by Martin Naylor 
(Moscow: Lomonosov, 2012).
52  The German version is reproduced in Bagrow, ‘Remezov’, pp. 124–25.
52 Valerie Kivelson
Muscovites followed developments in Western cartography with 
considerable interest. The tsars’ libraries and those of the Diplomatic 
and Siberian Chanceries acquired editions of the first world atlases 
published by Abraham Ortelius and Gerhard Mercator in the late 
sixteenth century and the somewhat later (first edition 1635) atlas 
produced by the father-son team Willem and Joan Blaeu, along with 
editions of Miechowita and other works imported from Poland. 
Appetite for geographic compendia was apparently not confined to 
the court. From the 1630s on, atlases became among the most popular 
and widely copied translated texts in Russia. Partial translations into 
Russian of several European “cosmographies”, geographic histories of 
the world, demonstrate significant interest in keeping up with Western 
scholarship and technology, although most were left incomplete and 
none were published in the seventeenth century.53 Omissions and 
amendments, particularly in the sections devoted to Muscovy itself, 
demonstrate active engagement with these imported sources. The first 
four volumes of the Blaeu atlas were translated from various editions 
into Russian between 1655 and 1657. According to N. A. Kazakova, the 
section on Muscovy is left as blank pages in Russian translations of 
Blaeu, suggesting that the treatment of the motherland required special 
consideration and was perhaps a bit too hot to handle.54 
The path of borrowing zigzags between Russia and Europe, with 
each iteration informing subsequent productions. Herberstein’s story 
epitomises the dizzying geographic and cartographic exchanges that 
53  S. M. Gluskina, ‘“Kosmografiia” 1637 goda kak russkaia pererabotka “Atlasa” 
Merkatora’, in Geograficheskii sbornik, 3 (Moscow-Leningrad, 1954), pp. 79–99; N. 
A. Kazakova, ‘Russkii perevod XVII v. truda Blau “Theatrum Orbis Terrarum 
sive Atlas Novus”’, Vospomogatel′nye istoricheskie distsipliny, 17 (1986), pp. 
161–78; idem., ‘Russkii perevod XVII v. “Theatrum Orbis Terrarum” A. Orteliia’, 
Vospomogatel′nye istoricheskie distsipliny, 18 (1987), 121–31; B. E. Raikov, Ocherki po 
istorii geliotsentricheskogo mirovozzreniia v Rossii (Moscow-Leningrad, 1947), pp. 
79–90. 
54  Kazakova, ‘Russkii perevod XVII v. truda Blau’, p. 169. On the translations, see 
also Francis J. Thomson, ‘Slavonic Translations Available in Muscovy: The Cause of 
Old Russia’s Intellectual Silence and a Contributing Factor to Muscovite Cultural 
Autarky’, in Christianity and the Eastern Slavs, vol. I: Slavic Cultures in the Middle Ages, 
ed. by B. Gasparov, Olga Raevsky-Hughes, California Slavic Studies 16 (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 193–94; p. 212, n. 211. 
For an account of the sources of early European cosmographic treatments of Russia, 
see Marshall T. Poe, ‘Muscovy in European Cosmographies, 1517–1544’, Russian 
History/Histoire Russe, 25. 1–2 (1998), 89–106. 
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characterised this period. Herberstein, the Habsburg envoy, drew on 
information provided by a Russian court translator (Gregory Istoma), 
a Russian diplomat (by the name of Dmitrii Gerasimov), and a defector 
from Muscovy to Lithuania (Ivan Liatskoi) among others. Their reports 
informed Herberstein’s geographic account and dictated the contours of 
the map cut by Augustin Hirsvogel in Vienna. Mercator’s atlas, which 
incorporated Herberstein’s description of Russia along with his map, 
brought the Habsburg envoy’s impressions back to Muscovy, where 
they would resonate in Russians’ self-descriptions and serve as a source 
of information about their own religion and practice for centuries to 
come.55 
The case, I hope, has been made here that, despite the apparent 
paucity of cartographic information of any scientific or utilitarian value, 
the inherent limits on communication in a manuscript culture, and the 
deliberate obstruction of knowledge transfer, actual practices of mapping 
and flow of information overturn those initial assumptions. From the 
sixteenth century onward, Russians and Europeans participated jointly 
in an energetic exercise in collecting, recording and circulating practical 
geographic knowledge and maps.
Remezov’s Maps: Information, Exchange, and the 
Strategic Value of Russian Chertezhi
As a closing example, I return to Semen Remezov, the Siberian 
cartographer who worked in Tobolsk in the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth century. He has been described as the last great representative 
of a purely Muscovite cartographic tradition, the “swan-song” of an 
uncontaminated indigenous Russian cartography.56 
Yet Remezov exemplifies the very pattern of ecumenical collection and 
dissemination of information that we have traced to this point. Enjoying 
one of the very first state-funded research leaves in Russian history, 
Remezov benefited from exposure to Western publications during 
the three months he spent in Moscow studying imported European 
55  Irena Gross, ‘The Tangled Tradition: Custine, Herberstein, Karamzin and the 
Critique of Russia’, Slavic Review, 50 (1991), 989–98.
56  Postnikov, Russia in Maps, p. 24.
54 Valerie Kivelson
maps and cosmographical atlases, mostly of Dutch provenance, in the 
archives and libraries of the Kremlin. He appreciated all that he learned, 
and once back in Tobolsk, he penned enthusiastic descriptions of the 
wonders of the magnetic compass, of the linear scale, and of the all the 
“clever sciences” on offer in Europe.57 He tested his skill in reproducing 
foreign maps, creating splendid copies by hand. In one atlas he included 
a copy of Blaeu’s 1635 “Tataria sive magni Chami imperium”, complete 
with longitude and latitude lines, camels and turbaned Muslims in the 
cartouches, and devils and dragons populating the “Lop Desert” just 
outside the Great Wall of China. He also copied a Polish map, probably a 
version of Anthony Jenkinson’s 1562 map, complete with its Polish title 
and an image of the mythological Zlata Baba, Golden Woman, in the 
far Northeast corner.58 Marina Tolmacheva notes wryly that Remezov’s 
goal in copying these European maps of Siberia was “to present the 
state of knowledge prevailing elsewhere, which is frankly estimated at 
nemnogo (‘not much’)”.59 
In spite of his familiarity with the latest cartographic works 
from Amsterdam and elsewhere, Remezov maintained many of the 
techniques familiar from the Russian mapping traditions examined 
here. Although Remezov’s small scale maps of large territories were 
usually oriented to the South with cardinal directions noted in the 
Western style, Daniel C. Waugh observes that his “large scale, detailed 
[maps]… most often were oriented to take full advantage of the largest 
(horizontal) dimension of a rectangular sheet of paper. This enabled him 
to follow rivers along their entire length, for indeed, as with the Book of 
the Great Map, the basic structure for what we might term Remezov’s 
practical or functional maps and atlases was river routes”.60 Almost any 
page from his Khorograficheskaia chertezhnaia kniga, an atlas of sketches of 
small sections of Siberia, exemplifies this observation nicely. A map of 
57  Remezov, Sluzhebnaia chertezhnaia kniga, fol. 12 (‘Do laskovago chitatelia’); Remezov, 
Khorograficheskaia kniga, ff. 8v-9.
58  Remezov, Sluzhebnaia chertezhnaia kniga, fols. 22v-23 (includes Zlata Baba); fol. 
107, ‘Chertezh zemli khanskago velichestva’, with cartouches, vignettes, and Latin 
labels. See also Remezov, Khorograficheskaia kniga, f.v., two-hemisphere map. 
59  Tolmacheva, ‘Early Russian Exploration and Mapping of the Chinese Frontier’, p. 
50.
60  Daniel C. Waugh, ‘The View from the North: Muscovite Cartography of Inner Asia’, 
Journal of Asian History, 49 (2015), 69–96, quote on p. 82.
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a segment of the Tura River, for instance, accommodates the rivers to fit 
to the horizontal width of the page.61 
Figure 16: Map of a segment of the Tura River,  
from S. U. Remezov’s Working Sketch Book.
The paper is marked with a grid, but one used to guide the artist rather 
than to indicate scientifically measured position.
“Even though Remezov’s maps were not composed according to 
the rules of Western-European cartography”, Kees Boterbloem writes, 
“their exquisite rendering of Siberia made it undoubtedly much more 
feasible to traverse its vastness for travellers and to asses the extent of 
their domination for Russian administrators”.62 Remezov’s approach 
was pragmatic and suited to communicating important information 
about relative location. 
61  Remezov, Khorograficheskaia kniga, f. 48.
62  Kees Boterbloem, Modernizer of Russia: Andrei Vinius, 1641–1716 (Houndsmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 166. Some scholars note a 
similarity with Chinese mapping. See Fedchina, ‘Central Asia on Russian Maps of 
the Seventeenth Century’, 104; Waugh, ‘View from the North’, p. 82; Tolmacheva, 
‘Early Russian Exploration and Mapping of the Chinese Frontier’, pp. 41–56. For 
a pair of maps by Kalmyk cartographers of the eighteenth century, displaying yet 
another cartographic imaginary, see Nicholas Poppe, ‘Renat’s Kalmuck Maps’, 
Imago Mundi, 12 (1955), 155–59. The maps are viewable online at http://goran.
baarnhielm.net/Renat/index.html  
56 Valerie Kivelson
The state agencies in Moscow understood the value of the maps of 
Siberia that Remezov produced, and they hounded him to send them 
the products of his work. Foreigners also tried to secure copies for 
publication in the West. The manuscript original of his Sketch-book of 
Siberia (Chertezhnaia kniga) testifies to this shared interest. All the labels 
appear in both Russian and Dutch. Most scholars agree that Dutch was 
added under the auspices of Andrei Vinius, the Russian-born son of 
a Dutch merchant, who served the tsarist state in various important 
capacities: as a diplomat, as postmaster, as head of the Apothecary 
Chancery, and, most relevant, as head of the Siberian Chancery. Vinius 
likely worked with Remezov to prepare the Sketch-book for publication 
abroad, but the plan never reached fruition. Various scenarios have 
been proposed: Vinius intended to smuggle the atlas out of the country 
but was caught, or, alternatively, he had a licence to publish it abroad. 
In a study of Vinius, Botterbloem suggests a different reading: “one 
wonders whether Vinius was annotating the maps to dispatch a Dutch 
copy to [his second cousin, the Dutch statesman, merchant, and scholar 
Nicholaes] Witsen, in order to help his cousin fine-tune the second 
edition of his Noord- en Ost-Tatarien”.63 Witsen had published his own 
treatise on Muscovy and Tataria, this same Noord- en Ost-Tatarien, in 
1690, including a map, probably modelled on originals by Remezov, 
Vinius, or both. As presented by Witsen, the map maintains a Muscovite 
Southern orientation but adds for the first time a geographic grid, 
though still one that is purely symbolic rather than carrying geodesic 
meaning.64
If we follow the path of borrowing and circulation further, it grows 
even more tortuous. Bagrow describes a head-spinning circuit of 
exchange and transmission, syncopated with blockages and censorship, 
around the publication of these late-seventeenth-century Siberian maps. 
In 1698, Bagrow tells us, Vinius befriended the Austrian ambassador to 
Moscow, Gvarienti, and in September of the following year, Vinius sent 
Gvarienti a map of Siberia, presumably his own or one of Remezov’s, 
with the proposition that his friend should publish it. The plan came to 
naught, and a few years later, Vinius was convicted of accepting bribes 
and fell from grace. Bagrow intimates (on the basis of nothing more 
63  Boterbloem, Modernizer of Russia, p. 166.
64  Postnikov and Falk, Exploring and Mapping Alaska, p. 9; Bagrow, ‘Remezov’, p. 125.
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than coincidental timing) that his disgrace may have had something to 
do with the Remezov atlas that he had so assiduously patronised and 
then annotated.65 
The whirl of names and whiff of scandal that cling to Bagrow’s 
description confirm the central findings of this survey of early 
Russian maps. Neither the restrictive regime of secrecy nor the fact 
that Muscovite maps existed only in manuscript form prevented the 
circulation of geographic knowledge. Moreover, despite the absence of 
advanced scientific measurement techniques, Muscovites commanded 
significant knowledge of their tsardom’s terrain. However naïve in 
rendition, Muscovite chertezhi, on both local and grand scale, were rich 
in valuable geographic information, and, as such, became tactical assets, 
objects of forbidden desire. They were sought after, bought, smuggled, 
adapted, and published abroad, while Muscovite mapmakers in turn 
incorporated foreign geographic ideas into their own work, participating 
in a vibrant web of information exchange. 
The history of mapping in early modern Russia shows a state 
“more rather than less open to foreign infiltration, more rather than 
less tolerant of cultural hybridity and textual circulation”.66 Intensely 
interested in geographic and ethnographic knowledge, Muscovites 
gathered, recorded, sorted, and mapped information cobbled 
together from multifarious sources, ranging from their own active 
observations and measurements, to reports from an international cast 
of interlocutors, to published treatises. Their communication network 
ranged from China to England, and swept in any potential informants 
in between. Communication, as is its wont, went in all directions. 
The secretive Muscovite regime, despite its efforts at controlling the 
message, participated in a world of lively exchange of information. As 
Afinogenov aptly observes, “Muscovy still has the ability to surprise 
us, both with the unexpected inventiveness of its intelligence-gathering 
practices and with the unintentional—and eagerly-exploited—porosity 
of the apparatus that was meant to keep them secret”.67
65  Bagrow, ‘Remezov’, pp. 124–25.
66  Afinogenov, ‘Eye of the Tsar’, p. 32.
67  Ibid., p. 34.

2. New Technology and the Mapping of 
Empire: The Adoption of the Astrolabe
Aleksei Golubinskii1
In the eighteenth century, interest in and the intensification of support 
for science became a part of everyday life in the courts of Europe. 
Russia, too, was caught up in a fascination with science from the Petrine 
era onwards. Besides scientific exchange, signs of scientific interest 
were apparent in a variety of areas of Russian life, from the introduction 
of new ideas, books, and instruments, to the systematic invitation of 
foreign scientists and academics to act as consultants, advisors, and 
teachers.2 As a result, Russia’s role in international affairs became more 
pronounced, and the representation of Russian territories became 
increasingly important for geographers both in Russia and abroad.3 
To a notable extent the achievements of the St Petersburg Academy 
of Sciences in the interrelated fields of geography and astronomy 
contributed to this. The links between the scientific communities in 
1  Translated by Elizabeth Harrison.
2  See, Anthony Cross, By the Banks of the Neva. Chapters from the Lives and Careers of the 
British in Eighteenth-Century Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); 
Frantsuzy v nauchnoi i intellektual′noi zhizni Rossii XVIII–XX vv., ed. A. O. Chubarian, 
F.-D. Lishtenan (Moscow: OLMA Media Group, 2010). 
3  See Leo Bagrow, History of Cartography, 2 vols, ed. by Henry W. Castner (Wolfe 
Island, ON: The Walker Press, 1975); V. F. Gnucheva, Geograficheskii departament 
Akademii nauk XVIII veka (Moscow: Izd-vo AN SSSR, 1946).
© 2017 Aleksei Golubinskii, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0122.02
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the Russian Empire and abroad stabilised, but, at the same time, were 
shaped by external political affairs.4 
As this chapter will discuss, the purchase of British astrolabes5 
by the Russian Empire demonstrates non-commercial international 
cooperation during the period when the signing of the Westminster 
Treaty in 1756 had significantly complicated relations between Russia 
and Great Britain. While the details of Russia’s procurement of complex 
technology during this period have not as yet attracted the sustained 
attention of historians, this case study is a key episode in the “scientific” 
turn in Russian cartography, which follows on from Valerie Kivelson’s 
study of pre-modern mapping techniques in the previous chapter of 
this volume. As this chapter demonstrates, the introduction of geodesic 
astrolabes, first from abroad, then through local manufacture, enabled 
the modern mapping of empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Astrolabes were essential to determine directions (angles) 
accurately and to calculate areas. They enabled Russian and European 
cartographers to produce relatively precise maps. Accurate mapping 
was of interest not only to geographers but also to astronomers, 
physicists, biologists and ethnographers, indeed to all who espoused the 
4  M. Iu. Anisimov, ‘Rossiia v sisteme mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii v 1749–56 
gg.’ (Kand. dissertation, Institut rossiiskoi istorii RAN, 2005); L. M. Grankov, 
‘Morskoi torgovyi flot i vneshnetorgovaia politika Rossii, XVIII–pervaia polovina 
XX vv: istoricheskii aspekt issledovaniia’ (Kand. dissertation, Rossiiskaia 
ekonomicheskaia akademiia, 2009). With Great Britain: M. Iu. Rodzinskaia, 
‘Russko-angliiskie otnosheniia v shestidesiatykh godakh XVIII v.’, in Trudy 
Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo istoriko-arkhivnogo instituta, 21 (1965), pp. 241-69; Iu. S. 
Medvedev, ‘Russko-angliiskie otnosheniia v seredine XVIII veka (1748–63)’ (Kand. 
dissertation, Rossiiskii universitet druzhby narodov, 2004). With France: E. E. El′ts, 
‘Franko-russkie kul′turnye sviazi vo vtoroi polovine XVIII v.’ (Kand. dissertation, 
Sankt-Peterburgskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 2007). With the Netherlands: 
I. V. Kolosova, ‘Formirovanie i razvitie otnoshenii mezhdu Rossiiskoi imperiei i 
Niderlandami: XVIII–I polovina XIX v.’ (Kand. dissertation, Diplomaticheskaia 
akademiia MID Rossii, 2007). 
5  The “astrolabes” in this chapter are surveying instruments, not planispheric 
astrolabes. This is consistent with Russian terminology (astroliabiia) from the 
eighteenth century onwards. We retain the terminology, although the relevant 
instruments might also be designated in English as circumferentors, or semi-
circumferentors, or graphometers. See W. F. Ryan, ‘Some Observations on the 
History of the Astrolabe and of Two Russian Words: astroljabija and matka’, in 
Studies in Slavic Linguistics and Poetics in Honor of Boris O. Unbegaun (New York and 
London: New York University Press and University of London Press Ltd., 1968), pp. 
155–61. The editors are grateful to Professor Ryan for his advice on the term.
 612. New Technology and the Mapping of Empire: The Adoption of the Astrolabe
encyclopedic approach to scholarship that was typical of the eighteenth 
century. Precise representation of territory helped to enhance the 
orderliness of territorial administration and provided better information 
for use at the state level. 
The production of astrolabes was quite knowledge-intensive. It 
required high-quality raw materials (metal and wood), a well developed 
manufacturing culture, precise measuring instruments, and well trained 
staff. In order for astrolabes to be produced in Russia in large quantities, 
improvements were needed in all these areas. The processes through 
which astrolabes were in the first instance acquired from abroad, and 
then manufactured in Russia, stand as an example of international 
exchange and of the adoption of technical expertise in an important area 
of information technology.
The Russian Imperial procurement of astrolabes from abroad made 
possible the creation of the largest government project to describe the 
territories of the Russian Empire, the Russian General Land Survey, 
which commenced from the middle of the eighteenth century. Over 
the course of the survey, six hundred thousand maps were produced 
in the scale 1:8400, as well as a total of more than 1.3 million documents. 
Generalised maps of Russia created on the basis of these maps began to 
filter into the West, and became the first relatively sound evidence for 
the actual configuration of land in Northeast Eurasia.
Attempts to carry out a universal survey of Russia’s territories had 
also taken place in the first quarter of the eighteenth century. However, 
this survey still depended on mapping instruments inherited from the 
seventeenth century, which were not up to the standard required in 
the new era. Thus, during the Petrine period, the Academy of Sciences 
in St Petersburg began to attract foreign scholars who could help to 
introduce a modern culture of science.6 Among them was the French 
astronomer and geographer Joseph-Nicolas Delisle. His name and that 
of Senate Ober-Secretary I. K. Kirilov are linked with the first attempts to 
create generalised (that is small-scale, general) maps of Russia. Among 
Delisle’s proposals was the greater use of astronomical observations 
in order to increase the accuracy in defining geographical coordinates, 
and a wider distribution of instrumental land surveys. His work also 
6  See G. N. Teterin, Istoriia goedezii v Rossii (do 1917 g.) (Novosibirsk: NIIGAiK, 1992). 
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included the creation of new instruments, for which the French master 
of instruments Pierre Vignon was brought to Russia along with Delisle. 
Figure 1: Plan of 1699 of the environs of Kolomna. Fragment.7
Towards the middle of the century, the demand for maps of Russia 
was so great that there was international competition for the rights 
to astronomical and geographical data on the Russian Empire. The 
publication of material about Delisle’s new geographic data precipitated 
a scandal since publication had been expressly forbidden by the Senate. 
In 1752 Delisle prepared a new map of Russian exploration that included 
7  RGADA, coll. 1209, descr. 77, file 25186. For more detail about maps in the 
seventeenth century, see Valerie Kivelson, Cartographies of Tsardom. The Land and 
its Meanings in Seventeenth-Century Russia (Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 2006). 
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the results of his first and second Kamchatka expeditions.8 G. F. Müller, 
one of the academicians of the Academy of Science in St Petersburg, was 
ordered, under threat of dismissal, to compose a “thorough refutation” 
for foreign journals and to concentrate on publishing new maps as 
soon as possible—both a general map and various specialised maps—
taking into account the latest discoveries, of which Delisle could not 
know. Leonhard Euler, also a distinguished member of the Academy, 
was forced to distribute this letter to various scientific journals under 
threat of being deprived of his pension.9 Another example of such 
competitiveness occurred in relation to a discussion of the fourth volume 
of Novi Commentarii Academiae Scientiarum Imperialis Petropolitanae, the 
official periodical publication of the St Petersburg Academy of Sciences. 
A. N. Grishov, the director of the Astronomical Observatory, requested 
the early publication of his research into the parallax of the moon 
according to observations from St Petersburg in 1752 and the coinciding 
observations at the Cape of Good Hope, so that French scholars could 
not beat Russian scientists to it.10 
In view of this situation, the Russian government began to turn 
its own attention to surveying. However, in addition to knowledge 
of how to make accurate measurements of the land, instruments 
themselves were required. Among these, the most important was 
the astrolabe, the device required for measuring angles and hence 
for producing calculations which are crucial for defining boundaries 
between pieces of land.11 Astrolabes may have appeared in Russia long 
before the era of Peter the Great, but they achieved comparatively 
widespread use during his reign. The first specimens of seventeenth-
century astrolabes that appeared in Russia most likely resembled that 
illustrated in Figure 2:
8  J.-N. Delisle, Explication de la carte des nouvelles découvertes au Nord de la Mer du Sud 
(Paris, 1752). 
9  Letopis′ rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk (St Petersburg: Nauka, 2001), p. 406. 
10  Ibid., p. 421.
11  T. V. Il′iushina, ‘Ot bussoli do astroliabii’, in Nauka v Rossii, 3 (2007), 97–101; V. 
S. Kusov, Izmerenie zemli: Istoriia geodezicheskikh instrumentov (Moscow: Dizain. 
Informatsiia. Kartographiia, 2009). 
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Figure 2: A universal astrolabe (semicircumferentor) with compass. 
Manufactured in the middle of the seventeenth century.12
The type and precise specification of astrolabes used for carrying 
out the General Land Survey is unknown. No examples of surveying 
equipment from the first half of the eighteenth century have been 
preserved either in the collections of the Moscow State University of 
Geodesy and Cartography, or in the Military-Historical Museum of 
Artillery, Engineer and Signal Corps in St Petersburg. The impression of 
what astrolabes of the period looked like is based on drawings found on 
the decorative borders of maps of Russian districts (uezdy) and towns.
Figure 3: Depiction of astrolabes (circumferentors) on the maps of the 
General Land Survey.13
12  Rossiia i Gollandiia: Prostranstvo vzaimodeistviia, XVI–pervaia tret′ XIX veka (Moscow: 
Kuchkovo pole, 2013), p. 311.
13  Plan of the city of Tver with its villages, RGADA, coll. 1356, descr. 1, file 6057; Plan of the 
city of Vesegonsk with its villages, RGADA, coll. 1356, descr. 1, file 6027; Plan of Tver 
province, RGADA, coll. 1356, descr. 1, file 5949. 
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In the first instance the astrolabe is depicted in profile, and the two 
other examples show that the astrolabe with compass was used, i.e. the 
type that could produce a measurement not only of angles between two 
lines, but also in relation to the position of the earth.14
Before the beginning of the General Land Survey, there was not 
enough equipment to carry out the project. For the creation of a full 
equipage of astrolabes and to assist the studies of future surveyors, 
four astrolabes and measuring chains were purchased by the Admiralty 
College (Admiralteistv-Kollegiia) in 1754.15 At first astrolabes were bought 
to Moscow to the Provincial Office of Surveying, and afterwards were 
placed at the Admiralty school.16
Figure 4: The Surveying Process. Two surveyors, armed with an astrolabe, 
apparently corresponding to those imported from England, measure the 
boundaries between plots of land. The head of the surveying party (with a 
sword) looks at the astrolabe and his assistant with a field notebook adjusts it. 
On their left is a man with a cane (the attorney of the landowner) and in the left 
corner of the picture is a peasant with a measuring chain ten fathoms in length. 
Fragment of a map of Iaroslavl Province.17
14  This is confirmed by the fact that on the plans and field notes, angles between two 
lines are fixed, as is the direction of the line in relation to the points of the compass. 
15  Twenty-two rubles and forty-eight kopeks per astrolabe. RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 
82, file 6740, fol. 1258 and 1258a; file 5949. 
16  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 82, file 6740, fol. 1264. 
17 Map of Iaroslavl Province, RGADA, coll. 1356, descr. 1, file 6735.
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At the same time, the question arose of Russian and foreign involvement 
in the production of astrolabes. Initially, in May 1754, the Senate 
sent the Academy of Sciences and the Admiralty College an order to 
manufacture two hundred astrolabes.18 It was clear that the Russian 
makers of astrolabes could not keep up with demand, so the only 
solution was to turn to makers abroad. The Russian ambassador in 
London, Count P. G. Chernyshev, received an order (ukaz): “we must 
get a hundred astrolabes without spirit levels from England […] with 
geodesic instruments”, and “having bought the requested geodesic 
instruments, send them here at once at the Crown’s expense”.19 The 
reference to geodesic instruments in the first message refers to both 
astrolabes and measuring chains, but, as became apparent later, with 
regard to chains, the Russian makers could achieve the required volume 
manufacture on their own. Emphasising the urgency of the work, the 
Senate added: “And if the one hundred astrolabes required cannot be 
bought at once, then buy as many as you can now, and the rest later, but 
buy them as soon as possible, because they are extremely necessary and 
their absence from this summer’s delivery has meant that in Moscow 
Province the surveyors have had to halt work”.20 
Were the astrolabes that had been ordered up to standard with the 
current level of technological development? In answering this question, 
it is necessary to say that in France at roughly the same time, the same 
type of instruments were in general use. These were distinguished 
by their simplicity, and the absence of additional elements such as a 
spyglass or telescope, for example. The most necessary accessory to the 
astrolabe was a compass, which had been requested in order to increase 
the accuracy of measurements.21
In the Academy of Sciences, three astrolabes were already nearly 
finished. Immediately after their completion at the Academy, the 
Senate paid two hundred rubles to increase production.22 Metal for the 
astrolabes was ordered from the director of the Schlisselburg copper 
18  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 82, file 6740, fol. 1231. 
19  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 82, file 6740, fol. 1306.
20  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 82, file 6740, fol. 1305.
21  Il′iushina, ‘Ot bussoli do astroliabii’, p. 101.
22  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 82, file 6740, fol. 1268. See also: P. P. Papkovskii, Iz istorii 
geodezii, topografii i kartografii v Rossii (Moscow: Nauka, 1983); Kusov, Izmerenie 
zemli.
 672. New Technology and the Mapping of Empire: The Adoption of the Astrolabe
factory, Franz Ludwig Popp. Having agreed to make the astrolabes in 
the rough, i.e. without wooden parts (oak or palm wood) and without 
detailed finishing touches, he asked that for every pood (approx. 16.3 
kilograms), he be given eleven rubles and ninety kopeks for all large-
scale detail and sixteen rubles each for fine finishing detail. 
Figure 5: Engraving from Recueil de planches sur les sciences, les arts 
libéraux et les arts méchaniques (1765–72).23
Further work on the astrolabes, including the addition of wooden parts, 
occurred at the Academy of Sciences. The government’s perception 
of the order’s importance can be seen in the speed of payment: the 
instruments were paid for from the Treasury (the College of State 
Expenses—Shtats-Kontor-Kollegiia) almost at once.24 As a result of such 
urgency, the manufacturers had to make the simplest instruments with 
dioptras [a surveying tool originating in the ancient world], omitting 
any telescopic elements.25
Almost immediately the problem of a lack of skilled personnel 
became apparent. The Academy did not have sufficient engineers with 
the necessary qualifications. An order from this period reads, “Due 
to the lack in the Academy of the type of craftsmen skilled in making 
scientific instruments, send Filip Tiriutin to other institutions so he can 
seek out those capable of this type of work, and investigate those he 
23  Artistes de la carte de la Renaissance au XXIe siècle (Paris: Autrement, 2012), p. 85.
24  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 82, file 6740, fol. 1278. On July 20, 2,120 rubles were paid.
25  Ibid.
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finds with a level of skill and availability; moreover, he should seek out 
free craftsmen, and reach an agreement with them at the chancery about 
the price per item and set them to work”.26 The team of workers was 
gathered from many government institutions, “Tiriutin’s apprentices 
made a report to the office of the Academy of Sciences declaring 
that they found qualified workers in state positions to help make 
astrolabes, specifically: in the main artillery, the instrument-maker 
Aleksei Dmitriev; the two coppersmiths, the Spiridon Kukin brothers; 
in the Naval Academy, the instrument maker Grigorii Mogilev, and 
the turner Petr Spalskoi”.27 Those working on the astrolabes were not 
permitted days off, and by January 1755 twenty-four astrolabes had 
been completed.28
Meanwhile the Russian Ambassador to London, Chernyshev, wrote 
that “…although I have continuously visited a large quantity of London 
mathematical experts famous for the quality of their work, […] I have 
not found a corresponding number of finished astrolabes and additional 
instruments”.29 It became clear that sending the pieces from London that 
year as ordered would not work. The distribution of orders between 
different craftsmen did not help. The timely dispatch of the astrolabes 
was also an important issue in light of the late thawing of ice in the port 
of St Petersburg. Delays for this and other logistical reasons were entirely 
possible, so Chernyshev suggested that they be sent “to Hamburg, 
Lübeck or Danzig by water, and shipped from there to St Petersburg 
over dry land, since by this method they may arrive by the beginning 
of the following spring”.30 Another reason to hasten the delivery was 
the absence of customs duties, which occurred with other government 
deliveries and even sometimes in cases of private procurement in which 
the state was particularly interested.31 Insufficient financial means was 
also an obstacle to the speedy fulfilment of the order: the initial deposit 
26  Ibid.
27  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 82, file 6740, fol. 1278v.
28  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 82, file 6741, fol. 22.
29  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 82, file 6740, fol. 1308.
30  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 82, file 6740, fol. 1308v.
31  The same policy was carried out from the reign of Peter I in relation to private 
apothecaries (in the beginning of the Petrine era medicines were without customs 
duties, then duties began to be paid through the Apothecary Chancery). See M. B. 
Mirskii, Ocherki istorii meditsiny v Rossii XVI–XVIII vv. (Vladikavkaz: Goskomizdat 
RSD-A, 1995), pp. 42, 64.
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“of a thousand rubles from the College of Foreign Affairs for the transfer 
still require[d] a bit less than twice that sum”.32
In July 1755 a discussion took place in the Senate about which 
method of delivery to choose. The State Surveyor General-in-Chief and 
Cavalryman Count Petr Ivanovich Shuvalov said that importing one 
hundred astrolabes from England together with the Øresund customs 
duty (for passage across the Strait of Øresund) would cost twenty-one 
rubles and sixty-seven and a quarter kopeks for each, while the astrolabes 
made in the Academy of Sciences cost around forty rubles apiece. In 
connection with this, he suggested the Academy of Sciences should not 
make any more astrolabes, apart from finishing those on which work 
had already begun.33 As a result, the idea of ordering another nine 
hundred astrolabes from England came about, but “to send as many 
as can be found in parts and prepared without making known the full 
number required… so that they will not increase the price”.34
The new Ambassador to England, A. M. Golitsyn, wrote that “the 
craftsmen there do not at present have the finished astrolabes, and they 
cannot complete even a small proportion of them for dispatch by the 
maritime route. The contracts signed with them stipulate that all the 
astrolabes should be made with the appropriate protractors; that they 
be of the same quality and in the same working order as those that were 
previously sent from there; and that they should not cost more than 
the previous price, that is, four pounds and ten shillings sterling each; 
that these craftsmen should produce a total of one hundred and thirty 
astrolabes per month; thus it is expected that all nine hundred should 
be ready by April of 1756”.35 The total cost of the contract stood at 20,773 
rubles and forty kopeks and was paid by the Treasury from a sum which 
had been designated for “emergency expenditure”.36
In order to imagine the magnitude of this sum, we can turn to a 
contemporary example. Jean Armand de L’Estocq, director of the 
Medical Chancery during Elizabeth’s reign, asked to be provided with 
an assistant doctor “experienced in administrative matters, for the 
32  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 82, file 6740, fol. 1306.
33  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 82, file 6741, fol. 974.
34  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 82, file 6741, fol. 974v.
35  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 82, file 6741, fol. 1194v.
36  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 82, file 6742, fol. 167.
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administration of the office of medical affairs under my direction”, and 
also to confirm the new budget, “an overall sum for salaries and for 
the maintenance of that chancery and of the pharmacies” (medicine 
was for the most part obtained from abroad). To cover the cost of sixty 
employees in St Petersburg and Moscow and other expenses, 7,431 
rubles was required.37 In another example, on 16 March 1755, the rector 
of Moscow University, A. M. Argamakov, said that the empress was 
bestowing four thousand rubles on the university library and asked 
the professors for advice on obtaining books. The sum of one thousand 
rubles was additionally to be spent on the acquisition of equipment.38 
However, despite its magnitude, the cost of the contract for the astrolabes 
was no more than 0.5% of English imports to Russia, so scholars who 
analyse export and import, dividing it into up to twenty categories, do 
not separate out the import of goods connected with knowledge-based 
technology.39
The precise date of the delivery of the instruments is unknown, 
but the report on the execution of the order, presented on 27 August 
1756, includes information that “recently these astrolabes arrived”.40 
The government had in vain tried to hurry Chernyshev and Golitsyn 
following the January 1756 signing of the Westminster Treaty by Great 
Britain and Prussia. Great Britain, which had been an ally of Russia for 
more than twenty years, thereby became its rival. Even in the period of 
armed conflict during the Napoleonic Wars, trade between Russia and 
Great Britain was maintained via so-called “licences”,41 but the threat 
of deliveries ceasing was very real.42 In 1791, in connection with the 
Ochakov Crisis during the Russo-Turkish War, the English side laid an 
embargo on the sale of equipment, and problems occurred putting into 
37  Mirskii, Ocherki istorii meditsiny XVI–XVIII vv, p. 94. 
38  Letopis′, p. 426.
39  In particular, N. N. Repin, ‘Vneshniaia torgovlia Rossii cherez Arkhangel′sk i 
Peterburg v 1700-nachale 60-kh gg XVIII v.’ (Dokt. dissertation, Institut istorii SSSR 
(Leningradskoe otdelenie), 1986), pp. 20–21. 
40  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 82, file 6742, fol. 167–8v. This report discusses a return of 
642 rubles and 6 kopeks. 
41  V. G. Sirotkin, ‘Kontinental′naia blokada i russkaia ekonomika (Obzor frantsuzskoi 
i sovetskoi literatury)’, in Voprosy voennoi istorii Rossii (Moscow: Nauka, 1969), pp. 
54–77 (p. 65). 
42  On the other hand, on 29 July 1756, in the company of the president, the English 
envoy W. Henbury visited the Academy (See Letopis′, p. 440.)
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operation a machine for pumping water, for which the necessary parts 
were lacking.43
At the same time, of the two hundred astrolabes being made in the 
Academy of Sciences, only fifty were completed, while the remainder 
had only been started. The original resolution of the Senate meant the 
cessation of work on the unfinished devices, but in the Academy it was 
declared, that “the palm wood and oak, leather for the cases and other 
things have been bought and are already in a state of manufacture, 
and so it is impossible to leave the astrolabes unfinished, because 
otherwise the Treasury’s funds will have been spent in vain…”44 These 
manufacturers therefore denied the government the choice, insisting on 
the continuation of the work. Moreover, by this point, the price of one 
astrolabe had sunk by nearly a quarter: “the astrolabes being made at 
present at the Academy now cost thirty rubles and twenty-five kopeks 
apiece, including materials and labour, but that price is not final, rather 
it is only approximate or estimated by the manufacturers themselves, 
and the actual cost will become known only when all two hundred 
astrolabes have been completed […]”.45
When work on the General Land Survey began in 1765,46 the 
Main Surveying Chancery had about twelve hundred astrolabes in 
its toolroom. This was more than enough for carrying out surveying 
work and training future surveyors. Moreover, this supply played an 
important role in the development of their own manufacturing capability. 
Apart from the manufacture of astrolabes in the Academy of Sciences, 
active training of personnel for manufacture of high technology had 
begun and skilled foreign craftsmen had already arrived as teachers. 
Discussing the conditions for a new contract with the Academy of 
Arts in 1776, the Englishman Francis Morgan spoke of his six students, 
who, with varying degrees of skill, might make astrolabes, electrical 
machines, telescopes, microscopes, or other instruments.47 There was a 
growing preference for a native skills base. Among the responsibilities 
of the Chief Surveying Chancery was the recruitment of personnel for 
43 Cross, By the Banks of the Neva, p. 245.
44  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 82, file 6741, fol. 1236v.
45  Ibid.
46  The General Land Survey was renewed by Catherine II in 1765 after re-thinking. 
47 Cross, By the Banks of the Neva, p. 234
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future surveys. As opposed to other areas of life, where fashion was 
dictated by foreigners (for example, medicine),48 the odds were at once in 
favour of Russian surveyors being chosen. By the end of the eighteenth 
century orders were being supplied by the workshop of the Academy 
of Sciences, headed by Ivan Petrovich Kulibin, and at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century the manufacture of geodesic equipment began 
in the Mechanical Institute of the General Staff under the direction of 
Kornelius Khristianovich Reissig.49 From the middle of the nineteenth 
century, orders for surveying equipment were placed exclusively 
with Russian producers.50 The reason was not protectionism, but that 
Russian firms were by then among the most advanced manufactures of 
surveying equipment. The leading producer was the Russian company 
Boelau (Gustav Boelau was a second generation Russian craftsman).51
As “the sole scale by which to create general maps from specialised 
maps”,52 a Russian-English hybrid was devised: one sazhen (seven feet) 
to an inch. It was invented by General Lieutenant William Fermor,53 the 
Russian-born son of an immigrant from England, together with Ober-
Secretary Glebov in the role of senate advisor. Officially the sazhen was 
introduced in 1797 as the principal unit for measuring distances, on the 
insistence of Charles Gascoigne, the director of the state iron foundries in 
Petrozavodsk, in a statute about weights and measures, and it remained 
the main scale in use until the survey office ceased to function as a result 
of the Revolution of October 1917.54
48  A. A. Golubinskii, ‘Stepan Khrulev: Sud′ba zemlemera’, in Rus′, Rossiia, Srednevekov′e 
i Novoe vremia, vypusk III, Tret′i chteniia pamiati akademika RAN L. V. Milova (Moscow: 
Orgkomitet Chtenii pamiati akademika RAN L. V. Milova, 2013), pp. 404–10. 
49  P. P. Papkovskii, Iz istorii geodezii, topografii i kartografii v Rossii (Moscow: Nauka, 
1983), pp. 11–12.
50  RGADA, coll. 1294, file 40218. 
51  RGIA, coll. 1350, descr. 88, file 362, fol. 1–21.
52  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 82, file 6741, fol. 80.
53  In the very beginning of its existence, during the reign of Elizaveta Petrovna, 
the Chief Surveying Chancery was headed by William Fermor. See Russkii 
Biographicheskii Slovar′, vol. 21 (St Petersburg: Tip. S. N. Skorokhodova, 1901), p. 
53. In 1743–44 Fermor was appointed to conduct an audit and a census, and also to 
survey peasant lands in St Petersburg and Ingria. 
54 Cross, By the Banks of the Neva, p. 237. 
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Figure 6: Fragment of map of the town of Klin.55 An astrolabe with 
compass is visible, a measuring chain and also a scale rule in yards per 
inch of the type adopted by the General Land Survey.
The fates of the astrolabes that were imported to Russia were varied. The 
majority of them were kept in working order until 1765, the beginning 
of the survey under Catherine II. Until that time, the main reserve of 
instruments in the Senate consisted of 611 astrolabes, a quantity of 
measuring chains (in Moscow alone 500 were made), plus tools for 
technical drawing. Moreover, in the College of Estates (Votchinnaia 
kollegiia) there were 206 Russian and British astrolabes. The total of 
British and Russian tools in the Chief Surveying Chancery came to 1,087 
items.56 A considerable number of these were perfectly serviceable until 
the end of the eighteenth century, when, on the one hand because of 
their age,57 and on the other, because of obsolescence (astrolabes with 
spyglasses had begun to appear), they went out of use. Most of the 
astrolabes perished during the occupation of Moscow by Napoleon’s 
55 Plan of the city of Klin with its villages, RGADA, coll. 1356, descr. 1, file 2463. 
56  G. N. Teterin, Istoriia geodezii v Rossii (do 1917 g.) (Novosibirsk: SGGA, 1992).
57  RGADA, coll. 1294, file 15335.
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troops. A barge, loaded with the possessions of the Survey Expedition, 
tried and failed to escape the city. Its cargo included 183 astrolabes, 
which were burnt and dispatched to the depths of the Moscow River.58
The results of boundary surveys carried out with the aid of Russian 
and British instruments transferred across to maps of state land 
allocations, which in their turn became the basis for maps of districts and 
provinces. The results of the surveying project were brought together 
for the first time in the Atlas of the Russian Empire in 1792. This atlas, 
while not free of inaccuracies and errors (especially in the Eastern part 
of the country, where there had not yet been a survey) became the basis 
for the much more complete atlas by V. P. Piadyshev that was issued 
from 1821. Piadyshev’s atlas, in turn, became a source for the ways in 
which, for much of the nineteenth century, the territory of Russia was 
conceptualised. Thus, the import and eventual domestic manufacture of 
the astrolabe led the Russian Empire to collect and process geographic 
information in a modern, scientific manner. This new-found knowledge 
both aligned the empire more closely with Europe and its cartographic 
technologies, and enabled Russia to see its own territory more clearly 
and accurately.
58  RGADA, coll. 1294, descr. 2. According to the index the file number is 27015, but the 





3. Muscovy and the European Information 
Revolution: Creating the Mechanisms for 
Obtaining Foreign News
Daniel C. Waugh and Ingrid Maier1
Treatments of the emergence of European “modernity” invariably 
emphasise the development of mechanisms for the rapid dissemination 
of knowledge. The establishment of postal networks and in the 
seventeenth century the rapid proliferation of printed newspapers made 
possible the sharing of news across political and social boundaries, thus 
contributing to a growing sense of “contemporaneity” on, eventually, a 
Europe-wide scale.2 The degree to which Muscovite Russia participated 
in this “information revolution” has been debated, though the 
impression persists that cultural barriers and conscious choice to a 
considerable degree limited any meaningful connection prior to the era 
of Tsar Peter I “The Great” (r. 1682–1725). 
1  The authors gratefully acknowledge the support provided by The Swedish 
Foundation for Humanities and Social Sciences (Riksbankens jubileumsfond, 
project no. RFP12–0055:1).
2  Wolfgang Behringer, Im Zeichen des Merkur. Reichspost und Kommunikationsrevolution 
in der Frühen Neuzeit. Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichte, 
Bd. 189 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003); Brendan Dooley, ‘Die 
Entstehung von Gleichzeitigkeit im europäischen Bewusstsein auf der Grundlage 
der politischen Nachrichtenpresse’, in Presse und Geschichte: Leistungen und 
Perspektiven der historischen Presseforschung, ed. by Astrid Blome and Holger Böning 
(Bremen: Edition lumière, 2008), 49–66; The Dissemination of News and the Emergence 
of Contemporaneity in Early Modern Europe, ed. by Brendan Dooley (Farnham, Surrey 
and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010).
© 2017 Daniel C. Waugh and Ingrid Maier, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0122.03
78 Daniel C. Waugh and Ingrid Maier
The issue here is not whether there was some degree of 
“Westernisation” prior to Peter, affecting primarily a small segment of 
the Russian elite. That such was the case has long been well known. This 
“Westernisation” involved translation of foreign books, acquisition of 
knowledge about history and geography, adoption of foreign fashion 
or artistic norms, and much more. Our subject here is the acquisition 
of current foreign news in a regular and timely fashion, a process that 
would require establishing a connection with what we might term the 
“state-of-the-art” communications mechanisms shared across much 
of Europe and which could not, ultimately, depend on irregular and 
unpredictable contacts. In the first instance, the evidence is to be found 
in the so-called kuranty, translations and summaries of foreign news 
produced for the Muscovite government. This chapter will trace the 
history of their development and contextualise them with reference to 
the broader European communications revolution of the seventeenth 
century.
Down through history, governments have prioritised the acquisition 
of foreign news that might be relevant to political or military concerns. 
With the development in Muscovy of formal bureaucratic institutions 
and record-keeping, starting in the late fifteenth century, we can begin 
to trace how its government was kept informed of foreign affairs. In 
the first instance, this was through the reports brought back by the 
infrequent embassies sent abroad, or those obtained from foreign visitors 
to Moscow. Military intelligence obtained along the borders presumably 
contributed in important ways to knowledge about immediate 
neighbours but this can be difficult to document. Developments 
which, elsewhere in Europe, were already beginning to revolutionise 
communication—the establishment of the Habsburg Imperial Post, the 
development of extensive networks of correspondents, especially for 
commercial intelligence, and the beginnings of permanent diplomatic 
representation at foreign courts—had as yet no impact in Muscovy. 
Nonetheless, it is possible to document a growing Muscovite awareness 
of the importance of obtaining foreign news. By the middle of the 
sixteenth century, instructions to ambassadors would regularly include 
the requirement to learn about foreign alliances and alignments.3 Even 
3  Knud Rasmussen, ‘On the Information Level of the Muscovite Posol′skij prikaz in 
the Sixteenth Century’, Forschungen zur Osteuropäische Geschichte, 24 (1978), 88–99.
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if there was no regular courier network to ensure rapid communication, 
for extended periods there were, in effect, resident Muscovite 
diplomatic agents in the Crimea, who would report in some detail both 
on Crimean affairs and more broadly about the Ottoman Empire.4 To 
the degree that the acquisition of foreign news was deemed important, 
it was solely for the use of the government, not a response to any kind 
of demand or curiosity on the part of society at large. In this regard, 
throughout the seventeenth century, Muscovy continued to differ from 
the rest of Europe, where private initiatives and the commercialisation 
of news and information networks formed an important part of the 
communications revolution. Except for news which might pertain to 
immediate neighbours of Muscovy, its government only very gradually 
acquired more than a vague understanding of current events farther 
afield and felt no particular urgency to have news of them which might 
be fresh enough to have operative value. 
As Andrew Pettegree has emphasised, news in early modern Europe 
might be transmitted in various media: it would be a mistake to assert, as 
historians of the periodical press have tended to do, that the development 
of printed newspapers (first known from 1605) defines the subject.5 In 
fact, some of the major centres of news acquisition and dissemination 
(Venice being an important example) did not have regularly published 
newspapers, relying rather on irregular separates devoted to events of 
particular significance. There was a large market for broadsides and 
pamphlets, whose content complemented the generally dry “objective” 
political communications in newspaper articles. The separates might 
emphasise religious dispute, contain political polemics, or illustrate 
paranormal or natural wonders. Serious economic information was often 
4  Aleksei V. Vinogradov, Russko-krymskie otnosheniia 50-e–vtoraia polovina 70-kh godov 
XVI veka, 2 v. (Moscow: Institut rossiiskoi istorii RAN, 2007).
5  Andrew Pettegree, The Invention of News: How the World Came to Know about Itself (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2014); cf. Holger Böning, Welteroberung 
durch ein neues Publikum. Die deutsche Presse und der Weg zur Aufklärung. Hamburg und 
Altona als Beispiel. Presse und Geschichte—Neue Beiträge. Bd. 5 (Bremen: Edition 
lumière, 2002), and idem, ‘Ohne Zeitung keine Aufklärung’, in Presse und Geschichte, 
ed. by Blome and Böning, pp. 141–78. Previous to Pettegree’s recent synthesis, 
various authors have adopted a more balanced view about the importance of media 
other than just printed periodical newspapers. See, for example, several of the 
essays in Die Entstehung des Zeitungswesens im 17. Jahrhundert: Ein neues Medium und 
seine Folgen für das Kommunikationssystem der Frühen Neuzeit, ed. by Volker Bauer 
and Holger Böning (Bremen: Edition lumière, 2011). 
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left to the extensive networks of private, handwritten letters. Even those 
who were interested mainly in international politics often preferred to 
rely on information from such trusted correspondents, rather than on 
printed sources. Oral communication of rumour—which, of course, is 
difficult to document—continued to be important. It is essential to keep 
this picture in mind in assessing Muscovite foreign news, especially 
given the fact that before the early eighteenth century there was no such 
thing as a printed newspaper produced in Russia. 
The analysis which follows here is limited by the uneven state of 
the preservation and publication of the primary sources. Prior to the 
seventeenth century, we have only a handful of news pamphlets that 
made their way to Russia and were translated. They are not without 
interest—for example, a report about an earthquake and even a 
pamphlet devoted to Columbus’s discovery of America—but their 
acquisition surely was a matter of chance.6 There is no reason to suspect 
that they hint at any significantly larger body of such news pamphlets 
which Muscovy might have acquired. 
Of greater value here are the reports of Muscovite ambassadors, 
whose files date from the late fifteenth century. What came to be termed 
the stateinye spiski were written reports filed at the end of an embassy.7 
The earliest ones tend to be rather cryptic, probably reflecting the fact 
that much which was transmitted orally was not committed to writing, 
but from the beginning of the second half of the sixteenth century, 
they become increasingly detailed. In the first instance, such reports 
were intended to show that the ambassador had fulfilled precisely 
his instructions and ensured that the honour of his ruler was not in 
any way impugned. Thus we find specifics of diplomatic exchanges 
and descriptions of ceremonies and, occasionally, entertainments. 
Since instructions to ambassadors regularly required that they learn 
of alliances and alignments of the court to which they were sent, the 
stateinye spiski contain often cryptic, formulaic indications about who 
6  Nataliia A. Kazakova, Zapadnaia Evropa v russkoi pis′mennosti XV–XVI vekov. Iz istorii 
mezhdunarodnykh kul′turnykh sviazei Rossii (Leningrad: Nauka, 1980).
7  For a sampling of the texts, see Puteshestviia russkikh poslov, ed. by Dmitrii S. 
Likhachev (Moscow: Izdatel′stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1954); on the procedures 
for composing the reports, see Aleksei A. Novosel′skii, ‘Raznovidnosti krymskikh 
stateinykh spiskov XVII v. i priemy ikh sostavleniia’, Problemy istochnikovedeniia, 9 
(1961), 182–94.
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was friends with whom, hostile to whom, etc. From the end of the 
sixteenth century, the stateinye spiski sometimes include appendices 
with translations of foreign news reports. 
By themselves though, the stateinye spiski sketch an imperfect picture 
of Muscovite news acquisition.8 They inform only on the occasion of 
the dispatch of an embassy. Such foreign missions were infrequent and 
irregular, even though they grew in number during the seventeenth 
century. Since the ambassadors reported only at the end of an embassy 
(until the last third of the seventeenth century, when the European 
postal networks made possible the release of regular dispatches to 
Moscow), the news they brought might be very dated and have little 
operative value by the time it reached the Kremlin. Granted, during any 
negotiation, either abroad or in Moscow, news might be communicated 
in ways that could influence the outcome. That was more likely to be the 
case where foreign embassies were in Moscow than in situations where 
the Russian representatives were abroad, handcuffed by instructions 
that gave them little flexibility to agree on anything of substance without 
first consulting Moscow. 
Since only a small portion of the very extensive archival files of reports 
sent to Moscow by its military governors (voevody) in the seventeenth 
century has been published, it is difficult to document exactly how 
significant such reports were in the acquisition of foreign news. Clearly 
though, these commanders were critical providers of information 
regarding what was going on adjacent to the Muscovite borders.9 Its 
sources could be merchants, other travellers (including, in the South, 
Balkan clerics hoping to obtain financial support in Muscovy), and spies 
sent specifically to gather foreign intelligence. Important news generally 
would be communicated by courier, which meant it might arrive in 
8  Cf. Mikhail A. Alpatov, ‘Chto znal Posol′skii prikaz o Zapadnoi Evrope vo vtoroi 
polovine XVII v.?’, in Istoriia i istoriki. Istoriografiia vseobshchei istorii. Sbornik statei 
(Moscow: Nauka, 1966), 89–129, who relies primarily on them in his assessment of 
the information level of the Ambassadorial Chancery in the seventeenth century. 
Noteworthy among those who have attempted to broaden the perspective offered 
by Alpatov is the late Elena I. Kobzareva, ‘Izvestiia o sobytiiakh v Zapadnoi Evrope 
v dokumentakh Posol′skogo prikaza XVII veka’ (Kand. dissertation, Moskovskii 
gosudarstvennyi universitet, 1988). Her specific examples focus on information 
about England; she pays considerable attention to the kuranty.
9  Nikolai Ogloblin, ‘Voevodskie vestovye otpiski XVII v. kak material po istorii 
Malorossii’, Kievskaia starina, 12 (1885), 365–416.
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timely fashion. While in the first instance the voevody reported to the 
Razriadnyi prikaz (which was in charge of military service appointments), 
news of particular interest regarding foreign affairs might also be 
quickly forwarded to the Ambassadorial Chancery (Posol′skii prikaz) or 
one of the departments with regional competence such as the Chancery 
for Ukrainian Affairs (Malorossiiskii prikaz). While systematic study of 
such material is a task for the future, arguably the reports by the border 
commanders constituted perhaps the single most significant source of 
foreign news for the Kremlin, focussed as they were on matters directly 
relevant to the state’s security. While such reports might include news 
from further afield, the government needed to develop mechanisms 
which would ensure its regular and timely acquisition. In this then lies 
the story of the Muscovite kuranty, which is inseparable from the history 
of Muscovy’s foreign post.
The term kuranty here will be used as a shorthand to designate a 
wide range of translated news sources acquired in Muscovy during the 
seventeenth century. In the Muscovite context, the term first appears 
around 1650, borrowed from the titles of some (especially Dutch) 
newspapers,10 but in fact the acquisition of such sources and their 
translation has an earlier history. 
Since the kuranty had first become known to scholars only from 
fragmentary publication of a few texts, there was little serious study of 
these news sources until the last decades of the twentieth century. To the 
degree that there had been any interest, the focus was on the question 
of whether they presaged the first publication of newspapers in Russia 
initiated under Tsar Peter I.11 The mistaken notion that they were the 
equivalent of a “newspaper” is one we question in our conclusion. In 
his Ph.D. dissertation, Daniel Waugh devoted a chapter to the kuranty, 
exploring in a limited way the relationship between the translations 
10  Daniel Clarke Waugh, ‘Seventeenth-Century Muscovite Pamphlets with Turkish 
Themes: Toward a Study of Muscovite Literary Culture in Its European Setting’ 
(Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1972), App. IIa, pp. 447–51, http://faculty.
washington.edu/dwaugh/publications/kurantyterminologydissappIIa.pdf; Stepan 
M. Shamin, ‘Slovo “kuranty” v russkom iazyke XVII–XVIII v.’, Russkii iazyk v 
nauchnom osveshchenii, 1. 13 (2007), 119–52. 
11  A. N. Shlosberg, ‘Nachalo periodicheskoi pechati v Rossii’, Zhurnal Ministerstva 
narodnogo prosveshcheniia, 35. 2 (September 1911), 63–135; Aleksei A. Pokrovskii, 
‘K istorii gazety v Rossii’, in Vedomosti vremeni Petra Velikogo, vyp. 2: 1709–19 gg. 
(Moskva: Sinodal′naia tipografiia, 1906), pp. 1–98.
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and some of their sources, and in the context of examining Muscovite 
writings about the Turks looked more broadly at a range of translated 
pamphlets which seemed to have been produced in conjunction 
with the Muscovite acquisition of foreign news.12 One real obstacle 
to meaningful study of the texts had been the limited knowledge of 
their foreign sources. What turned out to be extensive files of Western 
newspapers acquired in seventeenth-century Moscow had lain largely 
untouched in the Russian archives, and the labour-intensive process of 
locating additional sources in multiple repositories outside Russia had 
not begun. The publication of a few of the original newspapers in the 
vesti-kuranty series launched in 1972 (see below) enabled Roland Schibli 
to write a detailed monograph exploring the translation techniques at 
least for a limited period in the first half of the seventeenth century.13 
The work of Ingrid Maier has opened a new era in the study of the texts, 
as, almost single-handedly, she has been responsible for locating many 
of the originals the translators used and thus has been able substantially 
to expand our knowledge about virtually every aspect of the way the 
sources were processed by the translators in Muscovy. Her work for 
the first time provided a meaningful comparative perspective from the 
history of the European press, and her monograph-length treatment 
of the subject accompanies the first major compendium of the foreign 
source texts.14 Fortunately, on the Russian side, we also now have the 
contributions of Stepan Shamin, whose published kandidat dissertation 
on the kuranty in the time of Tsar Fedor Alekseevich (r. 1676–82) provides 
valuable information about the process of news acquisition, the content 
of texts, the instances where it is possible to document dissemination of 
texts outside the chancery milieu and more.15 
12  Waugh, ‘Muscovite Pamphlets’, Ch. 2, http://faculty.washington.edu/dwaugh/
publications/muscovitekurantydissch2text.pdf and http://faculty.washington.edu/
dwaugh/publications/muscovitekurantydissch2notes.pdf. For his publications 
based on the dissertation, see citations in various notes below.
13  Roland Schibli, Die ältesten russischen Zeitungsübersetzungen (Vesti-Kuranty), 1600–
50. Quellenkunde, Lehnwortschatz und Toponomastik. Slavica Helvetica, Bd. 29 (Bern 
and New York: Peter Lang, 1988).
14  See her ‘Vvodnaia chast′’, introduction to V-K VI/2, whose full citation is in n. 16. 
Many of her other publications are cited below.
15  Stepan M. Shamin, Kuranty XVII stoletiia. Evropeiskaia pressa v Rossii i vozniknovenie 
russkoi periodicheskoi pechati (Moscow and St Petersburg: Al′ians-Arkheo, 2011).
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The systematic publication of the texts began in 1972 in a series given 
the generic title Vesti-kuranty, reflecting the fact that often the news (vesti) 
came not from published newspapers but from manuscript newsletters 
or other sources.16 Unfortunately, decisions about what to include in 
the Vesti-kuranty series (hereafter abbreviated to its generic title V-K) 
mean that it is far from a complete record of foreign news arriving and 
translated in Moscow, since many of the archival foreign relations files 
have not been systematically explored to identify relevant material. That 
said, the kuranty that are available offer a reasonable approximation of 
the flow of foreign news and clear evidence as to how it was processed.
Documents in the first five volumes of the series (ostensibly covering 
the period from 1600 through the 1650s) leave us with the impression 
that news acquisition was unpredictable, vacillating between some 
periods of intensive and regular communication, and long periods 
when there was nothing (perhaps, of course, a reflection of poor 
preservation, rather than an indication of an actual void). Frequently the 
Russian translations of that period were based on news handed over to 
the Muscovite authorities by foreign merchants or agents, their sources 
being either printed newspapers or manuscript newsletters. Dutch 
merchants and entrepreneurs—Isaac Massa, Georg Klenck (Iurii Klink) 
and Carp Demulin are among them—provided a good many of the early 
foreign news sources.17 These sources often provide no information 
regarding the initiative for the supplying of such news: surely many 
of the foreigners voluntarily provided it, presumably in the hope of 
solidifying their position in the eyes of the Muscovite authorities, but 
one also has to imagine that pressures were exerted to ensure that 
information received through private correspondence was shared with 
16  The volumes are: Vesti-kuranty: vols 1–5: I (1600–39); II (1642–44); III (1645–46, 1648); 
IV (1648–50); V (1651–52, 1654–55, 1658–60), ed. by N. I. Tarabasova, V. G. Dem′ianov 
et al. (Moscow: Nauka, 1972; 1976; 1980; 1983; 1996) [hereafter abbreviated V-K I, II, 
etc.], vol. 6, pt. 1, Russkie teksty, 1656, 1660–62, 1664–70, ed. by A. M. Moldovan 
and Ingrid Maier (Moscow: Rukopisnye pamiatniki drevnei Rusi, 2009) [hereafter: 
V-K VI/1], vol. 6, pt. 2, Inostrannye originaly k russkim tekstam, ed. by Ingrid Maier 
(Moscow: Iazyki slavianskikh kul′tur, 2008) [hereafter: V-K VI/2]. For a detailed 
review of V-K I, see Daniel C. Waugh, ‘The Publication of Muscovite Kuranty’, Kritika, 
9. 3 (1973), 104–20; a detailed review of V-K V, by Vadim Borisovich Krys′ko and 
Ingrid Maier, in Russian Linguistics, 21 (1997), 301–10. It was only with publication 
of V-K VI that the deficiencies noted in those reviews began to be addressed. 
17  See V-K I, passim. For a review of the transmission and processing of foreign news 
in this period, see Schibli, Die ältesten russischen Zeitungsübersetzungen, esp. Ch. 2.
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the Russian officials. It was a normal procedure that foreigners would 
be interrogated on arrival in Muscovy. Since such news often came into 
Muscovy via the Northern route from the White Sea, by the time reports 
about events in Western Europe reached the Kremlin, they might be 
several months old. Furthermore, navigation via the Northern route 
extended only over a relatively short period of summer months. 
News arriving via Arkhangelsk would continue to be translated in 
subsequent decades. However, improvements to this irregular and slow 
transit would perforce involve more direct routes via the Baltic, taking 
advantage of the developing Northern European postal and merchant 
networks. Annotations on many of the news compilations indicate that 
they were forwarded from Pskov or Novgorod. In 1631, a certain Melchior 
Beckmann sent newsletters from Stockholm.18 For more than a decade 
beginning in 1636, a Swedish resident in Moscow, Peter Krusbjörn, 
supplied a substantial number of news reports.19 His successor Karl 
Pommering took up where Krusbjörn left off.20 There were opportunities 
for the Muscovite Ambassadorial Chancery to hire agents who might 
supply news on a regular basis. A Rigan, who wrote under the nom-de-
plume of Justus Filimonatus, offered to send news to Moscow, and in fact 
over more than half a year between late 1643 and mid-1644 submitted a 
series of reports from Riga and Danzig.21 In the 1640s, we increasingly 
see Peter Marselis, an important Danish entrepreneur, among those 
supplying news. His sons would later, for a brief period, run the 
Muscovite foreign post. John Hebdon, who subsequently would carry 
out commissions for Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich, also became a supplier 
of news in the 1640s. One of the impressive instances of intensive news 
acquisition came when a Muscovite embassy was in Stockholm between 
June and October 1649, from which it transmitted translations of foreign 
news via courier on a weekly basis over several months. Twenty of these 
translations have been preserved.22 The most important source was the 
18  V-K I, pp. 133–38, 161–62.
19  V-K I, pp. 167–76, 182–92, 204–07, 209–14; V-K II, pp. 11–14, 50, 88–91, 122–23, 
125–26, 207–09; V-K III, pp. 78–82, 121–30.
20  E.g., V-K III, pp. 190–96. 
21  V-K II, pp. 40–43, 54–55, 59–74, 76–80, 83–84, 97–103, 109–13, 126, 131–38, 146–47, 
167–72, 178–83.
22  V-K IV, pp. 97–169. For an analysis, see Ingrid Maier, ‘Newspaper Translations 
in Seventeenth-Century Muscovy. About the Sources, Topics and Periodicity of 
Kuranty “Made in Stockholm” (1649)’, in Explorare necesse est. Hyllningsskrift till 
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Wochentliche Zeitung published in Hamburg. Overall, despite some 
gaps we might attribute to vagaries of preservation, the quantity and 
coverage of foreign news received in Moscow in the 1640s is impressive.
Even if their acquisition was irregular, strikingly the first foreign 
newspapers made their way to Russia within a relatively short time 
after they had first begun to appear on a regular basis in the West.23 The 
earliest evidence for a weekly newspaper in Europe is from 1605, with 
the earliest known examples from 1609. By 1620, there were already 
several regularly published German and Dutch newspapers and the 
first in English and French (printed in the Netherlands). As early as 1621, 
only three years after the first appearance of a Dutch weekly newspaper, 
at least a couple of numbers had arrived in Moscow where they were 
translated. Translations into Russian from German newspapers also 
date from this year. During the first half of the seventeenth century, 
it seems that the German newspapers, primarily those published in 
Hamburg, were much more often the sources for kuranty than were the 
Dutch (primarily from Amsterdam). The Russian archival files preserve 
only occasional copies of the foreign newspapers which served as 
sources for the kuranty during the first half of the seventeenth century, 
the earliest German example dating from 1631 and earliest Dutch 
newspaper from 1646. Yet it was precisely these files that first drew 
the attention of historians in the first half of the nineteenth century to 
the Muscovite acquisition of foreign news. For the second half of the 
seventeenth century, the state of preservation is substantially better—
over 2600 individual numbers of the German papers, most of which are 
unique copies not preserved in other European collections, and more 
than 650 numbers of Dutch newspapers.24 
In the circumstances in which it seems relatively few of the 
newspapers were making their way to Moscow, the initial response 
of the Ambassadorial Chancery seems to have been to translate large 
Barbro Nilsson. Acta Universitatis Stockholmensis. Stockholm Slavic Studies, vol. 28 
(Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 2002), 181–90.
23 Maier, ‘Vvodnaia chast′’, introduction to V-K VI/2, pp. 29, 53–57.
24  V. I. Simonov, ‘Deutsche Zeitungen des 17. Jahrhunderts im Zentralen Staatsarchiv 
für alte Akten (CGADA), Moskau’, Gutenberg-Jahrbuch (1979), 210–20; Ingrid Maier, 
‘Niederländische Zeitungen (‘Couranten’) des 17. Jahrhunderts im Russischen 
Staatsarchiv für alte Akten (RGADA), Moskau’, Gutenberg-Jahrbuch (2004), 191–218.
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portions of them, if not necessarily their entirety.25 The result was 
the availability in Russian of a substantial collection of news about 
the events of the Thirty Years War, often containing detail that surely 
would have been meaningless to a reader in Muscovy and of no direct 
relevance for the shaping of Muscovite foreign policy. By the time of 
the Russian embassy in Stockholm in 1649, clearly the translators 
were being selective, using parts of some articles, omitting others, and 
combining material from several sources.26 In addition to the newspaper 
accounts, the officials in the Kremlin received and had translated larger 
separates. They had the entire texts of treaties, including the Swedish-
Danish treaty of Brömsebro27 in 1645, the treaty between the Netherlands 
and Spain of January 1648 in Münster, and that between the German 
Empire and Sweden in summer 1648 in Osnabrück—thus, two of the 
three treaties which ended the Thirty Years War in 1648.28 They obtained 
texts of pamphlets with the famous appeal of King Charles I and later a 
description of his execution in 1649, an event which offended the tsar’s 
government and resulted in the curbing of English trading privileges.29 
Since copies happened to be received (not, it seems, consciously sought 
out by the chancery) of extended accounts concerning the miraculous 
cures effected at the waters of the much-frequented Protestant spa at 
Hornhausen in Northern Germany, those too were translated.30 Surely 
this material would have struck a chord amongst those in Moscow 
25  See the analysis by Schibli, Die ältesten russischen Zeitungsübersetzungen.
26 Maier, ‘Newspaper Translations’, p. 188.
27  V-K III, pp. 21–39. See Ingrid Maier, Verbalrektion in den ‘Vesti Kuranty’ (1600–60). Eine 
historisch philologische Untersuchung zur mittelrussischen Syntax. Acta Universitatis 
Upsaliensis. Studia Slavica Upsaliensia, 38 (Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 
1997), pp. 37–41.
28  V-K III, pp. 161–79; V-K IV, pp. 13–64. See Maier, Verbalrektion, pp. 41–60.
29  V-K III, pp. 159–61; V-K IV, pp. 82–85. On the translation of Charles I’s ‘Declaration 
to all His Subjects’, see Ingrid Maier and Nikita Mikhaylov, ‘“Korolevskii izvet ko 
vsem ego poddannym” (1648 g.)—pervyi russkii perevod angliiskogo pechatnogo 
teksta?’, Russian Linguistics, 33 (2009), 289–317.
30  V-K III, nos. 48–49, pp. 133–42, and nos. P8–9, pp. 241–51. The first of these texts, 
no. 48 (see Maier, Verbalrektion, pp. 72–74), is a complete translation of Gründlicher 
unnd Warhaffter Bericht/ von dem Wundersamen Heilbrunnen/ so newlicher Zeit auß 
sonderbahrer Göttlicher Gnade/ in dem Stifft Halberstadt bey einem Dorff Hornhausen 
genant […] (n.p., n.d. [1646]). The second text, no. 49, is an almost complete 
translation of Weiterer Bericht Von dem wundersamen Heyl-Brunnen/ Welcher von einem 
Knaben/ als derselbe am fünfften Martii auß der Schuel gegangen/ zuerst erfunden worden 
[…] (n.p., 1646).
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familiar with the listings of cures appended to saints’ lives and tales 
about miracle-working icons. Indeed, accounts of the paranormal, 
including prognostications by self-proclaimed holy men, formed part of 
the output of the translators in the Ambassadorial Chancery, alongside 
propaganda that included fictive missives from the Ottoman sultan 
threatening death and destruction to Christian Europe.31 
The real push to regularise the acquisition of foreign news dates 
from the reign of the second Romanov, Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich 
(1645–76). An important reason for this appears to have been the 
personality and intellectual interests of the tsar himself. While we lack 
details, we know that part of his youthful education included exposure 
to European broadsides. The inventory of his Privy Chancery (Prikaz 
tainykh del), which had been created at the beginning of the long war 
against Poland in 1655 and was disbanded only after the tsar’s death in 
1676, offers ample evidence about his broad interests.32 Among the files 
were many stateinye spiski and, significanctly, long runs of the kuranty. 
In an instruction to his chief foreign affairs adviser Afanasii Ordin-
Nashchokin in 1659, the tsar indicated he wanted to be supplied with 
foreign news on a monthly basis.33 Soon afterwards, a Russian embassy 
to England and Italy was tasked with exploring the possibilities of 
engaging regular correspondents to send news to Moscow, though it 
seems no concrete arrangements followed. It is hardly a surprise that 
when the Muscovite foreign post was finally established in 1665, it was 
under the auspices of Aleksei Mikhailovich’s Privy Chancery, with the 
31  Stepan M. Shamin, ‘“Skazanie o dvukh startsakh”: K voprosu o bytovanii 
evropeiskogo eskhatologicheskogo prorochestva v Rossii’, Vestnik tserkovnoi 
istorii, 2008, 2 (10), 221–48; D. K. Uo [Daniel C. Waugh], Istoriia odnoi knigi: Viatka 
i “nesovremennost′” v russkoi kul′ture Petrovskogo vremeni (St Petersburg: Dmitrii 
Bulanin, 2003), pp. 48–53, 100–02, 294–95, 298–301; Daniel C. Waugh, The Great 
Turkes Defiance: On the History of the Apocryphal Correspondence of the Ottoman Sultan 
in Its Muscovite and Russian Variants, with a foreword by Academician Dmitrii 
Sergeevich Likhachev (Columbus, OH: Slavica Publishers, 1978).
32  Daniel C. Waugh, ‘The Library of Aleksei Mikhailovich’, Forschungen zur 
osteuropäischen Geschichte, 38 (1986), 299–324; idem, ‘Azbuka znakami lits: Egyptian 
Hieroglyphs in the Privy Chancellery Archive’, Oxford Slavonic Papers, 10 (1977), 
46–50 [with four plates]; idem, ‘Tekst o nebesnom znamenii 1672 g. (k istorii 
evropeiskikh sviazei moskovskoi kul′tury poslednei treti XVII v.)’, in Problemy 
izucheniia kul′turnogo naslediia (Moscow: Nauka, 1985), 201–08.
33  Shamin, Kuranty, pp. 83–84.
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explicit purpose of obtaining foreign news on a regular basis.34 Some 
credit the initiative to Ordin-Nashchokin, although direct evidence is 
lacking. He certainly had shown initiative earlier in establishing his 
own network of correspondents across the Northern borders, and had 
been one of the suppliers of foreign news to the tsar.
In May 1665, a postal contract was drawn up with the Dutch 
entrepreneur Johann van Sweeden, who had for some time been active 
in Muscovy.35 He was to be paid a lump sum each year to maintain 
a postal route to Riga with predictable bi-weekly deliveries of foreign 
news. Van Sweeden’s system was independent of the long-standing 
Muscovite network of horse relays (the iamskaia gon′ba). His riders 
had to wear uniform clearly marked with postal insignia. It was his 
responsibility to negotiate with the postmaster in Swedish-held Riga the 
details of the schedule and what news was to be acquired. 
This arrangement through a private contractor was not unusual in 
the larger context of the various efforts by the Muscovite government 
in the seventeenth century to tap foreign expertise, which in the first 
instance had been for the improvement of the Muscovite military by 
hiring mercenaries and raising arms production to a more efficient and 
technically advanced level. Nor was it unusual elsewhere in Europe 
when new postal networks were being established, to contract them 
to entrepreneurs who might have had some previous experience in 
managing such a system.36 Just as in Muscovy, so elsewhere in Europe 
the development of the post and the dissemination of news went 
hand in hand: European postmasters often were the collectors and 
34  For details on the early history of the Muscovite post, see D. Uo [Waugh] ‘Istoki 
sozdaniia mezhdunarodnoi pochtovoi sluzhby Moskovskogo gosudarstva v 
evropeiskom kontekste’, Ocherki feodal′noi Rossii, 19 (2017), 394–442. A good 
overview of Muscovy’s Riga postal connection is Enn Küng, ‘Postal Relations 
Between Riga and Moscow in the Second Half of the 17th Century’, Past: Special 
Issue on the History of Estonia (Tartu-Tallinn: National Archives, 2009), 59–81. The 
still unsurpassed history of the Muscovite post throughout the second half of 
the seventeenth century is I. P. Kozlovskii, Pervye pochty i pervye pochtmeistery v 
moskovskom gosudarstve, 2 vols (Warsaw: Tip. Varshavskogo uchebnogo okruga, 
1913), in which vol. 2 contains most of the important archival documents.
35  For the text, Waugh, ‘Muscovite Pamphlets’, App. IIc, pp. 510–12, http://faculty.
washington.edu/dwaugh/publications/vansweedencontractdissappIIc.pdf. On van 
Sweeden, see Kozlovskii, Pervye pochty, vol. 1, pp. 60–62. 
36  See, e.g., Karl Heinz Kremer, Johann von den Birghden 1582–1645. Kaiserlicher und 
königlich-schwedischer Postmeister zu Frankfurt am Main (Bremen: Edition lumière, 
2005).
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purveyors (even publishers) of newspapers. A generation earlier, a 
Muscovite foreign post probably would have been impossible, given the 
fragmented and often contentious nature of the various postal services 
in Northeastern Europe. Even if there were still improvements to be 
made and conflicts to be adjudicated, by the 1660s the postal networks 
in the Baltic region, which extended through the Northern German 
states West to Antwerp, South into Italy, and North into Sweden, were 
in place.37 To connect Muscovy via Riga, between which there had 
already been quite regular communication, was a logical next step. 
Despite the fact that van Sweeden seems to have had no previous 
experience in running a postal network, as near as we can tell he did 
manage to fulfill the terms of his contract and provide news from 
Riga on a bi-weekly basis.38 Even though van Sweeden’s contract was 
renewed in 1668, in that same year the management of the post was 
abruptly handed over instead to the Marselis family, who enjoyed the 
favour of Ordin-Nashchokin. Apart from personal loyalties, the move 
may in part reflect an effort by Ordin-Nashchokin, now in charge of the 
Ambassadorial Chancery, to streamline the management of Muscovite 
foreign affairs. The post was now delivered to his department, not 
routed first to the tsar’s Privy Chancery. When Ordin-Nashchokin lost 
his position in 1671, the post was handed over to Andrei Vinius, only to 
have it come back to Leonhardt Marselis when Vinius was sent abroad 
on a foreign embassy that lasted from 1672 to 1674. 
Under the Marselises, there was a substantial reorganisation (and 
upgrading) of the service, with the posts running weekly to both Riga 
and Vilna. The latter route was necessitated by the Truce of Andrusovo 
(1667), which established diplomatic residents of Poland-Lithuania 
and Muscovy in the respective capitals, requiring that they be able to 
communicate on a regular basis with their superiors. Moreover, the post 
was no longer to be an independent, private transport service; instead it 
was to use the Muscovite horse relays, within which system some carriers 
37  See Pārsla Pētersone, ‘Entstehung und Moderisierung der Post- und 
Verkehrsverbindungen im Baltikum im 17. Jahrhundert’, Liber Annalis Institut 
Baltici (Acta Baltica, 35) (Königstein im Taunus, 1997), 199–218; Küng, ‘Postal 
Relations’; Magnus Linnarsson, ‘The Development of the Swedish Post Office, c. 
1600–1721’, in Heiko Droste, ed., Connecting the Baltic Area: The Swedish Postal System 
in the Seventeenth Century (Stockholm: Södertörns högskola, 2011), pp. 25–47.
38  For details, see Uo, ‘Istoki sozdaniia’.
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were to be assigned specifically to postal duties and expected to keep to 
a regular schedule. Maintaining the schedule was not always easy, the 
initial targets for transit times were overly optimistic, the riders often 
incompetent (or drunk), and weather and road conditions hindered 
speedy travel.39 However, it seems that the Marselises did manage to 
establish a regular schedule, if with somewhat slower delivery than had 
originally been envisaged. An English embassy in Moscow in 1669 was 
able to send weekly reports back to London through the post.40 Under 
optimal conditions, those letters spent a little over a month in transit. A 
year or so later, a Swedish resident in Moscow, the Reval-born merchant 
Christoff Koch (later ennobled von Kochen), began to send weekly 
reports via Novgorod (which was on the Riga postal route) to Narva, 
which were copied there and sent to Reval, Stockholm and probably to 
other places.41 The Swedish diplomat Johann Kilburger, writing in detail 
about Muscovy and its trade in 1674, indicated that the elapsed time for 
mail between Riga and Moscow was nine to eleven days, which was 
certainly faster than had been possible a few years earlier.42 Nine days 
may be somewhat optimistic. In the 1690s, for which we have a decent 
run of statistics for the route, it seemed to deliver the mail between the 
39  See Kozlovskii, Pervye pochty, for much of the relevant documentation. Weather 
could interrupt the normally regular postal deliveries elsewhere in Europe as 
described in reports sent to London by English agents in Hamburg. The winter of 
1667 seems to have been especially severe. On 26 January 1667, the English agent 
reported “The northern posts for the most are yet to come w-ch. delay is onely 
caus’d by the great quantity of snow in Suedeland & the Danish streames frozen” 
(National Archives, London, SP 101/39, unpaginated, newsletter addressed to 
Joseph Williamson at Whitehall, probably sent from Hamburg on the same date).
40  The reports from the embassy headed by Sir Peter Wyche between June and October 
are in the National Archives, London, SP 91/3. While there are a few gaps (possibly 
due simply to the loss of a letter), the dates suggest weekly communication.
41  For the early part of the communications which Koch sent from Moscow to the 
Swedish governor in Narva on nearly a weekly basis, see Riksarkivet (Stockholm), 
E4304, Bengt Horns Samling. A forthcoming article by Heiko Droste and Ingrid 
Maier, ‘Christoff Koch (1637–1711)—Sweden’s Man in Moscow’ (forthcoming in 
Travelling Chronicles: Episodes in the History of News and Newspapers from the Early 
Modern Period to the Eighteenth Century, ed. by Siv Gøril Brandtzæg, Paul Goring 
and Christine Watson), will discuss his reports and this network; see also Maier’s 
chapter on the reports about Stepan Razin in the present volume. 
42  See Boris G. Kurts, Sochinenie Kil′burgera o russkoi torgovle v tsarstvovanie Alekseia 
Mikhailovicha (Kiev: Tip. I. I. Chokolova, 1915), p. 160.
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two cities in about eleven days with reasonable consistency (counting 
the day of departure and day of arrival).43 
The Vilna route also ran efficiently for a time and certainly was actively 
used by Vasilii Tiapkin during his residency in Poland from 1673 to 
1677.44 However once he left (and the Polish resident also had departed 
Moscow) the route became increasingly problematic, maintained in the 
first instance because of the continuing negotiations between the two 
countries which would result in the “Permanent Peace” of 1686.
In the final quarter of the seventeenth century, the Muscovite foreign 
post was managed by Andrei Vinius, whose Dutch father had come to 
Muscovy as an entrepreneur. The younger Vinius was probably born 
in Moscow, must have grown up bilingual, and from an early age, 
starting in the mid-1660s, served as a translator in the Ambassadorial 
Chancery.45 He surely would have been involved in the translation of 
Dutch and probably also German newspapers; we have a number of 
other translations written during his long career in Russian service, 
which lasted until his death in 1717. Even before he became postmaster, 
Vinius would have been one of the best informed Muscovite officials 
regarding European affairs; that, plus his language competence, would 
explain why he was selected to travel as an ambassador to several 
European states in 1672 in what would prove to be an unsuccessful 
effort to build a European coalition to fight the Turks.46 On his return, 
he assumed the postmastership, eventually taking on other important 
administrative responsibilities. So busy had he become in the 1690s that 
for a time his son Matvei officially took over the post, even though there 
is good reason to believe that his father continued to manage it.
43  Daniel C. Waugh, ‘The Best Connected Man in Muscovy? Patrick Gordon’s 
Evidence Regarding Communications in Muscovy in the 17th Century’, Journal of 
Irish and Scottish Studies, 7. 2 (2014 [2015]), 61–124 (pp. 96–97).
44  Aleksandr N. Popov, Russkoe posol′stvo v Pol′she v 1673–1677 godakh. Neskol′ko let iz 
istorii otnoshenii drevnei Rossii k evropeiskim derzhavam (St Petersburg: Tip. Morskogo 
kadetskago korpusa, 1854).
45  For Vinius’s management of the post, the fundamental work remains Kozlovskii, 
Pervye pochty, starting with Ch. 4. More generally for his biography, the fullest 
treatment is Igor′ N. Iurkin, Andrei Andreevich Vinius, 1641–1716 (Moscow: Nauka, 
2007).
46  Nataliia A. Kazakova, ‘A. A. Vinius i stateinyi spisok ego posol′stva v Angliiu, 
Frantsiiu i Ispaniiu v 1672–74 g.’, Trudy Otdela drevnerusskoi literatury, 39 (1985), 
348–64.
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In Muscovy, Vinius never could assume the role sometimes taken 
by foreign postmasters, simultaneously becoming the publisher of a 
newspaper. However, there is good reason to think that Vinius was a key 
figure in the processing and dissemination of foreign news in Muscovy, 
beyond his obvious involvement in acquiring the foreign news materials 
and facilitating their translation and summary. Insights into Vinius’s 
role in news dissemination can be gained from the diary of the Scottish 
mercenary Patrick Gordon. When in Moscow, Gordon would often 
meet with him; when abroad, Gordon sent Vinius reports on a regular 
basis, and when posted in Ukraine, through his correspondence with 
Vinius back in Moscow, Gordon regularly received news, sometimes 
in the form of published newspapers. In general, there seems to have 
been extensive exchange of foreign news amongst the Muscovite elite 
connected with the court. Arguably, Vinius stood at the centre of this 
web of information. 
The documents relating to Vinius’s management of the posts make it 
clear that he understood their significance for the acquisition of foreign 
news. When he was arguing for the closure of the Vilna route in 1681, 
on the basis of its being little used and too costly, he buttressed his case 
by stating:
And the Imperial and Dutch newspapers, which formerly were sent 
through the Vilna post, are now sent as well from Königsberg through 
Riga, and in addition, according to my agreement with the printer of 
the Riga newspapers, a third set of newspapers—the Riga ones—are 
now being sent, which never were received previously. And in these 
newspapers there is always more Polish and Swedish news than in the 
Königsberg or Dutch ones.47 
In the summer of 1683 he added:
And since 1681 only the Riga post has been running, and they have 
undertaken to send through the Riga post every week without 
interruption all the news of what is happening in Europe and in some 
parts of Asia.48 
These comments highlight shifts in the importance of various foreign 
news sources as the seventeenth century progressed, even if Vinius 
47  Kozlovskii, Pervye pochty, vol. 2, pp. 57–58.
48  Ibid., p. 69.
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might have stretched the facts in order to strengthen his argument. 
Oddly, during the first year Tiapkin was in Poland, hardly any foreign 
newspapers arrived via the Vilna route, a fact Shamin explains by 
suggesting Tiapkin’s own reports superseded them.49 While some of 
the Dutch papers continued to be received and excerpted regularly, 
we know that amongst the German newspapers, those published in 
Berlin were extremely popular in Moscow in the period between 1668 
and 1676.50 Königsberg papers similarly became very significant as 
sources for news in Muscovy, since, until the appearance of published 
newspapers in Riga (from 1681, at the latest), they were issued closest to 
the Muscovite borders, were full of news directly relevant to Muscovite 
interests, and could be obtained rapidly via the Vilna post. Kilburger 
specifically mentions in 1674 the regular receipt and translation of 
Hamburg, Königsberg and Dutch printed newspapers as well as 
manuscript newsletters.51 To the degree that statistics of preserved copies 
of the German papers from this period in the Moscow archives might 
reflect their relative popularity, newpapers published in Danzig were 
third behind those of Berlin and Königsberg. So far there is no reason to 
think that what we know about the composition of the sources for the 
kuranty translations during 1671–72 (those years to be covered in the 
next volume of the V-K series) will change significantly for succeeding 
years of the seventeenth century.
With the regularisation of the acquisition of foreign news (as a result 
of the establishment of the foreign post) clear patterns emerge in the way 
the Kremlin dealt with what was now, for Muscovy, a constant surfeit 
of information.52 When both the Riga and Vilna posts were functioning 
according to schedule, from six to eight news deliveries a month might 
arrive in Moscow. The translators had no choice but to be very selective 
if the news was to be made available in Russian without delay as soon 
as it had arrived through the mail. 
While there are exceptions involving the translation of foreign 
reports undertaken by members of a Muscovite embassy abroad or 
49  Shamin, Kuranty, p. 89.
50 Maier, ‘Vvodnaia chast′’, pp. 77–81; Simonov, ‘Deutsche Zeitungen’. 
51  Kurts, Sochinenie Kil′burgera, p. 161.
52 Maier, ‘Vvodnaia chast′’, Chs. 4, 5; Shamin, Kuranty, pp. 88 and passim.
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at border posts,53 for the most part the foreign news was processed in 
Moscow. After a short-lived contretemps in which Leonhardt Marselis 
was reprimanded for having opened the mailbags before handing them 
over to the Ambassadorial Chancery, the normal procedure was for 
them to be delivered sealed, even if private correspondence might then 
be handed unsealed to the postmaster for local delivery. Marselis also 
incurred the ire of the translators by suggesting to them the articles they 
should translate; he was told in no uncertain terms that it was none of his 
business, as the translators themselves had the expertise to decide. Of 
course in the absence of hard evidence this leaves open the question of 
how exactly decisions were made regarding what news was important. 
We can but assume that the translators, if regularly reading the foreign 
news sources as they arrived (and given the fact that at least some of 
them would have had a network of contacts in Moscow from which 
they could have acquired other information), would have an ongoing 
sense of the important developments across Europe. Presumably it 
did not take much to know the current priorities of Muscovite foreign 
policy and to have a sense therefore of what news should be deemed 
most relevant. Extant copies of the foreign newspapers in the Moscow 
archives often contain marginal markings which apparently specify 
which news might be of the greatest interest. And some copies of the 
papers were additionally annotated as having been translated or, on the 
contrary, containing nothing of particular interest since they duplicated 
information already in hand.
What “translation” really meant, though, needs some close 
examination.54 There are some serious methodological challenges to be 
addressed before it is possible to determine how the translators dealt 
with their sources. They generally would indicate in the heading for 
each set of the kuranty whether the source was printed or handwritten, 
in German or Dutch, both, or, rarely, in some other language. However, 
53 Maier, ‘Newspaper Translations’; Shamin, Kuranty, pp. 97–98. When Peter the Great 
was in Holland in 1697, his translators were translating foreign news reports and 
sending them back to Moscow alongside the original newspapers. See Ingrid Maier, 
‘Presseberichte am Zarenhof im 17. Jahrhundert. Ein Beitrag zur Vorgeschichte der 
gedruckten Zeitung in Russland’, Jahrbuch für Kommunikationsgeschichte, 6 (2004), 
103–29 (p. 109).
54  For further details on the challenges of identifying the original Russian texts and 
the features of the translations in the cases where the sources are now known cf. 
Maier, ‘Vvodnaia chast′’, esp. Chs. 4–6.
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in some instances, it seems that an indication of sources in both German 
and Dutch is erroneous, as in fact news was drawn from only one. In the 
absence of such headings, translation from a single language might be 
assumed. With rare exceptions (generally in the first half of the century, 
when whole newspapers might be translated), there is no indication 
of place, date or publisher of the original. Pamphlet titles might be 
translated, but not the titles of newspapers: the sources are generally 
termed simply kuranty, sometimes with the qualifier that they included 
both handwritten and printed items. While in a very few instances the 
translators selected from a single newspaper, which might make it 
easier to match the translation with the original (assuming there is an 
extant copy), more often any given set of the kuranty was compiled from 
reports in several separate issues of the foreign newspapers, and that 
information in turn might be supplemented with handwritten sources 
which have not yet been identified.
While they tended to condense and often simply to paraphrase their 
sources, at least in the early part of the century the translators generally 
would draw any given news item in a set of the kuranty from only one 
or perhaps two foreign sources. Later, our task of identifying sources 
becomes ever more complicated as they proliferated in Moscow and the 
translators tended to combine information from several different reports 
under a single date. Often there would be more than one newspaper 
containing a similar report but with the same dateline as in other papers 
that contained the same news.
It is important to keep in mind here that the average German 
newspaper of the period, printed in quarto (4o), would contain half a 
dozen to a dozen articles.55 The Dutch papers, published in small folio, 
with smaller font and generally with much shorter articles, might 
contain two dozen or more news items. There are a few examples where 
as many as half a dozen datelined articles in a single set of the kuranty 
can be traced to a single Dutch newspaper. Given the relatively poor 
preservation of the German newspaper originals for the 1660s, it is 
difficult to generalise about the degree of selectivity by the translators 
for any given number of a German newspaper.56 
55 Maier, ‘Vvodnaia chast′’, pp. 89–91.
56  Ibid., pp. 141–42.
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In short, all of these considerations, compounded by the fragmentary 
and scattered preservation of the original sources, render analysis of 
the translation techniques extremely difficult. That said, it is possible 
to suggest why, in many cases, material from the original was omitted 
or simplified. In the first instance, material deemed peripheral to the 
substance of the news report (or not at all relevant to the Muscovite 
government’s understanding of foreign affairs) might be deleted. The 
translator might deem irrelevant qualifications in the original news 
report regarding the degree to which a particular report was reliable. 
Of course, omitting such doubts would make the information in the 
resulting “translation” seem more authoritative than it was. Translators 
might omit or elide passages they could not understand (for example, 
quotations or words in Latin, which often found their way into the Dutch 
or German texts). Unfamiliar geographical locations might be dropped, 
although there also developed a practice of providing marginal glosses 
to those that remained but that might be assumed unfamiliar to the tsar 
or his boyars (nobles) when the texts were read to them. On the other 
hand, in such cases translators might add explanations in the text and 
might, on occasion, even update an entry with information that had not 
been known to the foreign writer or publisher. 
Apart from editorial techniques, the accuracy of the translations (or 
summaries) is of considerable importance.57 Sometimes, in the process 
of transcription, foreign names were garbled beyond recognition. 
Syntactical constructions in the originals might be misunderstood; 
words might be mistaken for ones of similar appearance but with a 
totally different meaning. Occasionally the lexical errors are surprising, 
as we would assume the words involved should have been familiar. 
While instances of such errors add up, on the whole the translations 
were not badly done, especially considering the haste with which they 
were produced. The translators seem to have had a decent knowledge 
of the Russian vernacular; their failings might have been due to their 
apparent lack of formal education in the foreign languages they were 
translating. It would be easy to explain this if, as seems to have been 
the case, some of the translators grew up in Moscow, learning Russian 
while young, speaking the family (foreign) language at home, but never 
57  This is the subject of ibid., Ch. 5.
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having had the opportunity to acquire much formal schooling in it. 
Only infrequently does a kuranty text identify who translated it, but 
whether linguistic analysis of those translations can help us to identify 
who undertook other, anonymous, ones is questionable. Given the small 
number of those who knew Dutch, we might venture to guess who was 
responsible for translating the Dutch newspapers, but for German, there 
are more possibilities.
Normally at most two or three copies of the kuranty translations 
were made. In some instances, we have both the draft copy, replete 
with crossed out text, corrections, etc., as well as the clean copy which 
presumably would have been taken to the tsar. There seems to have 
been a process where the translation was reviewed for possible further 
correction by a different individual before it was finalised.
The manuscripts occasionally have inscriptions added on the reverse 
indicating they had been read to the tsar, and even more rarely, “while 
the boyars listened in the antechamber”. Shamin suggests that it was the 
normal procedure for this to happen within a day or two of the receipt 
of the foreign post.58 In instances where the tsar was out of town, the 
kuranty might be taken to him, though this could involve some days’ 
delay. During the seventeenth century it seems that the interest of the 
rulers in hearing the news fluctuated, depending on the individual and 
on particular circumstances. While obviously interested in the news, 
Peter the Great, always impatient, began to require short summaries 
based on the longer compendia, so we begin to see such condensations 
in the last years of the seventeenth century. All in all, it is reasonable to 
suggest that the processes by which rulers and their advisers acquainted 
themselves with foreign news back in the seventeenth century were not 
vastly different from the processes today. Yes, political leaders may 
view, listen directly to, or read news sources, but at the same time, most 
of them have to rely on summaries of intelligence prepared by their 
staffs. Of course this process has the inherent danger that the staffers 
may not always select the right thing, may tell their bosses what they 
think they want to hear, or may deliberately skew their selection so as to 
influence decision-making.
58  Shamin, Kuranty, pp. 112–16, 123–28.
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After the establishment of the foreign post in 1665, the kuranty 
files are sufficiently complete to indicate the government priorities in 
obtaining foreign news. Here we can assume that the texts reflect a 
conscious policy of selection, not simply a possibly random compilation 
of whatever happened to be available. There are few surprises: by 
definition, news tends to be that which its consumers perceive to be 
relevant to their particular interests. In the Muscovite case, in the first 
instance this was information relating to its immediate neighbours, 
those states with which it had relations (whether friendly or hostile), 
and news about other states which might affect Muscovite security, 
political or economic interests. The most common topics in the 1660s 
included: news about Poland, the Ottoman Empire and its vassals; news 
relating to the competition for control of Ukraine; the Ottoman wars 
against Venice and the Austrian Habsburgs; events in Hungary and 
Transylvania; reports about Muscovy; and news relating to political and 
commercial matters in the Baltic region, involving Sweden, Denmark, 
Holland and England.59 The reports about Poland and Ukraine 
frequently focus on the rebellion by the Polish magnate Lubomirski 
and on the complicated politics involving the Cossacks. The Anglo-
Dutch war was of considerable interest, since it affected Baltic trade; 
some reports translated from Dutch newspapers were cargo lists for the 
East Indies fleets which had recently arrived in Amsterdam. There are 
reports in the kuranty about the peregrinations of the Swedish Queen 
Christina after she had abdicated, a subject that seems to have intrigued 
many followers of the news throughout Europe. An interesting view of 
what was being obtained in Moscow during this period can be seen in 
a scrapbook kept by Andrei Vinius, where amongst a broad range of 
visual material is an engraving of the great fire of London in 1666 and 
several engravings from news broadsides devoted to the Venetian naval 
wars against the Ottomans in defence of Crete.60 
59  See Maier, ‘Vvodnaia chast′’, pp. 91–108.
60  On the Vinius scrapbook (album), which Daniel Waugh has examined de visu, see N. 
Levinson, ‘Al′bom “Kniga Viniusa”—Pamiatnik khudozhestvennogo sobiratel′stva 
v Moskve XVII veka’, Ezhegodnik Gosudarstvennogo istoricheskogo muzeia. 1961 god 
(Moscow: Gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii muzei, 1962), 71–98. Amidst considerable 
controversy in Russia, the album was recently sent to the Netherlands for 
restoration; a facsimile edition, which we have not seen, has been published: Al′bom 
Viniusa, ed. and intro. by I. M. Beliaeva and E. A. Savel′eva (St Petersburg: BAN and 
Al′faret, 2010). 
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To a considerable degree, these emphases in the kuranty of the 
1660s were similar to the material one finds in the German-language 
newspapers published in Northern Europe; the same information also 
tended to dominate the handwritten newsletters being sent regularly to 
London by the English residents in Hamburg, whose sources included 
regular reports out of Poland and from Vienna.61 Those foreign reports 
rarely included news from Moscow, perhaps because little was to be 
had, but also possibly because it was simply of less interest than it seems 
to have been in Moscow itself (see below). 
Certain subjects were of such interest that entire separate pamphlets 
were translated (in addition to whatever shorter notices were in the 
periodical press).62 Noteworthy among them were reports about the 
treaty between the Netherlands and the Archbishopric of Münster 
in 1666; the abdication of Polish King Jan Kazimierz in 1668 and the 
election of his successor Michał Wiśnowiecki in 1669; a pamphlet 
containing a fictive threatening letter by the Ottoman sultan addressing 
the Habsburg Emperor in 1663; and the disorders in the Ottoman 
Empire in Arabia, especially during the brief period in 1665 and 1666 
when, throughout Europe, attention was focussed on the Jewish false 
messiah Shabbetai Zevi. Some of the translated separates are of interest 
for the fact that at least a few copies of them eventually found their 
way into wider circulation beyond the Ambassadorial Chancery: this 
is the case with the account about the Polish election and the fictive 
letter by the sultan.63 Probably the most intensively reported event, 
concerning the Ottoman disorders and Shabbetai Zevi, did not get into 
wider circulation. Throughout Europe it was a true news sensation, 
61  See the files in National Archives, London, SP 101/39, 101/42 and 101/43. These 
newsletters were presumably sent under the cover of the letters between the 
Hamburg residents and their correspondents in London, now filed as SP 82.
62  See the overview in Maier, ‘Vvodnaia chast′’, pp. 108–31.
63  For the fictive letters of the sultan, see Waugh, Great Turkes; Daniel Waugh, ‘The 
Russian versions of the apocryphal correspondence with the Ottoman sultan’, in 
Christian-Muslim Relations. A Bibliographical History, Volume 8. Northern and Eastern 
Europe (1600–1700), ed. by David Thomas and John Chesworth (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 
pp. 981–88; Ingrid Maier and Stepan Shamin, ‘Legendarnoe poslanie turetskogo 
sultana nemetskim vladeteliam i vsem khristianam’ (1663–64 g.). K voprosu o 
rasprostranenii perevodov evropeiskikh pamfletov iz Posol′skogo prikaza v 
rukopisnykh sbornikakh’, Drevniaia Rus′. Voprosy medievistiki, 30. 4 (2007), 80–89. 
Maier located the Dutch original for the translation of 1664, a broadside brought to 
Moscow by Dutch merchants via Arkhangelsk.
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not only unsettling Jewish communities everywhere and thus 
affecting commerce, but connecting with the eschatological concerns 
of various religious groups. The kuranty contain both translations of 
newspaper articles (notably from the Oprechte Haerlemse Courant) and 
translations from separate broadsides and pamphlets about the false 
messiah.64 The interest in Moscow may in part be explained by the fact 
that anything that would unsettle the Ottoman Empire could have a 
bearing on whether the Turks might be able to pursue an aggressive 
policy in Southern Poland and Ukraine; similarly, Shabbetaian unrest 
clearly had the potential to destabilise Poland. It is also reasonable to 
assume that the atmosphere in Moscow involving the Church Schism 
and the concurrent eschatological expectations would have created 
an environment conducive to the spread of news about Shabbetai. In 
fact though, this may explain why the news never made it out of the 
chanceries (except in a separately produced anti-Jewish polemical book 
published somewhat later in Ukraine65): the Orthodox authorities and 
the Muscovite government seem to have been particularly concerned 
to suppress any manifestations of “popular religion” (including 
eschatological agitation) that could not be controlled and directed by 
the Church. 
Not surprisingly, the coverage by the kuranty of foreign political 
news in the 1670s and 1680s seems to have been little different from 
that of the preceding decade, given that Muscovite foreign policy 
concerned itself with the same issues. News out of Poland and Ukraine 
and anything relating to the wars against the Turks and Tatars was of 
particular importance at a time when there were few periods of peace. 
Considerable diplomatic attention was devoted to the creation of a 
broad European coalition to fight the Turks, but any agreement with 
Poland about this was hindered by the historical legacy of its hostility 
with Muscovy, suspicions of deceit, and the as yet only tentative nature 
of the Truce of Andrusovo of 1667, which ongoing negotiations would 
64  Daniel C. Waugh, ‘News of the False Messiah: Reports on Shabbetai Zevi in Ukraine 
and Muscovy’, Jewish Social Studies, 41. 3–4 (1979), 301–22; Ingrid Maier and Wouter 
Pilger, ‘Polnische Fabelzeitung über Sabbatai Zwi, übersetzt für den russischen 
Zaren’, Zeitschrift für slavische Philologie, 62. 1 (2003), 1–39; Ingrid Maier and Daniel 
C. Waugh, ‘“The Blowing of the Messiah’s Trumpet”. Reports about Sabbatai Sevi 
and Jewish Unrest in 1665–1667’, in Dissemination, ed. by Dooley, pp. 137–52.
65  Ioanikii Haliatovs′kyi, Mesia Pravdivyi Isus Khristos Syn Bozhii… (Kiev, 1669).
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succeed in converting into a “Permanent Peace” only in 1686. Following 
the military disaster of the loss of Chyhyryn in 1678, Muscovy achieved 
a temporary respite by signing a peace with the Tatars in 1681, but it 
was again drawn into the Ottoman wars following the Turkish failure 
at Vienna in 1683, which began a long and successful military effort 
to push the Turks out of East-Central Europe. Among the noteworthy 
events of this long conflict that were reported in the Russian translations 
from the European press were: the destruction of the Parthenon during 
its siege by the anti-Ottoman forces in 1687; and, a decade later, the 
important victory over the Ottomans achieved by the Habsburg armies 
under Eugene of Savoy at Zenta.66 The first of these events, which had 
little strategic significance, probably attracted little attention when it 
was reported in the kuranty (nor would its cultural importance have 
been understood), but the second was the subject of several reports 
which made their way out of the confines of the chanceries and into 
wider circulation. In general, these decades were ones in which such 
translated items as the fictive letters of the sultan found wider audiences 
in Muscovy, although how we explain their appeal is uncertain. Was it 
because of the widespread concern over the Ottoman threat, or because 
of their being analogous to other polemical texts that circulated in 
Muscovy, or might there be some other explanation?
In his study of the kuranty, which focusses on the period of the 1670s 
and 1680s, Stepan Shamin delineates a number of topics (beyond the 
political reportage) which help us to appreciate the breadth of subject 
matter covered in the translations of foreign news and may thereby 
enhance our appreciation of why the kuranty would have interested 
the Muscovite elite. His focus is on what the news reports would have 
informed their Muscovite readers about various aspects of daily life and 
culture in Europe.67 
Even today, by its very nature, the news often focusses on what 
threatens lives and livelihoods. In the world of the seventeenth century, 
66  Daniel C. Waugh, ‘News Sensations from the Front: Reportage in Late Muscovy 
concerning the Ottoman Wars’, in Rude & Barbarous Kingdom Revisited: Essays in 
Russian History and Culture in Honor of Robert O. Crummey, ed. by Chester Dunning, 
Russell Martin and Daniel Rowland (Bloomington: Kritika, 2008), pp. 491–506 [with 
2 plates]. The material there about the reports on Zenta needs substantial revision, 
to incorporate unpublished texts in the Russian archives.
67  For what follows here, see Shamin, Kuranty, Ch. 4.
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understandably there was considerable attention devoted to reports 
of epidemics and disasters inflicted by severe weather. Of course, 
writing about such matters had a long history in Russia (as can be seen 
in chronicles and miracle tales). The news reports of the seventeenth 
century might cite them as evidence of divine dispensation (punishment 
for sins) or it might avoid such indications entirely. Reports sometimes 
specifically cast doubt on superstitious interpretations. For Muscovy, 
the news about epidemics was particularly significant, and we have 
evidence the government would quickly act to establish quarantines at 
borders if there was any indication of the spread of contagion.68 This 
is one of the clearest indications of how the news in the kuranty was 
actually used, and how its timely receipt was important.
Phenomena of nature such as comets or meteor showers were 
a traditional source of concern; during earlier times in Russia and 
elsewhere these were often interpreted as warnings of some impending 
doom.69 There was no clear distinction between what we term scientific 
astronomy and astrology. In this fertile soil for speculation and 
superstition, the occasional newspaper reports and often dramatically 
illustrated pamphlet separates or broadsides would resonate. A good 
many such accounts were translated, and the emphasis seems to 
have been on those that related the natural phenomena to impending 
disaster.70 It is of interest in this regard to compare the kuranty reports 
68  Apart from the examples cited by Shamin, one should note that the news about the 
major plague outbreak of 1665, translated for the kuranty, was marked by enclosing 
the relevant articles in boxes and placing crosses in the margins to indicate how 
important this news was. See RGADA, coll. 155, descr. 1, 1666 g., no. 11, fols. 
56–57, 59; published in V-K VI/1, no. 65, pp. 231–32. Presumably these markings, 
undoubtedly contemporary, were to indicate items that were to be copied or cited 
in warnings to be sent to border commanders. 
69  See, for example, Wolfgang Harms, Das illustrierte Flugblatt in der Kultur der Frühen 
Neuzeit: Wolfenbüttler Arbeitsgespräch 1997 (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1998). 
For a thought-provoking analysis of the changing interpretations of “natural 
wonders”, see Katharine Park and Lorraine J. Daston. ‘Unnatural Conceptions: The 
Study of Monsters in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century France and England’, 
Past and Present, 92 (1981), 20–54, and the same authors’ Wonders and the Order of 
Nature, 1150–1750 (New York and Cambridge, MA: Zone Press, 1998).
70  Apart from Shamin’s Kuranty, pp. 216–31, see, e.g., Stepan Shamin and Andrei 
P. Bogdanov, ‘Prirodnye iavleniia v tsarstvovanie Fedora Alekseevicha i 
chelovecheskoe soznanie (po gazetnoi informatsii Posol′skogo prikaza)’, in 
Istoricheskaia ekologiia i istoricheskaia demografiia (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2003), pp. 
239–55 (pp. 244–46). 
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of the widely viewed comet of 1680 with reports about the same 
comet which Sir Peter Wyche, the English resident in Hamburg, sent 
home. The Russian texts (one apparently translated from an illustrated 
broadside) include, seemingly without comment or expression of 
doubt, the popular perceptions of the comet as a warning of disaster 
whose appearance coincided with other paranormal phenomena. The 
educated Wyche, who made it clear “my assent is not easily wonne to 
Wonders”, nonetheless reported all these prognostications and stories 
about other supernatural phenomena. However, as a member of the 
Royal Society, he also recorded scientific observations about the comet 
and asked that they be sent on for the Society to use.71
Just as the reports on Shabbetai Zevi could not have been welcomed 
by the authorities if they threatened the stable order and official 
religious controls, likewise we find evidence that prognostications 
based on abnormal events in nature might be actively suppressed, for 
example in the period of political unrest following the death of Tsar 
Fedor Alekseevich in 1682. Of course not all of the real or imagined 
heavenly phenomena lent themselves to negative interpretations—one 
example, known to have entered Muscovy via Ukraine, was based on 
an apparently popular depiction of signs in the heavens interpreted to 
foretell the ultimate defeat of the Turks.72 Some copies of this escaped 
the chanceries, perhaps with the support of someone in a high place, 
since propaganda to drum up support for the wars against the Ottomans 
would undoubtedly have had official encouragement.
There is no clear line to be drawn between some of the texts relating 
to the Ottoman wars, “heavenly” phenomena or other reports of 
unnatural events (for example, “monstrous births”), and a broader 
range of translated material in the kuranty that touches on various 
aspects of European religious affairs. The machinations of the Devil 
71  National Archives, London, SP 82/16, containing letters of Sir Peter Wyche, English 
resident in Hamburg, to Sir Lionell Jenkins, here fol. 241, page 3 of letter sent 14/24 
January 1681. Wyche’s reports about the comet and what was being said about it 
begin on 23 November 1680 (Old Style) and continue through 21 January.
72  Waugh, ‘Tekst’. For significant new information and a different interpretation 
regarding the origins of the text and its illustration, see Iurii D. Rykov and 
Stepan Shamin, ‘Novye dannye o bytovanii perevodnogo izvestiia o Vengerskom 
nebesnom znamenii 1672 g. v russkoi rukopisnoi traditsii XVII veka’, in Istoriografiia, 
istochnikovedenie, istoriia Rossii X–XX vv. (Moscow: Iazyki slavianskikh kul′tur, 
2008), pp. 263–308.
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lurked in some reports, alongside others that clearly focussed on 
matters of secular political import. Readers of the kuranty could in fact 
find out a lot about Protestant vs. Catholic conflicts, Papal policies, and 
disputes within the Catholic Church, in addition to material about the 
confrontation between the world of Islam and Christian Europe. The 
intentions of the Papacy regarding the Orthodox world were clearly of 
concern in considering potential alliances to fight the “common enemy 
of Christianity”. 
Public ceremonies, generally involving royalty and the European 
elite, were frequently reported in the Western news: celebrations of 
weddings, births, birthdays, military victories, and funerals. It is thanks 
to this interest that we have some valuable reports that have helped 
to rewrite the history of the first court theatre in Moscow.73 While by 
no means all such reports made their way into the kuranty translations, 
this news was of interest if for no reason other than the fact that the 
Muscovite government kept close track of ceremonies that might in 
some way involve its own honour and prestige. This was not merely a 
matter of how one’s own ambassadors might be received, but whether 
others were given more lavish treatment. In addition, there surely has to 
have been some interest in the possibility of emulating entertainments 
that were common to other major courts. The fact that fireworks were 
already a part of some celebrations in Muscovy in the late seventeenth 
century is one indication of such an interest. By the time of Peter’s 
conquest of Azov in 1696, it is clear that in Moscow there was already 
a very good sense of the Baroque ceremonial celebration of military 
victories. One can at least posit that knowledge of the role of theatre 
and dance in court entertainment (even if not specifically derived from 
translated reports in the kuranty) had a bearing on the creation of the 
court theatre for Aleksei Mikhailovich.
Much has been made of the Muscovite government’s concern over 
protocol in diplomacy, including in particular the accurate rendering 
of the tsar’s titles. Frequently, negotiations foundered upon disputes 
73  See Claudia Jensen and Ingrid Maier, ‘Orpheus and Pickleherring in the Kremlin: 
The “Ballet” for the Tsar of February 1672’, Scando-Slavica, 59. 2 (2013), 145–84; idem, 
‘Pickleherring Returns to the Kremlin: More New Sources on the Pre-History of the 
Russian Court Theater’, Scando-Slavica, 61. 1 (2015), 7–56. Both articles with some 
revisions have now been published together: see Klaudiia Dzhensen and Ingrid 
Maier, Pridvornyi teatr v Rossii XVII veka. Novye istochniki (Moscow: “Indrik”, 2016).
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over titulature. Such concerns were hardly unique to the Kremlin, any 
more than concerns other governments would express over the way 
their affairs were reported in the news. One might think that there was 
no particular value to the Kremlin in translating from foreign news 
reports about Muscovite business—after all, they could learn nothing 
of a factual nature about what was going on at home beyond what they 
already knew. Yet in fact there is a significant amount of material in 
the kuranty containing reports from Moscow.74 There are well-known 
examples when, as the result of the publication of some report in the 
West, the tsar’s government lodged an official protest, demanding that 
the offending publications be destroyed and their authors or publishers 
punished. One suspects that some of these incidents were deliberately 
blown out of proportion to serve some other diplomatic aim; of course, 
if there was little that could be done to curb private publishers, the 
response from the recipients of the complaints might be inaction. Only 
in rare instances did foreign authorities attempt to comply with what 
Moscow demanded.75 
There is considerable evidence of widespread concern in Europe 
over the accuracy of reporting. English agents in the Baltic region would 
complain about what Dutch or German newspapers said about English 
affairs and constantly prodded their controllers in Whitehall to provide 
English versions of events that could be used in the foreign capitals 
to counter adverse propaganda. Sir Peter Wyche wrote to Sir Lionell 
Jenkins from Hamburg on 3 September 1680 (OS), 
I am in continuall Warre against the Impudent Libellers, But I must 
confesse I yet can not bethincke my selfe how to putt in practice Your 
Commands, to buy off the Gazettiers, to speake neither good nor bad 
of Our affaires. With all humble submission I thincke they are to bee 
more roughly handled and every Minister in his Post is to oblige the 
Government where he is, not to allow them to print the scandalous 
advices… I have complained, and will have the Printer severely 
punisht…76
The attitude expressed here and the action it proposed are little different 
from what we find the Kremlin doing if a foreign news report offended it.
74  There is an extended discussion of this material in Shamin, Kuranty, Ch. 3.
75  E.g., ibid., p. 151.
76  National Archives, London, SP 82/16, fols. 175-175v.
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Apart from anything that would have been of concern to the 
Muscovite government, in Muscovy the Scottish General Patrick Gordon, 
a passionate adherent of the Catholic Stuarts, was distressed when he 
received news (probably based on Dutch reports) about the invasion 
of William of Orange in 1688 that led to the “glorious revolution” that 
toppled King James II and VII.77 To him those reports were biased, even 
if, as he admitted, they had some element of truth about the weakness of 
the Royalists’ efforts to put James back on the throne. What Gordon may 
not fully have appreciated was the degree to which the Dutch Resident 
in Moscow, Baron von Keller, was perhaps manipulating the news he 
received (quite apart from the events of 1688) and was transmitting to 
the Muscovite officials, in ways that worked against English interests.78
This history opens up for us the possibility that by the 1680s, if not 
earlier, the acquisition and dissemination of foreign news in the elite 
circles in Moscow might have a significant political impact. The official 
acquisition of foreign news and its translation contributed to this 
awareness of contemporary events in Europe, but it was surely only part 
of the reason why there was a level of knowledge within the Foreign 
Suburb, and in the regular interactions between the foreigners and the 
arbiters of Muscovite affairs, that far exceeded what it might have been 
only a generation earlier. It was not merely an awareness of the value 
of factual reporting, but of the usefulness of manipulating the news for 
one’s own advantage. Indeed, as Shamin has suggested, there is some 
indication that foreign news stories were manipulated in translation to 
serve even domestic purposes, and by the mid-1660s there is evidence 
the Muscovite government was arranging to have stories planted in the 
Western press that would reflect favourably on Muscovy. While we have 
no proof it was acted on, a Swedish merchant in Lübeck, Johann van 
Horn, made a concrete proposal in 1667 to Ordin-Nashchokin whereby 
he would have become, in effect, Muscovy’s press agent in the West.79 
In any event, the planting of favourable stories had become a common 
practice by the time of Peter, which undoubtedly helps to explain why 
he created the published Vedomosti, so that the government would have 
77 Waugh, ‘The Best Connected Man’, p. 112.
78  Thomas Eekmann, ‘Muscovy’s International Relations in the Late Seventeenth 
Century: Johan van Keller’s Observations’, California Slavic Studies, 14 (1992), 44–67.
79  Shamin, Kuranty, pp. 152–53, no.18. 
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its own organ for spreading internally the news that would support the 
tsar’s policies. 
In processing the flow of foreign news, the Muscovite functionaries 
quickly developed a sense that careful selection was imperative, as was 
the awareness that timeliness in receipt was significant if the information 
was to have any operative value. This may have been less significant 
than the dramatic transformation in Europe that resulted from the 
communications revolution, during which, as Wolfgang Behringer 
points out, people began to mark time by the postal schedules, and a 
common salutation might be “What’s news?”80 At very least though, it 
is clear that being saturated with news did not mean accepting all of it 
uncritically. 
Certainly there was a relationship between the acquisition of foreign 
news and the making of foreign policy. Yet there are very few direct 
indications that foreign policy decisions followed upon receipt of a 
particular news item via the kuranty, or depended on the receipt of such 
news. Of course this could merely reflect a convention whereby such 
indications would not have made it into the written record, especially 
where that written record all too rarely provides any insight into the 
actual deliberations that resulted in the adoption of a particular policy. 
Another possibility, though, is that news sources other than the kuranty 
were more significant, since at least for neighbouring countries they 
might be more current and/or accurate. Where historians have paid 
close attention (which is all too rarely) to the acquisition of news and 
its relationship to the making of foreign policy (a noteworthy exception 
is the negotiations leading to the Permanent Peace with Poland in 
1686), the evidence suggests that information obtained by well-placed 
agents played a crucial role, rather than the news reports coming out 
of Poland that were commonly printed in the newspapers.81 Might it 
not be, as evidence from Western Europe continues to remind us, that 
the handwritten reports of trusted agents were much more likely to be 
valued by those in power than anything in the newspapers? Perhaps 
Baron Mayerberg’s sneer about how the benighted Muscovites in the 
1660s believed anything they read in the printed foreign newspapers is 
80  Behringer, Im Zeichen des Merkur, pp. 106–07, p. 117.
81  Kirill A. Kochegarov, Rech′ Pospolitaia i Rossiia v 1680–1686 godakh. Zakliuchenie 
dogovora o Vechnom mire (Moscow: INDRIK, 2008).
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totally wrong: when it came to practical policies, they may have believed 
little of it.82 At the very least, they were selective in what they actually 
used. At best, we might posit that the importance of the kuranty lay 
in what they contained about the broader context of European affairs 
which was not usually to be found in the more localised intelligence 
reports. Yet the evidence shows that in the process of selecting what 
news to translate, the Kremlin functionaries often deliberately narrowed 
the focus to the subjects that lay closest to home. 
The pre-eminent historian of the Muscovite post, I. P. Kozlovskii, 
articulated clearly the idea that the foreign post was, at least potentially, 
of immense cultural significance for Russia. Yet, by the end of the 
seventeenth century, when so few Russians were actually using it, he 
had to confess that its cultural impact had been disappointing. If we are 
to assess the cultural impact of the kuranty, whose history is inseparable 
from that of the post, we might be forced to reach the same conclusion, 
which is hardly at odds with what we already know about cultural 
change in late Muscovy. We must stress again that the kuranty were 
never intended for broad distribution; the news in them was deemed 
confidential, for the eyes and ears of the tsar and his close advisers. 
However, there is something to be said about the impact of the post and 
the kuranty beyond the circles of the court in Moscow.
Certainly one can trace the spread of a rather small number of 
manuscript copies of some of the translations that were part of the 
corpus of the kuranty.83 Even as early as the late fifteenth and the first 
half of the sixteenth century, the few translated foreign pamphlets 
we have in Muscovy are to be found exclusively in a few monastic 
miscellanies. Whether it is sufficient to conclude, as Shamin does, that 
they therefore “left a noteworthy mark on the cultural and religious life 
of sixteenth-century Russia” may, of course, be debated.84 One then has 
to jump ahead to the second quarter of the seventeenth century to find 
82 Avgustin Meierberg, “Puteshestvie v Moskoviiu Barona Avgustina Meierberga”, 
in Utverzhdenie dinastii. Andrei Rode. Avgustin Meierberg. Samuel′ Kollins. Iakov 
Reitenfel′s (Istoriia Rossii i Doma Romanovykh v memuarakh sovremennikov XVII–XX 
vv.) (Moscow: Fond Sergeia Dubova. Rita-Print, 1997), p. 90.
83  Shamin, Kuranty, brings together an overview of such material in his concluding 
Chapter 5; he has elaborated on the history of several texts in various articles cited 
there and in work that continues to appear as he mines the Russian manuscript 
collections.
84  Cf. ibid., p. 283.
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evidence about the spread of translated “news pamphlets”, evidence 
that, significantly, may be found in documents concerning government 
investigations about possible sedition or religious deviance. Rare are 
the instances in which we encounter more than an isolated copy of a 
text in some manuscript miscellany. Exceptions include the apocryphal 
letters of the sultan and a few pamphlets with prognostications based 
on wonder signs. Undoubtedly, people with close connections to the 
Ambassadorial Chancery somehow facilitated the making of copies 
that made their way outside the chancery milieu, even if it is difficult to 
identify who the individuals were. There are rare instances in which, on 
receipt of news about, say, an important victory of a Muscovite ally, the 
authorities would deliberately disseminate that news in order that the 
event be celebrated publicly. Unofficial channels may have circumvented 
the Ambassadorial Chancery (for example, if texts were translated in 
Ukraine). Whatever exactly the processes, what we really want to know 
is whether any of the translated brochures or occasional news reports 
of political or military events might have changed the worldview of 
Russian readers. To the extent that we can identify who owned the 
manuscripts, the “readership” would seem in the first instance to 
involve those who might already have been in a position to acquire a 
broader outlook than the ordinary peasant or villager. The content and 
number of the texts is so limited that they could hardly have done much 
to open up a wider world and provide their owners or readers with a 
sense of contemporaneity. If anything, arguably they generated interest 
because they connected with contemporary preconceptions and fitted 
comfortably within the framework of existing Muscovite culture.
Were we to follow the lead of some historians of the European press, 
we might wish to make the case that the kuranty provide evidence for 
increasing rationalism and secularism that are deemed to be hallmarks 
of modernity. Yet, even for other parts of Europe, such an emphasis 
has come under question, as scholars explore more broadly the ways 
in which news was transmitted and the content of the various popular 
genres transmitting it. Certainly there is no lack of material in the kuranty 
regarding the paranormal or natural wonders, and, as we have seen, 
some of what there is might be understood most persuasively within a 
context of traditional religious culture. Just because the kuranty were the 
province of a court elite does not mean then that this elite had moved 
far from the cultural milieu in which they were raised, any more than 
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the readers of Western newspapers in, say, Hamburg, can be assumed 
to have abandoned a providential view of the world inspired by deep 
religious devotion. The spread of kuranty texts may be significant as an 
indication of change in the patterns of Muscovite interaction with its 
neighbours and some kind of greater integration of Muscovy in Europe, 
but we should be very cautious in drawing any conclusions from such 
limited evidence regarding what the foreign news could possibly have 
meant for those who read or heard it. To have possessed a few of the 
translated reports hardly makes the owners of the manuscripts “readers 
of the foreign news” in any meaningful sense.85 
Since earlier studies of the kuranty focussed on their relationship 
to the first published newspaper in Russia, Peter’s Vedomosti, a few 
concluding comments on that subject are in order. Clearly the kuranty 
were not “Russia’s first newspaper”, if by newspaper we mean a publicly 
available periodical publication communicating news about current 
events. The kuranty were not published. They were not created to meet 
some broader demand from society at large to be informed regularly 
and rapidly about current events. Therefore, despite the fact that very 
occasionally items from the kuranty made it into wider circulation, it is 
impossible to speak of their having a role in the creation of a “public 
sphere”, as Jürgen Habermas argued (problematically) for the European 
newspapers of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. That said, 
it is clear that the mechanisms that were in place and functioning well 
by the last decades of the seventeenth century, connecting Muscovy 
with the European news networks, were essential to the creation of the 
Vedomosti, whose first issue (not extant in printed form) seems to have 
appeared in 1702.86 That is, to the degree that foreign reports made it 
into the new printed newspapers in Russia, they were supplied in a way 
85  Cf. ibid., p. 302.
86  There is a common misperception that the first printed Vedomosti date from 1703, 
but as K. V. Kharlampovich convincingly argued, even though no printed copies 
are extant, manuscript copies suggest that the first two numbers appeared near 
the end of 1702. See Konstantin V. Kharlampovich ‘Vedomosti Moskovskogo 
gosudarstva 1702 goda’, Izvestiia Otdeleniia russkogo iazyka i slovesnosti Rossiiskoi 
Akademii nauk, 23. 1 (1918), 1–18. Kharlampovich’s argument seems to have been 
accepted by the compilers of the standard bibliography of Petrine imprints in 
Slavonic type, T. A. Bykova and M. M. Gurevich, in Opisanie izdanii, napechatannykh 
kirillitsei. 1689-ianvar′ 1725 g. (Moscow and Leningrad: Izdatel′stvo Akademii nauk 
SSSR, 1958), p. 83. Those unique copies are in the manuscript which is the subject of 
Waugh, Istoriia odnoi knigi.
112 Daniel C. Waugh and Ingrid Maier
that differed little from what had become Muscovite practice. What 
Peter and his advisers knew about the nature and role of the European 
press, knowledge acquired in part through the kuranty, surely provided 
the inspiration for a regular, published organ of news controlled by 
the government and intended as a tool for generating support for 
Peter’s policies. The European experience certainly contained examples 
of a politically controlled press alongside the more abundant and 
freewheeling private news publications, which were nonetheless not 
immune to censorship and proscription. Was Peter’s goal in creating the 
Vedomosti to educate its readers and listeners and not merely to whip 
up enthusiasm for his policies? Possibly. But such a goal cannot be read 
into the history of the creation and development of the kuranty. As with 
so many other developments, the history of the kuranty is indeed part 
of the story of Russia’s “Europeanisation” or “modernisation”, but 
inevitably we need to recognise that developments we can trace both in 
Russia and elsewhere in Europe generally do not move in synchrony. 
Newspapers in Russia only began to play the role attributed to them in 
the West in a later era.
4. How Was Western Europe  
Informed about Muscovy?  
The Razin Rebellion in Focus
Ingrid Maier1
The Cossack peasant rebellion under the leadership of Stepan Razin, 
with its culmination in the year 1670, was not only a major event in 
Muscovy; it was also an exceptional media sensation. West European 
newspapers printed the latest reports from the battlefront with great 
regularity, as well as rumours about the leader, Razin, and his plans and 
military alliances. When no news had arrived at the publisher’s desk, 
this very lack of information was considered to be worth mentioning, 
for instance with the remark “About Razin there is no news, beyond 
that he is neither dead nor captured”, found in a Dutch newspaper 
1  The research for this chapter was provided primarily by The Swedish Foundation 
for Humanities and Social Sciences (Riksbankens jubileumsfond, ‘Cross-Cultural 
Exchange in Early Modern Europe’, RFP12–0055:1). Moreover, the author is most 
grateful to the National Endowment for the Humanities (RZ-51635–13) who helped 
to fund several research trips to London, Stockholm, and Bremen. Any views, 
findings, or conclusions expressed in this chapter do not necessarily represent those 
of the funding organisations. Holger Böning and Michael Nagel at the research 
institute Deutsche Presseforschung have made my extended stays in Bremen both 
productive and enjoyable, providing help in both scholarly and practical issues. 
My frequent co-author, Daniel Waugh (Seattle), has read two draft versions of this 
chapter and made numerous very helpful comments; he also pointed out many 
relevant documents. I also offer my warm thanks to Claudia Jensen, for her editorial 
help, and to Gleb Kazakov for the discussions, particularly relating to Fig. 2 in the 
present chapter.
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printed in Haarlem.2 One of the reasons for the unparalleled interest in 
all matters concerning the Razin uprising is the fact that the rebellion 
had a negative influence on trade, not only within Russia (or between 
Muscovy proper and the region of the Don Cossacks, beyond the “Don 
steppe frontier”3), but also between Muscovy and Western Europe. 
Merchants from Holland, England and Hamburg were discouraged 
from trading with Russia during the peak of the uprising, and thus there 
was a risk that trade between Russia and Western Europe would come 
to a standstill. The real culmination of the Razin rebellion, however, 
was reached several months earlier than the peak of the corresponding 
media hype in West European newspapers and pamphlets.
The reporting on the Razin rebellion is an excellent example to 
illustrate how news was collected in Moscow and transmitted to the 
West. The important research questions include: how did the publishers 
get the reports from Muscovy that ended up in their newspapers? Who 
were the authors, and how was the news transmitted to the West? The 
hypothesis is that there is some kind of connection between diplomatic 
correspondence and printed (or handwritten4) newspapers—a 
connection that has actually been demonstrated for a slightly earlier 
time period, viz. the early 1650s, when the Swedish resident in Moscow, 
Johan de Rodes, was sending regular reports to Queen Christina of 
Sweden, and the content of some of these letters could also be traced in 
printed Hamburg newspapers.5 Granted, we still do not know whether 
de Rodes himself had the necessary contacts with traders of news; 
2  Oprechte Haerlemse Dingsdaegse Courant 1671, no. 18 (National Archives London, SP 
119/53, fol. 53v), in a news item datelined Moscow, 26 March 1671. Most of the 
surviving historical Dutch newspapers are now available online at http://kranten.
delpher.nl/ 
3  The term is borrowed from Brian J. Boeck’s monograph Imperial Boundaries. Cossack 
Communities and Empire-Building in the Age of Peter the Great (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009).
4  I am focussing on printed newspapers because I have not studied manuscript 
newspapers—which also played an important role at the time—in any systematic 
way.
5  See Martin Welke, ‘Rußland in der deutschen Publizistik des 17. Jahrhunderts 
(1613–1689)’, Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte, 23 (1976), 105–276 (pp. 
151–53 and 255–64).
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possibly the letters to the Swedish heartland were copied somewhere 
en route (for instance, in Narva). 
While my main focus here is on Swedish diplomatic correspondence, 
I will first review how Razin’s rebellion was mirrored in the periodical 
press of the time, focussing above all on German-language newspapers 
from Hamburg, with only occasional examples from papers issued in 
other languages or from other countries. The German newspapers, 
especially the ones from Hamburg, are of particular interest, since they 
contain more—and also more detailed—articles about the uprising than 
other papers (including the Latin newspaper from Cologne).
The Razin Rebellion as a Media Sensation
According to the German press historian Martin Welke, the Razin 
rebellion was one of the most frequently reported subjects in the 
German-language press of the years 1670–71: between September 1670 
and August 1671, on average, there was news about this rebellion in 
every third or fourth newspaper issue available to him. He found a 
total of 180 items in that timespan that contained news about Razin. 
Another 40 items, dealing with the Muscovite government’s—usually 
successful—attempts to defeat the rebellion, after the execution of its 
leader had become known in the Western press, were found in papers 
printed between September 1671 and February 1672.6 The “media 
peak” thus started around the time when the actual uprising was more 
or less over: Razin had won his last military victories—at Saratov and 
6  Ibid., p. 203. Welke studied all the issues of printed newspapers in German for the 
relevant period that were available in the research institute Deutsche Presseforschung 
in Bremen, which houses copies of more than 60,000 different newspaper issues. 
When Welke’s dissertation appeared in print, in 1976, the huge collection of German 
newspapers kept at the Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnikh aktov (RGADA) in 
Moscow was not yet known in Germany; copies were received in Bremen only at the 
very end of the 1970s. See V. I. Simonov, ‘Deutsche Zeitungen des 17. Jahrhunderts 
im Zentralen Staatsarchiv für alte Akten (CGADA), Moskau’, Gutenberg-Jahrbuch, 
54 (1979), 210–20. Simonov lists all German-language newspaper issues that have 
survived in RGADA. To the 640 issues from the period September 1670 until 
August 1671 which Welke studied we can now add several dozen unique copies 
printed during the relevant time period in the Eastern part of the German-language 
territory, above all in Königsberg and in Berlin (ibid., pp. 215, 217). 
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Samara—in August 1670; in a decisive battle near Simbirsk the rebel 
was wounded and “disappeared from the scene until his final capture”, 
which took place on 14 April 1671.7 As noted already, the “culmination” 
of the rebellion in West European newspapers was “delayed”, in 
comparison with the historical facts. The earliest item published in A. G. 
Mankov’s chapter about “Reports from newspapers and chronicles” is 
datelined Moscow, 14 August [1670],8 an exceptionally long article about 
Razin’s seizure of Astrakhan and a discussion of the consequences for 
Moscow’s supply of fish, salt and horses from that region.9 The reason 
for this paradox cannot be explained exclusively by the transmission 
time; that is, it would normally take only about five to six weeks for 
news from Moscow to arrive at the newspaper publishers in Hamburg10 
7  The date 14 April is mentioned in the verdict, read aloud publicly on the day of 
Stepan Razin’s execution; see the publication of this text in Krest′ianskaia voina pod 
predvoditel′stvom Stepana Razina, vols 1–4 (Moscow: Izdatel′stvo Akademii nauk, 
1954–1976), here vol. 3, no. 81, p. 87. See also André Berelowitch, ‘Stenka Razin’s 
Rebellion: The Eyewitnesses and their Blind Spot’, in From Mutual Observation to 
Propaganda War: Premodern Revolts in their Transnational Representations, ed. by Malte 
Griesse (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2014), pp. 93–124 (p. 105).
8  Inostrannye izvestiia o vosstanii Stepana Razina. Materialy i issledovaniia, ed. by A. G. 
Man′kov (Leningrad: Nauka, 1975), pp. 92–93.
9  “[…] and trade with Prussia and Russia will probably come to a sudden standstill, 
and Moscow will be in great disorder because all salted fish—which is so important 
for this nation, because of a high number of fasting-days—and also the salt used 
to come here [from that place], and every year 40 000 horses from that region 
were brought to the tsar […]” (Man′kov, Inostrannye izvestiia, p. 93). The number 
of horses seems very high, and generally numbers (e.g., of Razin’s followers, or 
of those killed) given in newspaper articles are far too high. On the other hand, 
the information about the consequences for trade within Muscovy makes it clear 
that the author of that correspondence from Moscow must have had a very good 
knowledge of Muscovite trade. Cf. also the partially overlapping information in 
Nordischer Mercurius, pp. 587–88 (quoted Man′kov, p. 95).
10  Cf. Daniel C. Waugh and Ingrid Maier, ‘How Well Was Muscovy Connected with 
the World?’, in Imperienvergleich. Beispiele und Ansätze aus osteuropäischer Perspektive. 
Festschrift für Andreas Kappeler, ed. by Guido Hausmann and Angela Rustemeyer, 
Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte, vol. 75 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 
2009), pp. 17–38 (pp. 31, 33). The timespan of twenty or, at most, twenty-one days 
for mail from Moscow to reach Hamburg, mentioned in a news item in Nordischer 
Mercurius, datelined Moscow, 17 August 1668, is quite optimistic; only under 
optimal conditions could a letter from Moscow to Hamburg reach its addressee 
so fast. Some years later, in 1674, Philipp Kilburger gives the same optimistic view 
regarding the transmission time from Moscow to Hamburg: twenty-one days via 
Vilna and twenty-three days via Riga; see B. G. Kurts, Sochinenie Kil′burgera o russkoi 
torgovle v tsarstvovanie Alekseia Mikhailovicha (Kiev: Tip. I. I. Chokolova, 1915), p. 160.
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or Amsterdam (and some additional time for it to have reached the 
Russian capital in the first place), not several months. Another part of 
the explanation may lie in the fact that the “disappearance” of Razin 
from the battlefield constituted fertile ground for speculations, rumour 
and hearsay, much of which was published in Western news media. 
These news items often had very little in common with the actual events. 
According to Welke, as many as twenty-one newspaper items had 
as their subject Razin’s execution;11 moreover, two German-language 
“execution pamphlets” are known (see below, especially note 40). A 
number of pamphlets about the rebellion (and, above all, about Razin’s 
execution in Moscow on 6 June 1671) also appeared in other countries: in 
Holland, in the Holy Roman Empire, in England, and finally in France.12 
All known contemporary Razin-related pamphlets, and also a small 
portion of contemporary newspaper items, were republished during 
the Soviet era.13 Prior to these publications of printed sources from 
other countries, a multi-volume edition of Russian-language archival 
documents about the rebellion had been published by the Historical 
Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, under the generic title “The 
peasant war under the leadership of Stepan Razin”.14
How Reliable was the Printed Razin News?
The newspaper publishers and printers (in the first century of the 
printed newspaper this was often the same person) faced a rather 
difficult task in choosing the news items that they found most 
interesting for their readership, and most trustworthy, from among the 
incoming commercial newsletters, or from previously printed papers.15 
11  Welke, ‘Rußland’, p. 204, no. 444.
12  See A. L. Gol′dberg, ‘K istorii soobshcheniia o vosstanii Stepana Razina’, in Zapiski 
inostrantsev o vosstanii Stepana Razina, ed. by A. G. Man′kov (Leningrad: Nauka, 
1968), pp. 157–65; Berelowitch, ‘Stenka Razin’s Rebellion’, p. 97.
13  Man′kov, Zapiski inostrantsev and Inostrannye izvestiia.
14  Krest′ianskaia voina.
15  A very insightful treatment of the development of the news market is in the recent 
book by Andrew Pettegree, The Invention of News. How the World Came to Know about 
Itself (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2014). About the problem 
of “establishing the veracity of news reports” (regarding commercial manuscript 
newsletters), see especially pp. 2–3 and 115–16.
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To determine the reliability of news was a constant challenge, and not 
only with regard to news from Russia: how could a publisher decide 
which of the reported stories might later prove to be true, and which 
would turn out to have been mere gossip and hearsay? One option was, 
of course, to wait for independent congruent information from other 
sources. However, in this case the scrupulous publisher would risk 
being scooped by another paper whose editor was not so careful about 
verification. News from Muscovy sometimes had to pass through 
many mouths (and pens) before ending up in a printed newspaper. If 
one person in this information chain, which stretched between a far-
away eyewitness and the publisher (or, for that matter, the copyist of 
a manuscript paper), invented a few spicy details in order to make 
the news more interesting and therefore more “saleable”, the person 
at the end of the chain had no means whatsoever to detect this. The 
truth could be determined only in retrospect. The people who traded 
in news were very much aware of this problem, as can be shown on the 
basis of the following examples from printed newspaper articles, in 
which these difficulties are mentioned explicitly either by the author 
or by the editor. 
In a news item from Hamburg, 17 February 1671, published in the 
Berlin-based newspaper Mittwochischer Mercurius and dealing mainly 
with the uncertainty of incoming information about a conflict in nearby 
Braunschweig (also situated in the Northern part of the German Empire), 
the Hamburg correspondent makes a most telling comparison: “To 
sum up: nobody knows what is the truth in this question. How could 
we ever, in such circumstances, have any trustworthy information 
from Moscow, situated some 400 miles away?”16 This journalist was 
clearly addressing the permanent uncertainty concerning news about 
the Razin rebellion, when numerous contradictory reports could be 
read in the press. The problem that no one could guarantee the truth 
of any specific news item describing the current state of affairs in far-
away Muscovy was regularly addressed in the articles. According 
16  Mittwochischer Mercurius, zur 8. Woche 1671 gehörig, news item “Ein anders/ vom 
vorigen” (= Hamburg, 17 Feb.) on p. [2]. The only surviving original is in Moscow 
(RGADA, coll. 155, descr. 1, 1671, no. 3, fol. 22v). There is a cross mark in the 
margins exactly next to this sentence—apparently, this is a translator’s mark.
 1194. How Was Western Europe Informed about Muscovy?
to Welke, thirty-nine of the news items studied by him (from the 
period up to the first reliable reports about Razin’s execution) 
explicitly talked about the fact that there was contradictory news, 
that a previously printed news item had proven to be wrong, or that 
the latest news had not yet been confirmed.17 In the example quoted 
above the problem had been addressed by the author of the news item, 
but we have evidence for the same kind of awareness among some 
newspaper publishers. Without any doubt the editor and publisher 
of the Hamburg-based paper Nordischer Mercurius, Georg Greflinger, 
took the lead in this race, constantly emphasising the uncertainty of 
all incoming news from Muscovy. Browsing the complete collections 
of the years 1670–7118 gives plenty of examples, such as the following 
news item, datelined “Nider-Elbe vom 9. May” (“Lower Elbe, 9 May” 
[1671]): “Letters from Moscow itself of 31 March Old Style do not 
mention any particular disturbances in connection with the rebels. 
They confirm that a leading member of Razin’s party was captured, his 
hands and feet were severed, and finally he was hanged. Other [letters] 
report something different. Time will be witness to everything”.19 All 
news items containing the place name “Nider-Elbe” were apparently 
put together in Hamburg, and we can make a qualified guess that the 
“Lower-Elbe” items printed in the Nordischer Mercurius were composed 
by Greflinger himself, generally using material from several incoming 
newsletters sent from different places. 
17  Welke, ‘Rußland’, p. 203.
18  The regular newspaper issues have a continuous pagination for the whole year, and 
title pages only for every new month and new year; other issues indicate only the 
year and the current month in the same line (for instance, “Anno 1671. Majus”.). This 
“yearbook character” might have been the reason for the fact that some complete 
year collections of the Nordischer Mercurius have survived: the newspaper was not 
always used to wrap sandwiches, but at least some subscribers kept all their issues 
and took them to the book binder at the end of the year. For the year 1671 two 
complete collections are known, one in Deichmanske bibliotek in Oslo, the other in 
the Royal Library of Copenhagen (signature: 147.15); there are copies, as always, in 
Bremen (Deutsche Presseforschung). The entire Bremen collection has been digitised 
over the past few years and is now available at http://brema.suub.uni-bremen.de/
zeitungen17/ 
19  Nordischer Mercurius, May 1671, p. 288. The source here alludes to the fact that 
Muscovy, in common with many parts of Western Europe, still used the Julian 
calendar (the ‘old style’), in contrast with the Gregorian calendar (the ‘new style’) 
that had been introduced for most Catholic countries in 1582.
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News Directly from Moscow, and from 
“Passionate Places”
Comments by Greflinger in his Nordischer Mercurius suggest he 
considered news that was communicated in letters directly from 
Moscow to be more trustworthy than news composed in other places. 
The reason for this might be previous experience, for instance, that fewer 
post-factum corrections were needed for news that came directly from 
Moscow, compared with newsletters composed—less frequently—in 
Pskov or Novgorod, or beyond the Muscovite borders. 
News items about the Razin rebellion composed in Moscow during 
the first six months of 1671 report, as a rule, that the situation was 
under control (which is more or less according to the historical facts), 
whereas ones that had been written in Riga, Stockholm, Vilna, Warsaw, 
Lemberg (today Lviv, Ukraine), Danzig etc.—that is, by authors from 
Sweden and Poland-Lithuania, Russia’s potential enemies—tended to 
present the Russian state as weakened by the rebellion and to exaggerate 
Razin’s successes up to the very day of his execution20 and even beyond 
that date. So, for instance, we have a Russian translation of a news item 
from Hamburg, 6 June 1671, stating that “Couriers report from Livonia 
and from Moscow that the traitor Razin is again gathering his forces 
and seizing cities”.21 Ironically, 6 June was actually the day of Razin’s 
execution in Moscow. Almost two months prior to this he had been 
captured near Kagalnik (a village situated eight kilometres from Azov) 
by Kornei Iakovlev, the ataman (Cossack leader) of the Don Host (who 
was loyal to the tsar).22 Another item, datelined Warsaw 31 January 
[1671] and also translated for the Muscovite government, is in a printed 
Dutch newspaper from The Hague: “The news from Muscovy reports 
that the rebellion there is still going on and that the colonel [i.e., Razin] 
20  Cf. also Welke, ‘Rußland’, p. 203f.
21  The Russian translation is in RGADA, coll. 155, descr. 1, 1671, no. 7, fol. 158. 
The kuranty (compilations of foreign news that were produced regularly at the 
Ambassadorial Chancery) for the years 1671–72 are being prepared for publication 
under the title Vesti-Kuranty 1671–1672 gg. and will be printed in 2017. I have not 
been able to locate the original news item in German, which presumably was 
in a printed newspaper from Berlin or Königsberg that has not survived, so my 
translation is from the Russian version. The relevant printed papers had arrived in 
Moscow via the Vilna postal line on 6 July 1671; see RGADA, ibid., fol. 155.
22  Krest′ianskaia voina, vol. 3, no. 56, p. 62 and no. 58, p. 64.
 1214. How Was Western Europe Informed about Muscovy?
and his followers have conquered not only Astrakhan and Kazan, but 
also about 50 other important places. Their troops are said to consist 
of about 200,000 men. An envoy from the Swedish crown is said to 
have arrived there with letters, in which he [Razin] calls himself the 
Tsar of Astrakhan, to treat with him. Allegedly the Persian [shah] also 
is interfering in this rebellion on account of differences [with Russia] 
over the Caspian Sea”.23 The numbers in this news item are heavily 
exaggerated, and it is exactly the kind of report about which the 
publisher of Nordischer Mercurius, Greflinger, would have commented 
with the explanation that it had come from a “passionate place” (that 
is, the news is biased). Why such patently ridiculous articles were 
translated for the kuranty when the tsar, of course, had much better, 
more up-to-date, and more reliable sources about the current situation, 
has already been discussed in another article.24 It is well known that 
the Muscovite government was interested in foreign reporting about 
Muscovy, especially if it was false and could be protested. The tsar’s 
colonel, Nicolaus von Staden, wrote from Novgorod on 24 September 
(probably 1672) to a representative of the Swedish crown:25 “[…] 
Regarding the protest, which his Tsarish majesty has directed to the 
Swedish crown in connection with printed newspapers: it can be 
answered truly—as Count Tott also said in his answer to me—that 
neither in Sweden, nor in Riga, nor in any other territory belonging to 
his Royal Majesty [of Sweden] are any newspapers in German being 
printed. It is impossible to protect oneself from such deceitful people 
[falsche leute], who write down such lies and hardly control them, God 
forgive them. The old Marselis,26 who receives the newspapers, and 
23  The slightly abbreviated Russian translation is in RGADA, coll. 155, descr. 1, 
1671, no. 7, fol. 6v-7, the Dutch original in Haegse Dynsdaeghse Post-tydinge no. 14, 
preserved in RGADA, coll. 155, descr. 1, 1671, file 5, fol. 8. My translation is made 
from the Dutch original, not from the Russian version. Cf. also Ingrid Maier and 
Stepan Shamin, ‘“Revolts” in the Kuranty of March-July 1671’, in From Mutual 
Observation to Propaganda War, ed. by Griesse, pp. 181–203 (p. 193, with an English 
translation of the kuranty version).
24 Maier and Shamin, ‘“Revolts” in the Kuranty’.
25  Swedish State Archives in Stockholm (SSAS), Diplomatica Muscovitica, vol. 83 (not 
paginated). Since the letter to the (anonymous) “Hochgeehrter H. Bruder” (‘highly 
honoured brother’) was preserved among Adolf Eberschildt’s letters to the Swedish 
king, it is most likely that the diplomat Eberschildt was the addressee.
26  Peter Marselis, who had administrated the Russian post for a couple of years. 
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always immediately makes translations of news from Sweden directed 
against Moscow, has only caused problems because of that”.
We find the very first authentic (post-factum) information about 
Razin’s capture in a news item from Hamburg (“Nider-Elbe”) dated 20 
June, in which the editor (Greflinger) refers to newsletters directly from 
Moscow: “Letters of 16 May Old Style from Moscow itself confirm that 
the rebel Razin has been captured, and that he is being brought to the 
tsar very slowly. However, there are still no details about the manner in 
which he was captured and taken from his army. Some [letters] add that 
all lost cities, except Astrakhan, are again in the possession of the tsar”.27 
The first sentence may well be based upon a dispatch from Moscow 
sent to governor Simon Grundel-Helmfelt in Narva from the same date, 
quoted below (see p. 138). 
The newspapers occasionally referred explicitly to the fact that 
a news item’s reliability might depend on its place of origin. Several 
authors, as well as the publisher Greflinger, speak about “passionate 
places” (“passionierte Orte”), which should be understood as “partial, 
biased, one-sided” in this context. Examples are an item from Danzig, 
dated 7 April 1671: “Some [authors] talk again about the rebel Razin’s 
big successes, although this news for the most parts originates from 
‘passionate’ places”,28 or another, datelined “Nider-Elbe vom 9. April” 
(that is, most certainly containing Greflinger’s own voice): “There 
is news via Danzig saying that [those of] the Don Cossacks, whom 
Moscow is trying to win for money, are now on the side of the main 
rebel, Stepan Razin. However, some [people] think this is biased news” 
[“vor eine passionierte Zeitung gehalten wird”].29 
Many strongly biased news reports from “passionate places” can be 
found in the Cologne-based Latin newspaper Ordinariæ Relationes. For 
example, the following item from Lemberg (Lviv):
Lemberg, 27 March. […] From Muscovy we have learned that the 
rebellion is growing stronger and uglier from day to day, and that the 
rebels threaten to kill the Muscovite Grand Prince. Peasants and [people] 
belonging to the lowest layer of men flee in growing numbers to the 
army of the rebel Stepan Razin [Stephani Raninii] because they see that 
27  Nordischer Mercurius (June 1671), p. 380.
28  Nordischer Mercurius (April 1671), p. 217.
29  Ibid., p. 253.
 1234. How Was Western Europe Informed about Muscovy?
the Muscovite Prince is inferior in the defensive struggle, and that they 
will be living more safely under Stepan’s leadership than under the rule 
of the [Grand] Prince.30
Most suspicious of all, at least in Greflinger’s opinion, seemed to be those 
newsletters about the rebellion which were sent from Riga. International 
mail from Moscow was usually sent via the Riga postal line, which had 
been established in 1665; Riga was thus an important transfer point for 
news out of Moscow. When the Moscow news arrived in Riga, it was 
usually “completed” with information from other places—and probably 
with a great deal of hearsay. Greflinger summarises the difference 
between Moscow news and Riga news in an item from “Nider-Elbe” 
(Hamburg), dated 3 February: “Letters from Muscovy dated 24 
December report that everything is calm, whereas Livonian letters say 
it is all bad”.31 That much faked news was sent out from Riga can be 
explained in part by a conscious disinformation campaign carried out by 
the tsar’s Riga-born colonel, Nicolaus von Staden, in the spring of 1671. 
A news item from Riga, dated 6 March 1671, reports his arrival and then 
continues: “Moreover we hear from this envoy’s people that the well-
known rebel Stepan Razin has been completely defeated. 20,000 of his 
former followers were hanged, the same amount captured and killed by 
sword, and about 50,000 have been drowned”.32 This news was biased, 
and the numbers of people killed are heavily exaggerated. This can be 
compared with earlier information from “passionate places”, according 
to which Razin had assembled an army of 100,000 men. It may well 
be that Nicolaus von Staden’s “disinformation campaign”, conducted 
while he was in Riga in the spring of 1671 (undoubtedly on the tsar’s 
30  Ordinariæ Relationes 1671, no. 36 (printing date: 5 May 1671). The complete year 
collection is in private possession, at the Castle of Herdringen in Arnsberg, 
Westphalia (shelf number: Fü 3301a). The original Latin text reads: “Lembergo, 
27. Martii. […] Ex Moscovia resciimus rebellionem indies turpiorem accrescere, & 
mortem Magno Moscorum Principi rebelles minari: agricolæ & ex infima hominum 
fœce quamplurimi ad castra rebellantis Stephani Raninii confugiunt, vident enim 
Moscorum Principem resistendo imparem, seseque sub moderamine Stephani 
quam Principis imperio tutius victuros”. My thanks to the owner, Baron Wennemar 
von Fürstenberg, for letting me work with his unique collection on several 
occasions, and to Winfried Schumacher (Cologne) for his help with the translation 
from the Latin.
31  Nordischer Mercurius (February 1671), p. 74.
32  Nordischer Mercurius (March 1671), p. 188.
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orders), was one of the reasons why Moscow news “made in Riga” was 
not very trustworthy. Ironically, von Staden was also on the payroll of 
the Swedish state, although probably this began some months later.33
Greflinger usually published corrections and modifications of news 
printed during the previous month on the verso of the title page at the 
beginning of the new month. During January 1671, in his “Correctio Nicht 
erfolgender Sachen im Decembri 1670” (“Correction of News from December 
1670 that Could Not be Confirmed”), he writes: “The Muscovite news 
items are still very uncertain, therefore their correction will have to wait 
until the next month”. Most telling is a news item from the Hamburg 
region, “Nider-Elbe vom 17. Febr”., two thirds of which deals with the 
situation in Russia:
The news about the events in Muscovy varies so much that one is almost 
afraid of reporting anything […] Letters of 11 January Old Style from 
the city of Moscow itself report that nothing was known there about 
any rebellion, and the tsar is planning to marry again, within six weeks. 
Other [letters] of 5 January from the same city, that have arrived in 
Danzig, say that a lot of news is coming from the Muscovite army, but 
there is no reliable information. Older letters of the last of December 1670 
inform that the rebel has been repulsed to such a degree that a hundred 
miles are paved with poor killed people, former soldiers of the rebel’s 
army. Letters from Riga of 31 January New Style mention that no news 
had come in from Moscow these last days, and they therefore still do not 
presume anything positive. Everybody is invited to believe whatever he 
wants about all this […].34 
33  At a meeting of the Swedish Council of the Realm on Saturday, 29 July 1671, the 
councillor of the realm and governor general of Swedish Livonia, Count Clas 
Åkesson Tott Junior (1630–74), informed his colleagues that he, at the order of the 
king, had awarded von Staden a pension of 1000 dalers. The payment was for von 
Staden’s successful attempts in making “Artemon” favourably disposed towards 
Sweden. This refers to Artamon Sergeevich Matveev, head of the Ambassadorial 
Chancery since spring 1671. The council decided that a bill of exchange of 500 
dalers should be sent to Inspector Möller in Riga, apparently to hand the money 
over to von Staden at his next visit to his home town. See SSAS, Odelade kansli, 
Riksrådsprotokoll, vol. 58. My thanks to Heiko Droste for a transcription of the 
quoted protocol. See also von Staden’s letter sent from Novgorod and dated 24 
September (no year; probably 1672), signed by him personally, which was quoted 
on p. 121. Count Tott—with whom von Staden had been in contact—and “Stenca 
Raisin” are mentioned. See SSAS, Diplomatica Muscovitica, vol. 83 (not foliated; 
among letters from autumn 1672). 
34  Nordischer Mercurius (February 1671), p. 104. 
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Contradictory news from Muscovy arrived throughout the whole first 
half of the year 1671 and was published, very often with a comment by 
Greflinger saying that the reader could not be certain of anything. The 
situation changed only in the second half of 1671, from mid-July, when 
the first reliable news about the execution had arrived in Hamburg. 
However, at first the publisher of the Nordischer Mercurius remains 
somewhat cautious, as we read in a news item datelined “Nider-Elbe 
vom 11. Juli”: “We now have so many newsletters from Moscow [stating] 
that the rebel Razin has been seized, that one can no longer have any 
doubts about it, although the letters are still controversial. See some of 
them here [below]”.35 This announcement is followed by three news 
items, the first one from Pleskau (today Pskov) dated 20 May: “The Don 
Cossacks who have remained on the side of Moscow have captured the 
rebel with a special trick. He is being brought to the emperor [Käyser] 
to get his reward”. The second is datelined “Novigrodt” (Novgorod), 29 
May. It describes a great fire in Moscow and another in Tver. About 
Razin we read: “The rebel has been brought to Moscow as a captive. 
This, however, does not mean that the uprising has come to an end: 
they believe that there will be more disturbances”. Finally, the most 
recent—and therefore most updated—news item (from Moscow, dated 
8 June) reads: “On the third of this month the rebel was brought here, 
and on the sixth he was thrown to the dogs, very mutilated. More 
details will follow as soon as possible”.36 The only minor mistake in 
this Moscow news item, when it comes to historical facts, is the date 
when Razin was brought to the capital: this happened on 2 June, not 
on the 3rd.37 But generally the information is correct—for instance, the 
date of the execution was indeed 6 June. The news item from Pskov is 
also absolutely correct, and the one from Novgorod contains only one 
minor mistake: on 29 May, Razin had not yet been brought to Moscow, 
for on that date he was still on his way. The newsletter from Moscow 
dated 8 June had made its way to Hamburg very quickly, within around 
35  Nordischer Mercurius (July 1671), p. 417 [recte: 427].
36  Ibid., p. 428.
37  The date 2 June is mentioned in Krest′ianskaia voina, vol. 3, no. 99, p. 106 and no. 104, 
p. 114. We have the same date in Christoff Koch’s eyewitness report of 6 June 1671, 
sent to the Swedish governor general in Narva, Simon Grundel-Helmfelt (SSAS, 
Livonica II, vol. 180, Moscow attachment of 6 June 1671).
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thirty-four days, since Greflinger could publish it around 12 July,38 and 
10–11 July was apparently the time when the first information about 
Razin’s execution had reached Hamburg (both Moscow and Hamburg 
used the Julian calendar). Incidentally, in this specific case we can be 
quite sure that the printing date was 12 July, because the obligatory 
weather observations at the end of the issue cover the period between 
8 and 11 July,39 and generally we can presume that the printing day 
would have been one day after the issue’s “Lower-Elbe” item. On the 
basis of Greflinger’s “More details will follow as soon as possible”, we 
can extrapolate that he already had these details on 11 July. However, 
he could not insert a detailed description of what had happened in 
Moscow on 6 June into the current issue, which was already filled with 
all kinds of other news, the major portion of which most probably had 
already been typeset when the Moscow news came in. All he could 
do was insert that very short “post-execution” message. Immediately 
after the weather observations is another notification, an advertisement: 
“Hierbey wird etwas sonderliches verkaufft” (“In connection with this, an 
additional separate [publication] is being sold”). Although this phrase 
does not say explicitly that this “additional separate publication” was to 
cover Razin’s execution, it seems likely that this was the intent. 
A Printed German-Language Report  
About the Execution
Two anonymous German-language quarto pamphlets about Razin’s 
execution are known, one of them containing a (very unrealistic) 
“portrait” of the rebel.40 
38  The issues of the Nordischer Mercurius did not have a printing date on them, which 
was quite normal for seventeenth-century German-language newspapers from the 
Holy Roman Empire, whereas the printing date was usually given in Dutch papers, 
and also in the Latin-language paper published in Cologne.
39  Nordischer Mercurius (July 1671), p. 428. 
40  “Umständiger Bericht Von deß grossen Rebellen wider Moßkau STEPHAN 
RAZINS Hinrichtung; Geschehen in der Stadt Moßkau den 6. Junij st. v. 1671. 
Dabey auch seine gewesene Gestalt abgebildet ist” (“Detailed report about the 
great rebel against Moscow, Stepan Razin’s, execution, which took place in the city 
of Moscow on 6 June 1671 Old Style. With a picture of his previous appearance”); 
see Fig. 1. The portrait is on the verso of the title page. The only surviving copy 
I could locate is within the Copenhagen volume of the Nordischer Mercurius 
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Figure 1. An (invented) portrait of a turbaned Razin with a marshal’s 
baton in his right hand from a German-language pamphlet.41
According to Mankov, this pamphlet probably was an appendix 
(prilozhenie) to the Nordischer Mercurius,42 whereas Welke thinks 
that the “Razin issue” belongs to another Hamburg-based paper, 
Wöchentliche Zeitung auß mehrerley örther.43 In my estimation, it was 
not an appendix at all, but just a separate pamphlet. One additional 
1671, where the pamphlet is placed between p. 436 and p. 437. This imprint is 
not in VD17. The other edition, without the portrait, is registered in VD17 and 
available as full text at http://www.gbv.de/vd/vd17/12:629466X (The title in VD17 
is erroneously given as Umständlicher Bericht, instead of Umständiger Bericht.) The 
first part of the title is the same as in the edition with the portrait, including the 
date, “6. Junij st. v. 1671” although the information about the portrait is, of course, 
missing here. The only known copy is in the Bavarian State Library in Munich, 
signature Res 4 Crim. 140, 18. 
41  The woodcut portrait is based on a copper engraving printed in Nuremberg at the 
late Paulus Fürst’s printing house; see Gleb Kazakov, ‘Through Glory and Death: 
Portraying Razin the Rebel in Western Media’, in Iconic Revolts: Political Violence 
in Early Modern Imagery, ed. by Malte Griesse (forthcoming). The Fürst portrait is 
available at http://russiapedia.rt.com/prominent-russians/history-and-mythology/
stepan-stenka-razin/ 
42  Inostrannye izvestiia, ed. by Man′kov, p. 84.
43  Welke, Rußland, p. 204, no. 444. In 1671 the original title from 1618 (when this 
newspaper was founded) was no longer in use; at that time, the series published 
on different days of the week had different titles: Ordinari Diengstags Zeitung resp. 
Wochentliche Donnerstags Zeitung. Welke even gives a concrete ordinary number to 
which he thinks it belongs: “Prima zu Nr. 29” (which is synonymous with Ordinari 
Diengstags Zeitung, no. 29). There is no announcement about any special issue on 
the last page, as would usually be the case when a “special” had been issued; see 
http://brema.suub.uni-bremen.de/zeitungen17/periodical/pageview/1143975 
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textually identical version was published in an ordinary number of 
Europæische Montags Zeitung (issued in Hanover44), under the headline 
“Moßkau den 20. Junij/ styl. nov.” There are minor differences in spelling 
and punctuation between all three versions. Mankov reprints the 
text.45 Partially different versions (although some fragments always 
overlap with the “original” version, from 1671) were reprinted in later 
years, in chronicle books and historical encyclopedias such as Diarium 
Europæum (in German) or Hollandtsche Mercurius (in Dutch).46 Could 
it be that both scholars are right, and two Hamburg publishers issued 
one supplement each? In this case one might presume that the edition 
with the portrait was issued by Greflinger, the publisher of Nordischer 
Mercurius, because there is an advertisement on the last page of a 
February issue reading “In connection with this [hierbey] the portrait of 
Stepan Razin, the main rebel against Moscow, is being sold”47—which 
means that Greflinger actually was in possession of the “portrait” (an 
invented portrait, imitating a copper engraving from the workshop of 
the late Paulus Fürst, Nuremberg; see note 41).
44  See Else Bogel and Elger Blühm, et al., Die deutschen Zeitungen des 17 Jahrhunderts. 
Ein Bestandsverzeichnis mit historischen und bibliographischen Angaben, vol. 1 (Bremen: 
Schünemann Universitätsverlag, 1971), pp. 191–93. The relevant issue is number 
XXX of 1671, pp. [3]-[4] (signature in Deutsche Presseforschung, Bremen: Z161).
45  Man′kov, Inostrannye izvestiia, pp. 96–97. The text is not identical to any of the 
two pamphlets described above, in note 40, nor with the version in the periodical 
newspaper. According to the authors of this introductory section (A. G. Man′kov, A. 
L. Gol′dberg, and S. Ia. Marlinskii), the transcription was made from a copy in the 
city archives of Stralsund, “apparently, an appendix [prilozhenie] to the Nordischer 
Mercurius”, kept in the archive “within a volume of Hamburg newspapers of the 
year 1671” (ibid., p. 84). I find this information very confusing and suppose that it 
is based on a misunderstanding. It is true that the city archives of Stralsund house 
more or less complete collections of two Hamburg newspapers for a long series of 
years, among them the year 1671 (signature E.511 o), but Nordischer Mercurius is 
not among them—see Bogel and Blühm, Die deutsche Zeitungen, vol. 3, (Munich: 
Saur, 1985), p. 114—and I could not find this “appendix” in Stralsund. Apparently, 
the Russian scholars had not seen any original newspapers and pamphlets kept 
outside the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic, but were relying 
upon copies received from the Bremen scholars Elger Blühm and Martin Welke 
(Man′kov, Inostrannye izvestiia, p. 81). It would have been logical to look for this 
imprint in Stralsund if Welke’s hypothesis had been correct (see note 43), but in this 
case there would not be any connection whatsoever between the imprint and the 
Nordischer Mercurius.
46  See ibid., pp. 82–84, 100–01, 104–05.
47  Nordischer Mercurius (February 1671), p. 110.
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Although it seems impossible to prove whether one of the 
pamphlets was connected to Nordischer Mercurius in some way, at least 
one more note about the execution was printed in an ordinary issue 
of that newspaper. Under the headline “Nider-Elbe vom 1. Augusti” we 
read: “How the rebel Razin was executed has been drawn by hand in 
Moscow, and the description about it is in Greek letters. Arms and legs 
are on poles, and the head and the trunk, too, whereas the intestines 
have been thrown to the dogs”.48 This note apparently describes the 
colour drawing from Moscow (see Figure 2); either the author of this 
note (probably Greflinger himself) or somebody else must have seen 
a version of the drawing, not only heard about its existence, since the 
body parts that had been set up on poles correspond to the drawing, 
not to the actual facts: in all eyewitness reports about the execution 
only five body parts (arms, legs, and head) had been set up, whereas 
the trunk had been left on the ground for the dogs. We will return to 
this question below.
48  Nordischer Mercurius (August 1671), p. 474. The German press historian Else Bogel 
apparently thought that this note was related to the quarto pamphlet about the 
execution; see her hand-written note on the Bremen copy of the pamphlet, referring 
to p. 474 of “Z20” (= Nordischer Mercurius; the Bremen copies were made from the 
Copenhagen volume, where the pamphlet is placed after p. 436 of the newspaper): 
http://brema.suub.uni-bremen.de/zeitungen17/periodical/pageview/1001356 
However, Bogel is wrong; the small news item on p. 474 talks very explicitly 
about a drawing by hand (not an imprint), and the description is in “Greek letters” 
(= Cyrillic; see also below). Unfortunately, as a consequence of this mistake, the 
pamphlet was digitised together with the Nordischer Mercurius, where it was placed 
after p. 474. One strong indication for my hypothesis that the Razin brochure is 
not an integral part of the Mercurius is the format: in order to fit into the octavo 
volume of the Mercurius, the quarto pamphlet had to be folded twice, something 
that is quite obvious for a reader of the originals in Copenhagen, but impossible 
to see from the Bremen copies. The ultimate proof that the anonymous imprint 
does not belong to the periodical Mercurius is the fact that the Oslo volume does 
not contain this pamphlet. It contains another pamphlet, one that also does not 
belong to the periodical newspaper. I offer my thanks to Ole Skimmeland from 
Deichmanske bibliotek in Oslo for checking this for me and sending photographs in 
September 2016; see also note 18 about the two surviving complete year collections. 
A reasonable explanation is that the seventeenth-century newspaper reader 
and collector added the Razin pamphlet to his full-year collection of Nordischer 
Mercurius, apparently because of the thematic connection. This does not mean, 
however, that I would exclude Georg Greflinger from the possible publishers of 
this pamphlet. On the contrary, I think he is one of the stronger candidates, but 
more research is needed in order to corroborate such a hypothesis.
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Razin’s Rebellion in Swedish Diplomatic 
Correspondence
Let us now return to the research question formulated in the introduction 
to this chapter: who were the authors of the Muscovite items in the 
West European newspapers, and how was the news transmitted to the 
West? It has already been mentioned that Johan de Rodes, the Swedish 
commercial agent in Moscow in the first half of the 1650s, may have been 
the purveyor of news that ended up in printed German newspapers, so 
one hypothesis is that the situation was still just about the same in the 
early 1670s. During the period in which many Western newspapers quite 
regularly printed news about the Razin rebellion, another Swedish citizen, 
Christoff Koch—actually Johan de Rodes’s brother-in-law—was sending 
regular reports to the governor general of Swedish Ingria in Narva, 
Simon Grundel-Helmfelt (1617–77).49 Although I have not yet found any 
longer verbatim passages in that “Swedish correspondent’s” letters and 
in German-language newspapers, it seems very likely that some of the 
printed information about Razin had originally been assembled by Koch. 
He was born in Reval in 1637 to German-speaking parents50 and there are 
no indications that he knew much Swedish; all his letters, which have 
been preserved primarily in the Swedish State Archives in Stockholm, 
are written in German. Koch came to Moscow in 1655 aged eighteen, 
together with his brother-in-law Johan de Rodes, and stayed there for 
most of his life. He must have earned his living in Moscow first and 
foremost as a merchant, but he also received both money and recognition 
in Sweden for sending regular reports to Swedish court officials. His 
early letters sent to Helmfelt, from the 1670s, are always anonymous, 
but since a lot of later letters have also been preserved, signed by him 
personally (although usually not written by his own hand), we can be 
fairly sure that the earlier, unsigned communications were also written 
by him. A strong argument for this assumption is Koch’s particular use 
of German (for instance, the frequent appearance of Low German words, 
49  I will for the most part use “Helmfelt” as a short form of his name.
50  For more details about Koch’s biography, kinship relations, and activities, see 
Heiko Droste and Ingrid Maier, ‘Christoff Koch (1637–1711)—Sweden’s Man in 
Moscow’, in Travelling Chronicles: Episodes in the History of News and Newspapers from 
the Early Modern Period to the Eighteenth Century, ed. by Siv Gøril Brandtzæg, Paul 
Goring and Christine Watson (forthcoming).
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and Low German influences on his grammar and spelling); another is 
that no other regular “correspondent” from Moscow at the time is 
known. Moreover, the governor, Helmfelt, to whom the letters were 
sent, often mentions “my correspondent” or “the usual correspondent 
in Moscow”, and sometimes he even mentions Koch by name (in the 
Swedish form, Kock).
One of Helmfelt’s tasks was to send regular reports to the Swedish 
government about everything that was happening in Muscovy. His 
reports were officially addressed to King Charles XI, who had not yet 
attained his majority. Together with his own letters Helmfelt would also 
send attachments. Most of the attachments preserved in the archives 
are reports written by Koch, but Koch would also send other materials 
to Narva—for instance, official Muscovite documents, such as a peace 
treaty. He seems to have written to Helmfelt once a week, and apparently 
Helmfelt also wrote one letter every week to the king. Of course, many 
of these letters, and possibly even more of the attachments, are now lost.
Helmfelt received such correspondence not only from Moscow, 
but also from Novgorod and Pskov, although more rarely. If nothing 
had been received from any of these places he would mention this 
too, for instance with the words “no news has come in from the 
neighbourhood”51—Narva was very close to the Muscovite border—and 
he would still report about the state of affairs in Muscovy in a sentence 
or two. The governor’s letters are usually very short, in some cases 
because he had not received any reports. On other occasions he would 
offer a brief summary and mention that more details could be read in 
the attachment(s). Presumably Helmfelt normally did not forward the 
originals received from Moscow (written by Koch’s secretary), but had 
his own secretary make copies. However, some of the communications 
that were forwarded to Stockholm from Narva may well have been the 
originals from Moscow. 
The Moscow correspondence from the relevant timespan can be 
found in three modern archival files at the Swedish State Archives in 
Stockholm: Livonica II, vol. 179, containing Helmfelt’s letters (usually 
with attachments) to his king from the years 1668–70; vol. 180, 
comprising the years 1671–73; and the Bengt Horn collection, E4304, 
51  SSAS, Livonica II, vol. 180, passim.
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with letters—and attachments—from Helmfelt to Bengt Horn, the 
governor of Estonia from 1656. Interestingly enough (although not very 
surprisingly), several “Moscow attachments” in the “Livonica files” and 
in the Horn collection not only contain exactly the same reports, but 
are also written by the same hand; in these cases we can be sure that 
both copies were made by Helmfelt’s secretary, because the Moscow 
correspondent would not have sent two copies of the same letter to 
Narva. 
The first letter to the Swedish king in which Helmfelt mentions the 
rebellion of Stepan Razin is dated Narva, 14 July 1670.52 In addition, 
the attachments from Novgorod and Moscow also contain “Razin 
news”.53 In the following archival file, vol. 180, probably all the Moscow 
attachments had been sent to Narva by Christoff Koch. The oldest 
report from Moscow in this file is the “Extract schreiben auß Muscou d. 
13. Xbris 670” (“Summary letter from Moscow, 13 December 1670”).54 
It was sent from Narva to Stockholm together with an accompanying 
letter of 5 January 1671 addressed to the king and signed by Helmfelt. 
About two-thirds of the “Extract” deal with Razin: “From Astrakhan we 
do not have any other news, beyond that it is still occupied by Razin’s 
army. He has sent the harvest of this year, such as wine, melons, and 
other fruit, to his majesty [the tsar], that is, he has sent everything to 
Simbirsk, and the voevoda [military commander] has dispatched [a 
courier] to his majesty, asking whether he would like him to forward 
the merchandise to Moscow. Thereupon they consulted the patriarch, 
whose recommendation was to pour the wine into the Volga river, 
because Stenka could have poisoned it […]”. The letter is quite typical for 
Koch’s correspondence: many details are given, not only about Razin, 
but also—towards the end—about the new customs system which the 
52  See Livonica II, vol. 179 (not foliated), Helmfelt’s letter to the king from Narva, 13 
December 1670. Many thanks to Heiko Droste for sharing his notes on vol. 179 with 
me.
53  The attachment from Moscow was possibly not by Christoff Koch, who seems to 
have spent part of the year 1670 in Reval.
54  SSAS, Livonica II, vol. 180 (not foliated); most of the quoted letters by Koch and 
Helmfelt are from this volume. It is generally safe to assume that correspondence 
from Moscow was written by Koch. There is a microscopic theoretical possibility 
that some of the Moscow reports could have been written by somebody else (since 
they are anonymous), and only forwarded by Koch, but for most of the reports from 
Moscow this seems unlikely. 
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Muscovite government was about to introduce. First and foremost, 
Koch was a merchant who would have been attentive to such details. 
The report also contains some typical examples of “Koch syntax”, such 
as “von Stenca Raisins seinem Volcke […] besetzet”.55 Also included is a 
report from Novgorod (thus not written by Koch; we can only make a 
qualified guess that the Novgorod item was composed by the Swedish 
commercial representative to Novgorod), which is dated 25 December. 
Presumably, the Novgorod author also had other sources, since he 
underlines the uncertainty of the situation: “[…] About Razin different 
news has been received, so that nothing certain can be communicated. 
Some think that he is in Astrakhan, others that he is in Simbirsk, and 
although a letter which arrived here on 21 December tries to make the 
common populace believe that he has been wounded, this was only a 
rumour, because we were informed for sure by a secretary from the 
Chancery [auß der Pricase] that he is still healthy and is encamped near 
Simbirsk […]”. As we see, this Novgorod item contains exactly the same 
type of contradictory news as we could read in the newspaper items 
presented above.
In the next letter to the Swedish king, dated 12 January 1671, 
Helmfelt mentions an attachment, “which is a letter sent by the tsar to 
the voivods in Novgorod [Naugorodt] and Pskov [Plesco], in which the 
tsar himself reports in great detail what has happened since 1668, when 
this unrest started, until 6 December 1670, the date of the letter”. A letter 
to the military commander of Novgorod, M. Morozov, is published in 
Krest′ianskaia voina.56 It does not have an exact date on it, as only the 
month is indicated (November). The ending of this letter to Morozov 
gives some insight into how its contents might have become known to 
the Swedes and other foreigners: “When you have received our great 
ruler’s letter [gramota], you should order it to be read aloud more 
than once to the inhabitants of Great Novgorod, whatever rank they 
might be, in the administrative office [office of the provincial voevoda-
prikaznaia izba], so that they will get word about the victory, won by 
our great ruler’s soldiers, over the rebel, apostate and traitor Stenka 
55  In normal High German either “von Stenca Raisins Volcke”, or (colloquially) “von 
Stenca Raisin seinem Volcke” would be acceptable, but marking possession using 
both a genitive -s and the pronominal form seinem is unusual.
56  Krest′ianskaia voina, vol. 2, part 1, no. 277, pp. 339–42.
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Razin and his allies”.57 This is a very interesting example of the way the 
government wanted to get its version of the news out, presumably in 
the first instance for internal Muscovite consumption, but possibly also 
with foreign merchants and others in mind as a second target group. 
Helmfelt continues his short summary of the tsar’s gramota with 
the words “At the end he [the tsar] mentions that their Razin [Raisin] is 
wounded and had to retreat.58 The tsar orders that this letter be publicly 
read in the pricasse, or Chancery [Cantzleystube] […]”. There cannot be 
any doubt that both the commander of Novgorod and Helmfelt received 
essentially the same document. What we do not know is who sent or 
handed over the document to Helmfelt. Presumably the tsar’s letter was 
first sent (or given) to Helmfelt in Russian, and most probably Helmfelt 
forwarded the original Russian text to Stockholm, although we cannot 
exclude the possibility that the translation was made in Novgorod 
or in Narva, and Helmfelt received a Swedish translation. Since the 
handwriting of the Swedish version is the same as in many other 
translations from Russian that are preserved in the Swedish archives, 
it is more logical to presume that it was made by one of the translators 
for the Swedish crown in Stockholm. In the archival box there is no 
Russian version, only a Swedish one. Another attachment forwarded to 
the king by Helmfelt on the same occasion is the full twenty-eight-page 
text of the 1667 treaty of Andrusovo between Muscovy and Poland. The 
letter and the attachments were apparently sewn together in Stockholm; 
today, some folios have become loosened from the rest. In this way the 
official view of the Muscovite government might have found its way 
into a printed newspaper, via people like Koch and Helmfelt. 
An example for which we only have the Russian translation in the 
kuranty is a Moscow item of 26 January 1671 from a Dutch newspaper: 
“Here there are letters from the regiments of his Majesty the Tsar 
which write how the bandit Stenka Razin has arrived at the city of 
Simbirsk with 20,000 men. And from 4 September through 3 October 
they launched 15 terrible assaults on the city. […]”.59 The reader is told 
57  Ibid., p. 342.
58  Ibid. The Russian document here reads: “And this rebel and apostate fled away from 
Simbirsk, heavily wounded, down on the Volga river with a few boats and with a 
small group of his men”. 
59  RGADA, coll. 155, descr. 1, 1671, file 7, fol. 40v, and see also the complete English 
translation of this kuranty item in Maier and Shamin, ‘“Revolts” in the Kuranty’, 
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about the boldness of General Ivan Miloslavskii and about the joining 
of forces with Prince Iurii Bariatinskii, who had arrived from Kazan. 
The newspaper article also tells us that the tsar promoted Miloslavskii 
to a high rank for this victory. We read about Razin being wounded and 
that he “barely escaped in a boat, and only a few people escaped with 
him.60 Five hundred people were taken alive and executed on the spot 
[…] And this disorder has now completely ended, and the merchants 
can once again set out for this state”.61 The last sentence confirms 
that it was very important for the tsar to communicate to merchants 
in Western Europe that it was now safe again to take up trade with 
Muscovy. On 26 January 1671, three to four months had passed since 
the deciding battles, and such a “news” item would only make sense in 
the context of a summarising official statement, of the same type as the 
communiqué dated 6 December discussed above. I could not find such 
a summary in the published Russian documents, although there are 
plenty of reports about military action, which were sent separately as 
events were occurring. My hypothesis is that the government had made 
a compilation at the beginning of December 1670, and this compilation 
was either handed over to some foreigner or it leaked out. Eventually 
a version of this compilation was published in The Hague, and it came 
back to Moscow in a news summary, as a news item in the kuranty.
In his letter of 3 March 1671 Helmfelt informs the king that the tsar’s 
colonel, Nicolaus von Staden, is on his way to Riga, via Novgorod, and 
he also mentions two attachments about Razin, which were marked 
with the letters “A” and “B” respectively. About attachment “B” 
Helmfelt writes: “I am sending to Your Majesty, under letter B, what 
has been made public by the Russian side in the form of a report about 
the recent course of events concerning Stenka Razin [Stencka Raisin]”. 
Unfortunately, only the missive marked with the letter “A” is in the 
document box; the other attachment might have been filed somewhere 
else in the archive, or it might be lost altogether. But it is very clear 
p. 198. The authors say that the newspaper item must be based on “an official 
communication of the Russian authorities” (ibid.), but it was not yet known, at 
the time that article was written, that the Russian government really did spread 
its official viewpoint via foreign residents in Moscow, possibly above all foreign 
merchants, such as the Swedish citizen Koch.
60  Compare this with the Russian document quoted in note 58.
61 Maier and Shamin, ‘“Revolts” in the Kuranty’, p. 198.
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from Helmfelt’s letter that the tsar actively spread his communications 
to the foreigner Koch in Moscow, who forwarded them to Helmfelt in 
Narva. The most likely person to have contacted Koch was Artamon 
Sergeevich Matveev, the man who was to become the new head of the 
Ambassadorial Chancery, after Afanasii Ordin-Nashchokin had been 
removed in 1671.62 There are several letters from Moscow, mostly from 
the following year, 1672, in which Koch writes that he had been invited 
to take a meal with A. S. Matveev.63 Yet as early as 21 March 1671 Koch 
sent Helmfelt a very positive assessment of Matveev, and it is also clear 
from this and several other letters that Koch visited the Chancery quite 
regularly: “He [Matveev] is intelligent [gutes Verstandes], he makes 
quick decisions, and he helps the rich and the poor to obtain justice. […] 
Yesterday I saw him making more than thirty decisions [Urteil] within 
five hours. I have never experienced anything similar before. Probably 
he will climb high here”.
In a letter from Narva of 15 March, Helmfelt reports that “the 
news, according to which Stenka Razin had been brought to Moscow 
in chains, has not been confirmed”—the Russian side had spread this 
rumour prematurely, when it was already quite clear that the rebel 
would soon be seized.64 In the same letter Helmfelt also informs the 
62  Cf. an attachment, datelined Moscow 24 January 1671 and forwarded from Narva 
to the Swedish king on 3 February: “It’s over with Nashchokin, because the affair 
between Poland and the tsar has come to such a bad end”. The author understands 
clearly that Nashchokin is being removed for political reasons; eventually he took 
monastic orders.
63  Koch and Matveev had a close relationship, at least during the years 1671–72. For 
more details see Droste and Maier, ‘Christoff Koch’ (forthcoming).
64  Already on 4 January 1671 the ataman of the Don host, Kornei Iakovlev, reported to 
the Ambassadorial Chancery about an attempt to capture Razin, who, however, had 
escaped to Tsaritsyn; see Krest′ianskaia voina, vol. 2, part 2, no. 74, pp. 94–95. A missive 
dated 5 March (received in Moscow on 16 March), sent from G. Romodanovskii, 
the commander of the Belgorod regiment which was on the frontier with Ukraine, 
indicates that the capture of the Razin brothers by Kornei Iakovlev has occurred, 
but that the cossacks are holding him somewhere for reasons Romodanovskii has 
not been able to establish, so he is sending orders to find Razin and to have him 
sent on to Moscow without further delay. (See Krest′ianskaia voina, vol. 3, no. 22, p. 
29.) This reveals the level of uncertainty even among the best-informed Muscovite 
officials. In fact, it seems that Razin had not yet been seized, since an instruction sent 
out to Romodanovskii on 4 March to send reinforcements against Razin mentions 
a report by Iakovlev of 28 February, which stated that Razin was still at large near 
Cherkassk, and that there were not sufficient forces to capture him (ibid., no. 21, pp. 
27–28). Clearly there were Cossack rebels still on the loose, as we see in no. 34, pp. 
41–42, a report written between 30 March and 3 April by the military commander of 
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king that “Artaman Sergeevich [Sergeiewitz] has been installed at the 
Ambassadorial Chancery [Posolski pricas] instead of Nashchokin, 
because the latter has to go to Poland as an envoy”. Incidentally, the 
news about Nashchokin going to Poland was also premature, because, 
in his correspondence of 21 March, Koch writes that Ivan Ivanovich 
Chaadaev, Dementii Minich Bashmakov, and a secretary are going to 
Poland as envoys, instead of Nashchokin. 
In his letter of 19 April to the king Helmfelt gives a short summary of 
the included attachment, a report from Moscow dated 4 April, in which 
Koch writes: “They say, concerning the rebel Razin [Raisin], that he has 
been in Saratov not long ago and that he has substantial forces. They 
also say secretly [auch wird heimlich geredet] that he is planning to hand 
over Astrakhan to the Turks”. Helmfelt’s next letter to the king, dated 8 
May, contains an attachment from Moscow with Razin news (as usual, 
among many other subjects), dated 11 April: “The rebel is said to have 
united his forces with the Calmucks, the Bashkirians, and the cossacks 
from Zaporozh′e, and he is on his way to Simbirsk with powerful forces. 
Borotinskoi has been sent to Simbirsk with his forces, and Petr Vasilevich 
Sheremetev [Peter Wasilowitz Scheremetoff] has received orders to go to 
the Don with his army”. The confusing information is probably based 
on the equally confused state of the Russian authorities (cf. note 64). 
Koch makes it quite clear that this news has not been confirmed; he is 
reporting the rumours that were circulating in Moscow. 
After Helmfelt’s letter of 8 May there is a gap in the archival file. His 
next letter to the Swedish king is from 1 June. In the archive, this letter 
is filed together with attachments from Moscow of 16, 23, and 30 May.65 
Helmfelt comments on his long silence by observing that there were 
Korotoiak. On 1 April, Romodanovskii was sent further instructions to learn about 
Razin’s camp on the Don (no. 35, pp. 42–43), and on the same day Romodanovskii 
wrote about Razin’s intentions to march against the Ukrainian towns, for whose 
defence there were insufficient forces; this letter was received and read to the tsar 
on 6 April (no. 36, p. 44). A report of 8 April indicates that Razin had still not been 
captured, but his brother was under arrest in Tsaritsyn (no. 40, pp. 47–48). On April 
13, instructions were sent out referring to the danger that Razin was intending to 
march on Voronezh and Korotoiak (no. 44, p. 52). I am very grateful to Dan Waugh, 
who directed my attention to these documents and discussed their significance 
with me in great detail. 
65  The dispatch from Moscow dated 30 May cannot have been in Narva on 1 June, so 
the order in the archive might be inaccurate in more cases than this. 
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several posts that did not contain any news about Muscovy, or, if they 
did, the news they contained was not worth mentioning. However, in 
another archival file,66 containing Helmfelt’s reports to the governor of 
Estonia in Reval, Bengt Horn, there is a letter from the following day, 
2 June, with a Moscow attachment of 9 May. This is the earliest “Koch 
report”, in which we read about the seizure of Razin by the Cossack 
Kornei Iakovlev. However, Koch is still a bit skeptical: “Last Thursday a 
messenger arrived from the Don Cossacks, reporting that the rebel Razin 
was captured by a Don ataman, called Corneli Jacoblef, and he is said to 
be brought here as soon as possible. On the following Friday this news 
was confirmed by two written communications [2. posten] and spread 
among the most noble as well as the common people. Time will show, 
whether the same thing as happened lately will be repeated again”. The 
recent event was undoubtedly the occasion on which a previous report 
about Razin’s capture had to be disclaimed later on. 
In his letter of 16 May67 Koch confirms once more that Razin had 
been seized; among other things, he writes: “Not only several letters 
[etzliche Posten], but also fourteen Don Cossacks, who had been sent to 
Moscow five days ago especially for this reason, confirmed that an old 
ataman of the Don Host, whose name is Corneli Jacofloff, has actually 
captured the rebel, and he will soon be brought here [i.e., to Moscow]”.68 
The next Koch report, of 23 May, confirms this fact once more: “It was 
confirmed that Razin really has been seized. Count Grigori Grigoriewitz 
Romodannofskoj has sent some troops to meet up with them, so that 
those [Cossacks], who are with him, can advance safely”. In his letter 
of 30 May Koch communicates that the rebel and his brother will be 
delivered to Moscow “this coming Friday”, which also would prove to 
be correct: Koch usually wrote his letters on Tuesdays; the next Friday 
after Tuesday, 30 May, was in fact 2 June, the day on which Stepan and 
Frol Razin were brought publicly to Moscow, a scene very well known 
from several descriptions. 
66  SSAS, E 4304.
67  Now again in SSAS, Livonica II, vol. 180.
68  A letter by ataman L. Semenov of 25 April about the seizure of Stepan and Frol 
Razin, published in Krest′ianskaia voina (vol. 3, no. 52, p. 59), is a good candidate 
for one of the four “posts” mentioned by Koch in his newsletter of 16 May. Kornei 
Iakovlev is mentioned, and the letter states that the rebels are being brought to 
Moscow.
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Stepan Razin’s execution: a previously unknown 
illustrated description
Towards the end of June, Helmfelt sent two letters to the king, this time 
from Nyen (not from Narva, as usual), one on 24 and one on 30 June. The 
latter is very important for our purpose. Here Helmfelt mentions that 
the rebel Razin is dead, and that all details can be read and seen in the 
attached “relations and drawing”. Indeed, there are two “relations” in 
the Stockholm archives, in other words, two of Koch’s reports, written 6 
and 13 June respectively, both with the headline “Extract Schreibens auß 
Musco” and the date, and one coloured drawing. The drawing must have 
been made in Moscow, probably at the initiative of A. S. Matveev, the 
head of the tsar’s Ambassadorial Chancery, as proof that the rebellion 
was over. In the archive, the three attachments are sewn together with 
Helmfelt’s letter.69
Figure 2. Coloured drawing of Razin’s execution  
(originally from Moscow), 1671.
69  For a complete translation into Russian of Koch’s two “relations” about the Razin 
brothers’ delivery to Moscow and Stepan’s execution, as well as a comparison 
of Koch’s reports with other descriptions of these events, see Gleb Kazakov and 
Ingrid Maier, ‘Inostrannye istochniki o kazni Stepana Razina. Novye dokumenty iz 
stokgol′mskogo arkhiva’ (forthcoming in Slovene).
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The drawing shows two separate scenes: in the right half we see Stepan 
Razin on a cart and his brother Frol chained to the cart, four days before 
the execution, when the two brothers were brought to Moscow. (On 
the day of the execution the same cart was apparently used again.) In 
the left half, above the horses with the carter (iamshchik), Stepan’s body 
parts are shown, set up on poles: arms, legs, trunk, and head. The first 
scene (on the right) is apparently presented in a realistic way and must 
have been produced by someone who had seen how the two Razin 
brothers were delivered to Moscow on 2 June. Many people had seen 
this event, and an artist from a Muscovite chancery must have produced 
an illustration (or rather several copies, since they seem to have ended 
up in at least three countries; see below). 
The drawing was made by an artist who was not familiar with 
Western perspective: the perspective of the cart is not shown correctly, 
and all persons are shown from the front. Of course, it is also possible 
that the drawing was consciously done with iconographic inverted 
perspective, and we cannot exclude the scenario that it was produced in 
the first instance for a Muscovite, not a Western, audience, even if copies 
were then sent to the West. Moreover, the manner in which the cart is 
attached to the horses is technically impossible. Nonetheless, this is an 
extremely interesting piece of evidence, since not a single other portrait 
of Razin drawn from life exists.70 We had supposed that portraits printed 
in other countries were all based on pure imagination. However, it now 
appears that the portrait on the folding plate printed in London in 167271 
was modelled on this eyewitness drawing, so the London portrait, too, 
is based on reality, albeit at second hand. 
70  See Gleb Kazakov, ‘Through Glory and Death’ (forthcoming).
71  A Relation Concerning the Particulars of the Rebellion Lately raised in Muscovy by Stenko 
Razin; its Rise, Progress, and Stop; together with the manner of taking that Rebel […]. 
Published by Authority. In the Savoy: Printed by Tho. Newcomb, 1672. Wing R774 (British 
Library, shelf no. b.32.g.42). The folding plate measures 295 x 184 mm (printing 
plate: 280 x 163 mm). Both the folding plate (see Fig. 3) and the complete text (pp. 
3–18) are available online via Early English Books Online (EEBO). One more copy, 
also held at the British Library, was placed in front of another imprint about Razin 
when it was bound, viz. A Narrative Of the greatest Victory Known in the memory 
of man […]. London: Nath. Crouch, 1671 (no. C.194.a.635(16); I could not find the 
latter imprint in EEBO, 02/02/2016). The following pamphlet in this collection is A 
Relation Concerning… (see above).
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Figure 3. Folding plate, printed in London (1672).72
The engraving is a mirror image of the prototype from Moscow, the 
logical result of an engraving copied from an original and then reversed 
when printed. The engraver of the folding plate apparently tried to 
adjust the Muscovite original so that it was presented in something 
closer to Western artistic language. Although the perspective of the cart 
is quite odd even here, the human figures are shown from different 
angles (front, profile, back), and the horses—or rather donkeys, or 
mules—are attached to the cart in a realistic way. The artist’s intention 
was certainly not to make an exact copy of the Moscow drawing, indeed 
there are additional differences between the images. For instance, on 
the engraving Razin’s brother wears a cap; the carter is not sitting on 
one of the horses, but standing next to them, and the musketeers hold 
halberds, not clubs, in their hands. The “post-execution scene”, with the 
skewered body parts, is missing altogether on the London folding plate. 
But all in all there are so many similarities between the two pictures that 
we can safely exclude the possibility that the engraving could have been 
made without access to a copy of the drawing from Moscow. Of course, 
the drawing that was sent to England would not necessarily have been 
identical to the one kept in the Swedish archives; it is possible that some 
of the differences in the London image, relative to that in the Swedish 
archives, might have resulted from the production of multiple copies 
(for instance, perhaps the version used for the London illustration did 
not include the impaled body parts at all). 
72  With thanks to Dan Waugh, who made this photograph at the British Library, from 
the copy in no. C.194.a.635(16). 
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In any event, the London engraving is proof that drawings—as 
“hard-copy evidence” for Razin’s execution—were given to several 
persons in Moscow: beyond the original drawing preserved in Sweden 
we have indirect indications that a version ended up in England (the 
London engraving), and one copy must also have been delivered to 
Hamburg, since what was described in the small article in Nordischer 
Mercurius—“drawn by hand in Moscow”, with a description in Greek 
letters (actually Cyrillic), is nothing other than the colour drawing made 
in Moscow (see the full quotation above, p. 129).
The scene with the cart and the two brothers corresponds very well 
to the eyewitness reports about how the rebels were brought to the city. 
In several descriptions the construction to which Stepan is fastened 
with chains is called “a gallows”.73 This is shown by the (tiny) loop on 
the upper horizontal wooden beam and the word “petlia” (“loop”). The 
musketeers are shown with clubs in their hands—not with halberds, 
as they are shown on other Muscovite pictures and on the London 
engraving. The Russian text also says explicitly “strel′tsy z dubinami” 
(“musketeers with clubs”). Under the loop we can see the words “vor 
Stenka Razin” (“the rebel S. R.”), and on the left side of the cart, next 
to the portrait of Frol Razin, “brat evo Frolko prikovan k telege” (“his 
brother Frolko, attached to the cart”). At the bottom we are informed—
erroneously—that both persons were executed and quartered on 7 June 
(“kazneny chetvertovany iiunia v 7 den′”). 
A striking detail about this unique historical document is that it must 
have been produced before the execution had actually taken place. There 
is no absolute proof, but we have three indications for this statement. 
First, the date of the execution is not correct: the text on the drawing 
73  See, for instance, the description of Jacob Reutenfels (or Rautenfels, which was his 
real name) in his book De Rebus Moschoviticis ad Serenissimum Magnum Hetruriæ 
Ducem Cosmum Tertium (Padua, 1680), Liber secundus, p. 148: “Intrabat perduellis 
ille urbem, catenis patibulo alligatus […]” (“That rebel entered the city, chained to 
a gallows”). Thomas Hebdon used the same word in his letter to Richard Daniell, 
dated Moscow, 6 June, 1671: “Razin himself placed upon a scaffold under a 
gallows”. The letter, which is kept at the National Archives in London, SP 91/3, was 
published by S. Konovalov, ‘Razin’s Execution: Two Contemporary Documents’, 
Oxford Slavonic Papers, 12 (1965), 92–98 (pp. 97–98). The folio number given by 
Konovalov, 204, is wrong; the correct folio number is 202. I am grateful to Arthur 
der Weduwen for a photograph of the letter. Both the English text and a Russian 
translation of Hebdon’s letter are in Man′kov, Zapiski inostrantsev, pp. 129–31.
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says 7 June, instead of 6 June. (There seems to have been some confusion 
regarding the exact day and manner of the execution; see below.) 
Moreover, the text wrongly states that both rebels had been executed 
and quartered, although Frol’s life was to be spared for another five 
years,74 and finally, Razin’s trunk is among the impaled body parts, 
whereas all our descriptions agree upon the fact that the trunk had been 
left on the ground. 
Koch’s “relation” dated 6 June is a very detailed—and hitherto 
unknown—description of Razin’s execution. It comprises five pages, 
of which I will provide but a summary here. First Koch describes how 
the two rebels were “taken in miserably last Friday, that is, on the 2nd 
of this month, here into Moscow, through the Tver Gates, and brought 
to the Land Court75 in the Red Wall. The cart had four tall wheels, and 
it had a platform on top”. The description corresponds so well to the 
drawing that one may wonder whether Koch was describing the scene 
from his own memory, or, instead, from the drawing he had in front of 
him. He also mentions the “gallows”:
In the middle on that cart there was a gallows, about one span taller 
than himself; in this the poor hero Razin [Raisin] was fastened with iron 
chains. He was hanging in it like a fly in a spiderweb. First of all, his head 
was fastened on that same gallows with a chain; he was also fastened 
at both shoulders, at his arms, and on both posts of the gallows, with 
handcuffs on both hands that were forged to the posts of the gallows. 
The middle part of his body was also fastened with chains, and last but 
not least, below, both his legs were fastened on both sides of the posts, 
with chains. In front of his chest there was a horizontal wooden pole, 
onto which he could sometimes lean forward. Thus he had to make his 
entrance on such a Triumphal Chariot, standing, fastened to a gallows, 
as described above. His brother was fastened on the left side of the cart 
with a long chain. His legs were also bound together quite closely. 
So far everything is exactly as in the drawing. According to the written 
text, four musketeers were standing on the cart, one in each corner, 
74  The Brandenburg resident in Moscow, Hermann Dietrich Hesse, reported in his 
letter of 24 May 1676 to the Kurfürst in Berlin that Stenka Razin’s brother had been 
beheaded the previous Thursday. (Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz 
Berlin, I HA (Geheimer Rat), Rep. 11 (Auswärtiges), Nr. 6572.) My thanks to Heiko 
Droste for sharing his archival notes with me.
75  Koch writes “auff den Semschen Hofe”, which must be Zemskii dvor.
144 Ingrid Maier
whereas the drawing shows only two of them; similarly, on the three 
horses “three unhandsome boys were sitting in torn clothes”, whereas 
there is only one horseman in the drawing. The written text mentions 
that musketeers were riding on horses in front of the cart, as well as the 
Cossack ataman Kornei Iakovlev with five of his closest men, followed 
by another eighty Cossacks. Koch characterizes Razin as quite a tall 
person with large shoulders, light brown curly dense hair, covering 
half of his ears, and a “short, roundish dense beard”. His face looks 
strong and bold (frech); he appears to be in his mid to late thirties. His 
brother’s appearance is quite similar, his age about 26 years. Koch also 
describes the first torture session of 2 June; since he cannot have been 
an eyewitness to the torture, his report does not contain anything new 
on this subject. Then, however, we get some interesting and hitherto 
partially unknown information: on Saturday 3 June, two blocks—one 
each for the execution of the two brothers—were set up on Red Square, 
as well as five sharpened poles for each of them, for their heads, legs, and 
arms. At ten o’clock the execution was to take place, and the foreigners 
had been assigned a special spot from which they could see everything. 
However, the execution was delayed, because the two brothers were to 
be tortured once more. Apparently, no new date for the execution was 
given immediately, which might explain why the author of the drawing 
indicated the wrong date. Finally, “today” (6 June), at twelve o’clock, 
the Razin brothers were brought to Red Square, where Razin’s “wicked 
deed” and the verdict were read aloud; the public reading took about 
half an hour.76 “I will try to get this [text] and send it over”, Koch writes 
further down in this same report. Upon the command given by the 
“Chancellor Larrivan Ivanofvitz” (Larion Ivanov, who became a dumnyi 
d′iak, or state secretary, in 1669)77 to quarter the rebel, Stepan walked 
courageously towards the blocks, prayed, made the sign of the cross, 
and lay down on his belly. His right arm was axed off to the elbow, his 
left leg to the knee, then his left arm and his right leg, and finally his 
head. All five severed body parts were set up on poles; the remainder, 
the trunk, however, was left on the ground. Upon this, Stepan’s brother 
76  A copy of the document is kept in the Donskie dela files at RGADA. It was published 
in Krest′ianskaia voina, vol. 3, no. 81, pp. 83–87.
77  See N. F. Demidova, Sluzhilaia biurokratiia v Rossii XVII v. i ee rol′ v formirovanii 
absoliutizma (Moscow: Nauka, 1987), p. 225.
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said that he had something more to tell. He was conducted to the Land 
Court for a new session of torture, during which he lost consciousness. 
Like other eyewitnesses, Koch underlines that Stepan did not show 
any emotions during the torture, whereas his brother cried and was 
reproached by Stepan: “You son of a bitch, why do you cry? Remember, 
that you won much honour together with me, and that we had ruled over 
not only all of the Don, but also over the whole Volga”. The last twelve 
or thirteen lines of Koch’s correspondence contain other information: a 
courier is said to have arrived from Count Romodanovskii78—one of the 
field commanders fighting against the rebelling Cossacks—with word 
that “Astrakhan and all places that had been won by Razin were now 
brought back to his Majesty the tsar, and they are asking for mercy”.79 
The last two sentences of the letter are dedicated to other issues. 
The second “relation” mentioned by Helmfelt and also attached 
to his own letter of 30 June was written one week later, on 13 June. It 
contains the well-known story (a rumour?) about the treasure trove of 
gold, silver, and other precious things hidden near Tsaritsyn, reported 
by Frol Razin, a story that is also known from a Russian document.80 The 
men who had dug the hole had all been killed, and now Frol was the 
only remaining person who knew where it was. We learn that the five 
poles with Razin’s body parts were brought to the “swamp” (Bollota) 
on the other side of the Moscow River, and set up again, whereas the 
trunk was put on the ground, as before. Koch highlights the fact that 
he had seen all this “three days ago” (which would have been 10 June). 
We also get some background information about how Razin was taken 
prisoner by Kornei Iakovlev and his 2000 Don Cossacks, and that the 
78  Grigorii Grigor′evich Romodanovskii, killed during the uprising of 1682 in Moscow.
79  Among the published documents there are plenty of reports from military 
commanders about places retaken from the rebellious Cossacks (see for instance 
vol. 2, part 2, no. 78, pp. 102–03), but I have not found a specific document about 
Astrakhan.
80  This story, which is included in a report from an interrogation of Frol Razin on 8 
June, is in Krest′ianskaia voina, vol. 3, no. 85, p. 94. Frol talked about silk and other 
fabrics, but nothing about “treasures of gold and silver” as such; these things were 
given to the Metropolitan (Archbishop) of Astrakhan to guard them for Stepan, 
thus there was no buried treasure, which is why I think that the treasure story 
might have been based on hearsay. My thanks to Dan Waugh for bringing this 
reference to my attention. 
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ataman was richly rewarded by the tsar.81 The final—fourth—page is 
about other issues (for instance, a Polish embassy is expected). All in all, 
both attachments are typical examples of Koch’s detailed reports from 
Moscow.
Conclusion
Let us now return to the question of how the newspaper publishers in 
Western Europe were informed about Muscovy, through the prism of 
this specific case of the Razin rebellion. We have been able to document 
some overlap between Koch’s correspondence to Helmfelt, and articles 
in printed newspapers, but so far, we have found no longer fragments 
or whole news reports that are virtually identical in the two types of 
source. As was mentioned above, for another time period—the early 
1650s—it has been shown that certain parts of reports to Queen Christina 
of Sweden, written by Johan de Rodes while he was a Swedish resident 
in Moscow, also ended up in printed German newspapers, sometimes 
verbatim, although we still do not know how: did Rodes have contacts 
with any news agencies, or did the news “leak out” somewhere during 
the transmission, for instance, in Narva? My hypothesis is that not 
much had changed when Koch, Rodes’s brother-in-law, was sending his 
correspondence to Narva in the early 1670s; that is, I think that parts of 
Koch’s dispatches also ended up in the European news market. It is very 
difficult to prove this unequivocally as so many numbers of printed 
seventeenth-century newspapers are lost forever.
A major difference between the 1650s and the 1670s is, of course, the 
fact that in the meantime an international postal line between Muscovy 
and Western Europe had been established. For Koch this meant, on 
the one hand, that he could send his reports to governor Helmfelt in 
Narva—from which point they were forwarded both to other Swedish-
Baltic provinces and to the Swedish government in Stockholm—in a 
very timely fashion, once a week, every Tuesday; Koch did not have 
to wait for the next merchant or diplomat to cross the Russian borders, 
as would have been the case in the 1650s. Since Koch’s correspondence 
81  Rewards to Cossacks who helped fight Razin are mentioned in Krest′ianskaia voina, 
vol. 3, no. 99, pp. 106–08. On what was given to Iakovlev as a reward, see especially 
p. 107.
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was conveyed by Muscovite officials, this also meant that his dispatches 
could be opened, read and translated into Russian. He could therefore 
have written—or rather dictated—slightly different versions to 
Helmfelt, on the one side, and to a news agent, on the other side, to 
make certain he would not be blamed personally for any “inconvenient” 
news about Muscovy that had made its way into the international 
European press.82 However, in this case modern scholars, too, might 
never be able to really prove any direct or indirect connections between 
Koch and the news market. Even if we do not have, at this moment, any 
strong evidence that Koch’s reports in one way or another ended up 
in European newspapers, we can be fairly sure that the news market 
was being fed with Moscow news by men like Koch—well-informed 
merchants and diplomats with good relations to the tsar’s entourage, 
who were gathering news, in the first place, for the governments in their 
respective home countries. Koch, with his superb knowledge of Russian 
politics and culture, with his knowledge of the Russian language, and 
his (at that time) excellent relationship with the Russian political elite 
(especially Matveev), would have been an ideal person to gather news 
about Muscovy.83 
Koch’s newsletters—at least the ones we have found in the Swedish 
archives—were sent to Narva, and we know that copies were made 
in Narva: not only the Swedish government in Stockholm, but also 
Governor Horn in Reval, and quite certainly the governors in the other 
Swedish provinces on the Baltic littoral, were provided with copies 
of the reports that Helmfelt received from Moscow, Novgorod, and 
Pskov. Both the Narva copyist and those who received the new copies 
might have handed over “Koch news” to a news agent, so even if we 
eventually find overlapping verbatim passages in Koch’s newsletters 
and in the press, we still will not know the exact connection: was it Koch 
personally who fed the “Moscow news market” with his information, or 
was it somebody who had seen, or copied, his reports? 
An important result of this study is that we know the Russian 
authorities, during the reign of Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich, were more 
82  In this paper I have focussed only on German newspapers, although I am, of course, 
aware of the fact that the news market was international; see, for instance, Pettegree, 
The Invention of News.
83  See also Droste and Maier, ‘Christoff Koch’ (forthcoming).
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actively engaged in spreading their viewpoints (or their talking points) 
to foreigners living in Muscovy than we used to think, and, as a result, 
we might have to reconsider Muscovy’s “information policy” during 
this period. It has long been known that the Ambassadorial Chancery 
collected news from abroad (for instance, among other sources, via 
translations of handwritten and printed newspapers from Germany and 
the Netherlands; see the chapters by Waugh, and Waugh and Maier, in 
this volume). However, very little has been known about the manner and 
the degree to which the Kremlin actively manipulated Muscovy’s image 
in Western Europe. We have read about the tsar’s attempts to create a 
better image of Russia in the world by soliciting foreign governments 
to reprimand their gazetteers, or even punish them, if those writers 
had printed any “lies” about the tsar or his country.84 These attempts 
never worked out well, because, among other reasons, the Russian 
government’s ability to influence the press in countries like the Dutch 
Republic and the German Empire was very limited. Perhaps people like 
Matveev, the great “Westerniser”, had already grasped that there was a 
more influential way to manipulate public opinion about Russia abroad, 
that is, by making use of the foreign correspondents living in Muscovy 
itself. This chapter has shown that Muscovite authorities handed over 
official statements to Koch at several instances, and we can be sure that 
Koch was not the only foreigner who was given such “favour”. In his 
report of 6 June 1671, written immediately after Razin’s execution, Koch 
mentions the communication—Razin’s “wicked deed” and the verdict—
that was publicly read aloud on Red Square, and we should recall his 
comment “I will try to get this [text] and send it over”. Apparently, he 
knew that it would not be difficult to acquire this document. Although 
I have not yet seen it in the Swedish archives, it might well be there,85 
and in any event we have evidence that this “verdict” was handed over 
to foreigners, since it appeared in print, for instance, in Kort waerachtigh 
verhael, van de bloedige rebellye in Moscovien […]86 and in similar German, 
84  See, for instance, Krest′ianskaia voina, vol. 3. no. 236, pp. 285–86.
85  I would like to stress the fact that this document might indeed be somewhere else 
in the Swedish State Archives; of course, I have not looked through all possible files. 
Beyond the huge collections ‘Livonica’ and ‘Muscovitica’, such a document could 
also have ended up in another collection (e.g., ‘Extranea’).
86  Kort waerachtigh Verhael, Van de bloedige Rebellye in Moscovien, Aen-gerecht door den 
grooten Verrader en Bedrieger Stenko Rasin, Donsche Cosack… Nevens sijne Sententie… 
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English, and French printed versions of the years 1671–72.87 It also 
appears that the Kremlin was disseminating other documents: in one 
case a coloured drawing—undoubtedly produced in a Muscovite 
chancery—ended up in at least three countries (Sweden, England, 
and Germany); I do not doubt that even more copies were produced, 
although it seems that only one is preserved today (and two have 
left indirect traces behind them). Spreading “pictorial proof” of the 
executed Razin’s body parts was a means of fighting against rumours 
of his successes. In another case, as we have seen, the tsar’s official 
declaration about Razin’s rebellion, sent to Novgorod to be read aloud 
to the crowds, also ended up in Helmfelt’s hands and was eventually 
forwarded to the Swedish government in Stockholm. While that 
statement probably had as its target first and foremost a Muscovite 
public, it is likely that the tsar would not have protested if such 
information had been handed over to foreigners in Novgorod; in this 
case there was always a chance that a specific report would end up 
in a newspaper. Undoubtedly, the Kremlin tried actively to squelch 
rumours it did not like and to portray events with a positive spin. The 
correspondence sent by Governor Helmfelt in Narva to the Swedish 
king contains many official Russian documents, which may have 
come into Helmfelt’s hands in the first place through Koch,88 and in 
the second place through Swedish merchants in Novgorod and Pskov. 
Of course, not all “official” Russian news that ended up in Koch’s 
correspondence or in a printed newspaper was spread deliberately 
by the Kremlin; in some cases—for instance, when we talk about 
instructions given to Russian ambassadors—we have to suppose that 
the news had leaked out.
The Swedish diplomatic correspondence from Moscow and 
Novgorod also shows us something about the Muscovite postal system. 
(Haerlem: Pieter Casteleyn, 1671). Royal Library The Hague, KB Pflt 9875, p. 12–16 
(with thanks to Arthur der Weduwen for a copy of this pamphlet, which is not 
freely accessible online). 
87  The titles in all four languages are in Zapiski inostrantsev, p. 84n3–4; for the complete 
text of the English version and its translation into Russian see ibid., pp. 91–119. 
According to A. L. Goldberg (ibid., p. 158), the protograph was probably a Dutch 
version—however not exactly the version printed in the Kort waerachtigh verhael; 
see A. L. Gol′dberg, ‘K istorii soobshcheniia o vosstanii Stepana Razina’, in Zapiski 
inostrantsev, p. 158. For the English version see note 70.
88  A qualified guess is that the mediator usually was Artamon Matveev.
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Koch usually wrote one newsletter every week (every Tuesday89), 
and Helmfelt also would send one letter every week to his king. The 
Muscovite “international” postal line went through Riga (at certain 
periods there was also another line, through Vilna, today’s Vilnius), 
but no official Russian postal line connected Novgorod with Narva. 
However, as Philipp Kilburger writes in his report from 1674, although 
there is no ordinary postal line between Novgorod and Narva, “almost 
every week during the whole year there are opportunities to send letters 
from one place to the other”.90 The mailbag for Narva seems to have left 
Moscow with the Riga post, which was running once a week; it would 
be taken out in Novgorod to be put into the Narva post from there.91 
So usually Helmfelt would receive weekly reports from Moscow and/
or Novgorod, but sometimes the connection in Novgorod missed its 
departure, which explains the fact that occasionally Helmfelt included 
Koch’s dispatches from two subsequent weeks into his own report to 
the Swedish government.92 An interesting example in this connection is 
Helmfelt’s letter of 30 June 1671, which was sewn together with the two 
“relations” and the drawing about Razin’s execution: apparently both 
relations, dated 6 June and 13 June, arrived at Narva on the same day, 
since Helmfelt mentions both reports in his own communication (and 
includes copies of both). 
This chapter has also shown that the German newspapers—
especially the Hamburg Nordischer Mercurius, on which I have focussed 
in the first place (mostly due to the fact that the complete run for the 
year 1671 has been preserved)—were not, after all, so bad. During the 
Razin uprising not even the tsar and his closest advisers were always 
well-informed about, for instance, the numbers of people killed on each 
side in a battle, or about Razin’s whereabouts, and when the Muscovite 
government itself created confusion by stating that the rebel had been 
captured, long before he was actually seized, we cannot really blame 
the newspapers for publishing information that later on would prove 
89  The mail to Novgorod left Moscow every Tuesday evening; see Kurts, Sochinenie 
Kil′burgera, p. 160.
90  Ibid.
91  See Daniel C. Waugh, ‘Istoki sozdaniia mezhdunarodnoi pochtovoi sluzhby 
Moskovskogo gosudarstva v evropeiskom kontekste’, in Ocherki feodal′noi Rossii, 
vol. 19 (2017), 394-442. 
92  Ibid. 
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to be false. As we can still see today, confusing political situations lead 
to confusing reports in the press; this was all the more true during the 
seventeenth century, the first century of the printed newspaper. Both 
Christoff Koch and the publisher of the Nordischer Mercurius constantly 
stressed the fact that the latest news had not yet been confirmed. Only 
when it had been verified, from two or more independent sources, did 
they make it clear to their readers that the news now could be trusted.

III.  
NEWS AND POST IN RUSSIA

5. Communication and Obligation:  
The Postal System of the Russian Empire, 
1700–1850
John Randolph
In 1854, the Imperial Russian Historical Society published a portrait, 
in numbers, of Russia’s postal system. 3,950 relay stations, the Society 
reported, formed the system’s spine. Mail couriers, imperial officials, 
and even private travellers could find at these “posts” all manner of 
travel necessities—above all, fresh drivers and draft animals. The 
stations were spaced at intervals, along some 85,000 versts (roughly 
90,500 kilometres) of relay roads.1 16,510 mail couriers rode these routes 
with bags of correspondence; tens of thousands more labourers (men, 
women, and children) served the stations and drove wagons and sledges 
between them. Finally there were the horses, the prime motors of the 
post. The Division calculated that the empire harnessed 50,534 horses 
for its relays, alongside 432 reindeer and 1,800 dogs. On their backs, or 
in the vehicles they drew, some 733 Russian towns received deliveries of 
packages and letters. Most towns got mail twice a week, though 63 cities 
received mail 6 times a week—and Kamchatka twice a year.2 
1  This figure excluded Poland and Finland.
2  I. A. Gan, ‘O pochtakh v Rossii’, in Sbornik statisticheskikh svedenii o Rossii, izdavaemyi 
Statisticheskim otdeleniem Imperatorskogo Russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva (St 
Petersburg: Tipografiia Imperatorskoi Akademii nauk, 1854), p. 37, pp. 44–46. 
These counts align with others from the early nineteenth century.
© 2017 John Randolph, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0122.05
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The historian John Hyslop once called the postal roads of the Inca 
Empire—at least 23,000 kilometres in length—“South America’s largest 
contiguous archaeological remain”.3 While the material culture of 
Russia’s postal system is mostly buried—a good part of it under modern 
Russian roads—the whole must be regarded as a similarly massive 
monument of the Russian Empire. By the end of the eighteenth century, 
this relay network traversed the realm as few other official institutions 
did. Close studies of rural Russia in the pre-industrial period often 
describe it as under-governed, or even “ungoverned”.4 Yet the relays 
gave the Russian Empire a localised expression in both urban and rural 
areas, on the frontier as well as in the centre: indeed, quite often in the 
middle of nowhere.5 And the presence of relay stations mattered not 
only because of the things they moved—most famously, people and 
mail—but because of the mandatory contributions the state demanded 
from local populations to move them.
Organisations “so stupendous and so costly that it baffles speech 
and writing” (as Marco Polo described the Mongol posts), imperial 
relay systems did not appear spontaneously.6 Rather, empires created 
their posts by requisitioning the necessary resources from local people, 
a technique of power employed from ancient history well into the 
nineteenth century. Animals, food, fodder, shelter, labour, harness, and 
wagons: everything essential to support the relays might be demanded, 
on terms that were variously exploitative—and sometimes paired with 
ameliorating privileges—but never voluntary. For this reason, imperial 
communications exerted a noticeable and usually unwanted pressure 
on local societies. Thomas Allsen calls the Mongol Empire’s system of 
relay obligation “one of the most widespread and distasteful of labor 
3  John Hyslop, The Inka Road System (Orlando: Academic Press, 1984), p. xii, p. 3.
4  On the lack of official institutions in rural life, see Steven L. Hoch, Serfdom and Social 
Control in Russia: Petrovskoe, A Village in Tambov (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1986), p. 1.
5  For a thoughtful discussion of the post’s role as a ‘Grundbedingung staatlicher 
Machtpräsenz’, Roland Cvetkovski, Modernisierung durch Beschleunigung : Raum 
und Mobilität im Zarenreich (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2006), p. 114, 
passim. 
6  Marco Polo, The Travels of Marco Polo, trans. by Ronald Latham (London: Penguin 
Classics, 1958), p. 151.
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duties”.7 The sentiment is common across the experience of empire, 
providing one of history’s few constants.8 “Of all the burdens which lie 
upon a subject”, the Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus conceded to his 
people in 1613, “there is none greater, none more irritating, and none 
more troublesome”.9
Calculated by governments according to a variety of formulae, 
and used to bear varying amounts of traffic, such obligations might 
be a marginal “irritation” in some areas and the central fact of life in 
others. Russian provincial governors in the early nineteenth century, 
for example, counted relay obligations by the “soul” (that is, per adult 
local man registered on the census). The merchants of Astrakhan 
were required to provide one horse for every eighty “souls” in their 
community in 1801; local Tatars, one for every twenty-five or thirty-
five. Some particularly obligated villages bore relay burdens as high 
as three horses for every twenty-eight souls.10 And with these horses 
came other demands: not only for each animal itself, but also for the 
fodder, shelter, labour and vehicles necessary to serve it at the stations. 
Such impositions remained the foundation of both mail and official 
7  Thomas T. Allsen, Mongol Imperialism: The Policies of the Grand Qan Möngke in China, 
Russia and the Islamic Lands, 1251–1259 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1987), p. 212.
8  Adam J. Silverstein, Postal Systems in the Pre-Modern Islamic World (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007); Anne Kolb, Transport und Nachrichtentransfer 
im Römischen Reich (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2000); Peter Olbricht, Das Postwesen 
in China unter der Mongolenherrschaft im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert (Wiesbaden: O. 
Harrassowitz, 1954); Didier Gazagnadou, La poste à relais: La diffusion d’une technique 
de pouvoir à travers de l’Eurasie. Chine-Islam-Europe (Paris: Editions Kimé, 1992); 
Colin J. Heywood, ‘The Ottoman Menzilhane and Ulak System in Rumeli in the 
Eighteenth Century’, in Turkiye′nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Tarihi (1071–1920)/Social and 
Economic History of Turkey (1071–1920): Papers Presented to the First International 
Congress on the Social and Economic History of Turkey, ed. by Osman Okyar and Halil 
Inalcik (Ankara: Hacettepe University, 1980), pp. 179–86.
9  Michael Roberts, Gustavus Adolphus: A History of Sweden, 1611–1632, vol. 1 (London: 
Longman, Green & Co., 1953), p. 117. On the evolution of Swedish obligations 
thereafter, see Magnus Linnarsson, ‘The Development of the Swedish Post Office, c. 
1600–1721’, in Connecting the Baltic Area: The Swedish Postal System in the Seventeenth 
Century, ed. by Heiko Droste (Huddinge: Södertörns högskola, 2011), pp. 25–47.
10  RGIA, coll. 1289, descr. 1, file 118 (‘O soobshchenii Gosudarstvennomu Sovetu 
svedenii ob”iasniaiushchikh ustroistvo pocht’ [1801]), ll 220–21. The communities 
in question here were the specially obligated “relay suburbs” (iamskie slobody), 
about which more below.
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transportation throughout Russia until the mid-nineteenth century (and 
in some places stayed in force until the early Soviet period).11 
Communication and obligation thus go hand in hand in the history 
of imperial postal systems, in Russia as elsewhere. Since relay roads 
were generally supported through direct (if variable) demands on local 
societies rather than through monies paid out by central treasuries, the 
growth of the posts meant a corresponding expansion in the inherently 
unequal, and differentiating, geography of relay obligations. Yet 
scholarship about relay posts tends to foreground only one of these 
themes at a time, letting the other drop. This is true in Russian history, 
as well.
Before 1700, scholars focus on how the princes of Moscow used relay 
obligations to build official communications for their nascent Russian 
Empire. The Russian name for such duties—iamskaia povinnost′—takes 
its root from a Turkic word (ǰam, meaning “relay” or “post”), employed 
by the Mongol Empire to describe its relay system.12 This, and other 
similarities, caused sharp historical debate in the nineteenth century 
over the degree to which Russia’s relays were inherited from Mongol 
Imperial practice. Most today would see it as a transformation, under 
Chinggisid inspiration, of a still older duty to support travelling royalty, 
called podvoda in Kievan Rus.13 Regardless of origin, relays and the 
obligations that supported them were crucial to Moscow’s rapid early 
11  F. I. Bunina provides the best overview of the evolution of relay obligations 
in the nineteenth century in F. I. Bunina et al., Materialy po istorii sviazi v Rossii. 
XVIII-nachalo XX vv., ed. by N. A. Mal′tseva (Leningrad: Ministerstvo sviazi SSSR, 
1966), pp. 23–29. She portrays the system as gradually being transferred onto a 
commercial, rather than obligatory basis: that said, the late imperial and early 
Soviet systems still had recourse to transport obligations, see Yanni Kotsonis, States 
of Obligation: Taxes and Citizenship in the Russian Empire and Early Soviet Republic 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014).
12  Maks Fasmer, Etimologicheskii slovar′ russkogo iazyka, trans. by O. N. Trubachev, vol. 
4 (Moscow: Progress, 1973), p. 555; Allsen, Mongol Imperialism, p. 114.
13  See I. P. Khrushchov, Ocherk iamskikh i pochtovykh uchrezhdenii ot drevnikh vremen do 
tsarstvovaniia Ekateriny II (St Petersburg: A. S. Suvorin, 1884), pp. 3–5; I. Ia. Gurliand, 
Iamskaia gon′ba v moskovskom gosudarstve do kontsa XVII veka (Iaroslavl: Tipografiia 
Gubernskogo Pravleniia, 1900), pp. 29–50; P. Miliukov, Spornye voprosy finansovoi 
istorii Moskovskogo gosudarstva. Retsentsiia na sochinenie A. S. Lappo Danilevskogo, 
‘Organizatsiia priamogo oblozheniia v Moskovskom gosudarstve’ (St Petersburg: 
Tipografiia Akademii nauk, 1892), pp. 21–22; A. N. Vigilev, Istoriia otechestvennoi 
pochty, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Radio i sviaz′, 1990), pp. 44–45; Donald Ostrowski, 
Muscovy and the Mongols: Cross-Cultural Influences on the Steppe Frontier (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 47, pp. 119–21; Gustave Alef, ‘The Origin 
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modern extension to new conquests and frontiers, such as the White 
Sea, Kazan, Siberia, Ukraine, and the Baltic. “With each step further into 
new territory, relay institutions penetrated deeper into the country”, Ilia 
Gurliand argues in his foundational study of the early development of 
Russian relay transport.14 
So the story goes until 1650. Histories of communication thereafter, 
however, typically concentrate on relay functions, rather than on 
relay obligations. In particular, scholars explore how kinds of postal 
services that developed across early modern Europe began to appear 
in Russia, and to what effect. Thus, for example, the organisation of 
the first regularly scheduled mail route (weekly between Moscow and 
Riga, in 1665) is often presented as marking the advent of “European”, 
“modern”, or “proper” posts in Russia.15 Previously couriers had 
been dispatched by the court only when needed. The reign of Peter 
the Great (1689–1725) is generally seen as accelerating this break, just 
as it supposedly energised other modernising currents of Russian 
life. Histories thereafter focus on charting the functional parameters 
of these new postal services: the growth of mail routes, for example, 
or their reliability or speed.16 The labour system supporting these 
innovations, meanwhile, recedes to the background of this history, if 
it is mentioned at all.
The following survey of Imperial Russian postal communications 
between 1700 and 1850 will try to strike a better balance. I will explore 
both the development of relay services during this period and the 
and Early Development of the Muscovite Postal Service’, Jahrbücher für Geschichte 
Osteuropas, New Series, 15. 1 (March 1967), 1–15.
14  Gurliand, Iamskaia gon′ba, p. 54.
15  This tradition goes back to the nineteenth century: see A. Brückner, Die Europäisierung 
Russlands : Land und Volk (Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Berthes, 1888), pp. 67–94; I. 
P. Kozlovskii, Pervye pochty i pervye pochtmeistery v Moskovskom gosudarstve, vol. 
1 (Warsaw: Tipografiia Varshavskogo uchebnogo okruga, 1913); Vigilev, Istoriia 
otechestvennoi pochty, p. 96.
16  Vigilev, Istoriia otechestvennoi pochty; Cvetkovski, Modernisierung durch 
Beschleunigung; D. A. Redin, Administrativnye struktury i biurokratiia Urala v epokhu 
petrovskikh reform (zapadnye uezdy Sibirskoi gubernii v 1711–1727 gg.) (Ekaterinburg: 
Volot, 2007). The best general histories of posts—including both obligation 
and service in its brief—are provided in Oleg Kationov’s studies of Siberia: O. 
N. Kationov, Moskovsko-Sibirskii trakt i ego zhiteli v XVII–XIX vv. (Novosibirsk: 
NGPU, 2004); O. N. Kationov, Moskovsko-Sibirskii trakt kak osnovnaia sukhoputnaia 
transportnaia kommunikatsiia Sibiri XVIII–XX vv., 2nd ed. (Novosibirsk: NGPU, 
2008).
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concurrent evolution of relay obligations to support them. Keeping both 
sides of the story in mind seems important, for it will allow us to create 
a more expansive history of the meanings produced by this old imperial 
technique as it entered the modern empire. As Georg Simmel observes 
in ‘Bridge and Door’, the creation of a connection across space does 
not merely allow packets of information to be transferred between two 
points. It also reshapes the landscape between them—thereby creating a 
new arena for the production of meaning. When people build a bridge, 
they make waters easier to cross, but they also reshape the rivers’ 
banks to connect and support the new structure. The bridge focusses 
the interest of human community and polity to this spot, and not 
another, marking it on maps and devoting to it resources brought from 
elsewhere. In the same way, we might imagine that not only the people 
and things circulated by Russia’s posts, but also the vast infrastructure 
of relay obligation that made their movements possible, gave meaning 
to the landscape of Russian empire.17
Or, at least, we might engage in such a line of interpretation if we had 
histories of communicative practices that accounted for both sides of the 
coin. The following reconstruction of the development of the Imperial 
Russian relay across the long eighteenth century is meant to help make 
such research possible. We may begin by stepping a little further back.
The first concrete testimonies to the existence of a postal system at 
the court of Moscow date to the fifteenth century. In particular, Prince 
Ivan III, “the Great” (1462–1505), whose conquest of Novgorod and its 
hinterlands laid the foundation for Muscovy’s expansion into an empire, 
relied on horse relays extensively. Ivan III was so convinced of his post’s 
importance that in his last will and testament he told his heirs to “keep 
relays and horses on the roads in those places, where relays and horses 
were kept in my time”.18 He need not have worried: between his death 
in 1505 and 1650, Moscow’s relay system grew with Muscovy itself, by 
leaps and bounds. The seventeenth-century tsardom developed nine 
main relay routes, radiating outward from Moscow in all directions, 
17  Georg Simmel, ‘Bridge and Door’, in Simmel on Culture: Selected Writings, ed. by 
David Frisby and Mike Featherstone (London: Sage, 1997), pp. 170–74.
18  ‘Dukhovnaia gramota velikogo kniazia Ivana III Vasil′evicha’, in Dukhovnye i 
dogovornye gramoty velikikh i udel′nykh kniazei XIV–XVI vv., ed. by L. V. Cherepnin 
(Moscow and Leningrad: Izdatel′stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1950), p. 362.
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like spokes of a wagon wheel.19 (This architecture remained constant 
throughout the imperial period, and indeed can be seen from Google’s 
“God’s eye” view of Russian highways to this day.) A central chancery, 
the “Relay Chancery” (Iamskoi prikaz), planned the relay roads and 
organised stations along them. It also issued authorising documents, 
called “route letters” (podorozhnye gramoty), which governed the use of 
relay resources. These “letters”, or requisitions, specified such things 
as the travellers’ names and titles, their origin and destination, and the 
number of horses to which they were entitled.
Administered by the Relay Chancery, the local forms of relay 
obligation supporting the system varied. In some places, populations 
were asked to work the relays themselves, detaching their horses from 
the plough to hook them to official wagons or sledges. (The chaos 
caused in everyday labour by such interruptions was one of the major 
irritations of relay duty.) Other communities—either unofficially, or 
by charter—pooled resources to hire permanent teams of designated 
“volunteers” (okhotniki) to do this relay driving for them. Still elsewhere, 
by the late sixteenth century, the Grand Principality began to organise 
special societies of the road, called “relay suburbs” (iamskie slobody). 
These communities bore higher levels of relay obligation, harnessing 
more horses to ferry more traffic. To make these burdens more 
bearable—and also to distinguish their particular place in Muscovite 
life—the suburbs were granted a changing (and locally variable) set of 
privileges: such as the use of arable land, the right to trade in towns, 
and a yearly allowance from the treasury. Over time, Gurliand argues 
in his classic study, this created the foundation for the emergence of 
the so-called iamshchiki (literally “relay men”, though women as well as 
children also lived in these communities) as a special social caste within 
the growing empire.20 
Muscovy’s posts supported the rapid but irregular transportation of 
royal couriers, and with them royal mail. Riders—or teams of officials 
and cargo in wagons—were only dispatched according to the sovereign’s 
needs. The middle of the seventeenth century saw the introduction 
19  V. Z. Drobizhev, Istoricheskaia geografiia SSSR (Moscow: Vysshaia shkola, 1973), pp. 
160–66; A. S. Kudriavtsev, Ocherki istorii dorozhnogo stroitelʹstva v SSSR: Dooktiabr′skii 
period, vol. 1 (Moscow: Dorizdat, 1951), pp. 78–104.
20  Gurliand, Iamskaia gon′ba, pp. 206–70, esp. pp. 220–23.
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of new kinds of postal services to Russia, however. In particular, 
increasing commercial as well as diplomatic contacts with Western states 
encouraged the establishment of regular mail routes. These included 
lines to Riga (established 1665), Vilna (1667) and Archangel (1693). This 
“German” or “foreign post” (nemetskaia pochta), as the routes came to be 
called, possessed several novel features. It operated according to timed 
schedules (such as bi-weekly or weekly). It usually relied on sealed 
mail pouches that were relayed from station to station, rather than on 
couriers riding the whole route. Lastly, the “foreign post” transported 
merchants’ letters and other personal mail on a for-profit basis. In effect, 
all three lines—which were run by Dutch and Baltic immigrants to 
Moscow—were limited commercial concessions, granted to individuals 
by the tsars. Earning their own money from civilian use of the mail 
routes, these men promised to deliver the tsars’ own correspondence on 
a regular basis, in return.21
As Daniel Waugh and Ingrid Maier demonstrate in their chapter 
in this book, the information carried by the “foreign post” had 
great importance for the politics, culture and commerce of late 
seventeenth-century Muscovy. Yet the new routes did not have an 
equally transformative effect on Moscow’s existing system of relay 
communication. The “foreign post” did not, for instance, change the 
shape or size of Russia’s relay roads. The basic, wagon-wheel structure 
of routes from Moscow, including those through which the Riga, Vilna, 
and Archangel posts would run, had existed since Ivan III’s time.22 Nor 
did the “foreign post” disrupt the Muscovite practice of supporting 
postal relays through obligation. Quite the contrary: the tsars allowed 
the families organising these new routes to exploit the horses and riders 
provided by obligated communities. In effect, they privatised the profit 
from an imperial duty into the hands of a series of entrepreneurs.23 
21  Kozlovskii, Pervye pochty, vol. 1, pp. 99-111, pp. 145-55, pp. 299-312; Vigilev, Istoriia 
otechestvennoi pochty, pp. 98–118, pp. 147–62.
22  Kudriavtsev, Ocherki istorii dorozhnogo stroitel′stva, vol. 1, pp. 72–80; Vigilev, Istoriia 
otechestvennoi pochty, p. 147.
23  N. I. Sokolov, Sankt-Peterburgskaia pochta pri Petre Velikom (St Petersburg: Tipografiia 
Ministerstva Vnutrennikh Del, 1903), p. 9; Kozlovskii, Pervye pochty, vol. 1, pp. 
102–11, p. 164; I. P. Kozlovskii, Pervye pochty i pervye pochtmeistery v Moskovskom 
gosudarstve, vol. 2 (Warsaw: Tipografiia Varshavskogo uchebnogo okruga, 1913), 
pp. 3–39; Vigilev, Istoriia otechestvennoi pochty, pp. 102–18, pp. 130–40. The best 
detailed examination of the Riga services’ initial functioning is Daniel C. Waugh’s 
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As it happened, even this organisational outsourcing was only 
temporary. In 1701, the Vinius family—the last of the original 
concessionaires—was forced to relinquish control of the Riga, Archangel, 
and Vilna posts.24 Peter transferred control of the “foreign post” into the 
hands of his powerful favourite and diplomat Petr Shafirov. Shafirov 
was later to claim that the routes and the profits they generated were 
a personal reward for his services; perhaps not coincidentally, he fell 
into disgrace for corruption in the early 1720s.25 For a brief moment, it 
seemed that the “foreign post” might be combined, in its management, 
with the old relay system, still managed by the Relay Chancery.26 Yet in 
the end, this “overseas post” (as the routes were also known) remained 
in the hands of powerful favourites who operated on the international 
stage (such as Heinrich Johann Friedrich Ostermann, in the 1730s). Its 
management was handled by the College of Foreign Affairs—through 
whose coffers its earnings also flowed—rather than the Relay Chancery.
Rather than transforming the geography, social underpinnings, or 
even the functions of Russia’s imperial postal system, the “foreign post” 
thus spun off as a specially-managed, profit-seeking enterprise. Ceasing 
by 1703 to be a commercial concession, its portfolio of regularised 
relay routes was attached to one particular branch of the state and the 
grandees in charge of it. This division of Russia’s postal services, old 
and new, remained in place for several decades to come.27 To find the 
beginnings of more profound break in the history of Imperial Russian 
unpublished 2015 manuscript, ‘The Beginnings of the Muscovite Foreign Post in 
its European Context’, pp. 10–22. I am grateful to Professor Waugh for letting me 
consult this essay.
24  Vigilev, Istoriia otechestvennoi pochty, pp. 133–34.
25  See his remarks to that effect in a report attached to RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 16, bk. 
1065, fol. 43 (‘O soderzhanii pochty v Rossiiskom gosudarstve’.)
26  In 1722, the Petrine government imagined fusing the whole of postal 
administration—including the “foreign post” and the Relay Chancery—in the 
hands of a Post-Director-General; but though the decree survives this merger 
did not, and the Relay Chancery and the “foreign post” existed side by side until 
the 1780s, when a central postal administration was finally created. See Polnoe 
sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii, Series 1 (1649–1825) (hereafter PSZ 1), no. 4073. 
As a result, the organisation of local post offices long remained a responsibility 
unclearly divided between the Relay Chancery and local governors. See Vigilev, 
Istoriia otechestvennoi pochty, pp. 260–64, pp. 294–301.
27  Sokolov, Sankt-Peterburgskaia pochta pri Petre Velikom, pp. 137–50; Vigilev, Istoriia 
otechestvennoi pochty, pp. 134–35, pp. 263–67.
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relay practice, meanwhile, we need to look to the 1710s, and to deep 
changes in the organisational structure of the empire itself.28 
In 1712, Tsar Petr Alekseevich (later crowned Peter I) shifted the seat 
of his government to St Petersburg and his empire’s newly-conquered 
Northwestern frontier on the Baltic. The move to St Petersburg signaled 
Russia’s rise as a power in Europe, displacing Swedish authority in the 
North. But it also raised the problem of how to connect the new but 
peripheral capital to the empire’s main body. These concerns became 
even more pressing when Peter and his advisers sought to reform 
imperial governance, as well. In 1711, the tsar created a central Senate, 
to coordinate in St Petersburg the activities of Moscow’s old chanceries; 
in 1717, he started to eliminate many of the latter altogether, in favour of 
a smaller number of Petersburg-based colleges. To make improved local 
partners for these new central institutions, meanwhile, Peter reworked 
the system of territorially-based “governments” (or provinces) he 
had established a decade earlier. Entrusting the management of these 
territories to hand-picked intendants and military commanders, he 
expected them to be responsible to the new central bureaucracy in St 
Petersburg.29 
The result, however, was still a two-legged stool. The new central 
and provincial administrations were perceived to be inefficient, without 
better communications to support them. As Heinrich Fick (one of Peter’s 
closest advisers) observed in 1718, 
The Colleges cannot manage their affairs, unless a proper saddle-post is 
started at least once a week between the chief towns and governments 
of the State. 
Both the geography and the timetable of imperial relay communications 
had to change, Fick argued, “if Your Highness’s enlightened and most 
caring intentions for the State Colleges are to be fulfilled”. Nor was Fick 
28  In support of this periodisation, see Sokolov, Sankt-Peterburgskaia pochta pri Petre 
Velikom, p. 22. 
29  On the Collegial and Provincial reforms in general, see Claes Peterson, Peter the 
Great’s Administrative and Judicial Reforms: Swedish Antecedents and the Process of 
Reception, trans. Michael F. Metcalf (Stockholm: A.-B. Nordska, 1979), pp. 52–67, 
pp. 242–49; A. B. Kamenskii, Ot Petra I do Pavla I. Reformy v Rossii XVIII veka. Opyt 
tselostnogo analiza (Moscow: Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi gumanitarnyi universitet, 
1999), pp. 116–17.
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the first to make this observation: five years earlier, when the Senate was 
created, Shafirov had said much the same thing.30 
Already in 1712, designated mail routes (for on-demand use) had 
been planned between St Petersburg and the provinces. In response 
to Fick’s 1718 memorandum, Peter declared that these new internal 
“posts” (pochty) should be multiplied and operated on a timed, regular 
basis.
Posts should be arranged first between St Petersburg and all the chief 
towns where Governors now reside; then the master of the post, 
consulting with the Governors, should designate routes from those 
towns to others further away, as needed.31 
It should be observed that these new provincial mail routes altered not 
only the timetable but also the geography of relay communications in 
the empire. No longer a wagon-wheel set of main highways meant to 
connect Moscow with its borders, the relay system of the eighteenth 
century was envisaged as a finely branching network for internal 
communication, a web that extended inward and between the main 
lines. Its chief purpose was not the conduct of diplomatic relations with 
rival powers—or commercial ties with foreign interests, which as before 
ran through the “foreign post”—but rather the coordination of “central” 
and “provincial” institutions within Russia. Implicit in this conception 
was a great expansion in the network of relay stations, and with them 
relay obligation, in the century to come.32 
In this respect, the name chosen for this new system—the “relay 
post”, or iamskaia pochta—was significant. It reflected both the fact that 
the mail rode on relay horses and that local communities would continue 
to provide them (along with labour and other travel resources), through 
the iamskaia povinnost′. Spurning the entrepreneurial experiment of the 
“foreign post”, Peter and his advisers thus planned for a continuation 
of the imperial relay technique they inherited. That is not to say that the 
30  PSZ 1, no. 3208.
31  ‘Vysochaishie rezoliutsii na memorial inozemtsa Fika’, pp. 574–75; the construction 
of these new, “ordinary” (that is, regular) posts was confirmed in 1720: PSZ 1, nos. 
3591 and 3691, discussed below.
32  One of the first actions the government took in response to the decree on provincial 
posts was to conduct a survey of the existing relay network and “how it is 
maintained”. This fascinating document is RGADA, coll. 248, bk. 1065, fols. 42–115, 
‘O soderzhanii pochty v Rossiiskom gosudarstve’. Quotation, fol. 43.
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relays were placed entirely outside of markets in transportation services. 
Quite the contrary, to reinforce the existing system for the additional 
burdens of the eighteenth century, the St Petersburg government sought 
to stabilise relay communities by giving them a special status within 
roadside markets.
Peter established this principle in 1713, in a decree entitled “On the 
Settlement of Iamshchiki in St Petersburg Province”.33 The primary aim 
of this decree was to shore up the society of the Petersburg road, by 
commanding that hundreds of iamshchik households be resettled, from 
other provinces, to the stations between Moscow and St Petersburg. 
Though families from as far away as Kiev, Azov, and Kazan were indeed 
sent, the settlements seem not to have taken hold.34 The agricultural 
lands near St Petersburg were difficult to work, the demands of relay 
obligation high, and no matter how often they were replanted relay 
villages did not thrive there in the early part of the eighteenth century. 
By 1720, nearly two thirds of the 150 iamshchik households settled at 
Tosna (near St Petersburg) had fled or “died out”; as late as 1740, the 
government was still trying to get officials around Russia to find and 
return fugitive coachmen from the Petersburg road.35
Yet if Peter’s 1713 ukaz failed in its stated purpose, it nonetheless 
contained clauses codifying the economy of relay obligation, in a 
manner that stuck for the century to follow. Henceforth, Peter decreed, 
no one should use relay horses for free (darom), “neither for State nor 
for particular needs”. Instead, people travelling on requisitioned horses 
were to pay specified, per-verst fees (progony) directly “into the hands of 
the coachmen, and not to the Chancery or to Commissars”. (These payments 
were to be based on a new formula Peter included: 1 kopek per verst from 
Petersburg to Novgorod, ½ a kopek per verst elsewhere.36) Relay horses 
and wagons, it was further specified, should only be used for travel 
(proezd), and not for freight (klad′). This latter clause not only limited the 
literal weight of relay obligations, it also stood at the centre of the licit 
33  PSZ 1, no. 2741.
34  See also PSZ 1, no. 2833.
35  See PSZ 1, no. 3600; and PSZ 1, no. 8031.
36  This differential pricing scheme—whereby the Petersburg road charged higher 
rates, while the mileage fees in the provinces were smaller—would continue 
into the nineteenth century. Indeed, for much of the eighteenth century, the fees 
remained exactly these.
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market for transport services Peter wished to develop around the relay 
stations. Outlawing the transport of freight via relay obligations, he 
authorised all travellers to “hire peasants or relay coachmen not under 
their normal obligation, but for a free price”.37
In this way, Peter’s 1713 decree became a kind of a charter, explicitly 
defining the intersection of imperial obligations, postal services, and 
transportation markets on which the relay system stood. Peter himself 
seems to have assigned its provisions broad significance, declaring 
it should apply “not only along that road, but throughout the entire 
State”.38 More importantly, and regardless of his intentions, this 1713 
decree took on a life of its own after his death. In court cases and 
petitions filed by obligated communities throughout the century that 
followed, the 1713 decree is cited as the foundation of the society of 
the road’s rights; it has the same role in an official guide to the post 
published in 1803.39 
Some of the decree’s provisions, it should be said, were not novel. 
Mileage fees (progony) had been paid to someone—if not necessarily 
directly “into the hands of coachmen”—on a per-verst charge since the 
sixteenth century.40 In the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, we 
must presume that relay communities had long been in the informal 
business of transporting “particular” travellers and goods, for a price. 
Their concentrations of valuable human and horse power were surely 
too valuable to lay idle. 
By codifying this practice for “the entire State”, however, Peter’s 1713 
decree set the old relay system on a novel path. Unofficial, “particular” 
travel was now an explicitly licenced function of the system, rather than 
an informal local arrangement; people bearing relay obligations were 
likewise ubiquitously chartered to sell passenger and freight services 
37  PSZ 1, no. 2741.
38  Ibid.
39  Noveishii Rossiiskii dorozhnik, verno pokazuiushchii vse pochtovye puti Rossiiskoi Imperii 
i novoprisoedinennykh ot Porty Osmanskoi i Respubliki Pol′skoi oblastei (St Petersburg: 
Imperatorskaia Tipografiia, 1803), p. 279. See also Sokolov, Sankt-Peterburgskaia 
pochta pri Petre Velikom, p. 22.
40  The Muscovite government had tried to quantify the monies needed to travel 
across the realm, so that they could be paid (by petitioners seeking official action) 
in the fifteenth century, as in the ‘Decree on Travel’ in the famous judicial code 
of 1497: S. I. Shtamm, Sudebnik 1497 goda (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel′stvo 
iuridicheskoi literatury, 1955), pp. 83–86.
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at the stations. Civil and commercial on a state-wide scale, no longer 
restricted to the Sovereign’s use, the relay was becoming, in effect, a 
public institution of the Russian Empire. Yet this institution was being 
built within an old imperial framework, extending back centuries (and 
indeed millennia in other contexts). The “particular” market in relay 
travel the 1713 decree imagined was meant to make the old practice 
of relay obligation more bearable, and to prevent the communities 
it touched from breaking down, rather than to replace this system 
altogether. 
Two types of services lay at the heart of Peter’s ambition for the 
posts: regular mail delivery (pochta) and relay transportation (proezd). 
Both were meant, first and foremost, to support official communication, 
in particular the circulation of decrees and personnel throughout the 
empire. This priority found expression in basic decisions about how 
these functions were organised, which remained in force deep into 
the nineteenth century. After some hesitation, for example, Peter’s 
government decided that official mail would be carried by the system 
“without payment”. One hundred years later, a member of Alexander 
I’s Permanent Council blamed this privilege—which fully externalised 
the cost of official mail—for “the excessive correspondence, that so 
greatly burdens all branches of government today”.41 Notions of rank 
(chin) had been used to codify the number of horses a man could 
demand in the seventeenth century; Peter maintained this practice in his 
newly reformed Russia as well. Thus, according to a schedule published 
in 1721 but still cited as normative in 1824, a general or Senator could 
demand up to fifteen horses for his official use at a station, while a privy 
councillor could expect seven and a travelling translator one.42
How did these services work? The relay-driven “regular mail”—
ordinarnaia or obyknovennaia pochta, imagined in 1718 and further 
elaborated in 1720—was essentially an inter-urban service, connecting 
St Petersburg to the empire at large.43 Regular mail delivery within 
towns began to be organised only in the second quarter of the nineteenth 
41  Arkhiv Gosudarstvennogo soveta, vol. 3, pt. 2 (St Petersburg: Tipografiia Vtorogo 
Otdeleniia sobstvennogo Ego Imperatorskogo Velichestva Kantseliarii, 1878), p. 
848.
42  PSZ 1, no. 3855.
43  PSZ 1, no. 3691.
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century.44 Though this service was initially designed to deliver “letters 
and decrees from all the Colleges and Chanceries to Moscow, and 
thence where needed”, in October 1720 the Relay Chancery received 
instructions to “accept and deliver all manner of personal letters, except 
merchants’ letters (which are accepted and delivered, upon scheduled 
payment, at the special post established at the Foreign College)”.45 
To handle this mail, the following regulations were established in 
the 1720s. (Though details varied over time, and a special “heavy post” 
was added for large parcels in the 1780s, the same basic procedures 
guided the operation of the posts until the mid-nineteenth century.)46 
First, correspondence was to be brought, wrapped and addressed, to 
one of the new post offices set up in major towns. The postmaster then 
was supposed to log the origin and destination of the parcel in a ledger, 
and collect a fee for its delivery. (For much of the eighteenth century, 
postage rates depended upon both destination and weight, with 
deliveries on some routes costing more than others. In 1785, however, 
a universal tariff based on weight and distance was announced.)47 
Adhesive stamps, marking payment of postage, were not adopted until 
the mid-nineteenth century. Even so, starting in the mid-eighteenth 
century, post offices possessed postmarks, used to mark each letter 
or package once the proper fees had been collected and it had been 
accepted for delivery by the post.48
At some regular interval—twice a week in the capitals and weekly 
elsewhere, to start, though with greater frequency as the system 
developed—all the mail so collected was placed into a special pouch. 
The postmaster then added a contents list or “register” (reestr) to 
44  See Bol′shoi filatelisticheskii slovar′, ed. by N. I. Vladinets, et. al. (Moscow: Radio i 
sviaz′, 1988), p. 66.
45  PSZ 1, no. 3691; PSZ 1, no. 6987; and PSZ 1, no. 3591. See also Sokolov, Sankt-
Peterburgskaia pochta pri Petre Velikom, pp. 133–37. 
46  See PSZ 1, no. 3691 and compare it with, e.g., PSZ 1, no. 13400; Pochtovyi dorozhnik 
(1824), pp. 436–40. On the division of the regular mail into “light” and “heavy” 
deliveries, see PSZ 1, no. 15330.
47  For an initial schedule of fees, see PSZ 1, no. 4814; numerous subsequent decrees 
specify the weight charges for further provincial lines, as they are built (see nos. 
6376, 6987, 8911, 9929, 12961, 13861, etc.) across the eighteenth century. Finally, in 
1785, a general tariff by distance and weight was ordered, as became practice in the 
nineteenth century. See PSZ 1, no. 15875.
48  M. A. Dobin, Pochtovye shtempelia Rossiiskoi Imperii: domarochnyi period, 3rd ed. (St. 
Petersburg: Standart Kollektsiia, 2009), 9–15.
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the bag, noting all the parcels the pouch contained as well as their 
destinations. The bag was then sealed, and entrusted to the first of 
the many postillions (pochtaliony), who relayed it from station to 
station. Although these riders might travel on a single saddle horse, 
the Relay Chancery was instructed to authorise up to three horses, 
with accompanying harness, for each mail delivery.49 Keeping ready a 
constant supply of these special “postal” horses—in addition to relay 
horses for transportation use—became an additional burden on relay 
communities. The arrival of postal deliveries was scheduled according 
to an estimate of how long it would take to travel from the previous 
station; only оne, or at the most two hours, was to pass between the 
arrival and departure of any given delivery.50 In Petrine times, mail 
riders were expected to travel at an average speed of eight versts 
an hour. Target speeds were later adjusted seasonally, according to 
regulations of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, with 
eight versts per hour being expected in the muddy months of spring 
and fall, and ten or even twelve versts per hour being the norm for 
summer or winter.51
All along the way, at each intervening post office, the pouch was to be 
opened and its register inspected. Letters arriving to their destination—
or that had to be transferred to side-routes—were removed; new mail 
was likewise added, with the list adjusted accordingly. The time and 
day logged, the pouch was then re-sealed, and dispatched to its final 
destination. When it arrived there, and its last contents were finally 
removed, a copy of the completed register was prepared and sent back 
to the original post office. At this point, so the 1720 instructions direct, 
mail was to be “given out” to its recipients. Though there was no regular 
delivery of mail within towns, messengers were evidently sent from 
post offices to official institutions and important people; both officials 
and “particular” recipients, meanwhile, could also send servants or 
come themselves to collect their parcels.52 
49  PSZ 1, no. 3691; Sokolov, Sankt-Peterburgskaia pochta pri Petre Velikom, pp. 19–20.
50  ‘Ob uchrezhdenii pochty v raznykh gorodakh’, p. 276.
51  Sokolov, Sankt-Peterburgskaia pochta pri Petre Velikom, p. 126. See also PSZ 1, no. 
13435; Pochtovyi dorozhnik (1824), p. 432.
52  PSZ 1, no. 3691.
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Travel by “relay” or “postal” horses was the other service supported 
by Russia’s postal system. It was governed by its own set of official 
procedures, as well as by informal practices (both legal and illegal) that 
developed around the relays’ transportation markets. Travellers who 
were issued official requisitions had the right to demand fresh horses, 
in set quantities and at set mileage rates.53 At each new station, they 
were required to present their “route letters” to a local stationmaster 
(upravitel′), who was typically a retired soldier. After inspecting the 
document and recording its data in his own logbook, the stationmaster 
calculated the mileage charges due for the next link, demanding payment 
in advance. A station elder (starosta) was then in charge of rallying the 
required horses and drivers, upon the signal of the stationmaster. These 
horses were harnessed to the traveller’s carriage, and local relay men 
seated on the box or the front horse as drivers and guides, and the 
traveller was once again en route.54 
Unfortunately, few of the local log books documenting the use of 
travel requisitions survive. The ones that do, however, testify to the 
requisitioning of thousands of horses for relay travel in central Russian 
cities. In Vladimir in 1741, horses were requisitioned 3,915 times for 
relay duty; in Murom, 2,713; in Moscow in 1737, by another official 
count, 7,607 horses were demanded for relay transport, alongside nearly 
3,200 more for mail and packet service. In these central Russian towns, 
at least, the dispatch of horses provided by obligated communities was 
a daily occurrence.55 
In 1717, the Senate decreed that such requisitioned transports could 
be used by people travelling for “their own needs”, but only if they paid 
twice the official mileage fees.56 Though literature of the late eighteenth 
53  Periodically, the government needed to crack down on the range of institutions 
issuing such requisitions, to prevent their overuse. In 1742, for example, the 
government sought to forbid the use of pre-printed requisition “blanks”, claiming 
that they were too freely distributed and contributed to the immiseration of relay 
communities. PSZ 1, no. 8509.
54  For Petrine era practices—which again held true, with variants, for the century that 
followed—see PSZ 1, no. 4073; Pochtovyi dorozhnik (1824), pp. 425–32.
55  The logbooks for Vladimir and Murom are preserved in the archive of the Relay 
Chancery: see RGADA, coll. 290, descr. 16, file 337, fol. 195 and RGADA, coll. 290, 
descr. 16, file 336, fol. 147. A corruption case from the Senate archives, meanwhile, 
provides the Moscow figures: see RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 1071, fol. 399.
56  PSZ 1, no. 3075.
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and nineteenth centuries abounds with references to such a practice, it 
is not clear how quickly it began to be used. In the Vladimir and Murom 
logbooks from the 1740s, for example, there are only a few elusive entries 
that suggest use of the system for a personal purpose; the vast majority of 
entries document travel by ranked servitors, as authorised by the Relay 
Chancery or provincial governors for some official purpose. As in other 
empires, the practice of charging lower rates for official travel created a 
strong incentive for elites to claim this status even when travelling for 
“particular” ends. Quite often, it seems, men of stature travelling for 
“their own needs” simply demanded the cheaper, official rate; the few 
women mentioned in the logbooks are listed as the wives and daughters 
of servitors (and not as independent travellers themselves). Numerous 
petitions from local communities, alongside central decrees, bemoan 
private use of official rates as a disruptive “abuse”. Yet, though banned 
legally and protested (sometimes violently) at the stations, the practice 
seems to have been quite difficult to curb.57
Just as importantly, however, the existence of the official relay 
network encouraged modes of civilian travel that drew on resources 
provided by the system, but did not engage its formal system for 
requisitioning labour. The regularly spaced markets for food, shelter, 
horses, and labour the routes provided were key. In addition to licensing 
these markets, the imperial government advertised their existence. As 
early as 1733, the yearly official almanac published in St Petersburg 
began to include information about Russia’s posts. In 1762, this section 
spun off into a separately published series of itineraries (dorozhniki) that 
listed routes, stations, and the distances between them. These guides 
allowed travellers to chart and calculate the stages of their journeys, 
and to imagine the rest stops that might be available to them.58 Building 
57  For “individuals trying to pass themselves off” as officials to use the Mongol post, 
see Allsen, Mongol Imperialism, p. 213. Senate cases protesting personal abuse of 
obligated transports include RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 16, bk. 1069, no. 36, fol. 
174; RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 16, bk. 1069, no. 30, fol. 147–147v. Both are from the 
1730s; decrees across the eighteenth century sought to clamp down on the practice, 
evidently unsuccessfully. See, e.g., PSZ 1, nos. 2491, 3045, 3488, 8035, 8166, 8836.
58  Dorozhnoi kalendar′ na 1762 god, s opisaniem pochtovykh stanov v Rossiiskom gosudarstve 
(St Petersburg: Imperatorskaia Akademiia nauk, 1762); V. G. Ruban, Dorozhnik 
chuzhezemnyi i rossiiskii i poverstnaia kniga rossiiskogo gosudarstva (St Petersburg: 
Tipografiia Veitbrakhta i Shnoora, 1777); Rossiiskii pocht-kalendar′, s pokazaniem 
razstoianiia vsekh gorodov Rossiiskoi Imperii (St Petersburg: Gubernskoe Pravlenie, 
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from this infrastructure, various alternative civilian travel practices 
developed, at least for those permitted, in general, to travel. Although 
internal controls limiting the movement of women, serfs, royal peasants, 
and other categories of the population lie beyond the scope of this 
chapter, it should not be forgotten that they existed.59
Most simply, people owning draft animals could and did travel 
postal roads “on their own [horses]” (na svoikh). This required frequent 
rest stops for the animals, and thus was inevitably slower; by the same 
token, it was cheaper, requiring the purchase of labour and supplies 
only as needed. It was also possible to travel by hiring fresh teams of 
horses locally, at each stage. This practice was known as travelling “on 
free horses” (na vol′nykh). The expense involved was unpredictable, 
being subject to constant haggling and negotiation. Yet according to 
many accounts it seems to have been tolerable within central Russia. 
Foreign travel writers, for example, often praise the cheapness of this 
arrangement, by comparison with the European posts with which 
they were familiar. With time this practice seems to have become more 
organised, with drivers from separate villages working in combination. 
According to the famed statistician Heinrich Storch writing in 1803, 
peasants organised their own stable relay networks along important 
highways, complete with “Kommissars” in the major towns to promote 
and represent these long-distance services.60 Unfortunately, unlike 
the state system, such businesses seem to have left no archives behind 
them. Last, but not least, it was not unknown to hire teams of horses and 
drivers for entire journeys.61
How reliably, how comfortably, did these relay practices work? 
Better than one might suppose. Today, Russian roads are legendarily 
1800); I. P. Kondakov, ed., Svodnyi katalog russkoi knigi grazhdanskoi pechati XVIII 
veka, 1725–1800, vol. 4 (Moscow: Kniga, 1966), p. 216, p. 227.
59  V. G. Chernukha, Pasport v Rossii, 1719–1917 (St Petersburg: Liki Rossii, 2007); John 
Randolph and Eugene M. Avrutin, ‘Introduction’, in Russia in Motion: Cultures of 
Human Mobility since 1850, ed. by Randolph and Avrutin (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 2012), p. 14, n. 25.
60  Heinrich Storch, Historisch-statistisches Gemälde des Russischen Reichs am Ende des 
achtzehnten Jahrhunderts, vol. 7 (Leipzig: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch, 1803), pp. 
254–55.
61  Iu. M. Lotman, Roman A. S. Pushkina ‘Evgenii Onegin’: Kommentarii (Leningrad: 
Prosveshchenie, 1983), pp. 106–09; Cvetkovski, Modernisierung durch Beschleunigung, 
109–10; Kationov, Moskovsko-Sibirskii trakt (2004), pp. 299–327.
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awful; in the early eighteenth century they were largely non-existent. 
The first paved highways, or chaussées, did not appear in Russia until 
1817; before that, apart from a few experiments, road building consisted 
of “choosing a direction, clearing a way and arranging temporary 
fords across rivers and marshy places”, using axes and saws.62 Though 
the labour involved could be colossal—one late seventeenth-century 
embassy from Moscow to Smolensk counted 533 such crossings, made 
out of logs—nature remained the master of these surfaces, which could 
be washed out or made impassable by flood and mud alike. That said, 
the same was true of Europe and the world at large in the eighteenth 
century, where (as one scholar has written) “most roads were little more 
than unmaintained mud tracks or bridlepaths”.63 In such conditions, 
Ferdinand Braudel argues, differences in speed were dependent not 
on travelling surfaces, but on regular “services provided by other 
people”, food, shelter, labour, and above all draft animals chief among 
them.64 Only in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries did 
combinations of new road-making technologies (such as McAdam’s 
famous method), horse breeding, and improved postal organisation 
begin to allow a noticeable breakthrough in speed, as compared to 
ancient times.65 
In an extensive archival analysis of the speeds attained by official 
transport in the Urals in the 1740s, the historian Dmitrii Redin has 
estimated that a courier travelling the system could reliably average 
fifty-five kilometres a day in Western Siberia (Tobolsk), and between 
fifty and seventy kilometres a day elsewhere. While short of the targets 
announced by official decrees, these averages correspond to similarly 
mountainous provincial regions in Europe, such as the Pyrenees, 
he claims.66 Indeed, speeds of forty to fifty miles (or sixty to eighty 
kilometres) a day were typical for central Britain and much of Europe 
62  Kudriavtsev, Ocherki istorii dorozhnogo stroitel′stva, vol. 1, p. 67, pp. 75–76, p. 80; 
Drobizhev, Istoricheskaia geografiia, pp. 251–57.
63  Simon Ville, Transport and the Development of the European Economy, 1750–1918 (New 
York: St Martin’s Press, 1990), p. 13.
64  Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1982), pp. 415–29.
65  See also Philip S. Bagwell, The Transport Revolution (London: Routledge, 1988); 
Theo Barker and Dorian Gerhold, The Rise and Rise of Road Transport, 1700–1900 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
66 Redin, Administrativnye struktury, pp. 363–87, pp. 585–90.
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in the eighteenth century, as well as Rome two thousand years before.67 
In the central corridors between St Petersburg, Moscow, and Kazan, 
European observers from Herberstein (early sixteenth century) to Storch 
(early nineteenth century) were usually favourably impressed by the 
constant availability of horses—and with them, the speed and reliability 
of travel in Russia—even as they bemoaned the bumpy roads. (Winter 
was even better, when snow and ice created astonishingly fast roads for 
sleighs, “whose transport is agreeable and convenient” (dont la voiture 
est douce et commode), as Jean Struys rhapsodised about the Smolensk 
road in winter, in the late 1680s).68 The greatest difference noted was 
the lack of private inns in Russia—forcing travellers to sleep and eat in 
the common rooms of relay courtyards, or their own wagons—and the 
voraciousness of summer mosquitoes.69
None of this meant, of course, that Imperial Russian communications 
were up to the task Fick and other central planners set for them. As Redin 
observes, being able to achieve European speeds for horse travel did not 
shrink the size of a state that dwarfed its European contemporaries.70 
Though travel times between Moscow and St Petersburg slowly dropped 
across the eighteenth century, Tobolsk was still two months from 
Moscow even under ideal conditions, and on any given journey these 
could be disrupted by “capricious weather, the condition of the horses, 
and, in the end, the personal qualities of the courier”.71 Delivered by 
postmen selected from locally obligated people, correspondence could 
easily go astray at any point, creating mysteries not easily resolved from 
67 Barker and Gerhold, Rise and Rise, pp. 26–27; Dorian Gerhold, Carriers and 
Coachmasters: Trade and Travel before the Turnpikes (Chichester, UK: Phillimore & 
Co., 2005); Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, p. 424; W. R. Mead, An Historical 
Geography of Scandinavia (London: Academic Press, 1981), p. 91; Silverstein, Postal 
Systems, p. 31, p. 191.
68  Jean Struys, Les voyages de Jean Struys, en Moscovie, en Tartare, en Perse, aux Indes, et 
en plusieurs autres Païs étrangers, vol. 1 (Lyon: C. Rey and L. Plaigniard, 1682), pp. 
310–12
69  Sigizmund Gerbershtein, Zapiski o Moskovii, ed. A. L. Khoroshkevich, vol. 1 (Moskva: 
Pamiatniki istoricheskoi mysli, 2008), pp. 266–69; Friedrich Christian Weber, The 
Present State of Russia (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1968), pp. 115–16; Phillip Johann 
von Strahlenberg, Historie der Reisen in Russland, Sibirien, und der Grossen Tartarey 
(Leipzig, n.d.), pp. 183–85; John W. Randolph, ‘The Singing Coachman Or, The 
Road and Russia’s Ethnographic Invention in Early Modern Times’, Journal of Early 
Modern History, 11. 1–2 (February 2007), 33–61.
70  See Redin, pp. 385–87, pp. 585–90.
71  Redin, p. 382.
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the centre. “Letters disappeared en route”, the historian A. N. Vigilev 
observes,
A relay-man might forget to give the bundle of letters to his comrade, 
might drive past the town, to which they were addressed. If there were 
no pouches in which to drive the mail, the relay headman, if he thought 
it necessary, might keep correspondence at the station during bad 
weather, and letters might stay there for a long time.72
Although it achieved quite a lot by sustaining a workable system of 
relay communications across a vast early modern empire, the Russian 
posts of the eighteenth century could not coordinate the actions of a vast 
empire as fully as Russia’s rulers desired. It is doubtful that any animal-
powered system could have.
By the 1760s, it was the spatial and social footprint of its postal 
system—more than its speed or technology—that distinguished 
Russia’s relay network from those of its European contemporaries. 
First there was the matter of network size and density, which made 
gigantic Russia seem suddenly small. By the middle of the eighteenth 
century, according to various modern estimates, Russia had between 
eleven and fifteen thousand kilometres of relay roads.73 Using 
published itineraries, E. G. Istomina estimates this number rose to 
roughly seventeen thousand by the end of the century.74 Yet, in 1776 
France, whose overall territory was only a fraction of Russia’s, had 
a nearly equivalent 14,000 kilometres of relay roads (after which the 
French posts went on to experience a period of explosive growth).75 
More generally, by comparison with mail and transport systems 
throughout Europe, Russia’s postal system remained a thin and lacy 
structure, stretching in single lines across great distances to connect 
the empire’s “chief towns and cities”, even as the postal networks of 
72  Vigilev, Istoriia otechestvennoi pochty, p. 261.
73  Cvetkovski, Modernisierung durch Beschleunigung, p. 108, n. 79.
74  See L. M. Marasinova, ‘Puti i sredstva soobshcheniia’, in Ocherki russkoi kul′tury 
XVIII veka, Part 1, ed. by B. A. Rybakov (Moscow: Izdatel′stvo Moskovskogo 
universiteta, 1985), 270; E. G. Istomina, Vodnye puti Rossii vo vtoroi polovine XVIII-
nachale XIX veka (Moscow: Nauka, 1982), 25–26. 
75  Muriel Le Roux, ‘Expanding the Network of Postal Routes in France 1708–1833 
(Histoire des réseaux postaux en Europe du XVIIIe au XXIe siècle)’, trans. by 
Nicolas Verdier and Anne Bretagnolle, HAL archives-ouvertes.fr/Comite pour l’histoire 
de la Poste, May 2007, p. 6, https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00144669/
document 
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its smaller European contemporaries extended into the everyday life 
of hamlets and villages.76 Somewhat more dense on Russia’s Western 
frontiers—where the empire had many trading partners and interacted 
with other postal systems—the system of relay communications grew 
ever sparser East of the Moscow-Tula line.77 
Yet if the density of the Russian postal network was relatively low, 
its footprint in imperial society was both larger than this would suggest, 
and distinctively shaped. Instead of clinging close to the roads and towns 
the post served, the social supports anchoring Russia’s relays stretched 
sporadically in various directions. This was because—in contrast to most 
of its contemporaries—Russia continued to rely on direct obligations on 
individual communities to support its posts. Most generally, in states 
throughout Europe, relay services were run as farmed monopolies. 
Local notables (such as the ubiquitous French maître de poste) contracted 
to provide for official communications in exchange for the right to run 
postal services for profit. These postal “entrepreneurs”, as Daniel Roche 
has called them, hired their workers and horses from their own purses 
and conducted their relays as a business, on a local, regional, or even 
national scale.78 This was, of course, the same general model that had 
been used to establish the first “foreign post” in Russia, in the mid-
seventeenth century. 
76  See Wolfgang Behringer, ‘Communications Revolutions: A Historiographical 
Concept’, German History, 24. 3 (1 July 2006), 333–74; Wolfgang Behringer, Im 
Zeichen des Merkur: Reichspost und Kommunikationsrevolution in der Frühen Neuzeit 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003); Philip S. Bagwell, The Transport 
Revolution (London: Routledge, 1988); Barker and Gerhold, Rise and Rise.
77  See Istomina, Vodnye puti, 23.
78  Daniel Roche, La culture équestre de l’Occident XVIe-XIXe siècle: L’ombre du cheval, 
vol. 1 (n.p.: Fayard, 2008), p. 307. The Thurn-und-Taxis dynasty operated such a 
concession on an empire-wide scale, while in England not only mail and transport, 
but the actual construction of roads, was outsourced through the turnpike trusts. 
See Patrick Marchand, Le maître de poste et le messager, les transports publics en France 
au temps du cheval, 1700–1850 (Paris: Belin, 2006); Wolfgang Behringer, Thurn 
und Taxis: Die Geschichte ihrer Post und ihrer Unternehmen (Munich: Piper, 1990); 
Gerhold, Carriers and Coachmasters; Barker and Gerhold, Rise and Rise; Bagwell, The 
Transport Revolution; John Copeland, Roads and Their Traffic 1750–1850 (New York: 
August M. Kelley, 1968); Magnus Linnarsson, ‘Postal Service on a Lease Contract: 
The Privatization and Outsourcing of the Swedish Postal Service, 1662–1668’, 
Scandinavian Journal of History, 37. 3 (2012), 296–316; Linnarsson, ‘The Development 
of the Swedish Post Office, c. 1600–1721’.
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Yet, during his reign, Peter repudiated this model in favour of 
the older imperial practice of relay obligation. As a result, the 574 
stations that (by official count) comprised the Russian relay system 
in 1762 possessed a distinctive social footprint. They were connected 
to communities not simply through licenced markets, but through the 
reach of relay obligations.79 And this reach varied wildly, as Russia’s 
postal roads developed across the century, in some cases much faster 
than the structures of obligation that supported them. Even in Peter’s 
time, it will be recalled, “relay suburbs” provided only a portion of 
the horses needed by the system, with serfs, tribute-paying Muslims, 
Ukrainian Cossacks, town magistracies and “district people” (uezdnye 
liudi), among others, providing the rest. In 1767, meanwhile, the Relay 
Chancery observed that shifting routes had resulted in a situation 
where it was not uncommon for communities “two or three hundred 
versts or more” away from a station to be obligated to supply it with 
horses and drivers.80 
Catherine II (r. 1762–96) took vigorous action to push Imperial 
Russian communications down to the district level. Inheriting the 
territorial order created under her predecessors, in the 1770s she 
radically renovated it, increasing the number, responsibilities, and 
local subdivisions of Russia’s provinces; as in Peter’s time, this implied 
an internal refinement of Russia’s relay network.81 In 1782, Catherine 
ordered her provincial governors to draw up plans for creating three 
distinct levels of postal roads: 1) central arteries between Petersburg, 
Moscow, and the provinces; 2) roads between provincial capitals; and 3) 
roads from provincial capitals to the administrative centres of districts.82 
79  For count, see August Ludwig Schlözer, ‘Vom Postwesen im Russischen Reiche’, 
in M. Johann Joseph Haigold’s Beylagen zum Neuveränderten Russland, vol. 1 (Riga and 
Mietau: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch, 1769), p. 303.
80  ‘Nakaz, otpravlennomu iz Iamskoi kantseliarii v Moskvu, v stolitsu eia 
Imperatorskogo Velichestva, deputatu byvshemu v Iamskoi kantseliarii nadvornym 
sovetnikom, kotoryi nyne glavnogo kommissariata prokuror, gospodinu Nelidovu’, 
in Sbornik Imperatorskogo russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva, vol. 43 (Nelden, 
Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1971), p. 363.
81  On Catherine’s provincial reforms in general, see Robert E. Jones, Provincial 
Development in Russia: Catherine II and Jakob Sievers (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 1984); A. B. Kamenskii, ‘Administrativnoe upravlenie v Rossii 
XVIII v.’, in Administrativnye reformy v Rossii: istoriia i sovremennost′ (Moscow: 
ROSSPEN, 2006).
82  PSZ 1, no. 15323; this followed an order of the previous year to begin building 
district posts: PSZ 1, no. 15127.
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Though tracking the process by which these plans were implemented 
is difficult, early nineteenth-century maps and centrally collected 
statistics both document the rapid local expansion of Russia’s relays 
that followed.
Thus, in 1769, according to Schlözer, the empire’s 574 stations 
harnessed 3,866 postal horses in their service; by 1775, according to 
Vasilii Ruban, there were 4,895 horses provided for the relays, with 
1,417 of those (or about 29%) being located on the vital Petersburg-
Moscow road. (Ruban also counts 101 relay routes by this time.)83 By 
1801, the Chief Postal Directory informed the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs that there were 3,222 relay stations in the empire, commanding 
37,840 horses, a six-fold and nine-fold increase, respectively, in a little 
over two decades. Whereas in 1781 there had been 73 post offices in 
the empire—regional depots for the collection and circulation of letter 
and packet mail—by 1801 there were 450.84 This growth continued 
into the next quarter of the nineteenth century, as Kelly O’Neill’s 
digitisation of V. P. Piadyshev’s 1827 Geographical Atlas of the Russian 
Empire has shown. By this count, there were 3,567 post stations in the 
empire (as well as 576 “post houses”, concentrated largely in Finland 
and Ukraine).85
Between 1775 and 1825, in other words, Russia’s horse relay networks 
were placed on the path that would lead to their mid-nineteenth-century 
apogee. The network of 1854 is visible only in outline in the itineraries 
of the 1760s, but it exists in detail on the provincial postal maps of the 
first quarter of the nineteenth century (allowing, of course, for some 
subsequent growth).86 By comparison with this development, other 
innovations in postal services during Catherine’s reign seem minor. 
In 1781, a “heavy” post (for bulk official mail and larger parcels) was 
established twice a week between Petersburg and Moscow, alongside the 
83  Schlözer, ‘Vom Postwesen’, p. 303; Ruban, Dorozhnik, pp. xi–xv, pp. 223–24.
84  Cvetkovski, Modernisierung durch Beschleunigung, p. 114. See also RGIA, coll. 1289, 
descr. 1, file 118, 1801 g. (‘O soobshchenii Gosudarstvennomu sovetu svedenii 
ob″iasniaiushchikh ustroistvo pocht v Rossii’), fols. 37, 47v. 
85  See ‘Post Stations’, The Imperiia Project, http://dighist.fas.harvard.edu/projects/
imperiia/document/676 
86  See, for example, Karmannyi pochtovyi atlas vsei Rossiiskoi Imperii, razdelennoi na 
Gubernii s pokazaniem glavnykh pochtovykh dorog (St Petersburg: Sobstvennyi Ego 
Imperatorskogo Velichestva Departament Kart, 1808).
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established “light” post (for correspondence).87 Deliveries continued to 
be added to the mail routes of major towns. In 1770, Procurator General 
Aleksandr Viazemskii designed a stagecoach system to run between St 
Petersburg and Narva. The first public coach in Russia, it was meant to 
carry up to six passengers with their luggage in a carriage drawn by four 
relay horses, with scheduled times of arrival and departure. Despite 
this Northern experiment, however, public coaching did not become 
common in Russia until the 1820s and 1830s, when private companies 
were licenced for this purpose.88
Indeed, in retrospect, the most ambitious postal reform imagined in 
the Catherinean era failed outright. Both Viazemskii (in his plans for 
the Narva posts) and Prince Aleksandr Bezborodko (a favourite deeply 
involved in postal affairs in the 1780s) believed it might be possible to 
shift the support of the postal service onto some form of commercial- or 
tax-based footing. Catherine was sympathetic to these plans, and in 1784 
issued a personal decree “On the Emancipation of the Residents of St 
Petersburg and Olonetsk Provinces from Postal Obligation”. According 
to this plan, the “relay suburbs” in these regions were disbanded, and 
a tax was to be imposed on the whole provincial population. With this 
money, the plan was to hire relay servitors and organise relay stations 
directly from the treasury.89
In the mid-1790s, however, Nikolai Arkharov, Governor-General of 
St Petersburg, pronounced this reform unworkable. In a memorandum, 
he urged Paul I to reorganise the “relay suburbs”, and reinstate 
relay obligation more generally as the foundation of the province’s 
postal service. Paul approved this proposal, and went even further. 
In 1798, in a general decree on the proper organisation of the posts, 
Paul instructed his governors that support of the posts was a general 
“societal obligation” (obshchestvennaia povinnost′), to be born as needed 
by communities under their authority, whenever “relay suburbs” were 
not available.90 The effect was to urge governors to freely employ relay 
87  PSZ 1, no. 15330.
88  Alexandra Bekasova, ‘The Making of Passengers in the Russian Empire: Coach-
Transport Companies, Guidebooks, and National Identity in Russia, 1820–1860’, in 
Russia in Motion, ed. by Randolph and Avrutin, pp. 199–217.
89  PSZ 1, no. 16012; see also similar provisions in Viazemskii’s plans for the Narva 
post.
90  PSZ 1, no. 17582; PSZ 1, no. 17721; PSZ 1, no. 17744.
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obligations as they continued to extend imperial communications down 
to the district level.91 
In point of fact, to meet the demands posed by Catherine’s order to 
expand the network, they had already been doing so. The population of 
the “relay suburbs” had stagnated in the second half of the eighteenth 
century, growing by a mere 26% even as the demands made of them, in 
terms of stations and horses served, grew by leaps and bounds, 461% 
and 673% respectively.92 As a result, when asked in 1801 to describe how 
relays were supported in the provinces, Russia’s governors painted a 
spectacularly mixed picture. In Kaluga, local iamshchiki provided 48 
horses, the rest of the population 184; in Tambov, iamshchiki drove 
72 horses along 248 versts of roads, while “local district residents” 
maintained nearly 2,000 additional horses along 1,715 versts of roads (!). 
In Perm, 9,970 “souls” in towns were somehow made to pay for 19 
horses; Pskov taxed merchants at a rate of 1 horse for every 200 “souls”, 
and townspeople at a rate of 1 horse for every 337. The only pattern 
that emerges from this detailed report on relay obligations is that the 
maintenance of the relays was rarely confined to the estate of iamshchiki. 
Instead, as the system developed, it was spilling over into ever-broader 
categories of the population, often assuming the character of a local 
or even province-wide tax, whereby specific communities would pool 
resources to send a horse and driver to fulfill their obligation.93 Ever more 
ubiquitous, the society of the road was less and less a caste, and more 
and more a finely differentiated web obligating variable contributions 
from a range of Russian societies, and staffed using hired labour.
As an evolving spectacle in daily life, this broad performance of relay 
duty attracted concentrated attention, from politics, commerce, and art 
91  The central Relay Chancery was eliminated in 1781, and administrative power over 
local relay obligations transferred to the provincial governors: see PSZ1, no. 15178.
92  Arkhiv Gosudarstvennogo soveta, vol. 3, pt. 2, p. 874. For “soul” counts of iamshchiki, see 
See V. M. Kabuzan and N. M. Shepukova, ‘Tabel′ Pervoi Revizii Narodonaseleniia 
Rossii (1718–27)’, Istoricheskii аrkhiv, 3 (June 1959), 129, 165, as well as the overall 
population calculation made by Ia. E. Vodarskii, Naselenie Rossii v kontse XVII-
nachale XVIII veka (chislennost′, soslovno-klassovyi sostav, razmeshchenie) (Moscow, 
1977), Table 44, p. 192; Arkhiv Gosudarstvennogo soveta, vol. 3, pt. 2, p. 874; ‘Nakaz iz 
Iamskoi Kantseliarii’, p. 363.
93  ‘O soobshchenii’, fols. 99v., 104b, 188, 153, 158–158ob, 162–162v. The figures 
for Smolensk, for example, seem to line up exactly with the census count of the 
population as a whole, but elsewhere the pattern is more local, see fols. 88–97v.
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alike. On the one hand, between 1802 and 1825, the social conditions 
underlying the posts attracted the attention of no fewer than five high-
level government committees, most of which focussed on the question 
of whether and how to end the system of relay obligation.94 Some felt 
that Russia’s posts would never operate efficiently and equitably until 
they stood on a more universal footing: either a fully commercial system 
that placed the costs on the users of the post (including the government), 
or a nationalised one, where all of Russia’s subjects, through a common, 
empire-wide tax, subsidised this public good. Others, including Tsar 
Alexander I, regretted the inequitable distribution of postal obligations, 
but nonetheless believed in sustaining, and perhaps even expanding, 
the practice of organising communities specially obligated to serve the 
roads (the network of iamskie slobody).95
Nicholas I finally cut the Gordian knot in the late 1830s. Upset by 
what he perceived to be the chronic instability of relay stations on the 
Moscow-Petersburg highway, he was impressed by stations on the 
Dünaburg road, which connected Smolensk to Riga. Part of partitioned 
Poland, these routes had been organised on a commercial basis for 
decades, according to a project devised in the 1770s. After four years of 
planning, Nicholas ordered the transition of Russia’s system onto much 
the same foundation, in 1843. From then on a contract system would 
fund Russia’s postal stations, with prospective operators agreeing 
to run the relays on a for profit basis on terms set by the state. Using 
hired rather than obligated workers, such commercial posts gradually 
replaced relay duty as the basis of postal communications in the empire. 
Nicholas also ordered his Minister of State Domains, Pavel Kisilev, to 
oversee the conversion of Russia’s special estate of iamshchiki into the 
ordinary status of state peasants.96
This process took decades. In his autobiographical story ‘The 
Sovereign’s Coachmen’, Vladimir Korolenko would recall seeing 
remnants of the old relay order in the Siberia of the 1880s, left behind (as 
94  This complex official history is summarised in ‘Zhurnal i polozhenie komiteta o 
novom ustroistve pochtovoi gon′by mezhdu stolits’, RGIA, coll. 1289, descr. 1, file 
621, fols. 16–26v., from the early 1840s. See also Bunina et al., Materialy po istorii 
sviazi.
95  See the discussion in Arkhiv Gosudarstvennogo Soveta, 3, part 2, pp. 843–96.
96  ‘Zhurnal i polozhenie’, fol. 2v., 65–102, 135. The invention of the postal system of 
partitioned Poland dates to the 1770s, see PSZ 1, no. 13911.
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he put it) like a primordial glacier in a deep valley.97 Meanwhile, as its 
social underpinnings were being transformed, the imperial postal system 
became the object of a growing consumer and artistic cult, providing a 
set of objects and symbols imperial subjects could use to perform and 
represent their relationship to Russia. Already in the early nineteenth 
century, for example, merchants and rich peasants eagerly bought 
official-style “relay bells” (iamskie kolokol′chiki) to decorate their own 
troikas, despite official decrees forbidding the practice.98 In the 1820s, 
Russia’s first lithographers created quick-selling images of dashing mail 
troikas, even as poets and composers wrote widely popular songs about 
them.99 In this way, the culture of relay obligation in the Russian Empire 
not only served to shuttle people and things across points in space, but 
also helped generate cultural commonplaces to populate and unite the 
spaces between them.
97  V. G. Korolenko, ‘“Gosudarevy iamshchiki”’, in Sobranie sochinenii, ed. by S. V. 
Korolenko and N. V. Korolenko-Liakhovich, vol. 1 (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia 
literatura, 1953), pp. 414–20.
98  Lit″ v Kasimove: katalog-spravochnik duzhnykh i podsheinykh kolokol′chikov Kasimovskogo 
kolokololiteinogo tsentra XIX-nachala XX v., ed. by A. A. Glushetskii (n.p.: Collector’s 
Book, 2005); A. Glushetskii, Rossii bronzovoe slovo: o chem govorit duzhnyi kolokol′chik 
(Moscow: Tsentr delovoi informatsii ezhenedel′nika “Ekonomika i zhizn′”, 2007), p. 
25.
99  A. F. Korostin, Russkaia litografiia XIX veka (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel′stvo 
“Iskusstvo”, 1953), pp. 8–14, 25–26; Thomas P. Hodge, A Double Garland: Poetry and 
Art-Song in Early-Nineteenth-Century Russia (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 2000), pp. 81, 143–44; L. I. Sazonova, ‘Literaturnaia rodoslovnaia gogolevskoi 
ptitsy-troiki’, Izvestiia Akademii Nauk, Seriia literatury i iazyka, 59. 2 (2000), 23–30.

6. Information and Efficiency:  
Russian Newspapers, ca.1700–1850 
Alison K. Smith
At the end of 1702, while he was engaged in war with Sweden, Peter the 
Great decreed that a newspaper be established to spread information 
about “military and every sort of affairs” to “the people of Muscovy and 
of neighbouring states”. The newspaper (the word used was kuranty, a 
seventeenth-century holdover soon to be replaced by the word gazeta) 
was to be compiled from reports from the state’s various chanceries, all 
sent to the Monastery Chancery, and printed there in the state printing 
house.1 Within a month, the first issue of this state-sponsored Vedomosti 
(The News) was published, marking the beginnings of Russia’s history 
of newspapers.2 Over the next century, imperial decrees founded other 
newspapers (and a few independent newspapers appeared, as well), 
nearly all based in Moscow or St Petersburg institutions. Then, in the 
1830s, the number and scope of official newspapers in the empire 
was expanded significantly when a series of provincial newspapers 
(gubernskie vedomosti) was established, again by official decree.
1  Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii, Series 1 (1649–1825) (hereafter PSZ 1), no. 
1921.
2  Historians of Russian journalism usually take this event as their starting point, 
reifying its status as Russia’s first newspaper, though others find its erratic 
publication a “disqualification” from that status, as in Louise McReynolds, The News 
Under Russia’s Old Regime: The Development of a Mass-Circulation Press (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 19.
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Newspapers in Imperial Russia have most often been interrogated as 
part of a world of print culture, as sites where something like a civil or 
civic society might develop. This practice comes largely out of a focus on 
the later nineteenth century, when a “mass-circulation” press developed, 
bringing with it a space for the development of a public sphere.3 Earlier 
newspapers, however, are difficult to discuss in these terms. It is in part 
due to this kind of focus that Peter the Great’s Vedomosti has played an 
awkward role in the history of newspapers. It came first, but, as Lindsey 
Hughes put it, “controls from above and lack of initiative and expertise 
from below meant that a Russian free press was still in the distant 
future”.4 The general desire to focus on newspapers and their role in 
developing a civil or civic society may also explain why historians 
of journalism in Russia have generally skimmed over newspapers in 
favour of thick journals, where figures like Catherine the Great, Nikolai 
Novikov, and the first generation of the Russian intelligentsia appear as 
publishers and regular authors.5
Less discussed in histories of the Russian press has been the role 
of newspapers in Imperial Russian governance. In many ways, 
however, particularly in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
newspapers were perhaps above all intended to play roles in policing 
information: in spreading it from the imperial state, in collecting it from 
the population, and in allowing a certain degree of information sharing 
between lower-ranking administrative bodies and even between 
individuals. Gary Marker argued that during the eighteenth century in 
particular, “Russia’s rulers aggressively attempted to use the printing 
press to convey their own absolutist vision of politics and society to the 
entire populace”.6 Although he tempers this claim with a description 
of the ways that individual authors and publishers had a rather 
different set of interests in the wider world of print, newspapers viewed 
narrowly do in may ways fit this vision of print as a tool. In particular, 
3  McReynolds, The News Under Russia’s Old Regime, pp. 1–2, pp. 11–13.
4  Lindsey Hughes, Peter the Great: A Biography (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2002), p. 66.
5  P. N. Berkov, Istoriia russkoi zhurnalistiki XVIII veka (Moscow: Izdatel′stvo Akademii 
nauk SSSR, 1952), p. 21; B. I. Esin and I. V. Kuznetsov, Trista let otechestvennoi 
zhurnalistiki (1702–2002) (Moscow: Izdatel′stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 2002), 
pp. 8–25, p. 30.
6  Gary Marker, Publishing, Printing, and the Origins of Intellectual Life in Russia, 1700–
1800 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 10
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newspapers in eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century Russia become 
a kind of information technology, one of “those mechanisms that are 
used to organise, present, store, and retrieve information”.7 This could 
be information about international relations, about domestic reform, 
about crop and weather conditions, about prices and financial affairs, 
or about social control. All of these elements are reflected in the laws 
governing newspapers and their publishing.
From the time Peter the Great established the Vedomosti as the first 
civil newspaper in Imperial Russia through the middle of the nineteenth 
century, laws set out the parameters under which the Russian Empire’s 
newspapers operated.8 The intent behind those many laws focussed 
on a series of issues, all to do with controlling the distribution of 
information. They set out rules for who could publish newspapers. 
They set out rules for the sorts of information about the imperial state 
the newspapers should disseminate. They set out rules for notices that 
ought to be published in newspapers. They set out parameters for 
oversight and censorship. And they set out a financial structure that 
emphasised certain of these elements as particularly important. In so 
doing, they traced out a network of information to be sent initially out 
of Moscow and St Petersburg. This network disseminated information 
from the imperial state and from local administrations, and eventually 
allowed information to move back and forth between individuals, as 
well. In the second third of the nineteenth century this system expanded 
dramatically with the introduction of provincial newspapers meant to 
ease the circulation of information to an ever-wider audience. However, 
all through this period, as newspapers were consistently legislated as 
methods of information transfer, they were also evolving into rather 
less controllable sites, where other kinds of information created other 
visions of the Russian world. The laws imagined a perfectly efficient 
7  David R. Maines, ‘Varieties of Information Technology: An Editorial Introduction’, 
Qualitative Sociology, 21. 3 (1998), 221–24 (p. 221).
8  The discussion below draws primarily on the Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi 
imperii, the “complete” collection of the laws that first, does not always include the 
discussions that led to individual decrees, and second, is not actually complete. 
Despite these issues, it still acts as an entry into the desires of the state, although 
the results of those desires were far more complicated than the decrees themselves 
envisioned.
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information technology; the newspapers themselves were far more 
unruly.
The first newspaper, Peter’s Vedomosti, was compiled from 
information sent to the state printing house, then under the control of the 
Monastery Chancery and based in Moscow. Gradually, responsibility 
for the newspaper moved to St Petersburg, a move codified in 1728 
when a Senate decree gave responsibility for publishing to the Academy 
of Sciences. Founded only in 1724, the Academy of Sciences had a 
printing press and the ability to print “in Latin, German, and Russian 
dialects” (which meant that it had all three typefaces) and was starting 
to transmit news gleaned from foreign newspapers within Russia 
itself. Now the Senate decreed that the Academy of Sciences press 
ought to publish domestic news, as well.9 As a result, by the middle 
of the eighteenth century, Russia had two newspapers, one based in St 
Petersburg and printed by the Academy of Sciences (usually referred to 
as the St Petersburg Vedomosti), and one in Moscow eventually printed by 
the new Moscow University (the Moscow Vedomosti).10
According to official decrees, the clear goal of these official 
newspapers was to disseminate information from the state to the 
general public. Practically, this led to Vedomosti that were quite short, 
and which featured a mix of news from abroad and closer to home. 
One issue reported on military news from Warsaw and England, on the 
travails of the Genevan ambassador in Constantinople, and on news of 
ships carrying gold and silver from the Americas sunk in the Atlantic 
(to the dismay of merchants everywhere). Domestic news was limited 
to a report on the status of the ice on the river Neva in St Petersburg (it 
was now traversable on foot).11 Other editions contained only a single 
report on a battle of particular importance.12 Richard Pipes saw Peter 
the Great’s establishment of his Vedomosti as marking “a dramatic 
constitutional innovation”, part of Peter’s turn from secrecy toward 
“tak[ing] the people into his confidence”.13 Looking at the way news 
9  PSZ 1, no. 5267.
10  For an overview, L. P. Gromova, ed., Istoriia russkoi zhurnalistiki XVIII–XIX vekov (St 
Petersburg: Izdatel′stvo Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta, 2003), pp. 14–27.
11  Vedomosti (St Petersburg), 8 December 1715.
12  Vedomosti (St Petersburg), 28 November 1715.
13  Richard Pipes, Russia Under the Old Regime, 2nd ed. (London: Penguin Books, 1995), 
p. 129.
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was reported during his reign, it seems that, above all, the tsar wanted 
his people to know more about the world around them—the Vedomosti 
of his era feature foreign news almost to the exclusion of everything 
else. This is fully in keeping with Peter’s mania for all things foreign; 
knowledge of the world would make Russian subjects citizens of the 
world.
In 1725, in the early months of the reign of Catherine I, a decree 
reiterated that “all important matters other than secret news” should 
be shared in print with the public by the colleges and chanceries of 
the state.14 When news-gathering responsibility was transferred to St 
Petersburg and the Academy of Sciences, the terms of the 1725 decree 
stayed in force. All colleges and chanceries were to send important 
information to the Academy for publication. The laws did not clearly 
define “all important matters”, but the contents of the newspapers 
that resulted seem much the same as what had appeared in the reign 
of Peter. A single issue might contain news of the King of Sweden’s 
success at the hunt, earthquakes in Italy, military and diplomatic 
developments in Constantinople, and the report of a celebration at the 
Russian court.15 Later laws rarely address this kind of news explicitly, 
but do occasionally mention it, as when a 1769 Senate decree noted that 
information about the empire’s successes against the Turks in its current 
war were being regularly published in the St Petersburg newspapers.16
Later in the eighteenth century, laws most often focussed on 
newspapers as methods of disseminating not news from abroad, but basic 
information from inside the empire. As laws laid out responsibilities for 
various new bureaucratic offices, they often also included demands that 
certain kinds of transactions or activities be published in the newspapers. 
Catherine the Great’s Provincial Reform of 1775 laid out extensive 
rules for the administration of her lands. New local institutions were 
to publish certain kinds of transactions in St Petersburg and Moscow 
newspapers. Purchases of real estate, in particular, were to be made 
public in the central newspapers. Anyone who wished to contest such a 
purchase had two years from the time of publication to make his or her 
14  PSZ 1, no. 4694.
15  Rossiiskie vedomosti (St Petersburg), 11 December 1725.
16  PSZ 1, no. 13304.
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case.17 Provincial offices were also to publish all sorts of other news that 
the state wanted the larger population to know. They were to advertise 
public auctions, particularly of state lands. They were to give notice of 
outstanding wages owed to state servitors. They were to place notices of 
undecided legal affairs. They were to inform the public of bureaucrats 
appointed to new positions.18
Newspapers were also brought to bear on a particular concern of 
eighteenth-century governance: fugitives and vagrants. From at least 
the era of Peter the Great, the imperial state had sought to control its 
population through requiring passports, initially hand-written, and, 
later on printed forms. The goal was to wipe out fugitives and vagrants 
and thereby make the entire population productive.19 The reality was 
that vagrancy continued to be a real problem, as local police arrested 
many travellers who were either without documents, or who had 
expired or otherwise doubtful documents. In 1765, a Senate decree 
on fugitives and vagrants told local police officials to question such 
criminals carefully, and then, “so that owners may know of them”, to 
publish accounts of those they had detained in the newspaper of the 
Academy of Sciences.20
Two decades later, a request from local officials in the Caucasus flipped 
this responsibility for publishing. By this time, Catherine the Great had 
instituted a new policy of granting amnesty to fugitives, but officials in 
the Caucasus found this an additional burden on their resources.21 There 
were so many fugitives living in the region, and transportation was so 
challenging, that returning those fugitives to their proper places was too 
big a task. As a result, they asked first for more support, and second that 
serf owners place notices of their fugitive serfs in newspapers for ease of 
identification (and so that those serf owners could be approached to pay 
for the return of their serfs, or, instead, to let them transform themselves 
17  PSZ 1, no. 14392, st. 205, 487. A few months later, a second decree clarified these 
instructions: all such notices had to include the price paid for a piece of land. PSZ 1, 
no. 15109.
18  PSZ 1, no. 15212; no. 15794; no. 18184; no. 18637.
19  Simon Franklin, ‘Printing and Social Control in Russia 1: Passports’, Russian History, 
37 (2010), 208–37, esp. pp. 214–24.
20  PSZ 1, no. 12506.
21  On the amnesties, see Alison K. Smith, ‘“The Freedom to Choose a Way of Life”: 
Fugitives, Borders, and Imperial Amnesties in Russia’, Journal of Modern History, 83. 
2 (2011), 243–71.
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into state peasants and receive a credit toward the next military draft 
in return).22 The Senate approved this proposal, though the language 
is unclear—was this a demand, or a voluntary measure for those who 
wished to have fugitives returned to them? Was it to apply only in this 
particular case, or to set new precedent?
Already by the 1740s, newspapers were also seen as places to spread 
more general information about the state of the Russian Empire. In 1744, 
Empress Elizabeth decreed that the Academy of Sciences’ newspaper 
should publish accounts of new converts to Orthodoxy; the decree was 
sparked by two members of her court, one Catholic, one Lutheran, who 
had recently converted and taken new baptismal names.23 The demand 
that such conversions be made public served two purposes. The first 
was practical: people needed to know the new names. The second spoke 
to Elizabeth’s own strong evangelical Orthodox streak, and served to 
publicise a kind of activity she herself wished to encourage.
Catherine II expanded the kind of information that should be shared 
by means of newspapers. Early in her reign, a decree demanded both 
that population statistics be collected, and that certain of them be 
sent to the Academy of Sciences for printing in its News. The decree 
particularly focussed on mortality statistics in St Petersburg—all priests 
were to report on deaths in their parishes, with information on age 
and cause of death.24 A few years later, another Senate decree ordered 
that population statistics for Lifland province be published in both 
Moscow and St Petersburg newspapers “for popular information”.25 
Later in her reign, in reaction to inflation in Moscow, Catherine 
ordered that newspapers publish weekly notices of current prices for 
grain and other comestibles.26 The first decrees spoke to an interest in 
spreading knowledge about the state of the empire. The last spoke to 
a more practical desire, to let people know current costs for their own 
well-being (and perhaps also to shame publicly any merchants caught 
demanding higher than average prices).
22  PSZ 1, no. 16715.
23  PSZ 1, no. 8945.
24  PSZ 1, no. 12061.
25  PSZ 1, no. 12895.
26  PSZ 1, no. 16143.
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In part in order to control these many sources of information, laws 
also set out parameters for oversight and, eventually, censorship. By 
granting only a limited number of presses the authority to publish 
official statements, imperial decrees were already controlling the flow 
of information. That control quite quickly turned out to be insufficient 
in the eyes of the imperial state. As a result, already during the reign of 
Elizabeth, several laws set out additional restrictions on what could be 
printed. First, in reaction to “many untruths” published in the Russian 
News of the Academy of Sciences, and in particular to its statement 
that the empress had awarded Mikhail Bestuzhev a particular honour 
“which Her Imperial Majesty did not do”, a decree gave the Senate 
oversight over what was printed in the newspaper. All news now needed 
the approval of the Senate before publishing.27 A later decree was even 
more specific: no news about the imperial family could be published 
without proper approval (in this case, the decree was in response to an 
article about the empress going out of the capital to hunt).28
In 1780, another limit was placed on what newspapers ought to 
publish. The Senate heard cases on many topics, and the newspapers 
had been publishing most of them—a Senate decision was a Senate 
decision, whatever its subject. Now, however, a restriction was imposed: 
they were to publish only those meant for “general information” or 
with a specific notation that they were to be published.29 The rationale 
behind this law is unclear from its text. It might have been an effort to 
control information, so that if a decision only affected a few people, or 
was intended to guide administrative practices rather than set general 
precedents, it could be sent only to those who needed to know of it. 
But it may also have been a kindness to the newspapers themselves, 
seeking to free them from the responsibility to publish pages and pages 
of information with limited utility. 
While this sort of information was limited, in other cases decrees 
reduced the amount of oversight on publication. In 1781, a Senate decree 
declared that future advertisement of public auctions of state lands 
could be sent directly to the Moscow and St Petersburg newspapers, 
27  PSZ 1, no. 8529.
28  PSZ 1, no. 9903.
29  PSZ 1, no. 15001.
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bypassing Senate approval.30 The reason for this was a purely practical 
one: to get advertisements placed in time for more people to take part 
in the auction, thereby hopefully increasing the returns on the auctions 
(and therefore the state’s income). Not all such advertisements were 
made freer, however. Half a year later, another Senate decree affirmed 
that the Senate itself was to receive notice of land transactions between 
non-state actors—direct publishing was not acceptable in these cases.31 
Several years later, two additional decrees clarified the variety of land 
transactions that needed to be sent to the Senate, and also created a 
form for such notices.32 This last provision is an important one in the 
context of viewing newspapers as a type of information technology. 
It standardised information, giving a list of exactly what needed to 
be included in notices regarding this kind of transaction. Eighteenth 
century laws also began to address an important question: who was 
to pay for putting information into newspapers? In 1766 the press of 
Moscow University, which had been publishing the Moscow News, asked 
that local government offices that wished to print reports of their actions 
should bear the cost of publication. The Senate agreed, and sent out 
decrees to that effect.33 This was not always a simple matter, however. 
Later that same year, both the St Petersburg Academy of Sciences press 
and the Moscow University press asked local bank offices (bankovaia 
kontora) to pay the costs associated with printing information they were 
required to publish. The costs, however, were large (the Academy of 
Sciences estimated the paper costs alone as two hundred and seventy 
rubles) and the bank offices were themselves confined by statute as to 
their expenses. The Senate decreed that they be allowed to use interest 
income hitherto kept in reserve to pay the costs of publication.34
In these cases, the Senate believed that the dissemination of 
particular information to wider audiences was worth the cost to 
30  PSZ 1, no. 15212.
31  PSZ 1, no. 15413.
32  PSZ 1, no. 16460, no. 16506. Nor was this the end; more decrees repeating the need 
to send out this kind of information continued to appear, including PSZ 1, no. 
16885.
33  PSZ 1, no. 12767.
34  PSZ 1, no. 12783. Later laws also touched on questions of payment. In 1811 the 
Academy of Sciences approached the Synod for help in collecting outstanding fees 
for notices placed by Consistories. The Synod told all its consistories to pay up 
promptly. PSZ 1, no. 24749.
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public administrations. In other cases, however, decrees ordered other 
methods of payment. A 1765 decree requiring police departments 
to publish information about arrested fugitives did not lay out 
responsibility for bearing the costs of such publication. In 1770, another 
Senate decree clarified the issue: those who placed the notice (i.e. the 
police departments that arrested fugitives) were to pay for publication. 
However, if the notice resulted in sending a fugitive serf back to his or 
her owner, the police department could recover publication costs from 
that serf owner.35
By the time Alexander I came to the throne in 1801, newspapers 
were well established as a means of circulating information, and decrees 
from his reign only emphasise that fact. Newspapers already not only 
transmitted information that the state wanted transmitted but also 
made the larger legal system work efficiently. Several decrees from 
the reign of Alexander I reaffirmed the use of newspapers to circulate 
information about runaways.36 Other decrees focussed on property 
disputes. A decree of 1803 stated that Senate decisions on property 
deemed “worthy of attention” should be published “through the 
newspapers so that petitioners or heirs or their delegates” should know 
of them and take proper, prompt action.37 Over the next several years, 
a number of Senate decrees also focussed on the Surveying Chancery—
the results of its investigations were to be published as of a decree of 
1805 (though matters involving court peasants were exempted from 
the duty to publish in 1810).38 That process of publication was intended 
to make decisions about property more efficient. As a result, when the 
notices placed by the Surveying Chancery turned out to be inexact, and 
therefore to cause the Senate “difficulties and excessive correspondence 
about matters”, the Senate sent it a “severe correction” to be more exact 
and more complete in its notices.39
35  PSZ 1, no. 13507. Later, after rules on publishing notices changed, so too did the 
rules on payments; Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii, Series 2 (1825–1881) 
(hereafter PSZ 2), no. 1021.
36  PSZ 1, no. 21939; no. 28263.
37  PSZ 1, no. 21048.
38  PSZ 1, no. 21735; expanded in no. 22029. Matters concerning court peasants were 
exempted in 1810. PSZ 1, no. 24371.
39  PSZ 1, no. 26332; no. 26654.
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As in the eighteenth century, these demands for publication created 
a problem of funding. In 1808 the Senate decided a question of who 
was responsible for paying for the notices of purchases required by 
law. Now, every provincial administration sending such notices to 
St Petersburg or Moscow for publication was to include one ruble 
fifty kopeks to cover the cost of printing the notice three times.40 The 
provincial administration could collect the money from those involved 
in the purchase or other matter requiring official notice.
There was also something very new in the decrees of Alexander’s reign: 
a new kind of language that emphasised a broader vision of information 
that could bring benefit to the Russian state. Eighteenth-century news 
encompassed foreign affairs, military matters, and internal governmental 
decisions. Now, in several early decrees, Alexander began to emphasise 
the importance of developments in industry and technology to the state, 
asking the Academy of Sciences to find “useful” information, translate it 
into Russian, and publish it in its newspaper.41 In 1809 he went further. 
In a personal decree sent to the Minister of Internal Affairs, Alexander 
appointed a new editor within the Ministry to begin publishing a new 
newspaper, The Northern Post, or New St Petersburg Gazette.42 It was not 
only “useful that information from […] the provinces be brought to 
the attention of the public”, but even “all the more necessary because 
much of this information concerns not only the police, but agriculture, 
factories, and other elements of the state economy”. In other words, the 
goal was not just that newspapers be brought to bear on a narrow vision 
of governance, but also that they should communicate information that 
would support other goals of the state.
That new newspaper was only one of several founded at the turn 
of the eighteenth century. Alexander’s father Paul had granted a Riga 
printer permission to begin publishing a German-language newspaper 
that would have the status of a state publication in return for its printing, 
without charge, all of the Riga provincial government’s decrees.43 Two 
years later, under Alexander, another decree approved the founding 
of a Commercial News to be published by the recently-created Ministry 
40  PSZ 1, no. 22793; a further clarification appeared in PSZ 1, no. 23266.
41  PSZ 1, no. 20144; no. 20153.
42  PSZ 1, no. 23768.
43  PSZ 1, no. 19496.
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of Commerce.44 Now faced with competition from other options for 
news, the newspaper of the Academy of Sciences soon asked for and 
received exclusive rights to publish central state information.45 Only 
a few years later, in 1808, the Minister of Justice asked permission to 
reorganise the Senate press; it had developed haphazardly and was 
now overburdened and stuck with failing equipment. In addition, he 
asked that the press be given a monopoly on printing and selling laws. 
It would, in return, publish a weekly newsletter about current legal 
matters (to which readers could subscribe for a fee).46 In other words, 
it would gain a monopoly on one kind of state information in order 
to increase its revenue. Quite quickly, however, this limit on other 
presses was relaxed in the name of information transfer. In July 1809 
the Minister of Commerce asked that the Commercial Gazette be allowed 
to publish legal decisions of particular interest to merchants.47 They 
needed to know this information, and their Gazette was clearly the best 
option for getting it to them. Alexander agreed. Proper dissemination 
of information to those who needed it was more important than the 
financial status of any one institution.
The reign of Nicholas I saw another significant shift in the role that 
newspapers were to play in the Russian Empire. Nicholas is a difficult 
figure for historians, who see his reign as both the “apogee of autocracy” 
and as the time of the flowering of the Russian intelligentsia, a time of 
public conservatism and private discussions of reform.48 Both these sides 
of his personality and his reign are apparent in his attitude towards the 
use of print. At base, Nicholas’s decrees regulating newspapers went 
back and forth between an emphasis on control and an emphasis on 
their utility as an information technology.
First, Nicholas’s reign brought in new regulations limiting what 
newspapers might print. Certain topics came to require special oversight 
for security reasons. Any publications about medicines or medical affairs 
44  PSZ 1, no. 20565. After the Napoleonic wars, Alexander founded another newspaper, 
the military paper Russkii invalid, to focus on issues of particular interest to veterans 
and serving forces. PSZ 1, no. 27663.
45  PSZ 1, no. 20863, §§ 115, 124.
46  PSZ 1, no. 23390.
47  PSZ 1, no. 23747.
48  A. E. Presniakov, Apogei samoderzhaviia: Nikolai I (Leningrad: Brokgauz-Efron, 
1925).
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had to be approved by the medical faculty of whichever university was 
closest to the place of publication,49 since inaccurate news about health 
could have potentially harmful outcomes. No news about the imperial 
family or events at court was to be published without approval by the 
Ministry of the Imperial Court.50 This had less to do with a concern for 
security than it reflected a growing desire to project the proper image of 
the imperial family, in order to promote the empire itself.51 
Nicholas’s reign also saw an attempt to create an overarching 
censorship structure for the empire. Newspapers (and other periodical 
publications) were singled out in the new censorship regulations released 
in the first year of Nicholas’s reign (and then replaced a few years later 
by a second set of regulations that unified censorship of Russian and 
foreign-language materials, until then under the jurisdiction of separate 
ministries).52 As the first set of regulations put it, such censorship was 
absolutely necessary for Russia: “The goal of the establishment of 
Censorship is so that works of Literature, the Sciences and the Arts, 
when they are published for the World by means of printing, engraving, 
and lithography, give useful, or at least not harmful, guidance for the 
well-being of the State”. Censorship allowed for the useful, and avoided 
the harmful.
Second, Nicholas’s reign recognised the many uses of newspapers. 
Nicholaevan decrees added to earlier decrees that used print as a 
method of spreading official information, sometimes simplifying, 
sometimes adding layers of complexity to these existing laws. Therefore, 
one decree of 1828 continued to demand that property transactions, 
whether sales between two individuals or auctions to pay off someone’s 
debts, be advertised in newspapers so that any challengers were 
properly informed.53 Later laws regulating different kinds of property 
transactions and documents often included clauses that required 
49  PSZ 2, no. 3994.
50  PSZ 2, nos. 4236 and 4237. At nearly the end of Nicholas’s reign, some information 
about the imperial family—their travels—no longer needed special permission. 
PSZ 2, no. 24979.
51  Richard S. Wortman, Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy 
from Peter the Great to the Abdication of Nicholas II (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2006).
52  PSZ 2, no. 403; no. 1979.
53  PSZ 2, no. 2139. PSZ 2, no. 4237 similarly reaffirmed earlier practices involving 
publishing in newspapers as a method of confirming property transfers.
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the advertisement of changes in ownership or lost documents in 
newspapers.54 Decrees continued to order that news of vagrants be 
published in order to find their owners or proper place of registry.55 
Other forms of advertisement were also mandated in law. Schools were 
to publicise openings for students.56 Spouses seeking a divorce on the 
grounds of abandonment were to advertise in newspapers to provide 
evidence of that abandonment.57
The many different kinds of notices that were to appear in 
newspapers, and the many different decrees that had established that 
fact, soon required new fee structures. In 1831 the Senate released 
overarching guidelines for how such notices were to be handled when 
it came to payments.58 These included notices from the Senate about 
appeals; elections to Noble Assemblies; reports of dead bodies, fugitive 
peasants and townspeople, prisoners, and draftees; of lost and found 
passports and documents; of missing state stamps; of lost and found 
property (and also stray livestock); notices seeking inheritors of estates 
or creditors, and many others. In general, if there was an obvious profit 
to someone as the result of a notice, such as the return of property 
(including serfs), that profit paid for the advertisement. If the benefit 
was to the proper and efficient functioning of some state apparatus, 
then the notice was to be printed without charge. 
There were larger statements made about the role of newspapers, 
as well. In 1828, the Committee of Ministers heard a project presented 
by the Minister of Education “to improve the St Petersburg Academy 
Newspaper”.59 It spoke of a need to “make it as worthy of attention as 
possible”, and listed a number of kinds of news it would print in order 
to meet that goal. Not only would it publish “domestic and foreign 
news”, but also “notices from the police” as well as “other news, curious 
for the public”. In return for receiving things like “police notices that 
up to now have been in part in print, in part in manuscript, distributed 
by police servitors to houses”, the Academy promised to publish the 
54  PSZ 2, no. 3262, §§ 16, 42; no. 3693; no. 4255; PSZ 2, no. 5360, § 361; no. 5462, § 99; 
no. 5463, §§ 21, 48, 110, 127; no. 5464, §§ 167–69; no. 8545.
55  PSZ 2, no. 1893, §§ 14–15; no. 8536, §§ 2–5.
56  PSZ 2, no. 5470, § 9.
57  PSZ 2, no. 5870, § 123.
58  PSZ 2, no. 4402.
59  PSZ 2, no. 2516.
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newspaper faithfully every day, and to include any such notices sent 
to it at least a few hours before the newspaper was to appear in print. 
It would also publish news of those entering and exiting St Petersburg, 
weekly bulletins on prices, and reports on imports, health statistics, and 
the current population of the capital “by calling and sex, after every 
Police census”. Furthermore, the proposal gave a rationale for using 
the newspaper in this matter: it was “the most simple and convenient 
method for informing the public in a timely fashion of various police 
actions and orders”.
This was certainly the main goal of many of the decrees about 
newspapers: making the state, the bureaucracy, and the economy 
function more efficiently.60 One Senate decree ordering that the 
Surveying Chancery give proper attention to the publication of its 
notices explicitly observed that such publication was an effort to “fend 
off the endless correspondence” that otherwise resulted.61 This suggests 
that newspapers played a role as a form of information technology 
used by the state. Other decrees, however, blur the line between 
that interpretation and the idea that newspapers were a space for 
the development of a civic culture. Several decrees from the reign of 
Nicholas I focussed on a very different kind of notice—notices giving 
thanks. In one case, a noble assembly wished to publish a notice in a 
regional newspaper praising a particularly good bureaucrat for his 
service. There were, however, no rules that allowed such a notice. The 
Ministry of Internal Affairs asked the Committee of Ministers, and the 
Committee decided that such notices should be authorised and did not 
henceforth need special permission.62
On the one hand, this is an example of the desire to have the 
regulations spelled out clearly. It is hard to imagine why thanking a 
bureaucrat publicly might be a problem, and yet the local society was 
not certain it was acceptable. On the other hand, it set out a new way 
of thinking about the kind of information that should be included in 
newspapers. Regulations built on the idea that newspapers were places 
to thank individuals for particular services, be they in the bureaucracy, or 
60  PSZ 2, no. 11109, § 109 founded a new St Petersburg police newspaper, in order to 
make its ordinances better and more easily known.
61  PSZ 2, no. 5439.
62  PSZ 2, no. 4218.
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in philanthropic activities. Regulations regarding a school, for example, 
included a notice that any particularly large charitable contributions to 
the school could and should be reported in local newspapers.63 These 
sorts of notices could be read as examples of a kind of civil or civic 
consciousness on the part of individuals or societies. The fact that they 
were mandated by law emphasises their role in supporting the aims of 
the imperial state, by rewarding effective bureaucrats and those who 
supported education.
Nicholas’s reign also saw the biggest expansion of newspaper 
publishing Russia had yet seen via decrees that established a network of 
Gubernskie vedomosti, or Provincial News, through much of the empire.64 
This was an attempt to solve a consistent problem that plagued the 
regulation of newspapers: the problem of the provinces. Many of the 
decrees envisioned a world in which newspapers were used to transmit 
information from St Petersburg and Moscow to a wider readership. 
There was a problem, however. St Petersburg and Moscow were well 
served, but already by the 1760s, decrees began to mention the question 
of how to get important information out beyond them. So, for example, 
a 1765 decree that ordered police to publish reports on arrested fugitives 
in the St Petersburg newspaper also included a method to disseminate 
information even further: “send such information to Provincial 
and Town Chanceries”.65 What those chanceries were to do with the 
information, however, was unclear. 
A more specific response to the problem of the provinces first 
appeared in a 1769 decree to communicate information about Russia’s 
successes against the Ottoman Empire. As the decree put it, although St 
Petersburg and Moscow newspapers were publishing reports on such 
victories, “these newspapers are not received in all towns of the Russian 
Empire, and so not everywhere has received news of [our] military 
successes”. In this case, the solution was to place responsibility onto 
the Senate printing press itself. News would be extracted from the St 
Petersburg newspapers and reprinted by the Senate press for circulation 
63  PSZ 2, no. 6788, § 38.
64  There is a recent extensive Russian-language literature on individual or regional 
provincial newspapers, summarised in V. V. Shevtsov, ‘Tomskie gubernskie vedomosti’ 
(1857–1917 gg.) v sotsiokul′turnom i informatsionnom prostranstve sibiri (Tomsk: 
Tomskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, 2012), pp. 13–16.
65  PSZ 1, no. 12506.
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in the wider Russian world.66 Similarly, in the early nineteenth century, 
a number of decrees focussed on how best to disseminate information 
about fugitives and the passportless. Local authorities were supposed to 
“publicise” such information, but through what means? Decrees came 
to describe “public notices (vedomosti)” in provincial towns, but these 
were themselves undefined and poorly regulated.67 
Finally in 1830, Nicholas promulgated a charter founding gubernskie 
vedomosti.68 There had been a few newspapers based in provincial towns 
before, but none had lasted very long.69 The first, a shortlived Tambov 
News, had been established in 1788 by the region’s then governor, 
the poet Gavril Derzhavin. Derzhavin explicitly tied his desire to 
establish such a publication to the need to simplify government work.70 
According to the decree listed in the Complete Collection of the Laws, 
the proposal to found a wider network of newspapers came from the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and was approved by the Committee of 
Ministers and by Nicholas I. According to Susan Smith-Peter, however, 
the Minister of Finance, E. F. Kankrin, had actually originated the idea 
several years before.71 She furthermore points to continued tension 
between the two ministries (or the two ministers) about the content of 
the newspapers, with the Minister of Internal Affairs emphasising their 
role in governance, and the Minister of Finance more interested in their 
broader role in developing provincial economies.
The new decree set out an ambitious plan for a great network of 
newspapers “in every one of the provinces [guberniia]” under the 
authority of provincial governors and their staffs. According to the 
proposal, “the goal of publishing gubernskie vedomosti is to aid Chanceries 
in their affairs by decreasing paperwork, and in addition to give a means 
for state offices, and also for private individuals, to get information that 
pertains to them”. In other words, it was a culmination of the idea that 
66  PSZ 1, no. 13304.
67  PSZ 1, no. 21939; no. 24516; no. 25516; no. 25746.
68  PSZ 2, no. 4036.
69  B. I. Esin, Russkaia dorevoliutsionnaia gazeta, 1702–1917 gg. (Moscow: Moskovskogo 
universiteta, 1971), pp. 17, 20.
70  Susan Smith-Peter, ‘The Russian Provincial Newspaper and Its Public, 1788–1864’, 
Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East-European Studies, 1908 (2008), 6–7, https://
carlbeckpapers.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/cbp/article/view/145
71 Smith-Peter, ‘Russian Provincial Newspaper’, pp. 7–8, also Shevtsov, Tomskie 
gubernskie vedomosti, p. 26.
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newspapers had a practical role in circulating information necessary 
for the proper functioning of the state apparatus and for the proper 
participation of citizens in society.
This was a general statement of goals; the proposal also included 
more specific guidance “on the subjects that should be covered in the 
gubernskie vedomosti”. All such newspapers should include four major 
sections. The first was to include “decrees and regulations”, including 
imperial manifestos, notices about the imperial family, “about peace, 
war, taxes”, and decisions by the Senate or Committee of Ministers. 
These were primarily new legal decisions that might change some 
aspect of administration or of everyday life. In addition, this section 
could include news from an individual province’s administration, 
either from the governor and his staff, or from the provincial treasury. 
To help decide on “the choice of topics” that ought to appear in the 
newspapers, the proposal went on to list twenty-two separate kinds 
of information that might be produced by provincial authorities and 
were deemed worthy of inclusion. They include news about comings 
and goings in the provincial bureaucracy, about taxes and tolls, about 
the draft, about diseases in the province, and about opportunities for 
charitable contributions. 
The second section of the gubernskie vedomosti was allocated to 
notices of matters pertaining to the treasury. In the context of Imperial 
Russia, where provincial treasury departments (kazennye palaty) served 
both fiscal and census functions, this was a broad category. Here were 
notices of property transactions of various sorts, and of opportunities 
for tax farming. Postal matters appeared in this section, as did reports of 
bankrupts, of fugitives, of vagrants, and of found dead bodies.
The third section was simply labelled “news” and included a whole 
series of different topics. First, it meant “important events”, like the 
travels of significant people or the deaths of local notables, whether 
first-guild merchants or artists and scholars. Second, it meant news 
about the economy. New factories and inventions, reports on markets, 
trade, and prices were supposed to appear in this section. So too were 
“subjects helping to improve agriculture”, ranging from “methods of 
fertilising fields”, to specific reports on successes in animal husbandry 
or agriculture in the province. “Various statistical and historical news” 
meant anything from information about current building projects 
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in towns, to archaeological finds, to vital statistics. This listing of 
appropriate sources of news also included a note giving additional 
information about what this section was intended to promote: “all 
these news relate to that Province in which the vedomosti are printed”. 
News from neighbouring provinces was allowed, if it was particularly 
important to residents of the paper’s home province.
Finally, the fourth section gave space to “private advertisements”. 
In many ways, these advertisements complemented the second section, 
which included notices of found property, including documents, 
physical objects or, in its notices about vagrants, runaway serfs, that 
had been brought to the attention of provincial authorities. Here in the 
fourth section, private individuals could likewise place notices about 
their lost property or runaway serfs. They could also advertise property 
for sale or for rent, or place notices seeking servants. In addition, any 
other advertisements “that cause no harm to anyone” and which were 
allowed in the St Petersburg and Moscow newspapers were allowed 
here, as well. Owners of shops or restaurants could and did place 
advertisements here.
Only one topic was outright banned from inclusion. The very first 
point made under the broad topic of subjects to be included in the news 
was, in fact, the subject to be excluded: “in the gubernskie vedomosti the 
printing of political articles, as they do not correspond to their goals, is 
not allowed”. If the goal was to streamline administration and transmit 
useful knowledge, politics would, it seems, only muddle things.
Not only did the proposal legislate the topics appropriate to 
provincial newspapers, it also legislated, at least in part, their readership. 
The plan gave instructions for how to subscribe to the newspapers (in 
provincial capitals, turn to the newspaper offices; in district towns, look 
to the postal service) and what its cost should be (no more than ten 
rubles a year). It also noted that all state servitors in the province were 
required to receive a copy of the newspaper. So too were bureaucrats 
of the Ministry of Internal Affairs who dealt with issues pertaining to 
agriculture, of the Main Administration of Transportation who dealt 
with provincial transportation issues, and of local offices of the Ministry 
of Finance and Ministry of Education. In addition, township-level 
boards of both court and state peasants were to receive their appropriate 
provincial newspapers.
204 Alison K. Smith
Finally, the proposal for the new newspapers emphasised the 
practical role they would play in streamlining administrative processes 
in the provinces. The first two sections—“decrees and regulations” 
and notices from the treasury—were the focus here. The plan was 
clear: those two sections “have in their own province official strength”. 
That is, they were to serve as official notice from the government of 
new regulations and laws. No one was to await further instructions 
once these were placed in the newspapers. Local administration even 
received explicit guidelines on how to read and use the newspapers: 
they were to read through them carefully, make a note in their own 
records of any applicable new decrees, and from that point on, follow 
them. Local authorities were also to pay attention to all the issues they 
received, and to make note of their numbers—if any went missing in the 
post, local authorities were responsible for turning to the post office to 
replace them. At the end of the year, authorities were to bind all issues, 
and place them in archives.
There were several immediate refinements to the plan. When the 
proposal for the new gubernskie vedomosti was publicised, it included a 
preface from the Senate. It announced a scaled down version of this new 
scheme—vedomosti were initially only to be founded in six provinces 
(in Astrakhan, Kazan, Kiev, Nizhnii Novgorod, Slobodo-Ukrainsk, 
and Iaroslavl provinces), and if they proved to be a success there, they 
would gradually be rolled out elsewhere. In addition, the preface gave a 
number of Nicholas’s personal additions to the proposal. The vedomosti 
should be printed “on the best paper possible, with a good typeface and 
in a proper form”. At the same time, Nicholas recognised that “due to 
the current insufficiency” of printing facilities in the provinces, state aid 
would be given to their development.
Only in 1837 did Nicholas I’s regime follow up on its initial 
establishment of six provincial newspapers and realise the plan for a 
wider network of gubernskie vedomosti. In a long new set of instructions 
for provincial administrations (which was itself in the middle of a 
series of new instructions for provincial governors and other provincial 
offices) appeared a second, more forceful, and slightly altered statement 
of the need for gubernskie vedomosti in all provinces of the empire. Again, 
the stated goal of the vedomosti was to make the spread of information 
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more efficient—for “ease” of access, for “a most convenient method of 
getting news in proper time”.72
The plan had shifted somewhat since the initial 1830 decree. Now, 
gubernskie vedomosti were to consist of two major sections: Official and 
Unofficial. The Official section included all notices and reports pertaining 
to circulars and decrees from central and provincial authorities; notices 
of town and noble assembly elections; notices of newly appointed 
bureaucrats (or of those leaving their posts or receiving awards); notices 
of lost passports or other documents; notices of found property, and of 
public auctions; of infectious diseases in the province, or of dangers to 
crops or livestock. The section was also to include reports of fugitives, of 
arrested vagrants, and of dead bodies discovered (all with descriptions 
of their physical characteristics). 
For all that most of these subjects were intended to circulate 
information outward, the list of possible topics also framed a broader 
network of information transfer. Official sections might include notices 
of what police departments were doing in one district, “which may 
serve as guidance in similar situations for the police departments of 
other districts”.73 Similarly, Official sections were to be shared beyond 
provincial limits—a copy was to be sent to the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and to other provincial administrations. The reason was 
similar—they were to republish useful information, including news of 
infectious diseases and cattle plague and reports of fugitives, vagrants, 
lost and found objects, and auctions.
There was also a limit, but this time an odd one: “In the provincial 
newspapers not in any circumstance should decrees, laws, and 
announcements published in the news printed by the Governing Senate 
be republished”. The persistent importance of the Senate news was also 
addressed in terms of circulating knowledge. Any information that 
provincial governments believed needed to be shared with the entire 
empire was to be sent to the Senate for publishing in its newspaper 
(along with the proper fees, of course).
72  PSZ 2, no. 10304, § 86. In 1838, St Petersburg got its own version for local affairs (the 
existing St Petersburg Vedomosti had an empire-wide focus, leaving St Petersburg as 
a town and as a province without the same local source of information). PSZ 2, no. 
11109, § 109 and no. 11849, §§ 7–31; Moscow followed almost a decade later. PSZ 2, 
no. 20997.
73  PSZ 2, no. 10304, § 88, no. 3.
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The Unofficial section might include all sorts of other subjects. 
Here was a general “news” section, to include “unusual events in the 
province”, information about the provincial economy, agriculture, 
weather, new schools, and local history. The Unofficial section was 
also the place for private advertisements—buying, selling, and renting 
property, seeking servants or employees, private notices of runaway 
servants or serfs, lost documents or objects. Such advertisements were 
priced “by the line and letter”.
This decree did something quite different from the 1830 plan. Now 
the two sections were to be printed separately, an act that more fully 
disentangled the functions of the press. The Official section continued 
to serve as a mechanism of governance, as a way of regularly publishing 
important official information. Decrees or instructions that required 
some specific action from local authorities were to be printed there with 
space left for notes by those local authorities. The Official section also 
had an official audience—all provincial, district, town, and township 
authorities; the Marshals of the Nobility; church leaders, both Orthodox 
and non-Orthodox. District level marshals of the nobility received three 
copies of the Official section. One stayed with the marshal, and the other 
two copies could be circulated around the district, shared with “nobles 
or estate managers”. The Unofficial section now became something 
rather different, and presaged a shift towards a more civically engaged 
press in the later nineteenth century.
At the end of 1838, the Committee of Ministers released a decision 
that emphasised the specific ways that the gubernskie vedomosti were 
intended to function.74 A question arose over the cost of a subscription 
to the gubernskie vedomosti after the governors of Olonets and Podolsk 
had raised local prices. The committee drew on the 1830 and 1837 
instructions in their deliberations. According to the Committee, the first 
instructions had ordered that gubernskie vedomosti bear a “moderate 
price” in order that “people of all sosloviia be given the possibility of 
receiving them”. It therefore found that increasing the cost to private 
subscribers would oppose this goal. Raising the cost of subscription to 
official subscribers, who were forced by law to take in the newspaper, 
was only allowable if the raise was “not burdensome”. As a result, the 
74  PSZ 2, no. 11889.
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committee decided to set a maximum cost for a year’s subscription to the 
gubernskie vedomosti in any province at 10 rubles for a private subscriber, 
and 20 rubles for an official one.
Although most gubernskie vedomosti did not appear until the very 
end of the 1830s, decrees began to refer to them much earlier. An 
1831 Manifesto gave new rules for elections to noble assemblies. All 
such elections were to be announced in advance, and to be advertised 
“throughout the Rural and Town Police, or through the Gubernskie 
vedomosti (where they are published), and in their absence through public 
notices”.75 As more and more laws included provisions for publishing in 
newspapers over the next several years, that phrase or a variation kept 
appearing: “through the gubernskie vedomosti where they exist”.76 Not all 
did—in a few cases, statutes continued to refer only to “the newspapers 
of both capitals”.77 That was, at the time, the more sensible way to refer 
to things, for there were few provincial newspapers actually in print.
As more provincial newspapers began to appear, decrees continued 
to reference them, both to disseminate information and to make clear 
official positions. A decree instructed all gubernskie vedomosti to publish 
monthly reports of what was going on in their regional administrative 
offices.78 In this case, the governor of Tula province had started the 
practice, and Nicholas, upon reading of this action in a yearly report, 
wrote next to it “good idea, it wouldn’t be bad to order it done 
everywhere”. Another stated that reports on fraud published in the 
capitals ought also to appear in the provinces.79 In 1838, a decree laid out 
rules for how to know that a given published announcement had official 
weight. The answer was mostly simple: if it came from the Senate, it 
had official weight. If it came from a ministry, it had official weight. So 
too did the gubernskie vedomosti: they were, in essence, “an extension of 
Senate publications”.80 
Of course, there was a real problem with using newspapers as a 
major part of governance, as the laws that treated them as a form of 
information technology tended to do. It was a problem based in the 
75  PSZ 2, no. 4989.
76  PSZ 2, no. 5360, § 361; no. 5464, § 168.
77  PSZ 2, no. 5463, §§ 21, 48, 110, 127; no. 6588, §§ 20, 26.
78  PSZ 2, no. 16886.
79  PSZ 2, no. 23686.
80  PSZ 2, no. 10978.
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difference between the laws regulating newspapers in principle and 
the actual newspapers as they existed in practice. In law, newspapers 
were almost imagined as a pure method of transferring the information 
deemed important by some level of the imperial state. Property, fugitives, 
official decrees, local decisions—newspapers were a way to keep track 
of the population and to make sure that population knew how it related 
to the imperial state. Even more abstract information served a purpose: 
introducing newly Europeanised Russians to the world; making their 
empire familiar to them; improving agriculture. Even here, newspapers 
were to be purely efficient.
But none of the newspapers were ever that pure. Even the very first 
publications at the beginning of the 1700s were compendiums of foreign 
news that brought in all sorts of novel ideas. As such, they not only 
give historians a glimpse of a long-ago Russia but also gave Russians 
of the time an insight into far-away worlds. How else to understand 
news reports like the very first one from Madrid in an issue from June 
1725: “The prophecy of a nun about which something was written 
earlier has turned out to be false and baseless”?81 It might be a warning 
against anti-modern superstition, but given that it implies the prophecy 
had been reported as news earlier, that message was blurred at best. 
As a result, for all that one Soviet historian of newspapers referred to 
the Vedomosti of Peter the Great’s era as having a strong pro-Petrine 
reformist propaganda role, they are in reality much harder to define so 
neatly.82 From a very early period, newspapers aimed to be “not only 
useful but also entertaining”.83 
By the end of the eighteenth century, and after nearly a century 
of laws that viewed them as methods of transmitting official or semi-
official information, Vedomosti played roles that were obviously more 
complicated. The St Petersburg Vedomosti included official reports 
as well as news from St Petersburg and military reports from around 
Western Europe. Then came advertisements, first “news” of books 
for sale at the Academy of Sciences bookshop—an example of the 
publisher of the newspaper advertising its other wares. Then followed 
private advertisements offering firewood for sale, seeking purchasers of 
81  Vedomosti (St Petersburg), 2 June 1725.
82  Esin, Russkaia dorevoliutsionnaia gazeta, pp. 10–11.
83  Istoriia russkoi zhurnalistiki, p. 25.
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property ranging from settled estates to horses and ducks to individual 
serfs. Shopkeepers invited people to look over their imported goods, 
like coffee and tea and “cured beef from Hamburg”. Advertisements 
sought people to do particular jobs, like translating a “not too big 
notebook” from English into Russian. At the end, an official notice about 
debt was followed by a table naming all the debtors and enumerating 
their debts.84 In another issue, much the same mixture appeared, plus 
notices of people leaving St Petersburg, and a report on the weather for 
the past three days.85
Already, newspapers in their practice challenged any effort to conceive 
of them as a pure tool of the state. Pages devoted to advertisements 
easily outnumbered those devoted to official news. In part this was due 
to the legislated demands that they publicise certain things, like debts 
and property transactions. As a result, however, newspapers created an 
image of an official world that existed largely outside Russia, and then 
an everyday world that consisted primarily of debts and secondarily 
of trade in goods and people. This divergence was even more true 
in Moscow, where Nikolai Novikov, often lauded as a progenitor of 
the intelligentsia, took over publishing the Moscow Vedomosti for a 
time during the 1780s.86 It is only because newspapers had taken on 
this role that they were able to play a major role in Alexander I’s first 
small steps toward ameliorating the condition of serfdom. Alexander 
did not ban outright the sale of serfs without land—a practice seen 
as particularly demeaning to the personhood of the serf—but instead 
forbade advertising the sale of serfs without land in newspapers.87 This 
law only had meaning in a context in which publicity via newspapers 
made things known and real.
Over the first half of the nineteenth century, newspapers diversified 
significantly in their content. In part this diversification reflected sheer 
growth in numbers. Many new newspapers came to be. Those based in 
particular ministries or administrations had particular focusses, whether 
84  Sanktpeterburgskie vedomosti, 2 January 1795.
85  Sanktpeterburgskie vedomosti, 5 January 1795.
86 Berkov, Istoriia russkoi zhurlalistiki, pp. 112–13.
87  PSZ 1, no. 19892. Of course, he had to repeat the law several times, including in PSZ 
1, nos. 25775 and 29525.
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military or agricultural,88 while those founded in the provinces existed 
to develop a richer sense of provincial life. All of this, though, had the 
potential to expand the goals of the state to unrecognisable ends.89 
Publishing news about the provinces, even when “political” news 
was explicitly excluded, could not but bring to light a vision of society 
that might not entirely match up with state goals. The experience of a 
decade of their development apparently led to concern that things were 
not properly controlled. As a result, at the beginning of 1851, during 
the most repressive years of Nicholas’s reign, a new decree stated 
that the Unofficial sections of provincial newspapers henceforth had 
to undergo a new level of censorship. Either a censorship committee 
within the provincial government, or a single professor or high-ranking 
bureaucrat, was to read and approve all materials published.90
It is in this context, too, that the provincial newspapers, particularly 
their Unofficial sections in which local editors published articles of 
local interest, seem to represent a dramatic shift in the development 
of something approaching a “free press” (despite being founded by 
decree). The Soviet historian B. I. Esin described the gubernskie vedomosti 
as “shabby”, and claimed that even figures like Alexander Herzen were 
“powerless to change them, to enliven them”.91 More recent historians 
have been kinder to them, however. Now gubernskie vedomosti are more 
often interpreted as a major part of the provincial print culture of early 
nineteenth century Russia.92
This problem with newspapers in reality, as opposed to newspapers 
in principle, places the specific case of Russia before 1850 within larger 
discourses current in the study of information technologies. Studies 
of modern information technologies have come to focus on both state 
88  Istoriia russkoi zhurnalistiki, pp. 201–04. On the Farming Gazette, founded to improve 
agriculture, see Alison K. Smith, Recipes for Russia: Food and Nationhood under the 
Tsars (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008), pp. 128–31.
89  This is also part of the argument of L. P. Burmistrova, Provintsial′naia gazeta v epokhu 
russkikh prosvetitelei (Gubernskie vedomosti Povolzh′ia i Urala 1840–1850 gg.) (Kazan′: 
Izdatel′stvo Kazanskogo universiteta, 1985). 
90  PSZ 2, no. 24979; it was soon followed by another decree stating that the unofficial 
section of the Moscow Police news also needed special censorship: no. 25370.
91  Esin, Russkaia dorevoliutsionnaia gazeta, p. 22.
92  For a discussion of the Vedomosti in the contexts of print culture, regionalism, 
and emerging civil society, see Smith-Peter, ‘The Russian Provincial Newspaper’, 
Katherine Pickering Antonova, An Ordinary Marriage: The World of a Gentry Family 
in Provincial Russia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).
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regulation and its efforts to create efficient “information societies” 
on the one hand, and a much more unruly use of technologies that 
emphasise publicity and create spaces for civil societies on the other. 
Periods of growth in those technologies create increased spaces for 
freer interactions, and are as a result at times followed by periods of 
increased regulation focussed on eliminating that space for civil society 
in the name of efficiency.93 Early newspapers in Russia, then, become 
emblematic of an information technology conceived as a method of 
governance and efficiency, transformed by practice into something with 
the possibility of unsettling, if not actively undermining, the goals of the 
imperial state.
93  Byoung Won Min, ‘Biting Back Against Civil Society: Information Technologies and 
Media Regulations in South Korea’, Journal of International and Area Studies, 20. 1 
(2013), 111–24.

7. What Was News and How Was It 
Communicated in Pre-Modern Russia?
Daniel C. Waugh1
Increasingly those who study the mechanisms for the spread of news 
in Europe are moving away from an emphasis on what, it has been 
argued, was a principal “modernising” medium  in the pre-modern era, 
the printed newspaper with its ostensibly secular emphasis and focus 
primarily on political and economic news.2 There is a huge, largely 
uncharted territory of manuscript news. Some of the most widespread 
conveyers of news were the brochures and pamphlet separates, whose 
focus often was the paranormal and the sensational, and underlying even 
the sober printed newspaper reports was a great deal that had first been 
transmitted orally and might well be categorised  as unverified rumour. 
Public display—festivals, religious and political ceremonies, theatrical 
events—are among the means by which even the illiterate could be 
informed. A critical component in the shaping and transmission of 
1  This chapter was written with support provided by The Swedish Foundation for 
Humanities and Social Sciences (Riksbankens jubileumsfond, project no. RFP12–
0055:1) and the National Endowment for the Humanities (grant RZ-1635–13), 
the latter for work in the National Archives (London). Any views, findings, or 
conclusions expressed in this chapter do not necessarily represent those of the 
National Endowment for the Humanities.
2  For a recent and balanced treatment of the development of news media in Europe, 
see Andrew Pettegree, The Invention of News: How the World Came to Know About 
Itself (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2014).
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news was oral communication, and it seems very likely that, even over 
centuries in the pre-modern era, the way that operated changed little.
My goal here is thus to look beyond the kuranty, the Muscovite 
compilations of translated news from foreign sources (much of it from 
printed newspapers) about which Ingrid Maier and I write in Chapter 3. 
With rare exceptions, the information the kuranty contained was not 
deliberately circulated to the public, and, one might suggest, that public 
(however we might define it) probably would have shown little interest 
in what were largely accounts of foreign places and events whose 
relevance for domestic concerns would have been difficult to ascertain. 
What other kinds of news were there in Muscovy, and how was it 
transmitted? If the kuranty were for the privileged few of the court elite, 
was that same elite interested in other kinds of news, and what was 
news for broader segments of the population? My a priori assumption 
here is that “news” is information presumably of potential or actual 
current interest for its recipients either because it was new to them and/
or because it related to matters that they might have perceived affected 
their daily lives or professional activity. That is, news is something that 
may relate to ordinary experience, but has some element of novelty, 
and possibly would have some consequence requiring action. As the 
evidence discussed here suggests, specifically with regard to this 
last point, we may wish to classify a lot of news as “transactional” in 
that it pertained to the immediate personal or economic concerns of 
individuals. 
If some news is thus highly personal and relevant mainly for 
its immediate consumer and perhaps his close associates, is it also 
possible to distinguish different categories of news, which might 
have had broader relevance for a community or social group? As an 
astute anonymous reviewer of this essay wondered, is there not some 
danger that my approach might produce “an undifferentiated notion 
of ‘news’ that is so broad and all-inclusive as to risk obscuring, rather 
than illuminating the issue at hand”? That is, should we not need to 
distinguish clearly between various kinds of “information”, including 
but not limited to rumour and intelligence gathering, and determine 
how the relationships between them changed over time? The discussion 
that follows will demonstrate that indeed there are differences in the 
way “news” was acquired, the purposes to which it was put, and the 
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degree to which what was “news” may not fit any formal analytical 
category but rather may be a moving target reflecting the changing 
perceptions of its consumers and creators. We are confronted with a 
picture of complexity in which the boundaries between one type of news 
and another are permeable. This will be evident especially in the final 
section here, when we shall see how oral testimony, some of it easily 
characterised as rumour, passes through institutionalised mechanisms 
of intelligence gathering and verification, and enters the written record. 
When this material ceases to have current relevance, it arguably might 
cease to be “news”. But short of that, the information may continue to 
operate as news, communicated in part orally, in part in writing, in part 
in public performance and symbol. If ideally news should be factual, in 
our own times we have ample evidence that this may not necessarily be 
the case. News may still contain rumour, may be based on contrafactual 
invention, be communicated (and in the process distorted) for purposes 
of propaganda, and so on.
I can, then, only offer a very preliminary inquiry to determine where 
we might locate information about “news” in its many manifestations 
in Muscovy. Much more study will be needed to clarify distinctions and 
trace transformations. I have deliberately not attempted to provide a 
review of the methodological literature on studying news, a task for 
which I have limited enthusiasm even though I recognise it will be 
necessary if the questions raised here are to be pursued in greater depth. 
Perhaps most importantly, there is an increasingly significant body of 
analysis on rumour which I have not yet explored in order to deal as 
fully as I would have wished with that aspect of my topic. 
The road to uncovering evidence about oral transmission of news 
lies through the written record, several genres of which are treated 
here: certain kinds of missives (poslaniia, gramotki), reports and orders 
(otpiski, ukazy) communicated by or to government officials, chronicles 
(letopisi), and accounts about miracle-working icons. For communication 
networks, customs records (tamozhennye knigi) are invaluable, since they 
closely track frequent merchant travel, even if they are silent on what 
news those travellers may have carried. Some of the written record is 
disappointingly opaque on the subject of news. To some degree, then, 
we may have to relax normal rules for source-based historical argument 
and indulge in a certain amount of imaginative reconstruction of the 
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scenarios in which news spread. While the focus here will be on the 
seventeenth century, some of my examples are earlier. And my use of 
the term “Russia” (instead of Muscovy) in part reflects the inclusion 
of evidence from Novgorod when it still was independent, and from 
border regions that may have been in the process of being incorporated 
into Muscovy but were hardly Russian in any ethnic or linguistic sense.
Private Letters
There is still a great deal to learn about literacy in Russia, even though 
we have some idea of the varied levels for different social groups.3 Even 
those with no formal literacy could ask someone to write for them or 
read to them a written message. Keeping this in mind, the substantial 
amount of private communication in seventeenth-century Russia is a 
logical place to start if we wish to learn what might have been news. 
Most letters follow a standard format with a salutation and an exchange 
of sentiments about the health of both the writer and the addressee. 
Sometimes the writer merely asks that he or she be kept informed of 
the addressee’s well-being. Letters often include concern for relatives, 
information about deaths and funerals or about marriages. A certain 
Ganka Iakovlevich Tukhachevskii wrote to his (rich?) brother about 
his ill son’s disappointment at not being able to see his uncle when 
the latter’s servant informed the family after a church service that 
the uncle would be visiting in a neighbouring village.4 It seems that 
such short personal messages were mainly a way to maintain family 
communication. Even highly placed members of the Russian elite (e.g. 
Prince Vasilii Vasilevich Golitsyn) engaged in such correspondence.5 
In an expansive moment, presumably to impress his father, Golitsyn’s 
son Aleksei wrote on 1 September 1677, “You should know, my lord 
3  See, for example, Gary Marker, ‘Literacy and Literacy Texts in Muscovy: A 
Reconsideration’, Slavic Review, 49. 1 (1990), 74–89.
4  Gramotki XVII-nachala XVIII veka, ed. by N. I. Tarabasova, N. P. Pankratova and S. I. 
Kotkov (Moscow: Nauka, 1969), no. 140, p. 79.
5  For a summary on Golitsyn’s correspondence, see Lindsey A. J. Hughes, Russia and 
the West, the Life of a Seventeenth-Century Westernizer, Prince Vasily Vasil′evich Golitsyn 
(1643–1714) (Newtonville, MA: Oriental Research Partners, 1984), pp. 12–13; for a 
selection of his personal letters, see Moskovskaia delovaia i bytovaia pis′mennost′ XVII 
veka, ed. by S. I. Kotkov, A. S. Oreshnikov and I. S. Filippova (Moscow: Nauka, 
1968), Section 1, pp. 16–35.
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father, that I was in attendance on the procession to Kolomenskoe with 
the sovereign and on the name day of Tsarevich Ioann Alekseevich 
met his majesty face to face and attended the feast, whereas there were 
few (other) gentlemen of the bedchamber present”.6 News, then, in the 
first instance might be narrowly personal, conveyed for the most part 
by private messengers, though individuals in government service took 
advantage of opportunities to use official networks. In one unusual 
case of correspondence between Fedka Zinovev and Fedot Tikhanovich 
Vyndomskii in 1697, an annotation indicates that one letter had arrived 
“through the post at the post court”, where it was picked up and then 
delivered.7 The instructions were that the delivery was to be via the 
Novgorod residency (podvor′e) in Moscow.
A great deal of correspondence was what I term “transactional”, in 
that, following the opening sentiments, the letters would shift to some 
specific business between the correspondents.8 This might involve 
asking someone for financial assistance or intercession on behalf of 
the writer or someone connected with him. A missive might introduce 
an agent travelling on behalf of the writer, for whom accommodation 
was being sought. Letters could involve specific economic interests—
peasant villages owned by one of the parties, the shipment of goods, the 
management of resources. A husband sends his wife instructions about 
brewing beer, an archbishop writes from Vologda to order bells for a 
newly constructed church since none are to be had locally.9 At the very 
end of the seventeenth century, there is a remarkable set of long letters 
between Klement Prokofevich Kalmykov, a member of the gostinnaia 
sotnia (one of the privileged corporations of merchants), and his agents 
on the Volga concerning very substantial business operations.10 So here 
too we have a kind of news, specific to the individuals involved. 
6  Moskovskaia delovaia i bytovaia pis′mennost′, Section 1, no. 9d, p. 26.
7  Gramotki, no. 172, p. 99. The following letter, no. 173, was also delivered by the post.
8  Note, here I am not including petitions (chelobitnye) and a number of other formal 
genres of documents submitted to or generated by the bureaucracy, even though 
the issues they raise undoubtedly could have been “newsworthy” to the circles of 
those who generated or read them. For military governors’ reports (otpiski) and the 
instructions sent to them though, see the final section below.
9  Moskovskaia delovaia i bytovaia pis′mennost′, Section 1, no. 17v, p. 39; Gramotki, no. 462, 
p. 285.
10  Gramotki, pp. 176–248.
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It is rare to find in such correspondence other kinds of news such as a 
report on the taking of Azov in July 1641 and the decision to release the 
Turkish captives to go home. Some 500 Arians and a certain foreigner 
Iakushka, described as a traitor, who was with them, were turned 
over to the Don Cossacks; the traitor was then crucified.11 In autumn 
1696, a Petrushka Lvov, writing to Gavriil, the Archbishop of Vologda 
and Beloozero, prefaced the substance of his letter, which dealt with 
attacks on Lvov’s peasants by those under Church jurisdiction, with the 
following news:
In addition, lord, you should know that the pious sovereign Tsar Peter 
Alekseevich arrived in Moscow on 27 October. And the infantry and Don 
Cossacks were left at Azov and the voevoda (commandant) left there was 
Akim Iakovlev syn Rzhevskoi from among the stol′niki. And my friends 
write from Moscow that they expect instructions to all about their service 
and a campaign to be mounted beginning on 1 March or earlier.12
Two letters by Gavrilko Ivanovich Snarskii to his parents include some 
details of the campaign in which he was participating in the border 
region near Pechory not far from Pskov.13 A distinctive feature of these 
letters is that in part they are written in Polish, and the parents’ home 
address is in the Belsk uezd of Dneprovskaia volost′—that is, presumably 
somewhere on the Western frontier where the family may well be 
Belorussian. The father Ivan Aleksandrovich was a high-ranking court 
official (a stol′nik). 
In one instance, the bulk of a message from Mishka Prokofev, writing 
from Moscow to his employer, the stol′nik Andrei Ilich Bezobrazov, 
describes a major fire:
I inform you, my patron, that on 13 October in the fourth hour of the 
end of the night a fire began in the Belyi gorod [one of the central areas of 
Moscow—DW] behind the sovereign’s large stable in the parish of the 
Church of the Miracle Worker Antipii. It broke out in the courtyard of 
11  The letter, written from Moscow on 1 August by one Nikishko (Nikita) Druzhinin, 
is to an addressee whose name has not been preserved, which makes it difficult to 
explain the possible context for the inclusion of the news about Azov; see ibid., no. 
47, pp. 37–38.
12  Ibid., no. 476, p. 292.
13  Ibid., nos. 224, 225, pp. 120–22, written on 21 September and 15 October but the year 
not specified. There are several additional letters in this series, apparently from the 
father’s personal archive.
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dumnyi dvorianin (conciliar lesser noble) Semen Fedorovich Tolochanov, 
and from that fire the roofs of seventeen churches began to burn, and 
among them in two churches people of various strata burned. Five 
hundred and four homes burned and twenty-six courtyards were 
destroyed, fifteen monastic cells on church grounds, two hundred and 
thirty-eight shops in the marketplace and in the same market area eight 
trading houses, and bathhouses burned. It was impossible, lord, to put 
out the fire by any means due to a great storm, and had the wind not 
subsided, I expect it would have been a lot worse.14
As we shall see, the frequent fires which devastated the largely wooden 
Russian towns were certainly a subject of news that must have been of 
great concern for all social strata. One might assume that this particular 
fire affected the economic interests of Bezobrazov. 
In examining such correspondence, so far I have not come across any 
communication of news about unusual weather (unless the subject is 
merely when the first shipping can move after the ice on the river melts), 
paranormal events, or supposed miracles connected with a local cult. 
Some letters by supplicants mention that the writer’s circle is starving, 
but that is not an indication of some larger famine affecting a region and 
may simply be a rhetorical device to elicit sympathy.
Correspondence, then, in the first instance seems to have been for 
practical purposes focussed on immediate concerns. If this were our only 
source, it would be tempting to suggest that news in any broader sense 
simply was of very little interest to most writers. Indeed, what we know 
about Patrick Gordon’s correspondence suggests that a lot of it stuck 
closely to personal and family matters.15 Yet in his case there is ample 
evidence that he was a voracious consumer (and active disseminator) of 
news, notably in his correspondence with the important state secretary 
and postmaster Andrei Vinius.16 Gordon’s personal letters on private 
and family matters seem by and large simply not to have been the 
14  Pamiatniki russkogo narodno-razgovornogo iazyka XVII stoletii (Iz fonda A. I. Bezobrazova), 
ed. by S. I. Kotkov and N. I. Tarabasova (Moscow: Nauka, 1965), no. 147, p. 84.
15  A Scottish mercenary in Russian service, Gordon compiled a distinguished record 
of military service, undertook diplomatic missions, and advised the young Tsar 
Peter I. For more information about Gordon, see Chapter 3 of the present volume.
16  See my ‘The Best Connected Man in Muscovy? Patrick Gordon’s Evidence 
Regarding Communications in Muscovy in the 17th Century’, Journal of Irish and 
Scottish Studies, 7. 2 (2014 [2015]), 61–124. On his interaction with Vinius, see esp. 
pp. 106–09.
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occasion for conveying other kinds of information, which perhaps 
should not surprise us. 
Amongst the Russian elite in pre-modern Russia, personal family 
letters might be only part of the correspondence carried on by an 
individual who had official or business obligations. Of course it can be 
difficult to draw a line between the private and family- or clan-oriented 
concerns on the one hand, and that which related to public or official 
function on the other. A lot might depend on a particular individual’s 
education and outlook. Vasilii Golitsyn’s correspondence is a case 
in point. Posted to the South in the campaigns of the mid-1670s, he 
corresponded about family matters but also received and acted on a 
request from A. I. Bezobrazov that he use his position to help retrieve 
the latter’s peasants who had fled to territories under the jurisdiction of 
Cossack Hetman Ivan Samoilovich.17 
Golitsyn, well known as a prominent “Westerniser” in late 
seventeenth-century Muscovy and ambitious for his own career, was 
certainly interested in all kinds of news. Not only his family but also 
his stewards or other employees in Moscow clearly had instructions 
to keep him informed of the latest business at court when he was off 
on campaign. There are several long letters from Matiushka Boev to 
Golitsyn, which passed on details about events in Moscow and about 
what the Russian commander in the Chyhyryn campaign of 1677, 
Grigorii Grigorevich Romodanovskii, had reported to the tsar.18 Since 
his role in that campaign had been eclipsed by Romodanovskii’s, 
Golitsyn felt that he had been slighted when the rewards were handed 
out. Reports transmitted in this fashion were not official, such as the 
formal dispatches that military commanders and governors were 
expected to submit with some regularity to a central office in Moscow, 
even if some of the content might be similar. Later, in the 1680s, when 
on a mission in Western Europe, Patrick Gordon was formally instructed 
to send regular reports to Golitsyn. Was Golitsyn a special case? Based 
on the isolated examples quoted above, we might at least hypothesise 
that many others would have been receiving in their correspondence 
news that was not merely “transactional”. We might hypothesise that 
important merchants in Northern Russia, like the Fuggers (the German 
17  Pamiatniki, no. 22, pp. 19–20; no. 88, p. 54.
18  Gramotki, pp. 128–133. 
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merchant and banking family) in the West, had an active interest in 
international news which might affect their business. Since some of the 
news translated for the kuranty arrived in Moscow via the White Sea 
and the commercial highway that ran South through Velikii Ustiug, 
Vologda and Iaroslavl, it is easy to imagine how the foreigners who 
brought it might have communicated it to the Russian merchants with 
whom they interacted. 
Evidence from Chronicles
To broaden our perspective on what might have been news, let us now 
examine evidence from what may at first seem an unlikely source, the 
chronicles. Chronicles, after all, were often compiled well after the events 
they record, and there is a somewhat mistaken impression that their 
regular compilation died out before the end of the seventeenth century.19 
If our interest is the concerns of ordinary people, not just a small literate 
elite, the chronicles may seem to be a rather imperfect window through 
which to find evidence of news. Their focus often is on princely politics, 
births and deaths in the ruling families, high-level ecclesiastical affairs 
(but also the building of churches), invasions or military campaigns. 
It is not as though such information would have been deemed totally 
irrelevant to the daily well being of ordinary people, but one has to 
imagine that the news of very specific local consequence may have 
been deemed more important. The chronicles of Novgorod and some 
other places in the Russian North are known for the abundance of such 
local reporting. Of course, one challenge in assessing chronicle entries 
is to determine when and how the information they contain became 
known in the place where the chronicle was compiled or how current 
it was when recorded. Even though my main focus in this chapter is 
the seventeenth century, by stepping back to a specific example from a 
much earlier source, we can see the potential for locating information 
about what was news and how it was transmitted. Later and better 
19  Taking note of this, Malte Griesse dismisses the chronicles as a useful source for 
the kind of analysis about revolts highlighted in several essays in the stimulating 
volume From Mutual Observation to Propaganda War. Premodern Revolts in Their 
Transnational Representations, ed. by Malte Griesse (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 
2014), p. 14.
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documented examples may help us to interpret the earlier evidence and 
may also suggest that in important ways the subject of the news and 
mechanisms for its transmission changed little between the periods we 
artificially label as “medieval” or “modern”. 
My example is from the so-called Novgorod First Chronicle, where 
the entry for the year 6898 (1389–90) opens with political and local 
church news and then reads:
The same autumn there was a great plague in Novgorod; all this came 
upon us because of our sins; a great many Christians died in all the streets. 
And this was the symptom in people: as death approached, a swelling 
would appear, and death came within three days. Then they erected a 
church to St. Afanasii in a single day, and Bishop Ioann, Archbishop of 
Novgorod, consecrated it, with all the abbots and priests and with the 
synod of the Cathedral of St Sophia; so by God’s mercy, the intercession 
of St Sophia, and the blessing of the bishop, the plague ceased.
The same winter the Church of St Dmitrii in Danislav Street burned 
down, and all the icons, and books and all the church stores, and a great 
many goods burned, for the fire took hold rapidly.
In the year 6899 [1390–91]. There was a fire, which burned from 
Borkova Street up to Gzen [Brook], and on the other side from Mikitin 
Street to Rodokovichi: eight wooden churches burned down and three 
stone churches were partially burnt, and fourteen men, women and 
children perished, on 5 June, the day of the holy Martyr Dorofei. On the 
21st of the same month, the day of the holy Martyr Ulian, a fire broke out 
in Prussian Street at the Church of the Presentation of the Holy Mother of 
God, and the whole of the Liudin Quarter burned up to St Alexei. Seven 
wooden churches burned down, and four stone churches were partially 
burnt.20 
Surely much of this is eye-witness reportage, either directly by the writer 
or recorded from someone else’s testimony, even if transmitted through 
a later manuscript. There is little here to distinguish the descriptions 
of the fires from that in Mishka Prokofev’s letter quoted earlier, a 
report that clearly must have been written down very soon after the 
fire in Moscow. Nor do the Novgorod reports on the plague and fires 
20  Novgorodskaia pervaia letopis′ starshego i mladshego izvodov, ed. by A. N. Nasonov 
(Moscow-Leningrad: Izdatel′stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1950), pp. 383–84. The 
translation is largely mine, though some parts follow The Chronicle of Novgorod 
1016–1471, tr. by Robert Michell and Nevill Forbes. Camden Third Series, vol. XXV 
(London: Camden Society, 1914), pp. 163–64.
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differ significantly from what one might find in European manuscript 
newsletters or in a printed seventeenth-century German newspaper 
whose priority was to publish news as quickly as possible about a 
recent occurrence. Sir Peter Wyche, the English resident in Hamburg, 
was the regular informant for Sir Lionell Jenkins, the Foreign Secretary 
in London. In June 1680, Wyche included information about plague in 
Eastern Europe in more than one dispatch, and in his letter of 15 June, 
news of a fire that had gutted the centre of Stralsund. While he himself 
apparently did not subscribe to such beliefs, he passed on information 
about “superstitious feares” that such events engendered.21 Fires in 
Russia did make the news in the West, especially if they occurred in 
locations where foreign interests were affected. One such report, about 
a fire in Arkhangelsk in 1695, was translated or at least summarised in 
the kuranty in Moscow, the news having originated in Muscovy, been 
printed in a yet unspecified Western newspaper, and then come back 
to Russia.22
It does not take much imagination to place oneself in Novgorod 
in those two years the chronicle covers and reconstruct how the news 
might have spread quickly throughout the city about the threats to life 
and property, or how the construction and consecration of churches 
would have involved a lot of people who would walk away from 
the consecration ceremony and perhaps later say something about it 
to those not present whom they might meet at the market. These are 
specific reports on the fires and plague, life-threatening events which 
surely would have been of great concern to Novgorodians. 
Ideally we would be able to find documentation clearly labeled as 
eyewitness testimony for analogous events of such crucial local interest. 
In fact, there is at least one unusually revealing source about what 
happened when a fire broke out on 17 May 1646 in an area of Moscow 
called Kulishki in the house of Uliana, the widow of an under-secretary 
Ivan Eremeev Fustov.23 The district administrative office (Zemskii dvor) 
investigated to determine whether or not Uliana was responsible by 
21  NA (National Archives, London), State Papers 82/16, fols. (printed numbering) 
128v, 130v, 135v.
22  S. M. Shamin, Kuranty XVII stoletiia. Evropeiskaia pressa v Rossii i vozniknovenie russkoi 
periodicheskoi pechati (Moscow-St Petersburg: Al′ians-Arkheo, 2011), p. 192, no. 130.
23  Moskovskaia delovaia i bytovaia pis′mennost′, Section 3, no. 1, pp. 125–27.
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having left unattended a lighted stove in the living quarters of the home. 
The sworn testimony of several individuals was taken (“[name] said, 
having sworn an oath by kissing the cross”), most of them government 
clerks in various departments, as Kulishki seems to have been their 
home. As professional scribes, most submitted their testimony in their 
own hand. Interestingly, the surviving record includes no testimony 
from Uliana herself. The assembled depositions (perechnevaia vypiska) 
were then submitted under the signature of a state secretary and sent to 
the Zemskii dvor on 26 May, only nine days after the fire.
Under-secretary Ramashko Protopopov of the Great Revenue 
Chancery (Bol′shoi prikhod) recorded that he was at home asleep, and 
“when the fire began on Kulishki and I heard the bell of St Nicholas the 
Miracle Worker, I raced over to it”. He could not say whether Uliana had 
lit the fire but knew that she was out visiting. A zhilets (the designation 
for a lower service rank) Ivan Samoilov syn Savin, who also wrote down 
his own testimony, indicated simply that he saw the fire but had no idea 
whether she had started it. An under-secretary of the Zemskii chancery, 
Mikiforko Vyrshin, confirmed that Uliana had been visiting at the home 
of the secretary Timofei Golosov. Vyrshin was at his office at the time, 
whence he rushed home to find his barn afire. “And at that moment 
Semen Stepanov, the son of the sexton of St Nicholas Podkopaev, 
told me, Mikiforka, that the fire had broken out atop the upper story 
under the roof of the home of Uliana, the widow of under-secretary 
Ivan Eremeev, and when he, Semen, had run up to her home, at that 
moment the roof took fire, and he Semen poured water on the fire and 
broke the lock of the upper chamber”. The Siberian Chancery under-
secretaries Eufimka and Vikulka Panov reported: “I, Eufimka, was at 
that moment attending evening vespers in the Church of the Miracle 
Worker St Nicholas Podkopaev, and just then a man on a horse raced 
up and yelled out that there was a fire in Kulishki, and in an instant I 
leapt out of the church and ran up to her house where already the entire 
upper story was aflame. I, Vikula, had gone into town and had almost 
reached the Frolov Gate when the alarm was rung. Seeing that there was 
a fire in Kulishki, I raced over [to it]”. 
Under-secretary Petrushka Koludarov of the Novgorodskaia chet′ (an 
office with fiscal responsibilities) was at work. On his way home, he 
stopped at the home of the secretary Timofei Golosov, since his mother 
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was visiting there, and they had left in their own home their neighbour 
Arinka. He did not recall exactly when they got home but went to bed 
only to be awakened when the neighbour Arinka “cried out that next to 
our house, the home of Uliana, widow of Ivan Eremeev, was burning, 
and I, Petrushka, jumped up…and I, Petrushka, splashed water [on the 
fire], and I do not know what caused the fire, but on that day the widow 
Uliana was home in the morning and then went to visit at Timofei 
Golosov’s in the afternoon”. However, he could not say whether she 
had lit the stove before going. Two other clerks testified simply that 
they knew nothing about the cause of the fire. Under-secretary Smirnoi 
Bogdanov of the Foreigners’ Chancery (Inozemskii prikaz) explained his 
ignorance by the fact that he was not at home but at work where “I heard 
from people” about the fire. Finally, the icon painter Senka Stepanov 
reported that he had been at the home of Prince Semen Pozharskii, and 
as he was leaving “he heard a racket and saw smoke and ran up just as 
his widow’s [place] went up…and the chamber was locked, and having 
raced up, they broke the lock and poured water on the fire. But at that 
moment the widow Uliana was not home and was over at the secretary 
Timofei Golosov’s”. 
All in all, this is a remarkable record of how news spread, unique 
perhaps in that it is largely the reports of witnesses who wrote down 
their accounts within days of the actual event (most of the reports seem to 
have been written on 20 May). Although populated with literate officials, 
Kulishki otherwise probably was typical of almost any neighbourhood 
in Moscow or any small town in Russia, where everyone seems to have 
known everyone else, and many people interacted socially. In such a 
neighbourhood, oral transmission of news, rumour and gossip might 
have been quite normal even if not in moments of crisis. The first 
knowledge of the fire for some was from their direct observation, but 
in other cases because they heard the alarm or someone told them. The 
written documentation came soon after, preserving a directness and 
immediacy that the report in the Novgorod chronicle fails to convey, 
even if it may have likewise been recorded from eyewitness testimony 
when the event was still news. True, the requirements for bureaucratic 
paperwork in mid-seventeenth-century Moscow likely had advanced 
considerably over those in fourteenth-century Novgorod, but what 
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was newsworthy, and the role of oral transmission at the moment it 
happened, surely must be similar in both cases. 
What I have seen of the still largely unpublished later seventeenth- 
and eighteenth-century Novgorodian chronicles indicates that 
analogous reportage of local events was an ongoing preoccupation of 
the compilers, as many of the manuscripts evidence a continual process 
of record-keeping by different scribes, marginal additions, and the 
like.24 Possibly our analogies here would be with some of the larger 
printed compendia of news published in the West, starting with the 
volumes sold at fairs in the late sixteenth century,25 and then in the era 
of the periodical press, evident in the consecutively paginated numbers 
of newspapers which might be bound into annual volumes. Some 
publishers would also bring together at the end of a year a large volume 
containing such reports, which are generally included in any analysis of 
news in early modern Europe. 
If Novgorod even in its decline after its incorporation into Muscovy 
continued to be well connected to news networks and retained a 
remarkably vibrant tradition of chronicle-writing well into the era when, 
so we are told, the genre was dying, what about a more remote location? 
My main example here will be Khlynov (re-named Viatka in the late 
eighteenth century; now Kirov), North of Kazan as one heads up river 
into the Urals, the town which in later perceptions was the quintessential 
provincial backwater of Russia. As near as we can tell, regular recording 
in writing of news and historical information in Khlynov began only 
around the middle of the seventeenth century. 
As in Novgorod, churchmen in Khlynov were the primary recorders 
of the news in the local chronicles.26 Key roles in the development of 
chronicle writing in Khlynov were played by the town’s first bishop, 
24  See S. N. Azbelev, Novgorodskie letopisi XVII veka (Novgorod, 1960), some of whose 
observations I have confirmed in a (granted, cursory) examination of one or two of 
the manuscripts in the collection of the Russian National Library in St Petersburg.
25  See Esther-Beate Körber, Messrelationen. Geschichte der deutsch- und lateinischsprachigen 
“messentlichen” Periodika von 1588 bis 1805 (Presse und Geschichte—Neue Beiträge, 
Bd. 92) (Bremen: Edition lumière, 2016).
26  For details of the rather complicated history of the compilation and interrelationship 
of those texts, readers are referred to my book, Daniel C. Waugh [D. K. Uo], Istoriia 
odnoi knigi. Viatka i ‘ne-sovremennost′’ v russkoi kul′ture Petrovskogo vremeni (St 
Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2003). 
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Aleksandr, appointed in 1657, and by a sacristan Semen Popov, whose 
father had also served as a sacristan in the main cathedral. Popov was 
obviously well connected in the community, with access to libraries and 
to the local chancery; he served for a time as one of the newly created 
Petrine burmistry, the officials in charge of local tax collection. Events of 
“all Russian” significance were the context for and background to his 
inclusion of events of local interest, one of them involving the history 
of the venerated miracle-working icon of St Nicholas Velikoretskii 
(about which more below). That Popov may have viewed the chronicle 
information, or at least some part of it, as “news” would seem to be 
confirmed by the fact that over a period of more than a decade at the 
beginning of the eighteenth century, he assiduously collected and 
preserved in chronological sequence copies made from the published 
Petrine newspapers (Vedomosti) and other reports about the ongoing 
events of the Northern War. The boundaries between keeping a historical 
record and keeping a record of current events surely were permeable. 
For the late seventeenth century, there was a particular focus in the 
Khlynov chronicles on the Romanov succession and births, deaths, and 
marriages in the royal family. There is good reason to think that at least 
some of the information in such entries derived either from the writer 
having witnessed the celebration of the events in the local cathedral 
and/or from having accessed the decrees sent from Moscow with the 
news and the indication that it was to be celebrated locally. Such official 
commemorations surely would have served to disseminate the news 
to a broader public. Apart from news of the royal family, another item 
of “national” significance was an entry encapsulating the history of 
Stepan Razin, from his rise to his execution by quartering in Moscow. 
One might imagine that the ultimate source for this compact (single 
paragraph) treatment was some official communication circulated from 
Moscow. 
Local reportage understandably included the installation of a new 
bishop. When Iona was appointed bishop in August 1674, a musketeer 
arrived ahead of him in town with a missive from the new appointee 
conveying the news, and then a service was celebrated on its receipt. 
Apart from such items, as in the Novgorod case, the local chronicles 
included information about natural or manmade disasters:
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In the year [6]175 [1667] on the twelfth day of the month of July there was 
in the town of Khlynov frightful thunder and lightning, and on account 
of the lightning the monastery stable and all the horse tack burned.
In the year [6]179 [1671] on the sixteenth day of June the Dormition 
Cathedral of the monastery took fire from lightning and on account of 
that, the entire monastery burned on 16 June at the thirteenth hour in 
daytime, and the bells melted.27 
It is likely that the source for these two entries was a record kept in the 
monastery, though of course the events would have been witnessed by 
many and undoubtedly not readily forgotten. 
Destruction caused by storms was also news elsewhere in Europe. 
One of Peter Wyche’s reports to London in 1680 from Hamburg told of 
the damage caused by an unusually severe hailstorm in a nearby town:
The memory of Men cannot second it, it hath scarce left a Tile on the 
roofe of any house, or a paine of Glasse in any Window in the Towne, 
which looks as desolate, as if it had past through the hands of an unrulely 
Army. The Corne thereabouts is soe platted, that it lyes as if t’ had beene 
mowed. The Poultrey, some Sheepe and Young Cattell were struck dead, 
and one relation saith, there were Haile Stones of a Pound and a halfe.28 
Even though chronicle entries about newsworthy events such as bad 
weather or disastrous fires are quite common, we should not necessarily 
expect that a chronicle account would retain the immediacy of an 
eyewitness report. For example, in the Ustiug chronicles of the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, entries about fires, which 
sometimes include a long list of villages and even precise numbers 
of houses burned, may but transmit a dry bureaucratic assessment 
by some junior clerk who walked through the ruins.29 It is difficult 
to tell how accurate such reporting was, especially if, in some cases, 
such accounts of disasters keep company with entries about unnatural 
occurrences and sentiments about divine dispensation. In context 
then, what we might have is less the keeping of the news and more 
the combination of entries that reflect a particular providential stance 
27  Ibid., p. 329.
28  NA, SP 82/16, fol. 148v, Wyche to Jenkins 23 July 1680.
29  Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei, vol. 37, Ustiuzhskie i vologodskie letopisi XVI–XVIII vv. 
(Leningrad: Nauka, 1982), pp, 124–25.
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of the writer/compiler. Typically, the other local entries would concern 
the appointments of prelates or building of churches, but in the case of 
the appointments as reported in the Ustiug chronicles, it seems we are 
not dealing with an immediate record but rather a retrospective entry 
which would also summarise how long the bishop served, where he 
went if he left and when he died.
The chronicle notes, which Semen Popov was keeping in the 
beginning of the eighteenth century, included an entry for 1637 about 
a particularly warm spring when the planting was done early; later in 
that year, the river froze only four days after Christmas. He brought 
together the information about the appointment of the first three 
bishops of Viatka, Aleksandr, Iona and Dionisii. While he recorded 
few entries on local events other than those pertaining to the Church, 
an event in the neighbouring town of Slobodskoi clearly must have 
been in the news: “In [6]204 [1695] on 21 December in Slobodskoi 
while on the way to the monastery, seven people were bitten by a wolf, 
and two of them died”. Now that surely was news to make the local 
population sit up and take notice!
Paranormal Events
Despite the common perception that, on the cusp of the modern era, 
rational and scientific thought was taking hold in Europe, the line 
between a natural phenomenon and the paranormal or possibly 
divinely inspired occurrence was blurred in popular belief in the 
seventeenth century. Unusual natural events—whether simply bad 
weather, an outbreak of infectious disease, or astronomical phenomena 
such as an eclipse, a meteor shower or the appearance of a comet—were 
newsworthy in part precisely because they inspired awe and speculation 
about divine intervention in human affairs. In the Russian tradition, as 
is well known, heavenly signs had long been recorded in the chronicles, 
often, it seems, retrospectively inserted (and sometimes thus misdated) 
as portents of some coming disaster which might be attributed to human 
sin and divine retribution. 
Stepan Shamin has effectively summarised  Russian responses 
to direct sightings of, or news about, comets in the last third of the 
seventeenth century, all of which in one way or another interpreted them 
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as portents of some impending catastrophe.30 The comet that appeared 
in 1680 was news everywhere in Europe. Sir Peter Wyche in Hamburg 
wrote about it in some detail in his reports to London. As a corresponding 
member of the Royal Society he recorded serious observations, and 
even though he clearly did not believe popular superstition as to what 
it meant, he reported on the widespread speculation that the comet 
inspired.31 Reports about it apparently continued to appear in the West 
well after it had come and gone. The news of this particularly brilliant 
comet made it into Semen Popov’s Khlynov chronicle and the translated 
kuranty, and was invoked in verses by Evfimii Chudovskii as foretelling 
the death of Tsar Fedor Alekseevich. 
Popular belief in miracles continued to be widespread throughout 
Europe, with miraculous cures occupying a prominent place. Within 
Russia, news of miraculous healing most commonly was associated 
with some holy relic. Particularly venerated was the object understood 
to be the robe of Christ, sent as a gift to Moscow from the Shah of 
Persia in 1625, and then “tested” for its efficacy. When it produced 
the anticipated miracles, it was installed with great ceremony in the 
Cathedral of the Dormition in the Moscow Kremlin and a service for 
its annual commemoration printed.32 Its acquisition and installation 
surely were newsworthy events, in the same way that the bringing to 
Moscow a few years ago of the relic believed to be the right hand of John 
the Baptist was newsworthy and inspired Muscovites to queue for its 
veneration.33 Among the holy objects most commonly associated with 
miraculous cures were particular icons and the relics of saints.
An example is the miracle-working icon of St Nicholas Velikoretskii 
(so named for having been found in a village near Khlynov on the 
30  Shamin, Kuranty, pp. 216–25.
31  NA, SP 82/16, Wyche to Jenkins, 23 November; 10, 28, 31 December; 7, 4, 21 January.
32  See Daniel C. Waugh, ‘The Writings about the Translation of the Savior’s Robe to 
Moscow in 1625: Materials for Further Study’, Appendix I B in Edward L. Keenan, 
The Kurbskii-Groznyi Apocrypha: The Seventeenth-Century Genesis of the ‘Correspondence’ 
Attributed to Prince A. M. Kurbskii and Tsar Ivan IV (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1971), pp. 142–47, 226–29; S. N. Gukhman, ‘“Dokumental′noe” 
skazanie o dare shakha Abbasa Rossii’, Trudy Otdela drevnerusskoi literatury, 28 
(1974), 254–70. 
33  Nick Paton Walsh, ‘Hand of John the Baptist in Russia’, The Guardian, 9 June 2006, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/jun/10/russia.religion. As I saw from a 
tour bus that drove by the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow, the line of 
those wishing to worship at the relic extended around the block.
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Velikaia river, whose history provides some insights into the ways 
news spread in Russia.34 Its discovery, veneration and the miracles 
attributed to it were items of news that undoubtedly would have had 
great significance both for the Church hierarchy and ordinary believers. 
A peasant reported its miraculous appearance to the church authorities, 
who removed it to the provincial capital. On two occasions the icon 
was taken off to Moscow, where it received national recognition before 
returning to become the local palladium in Khlynov. Those who prayed 
before it reported miraculous cures; it was the focal point of an annual 
procession around the lands of Viatka. Some 220 healings were attributed 
to the icon prior to the beginning of the eighteenth century.35 There 
are analogies here with the accounts about the miraculous healings 
reported at the North German Protestant spa of Hornhausen, published 
accounts of which were translated for the Muscovite kuranty.36 Of course 
there is an important difference too, in that the fame of Hornhausen, 
while undoubtedly spread by word of mouth, was also disseminated 
in published brochures and leaflets. As a result, many of the European 
elite patronised its healing waters. In the case of the icon of St Nicholas, 
there are relatively few manuscripts about its history, and the record of 
these healings, appended to the tale of its founding and installation, is 
even more rare. 
Clearly the local authorities, ecclesiastical and secular, played a role 
in spreading the fame of the icon, presumably both because of religious 
conviction and because of the economic benefits the icon could bring to 
34  For details of its history, see Daniel C. Waugh, ‘K voprosu o datirovke Velikoretskogo 
krestnogo khoda’, Gertsenka: Viatskie zapiski, 6 (2004), 129–36; Waugh, ‘Religion 
and Regional Identities: The Case of Viatka and the Miracle-Working Icon of 
St. Nicholas Velikoretskii’, in Die Geschichte Russlands im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert 
aus der Perspektive seiner Regionen, ed. by Andreas Kappeler, Forschungen zur 
osteuropäischen Geschichte, 63 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2004), pp. 259–78; 
Waugh, ‘Mestnoe samosoznanie, religiia i “izobretenie” regional′nogo proshlogo’, 
Trudy Otdela drevnerusskoi literatury, 57 (2006), 350–58.
35  In the absence of a full critical edition of the text that includes all the miracles, my 
observations are based on the rendering (some is quotation, some is rephrasing) in 
Stefan Kashmenskii, ‘O chudotvornoi Velikoretskoi ikone Sviatitelia i Chudotvortsa 
Nikolaia’, Viatskie eparkhial′nye vedomosti, Otdel dukhovno-literaturnyi, 1875, no. 9, 
286–94, no. 10, 311–27, no. 11, 359–71, no. 12, 379–93, no. 16, 495–510, no. 17, 523–38; 
1876, no. 9, 256–62; and on A. S. Vereshchagin’s sometimes indecipherable notes 
from the manuscript in GAKO (Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Kirovskoi oblasti), coll. 
170, descr. 1, no. 270.
36  See Waugh and Maier’s chapter in this volume, esp. the references in note 30.
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those who promoted it. The earliest itinerary of the annual procession of 
the icon in the Viatka lands was a relatively short one, but then over time, 
the routes were expanded, with every iteration then generating news 
and expectations along its path. Reports about miraculous cures surely 
have to have spread in the first instance by word of mouth, although 
with the bureaucratisation under the Synod in the eighteenth century, 
church authorities began to issue explicit instructions to prepare for the 
icon’s arrival on its route.
The written record occasionally describes the reception of the icon 
with great public ceremony and the witnessing of the miraculous cure, 
not only by a priest, but also by local secular officials or members of the 
elite and in some cases by a large crowd. The visual and performative 
would have contributed to the spread of news. On 28 September 1614, 
the icon was welcomed in Kazan by the citizens of that town and the 
church hierarchs in a public ceremony, when it was placed (temporarily) 
in the main cathedral. When a miraculous cure occurred there the next 
day “archpriest Iakov began to pray to the assembled […] and offered 
up praise”. Before it left the city, another miracle occurred 
before the assembled clergy and the boyar Prince I. M. Vorotynskii, 
before the commandants and a great multitude of people. And the boyar 
and all the people having witnessed this… offered up praise… and thus 
they accompanied the icon from the city of Kazan to the imperial city of 
Moscow. 
It arrived in Cheboksary, where it was met by “all the people”. When 
it finally arrived back in Khlynov at the end of August 1615, it was met 
by the church hierarchs, commandants F. A. Zvenigorodskii and V. T. 
Zhemchuzhinov, secretary M. Ordintsov, and a large crowd. A few years 
later, one of the recorded miracles occurred during the public reception 
of the icon back in Khlynov on its return from the annual procession to 
Velikoretskaia.37
For the most part we can but speculate how those not resident in 
Khlynov would have heard about it and come to the town to seek a 
cure. As discussed below, the towns of the Russian North were well 
connected. Moreover, some copies of the Khlynov icon were deposited 
37  Kashmenskii, ‘O chudotvornoi Velikoretskoi ikone’, 1875, no. 16, 501–02. 
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in churches in other locations, one in the Cathedral of the Intercession 
on the Moat, popularly known as St Basil’s, in Moscow’s Red Square. 
One can envisage a “catchment area” centred on the location of the 
icon at any given moment. Its central point would be Khlynov, soon 
expanded into the area adjoining the route of the annual procession 
to Velikoretskaia and back. As the route of that procession grew, the 
catchment area would eventually include much of the Viatka region. 
Certainly the history of this one icon is not unique in Muscovy. In all such 
cases, oral testimony must have been the first method to communicate 
the news about the miracles, even if then entered in a written record. 
In the seventeenth and especially in the early decades of the eighteenth 
century, the Church authorities tried to control such manifestations 
of popular piety. It seems to have been a losing battle, however. An 
entry dated 24 February 1714 near the end of one of the late Novgorod 
chronicles relates how a widow in Kargopol witnessed that an icon of 
the Kazan Mother of God in her home began to weep.38 She told the 
local priest, who took it off to his church, installed it, and performed 
the appropriate prayers. At the hour when, according to the Gospels, 
Christ had breathed the last on the Cross, the icon began to weep again 
“in the presence of all the people”. Over the next days, further such 
incidents occurred, “and this miracle was witnessed by many citizens”. 
The icon then was sent to Novgorod, where it was responsible for many 
miraculous cures. Somewhat less than a year after its miracles had first 
been reported, it was returned to Kargopol.
Analogous examples can be found in accounts about locally 
venerated saints, whose cults became embedded and who attracted 
widening circles of devotees. Certainly the local parish or a regional 
centre of a bishopric or important monastery provided a focal point 
where people gathered on a regular basis and shared all kinds of news 
or rumour about events, near and far, and gossip (another kind of news) 
about their neighbours. Another opportunity for the exchange of news 
could have been the ongoing interactions amongst merchants or the 
annual fairs which were so important for bringing together people from 
distant towns.
38  RNB (Russian National Library), Collection of M. P. Pogodin, no. 1411, fols. 
314(315)-315(316).
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Connectivity in Northern Russia
It is important to remember that despite the low density of population in 
the Russian North, the region was well connected via the river routes and 
in certain instances by roads. The seventeenth-century customs registers 
(tamozhennye knigi) kept in the major towns such as Velikii Ustiug and 
Solvychegodsk testify to the regularity and rapidity of communication 
involving merchants from distant locations. Beyond the official horse 
relays and foreign post then, there were networks that communicated 
news that merit further study.39 Each entry in the registers identifies the 
traveller by his town or region of origin. To take one year (September 1, 
1634–August 31, 1635), of a grand total of 433 individuals, the merchants 
who bought and sold in Velikii Ustiug registered as living in other 
towns or regions, included 66 from Solvychegodsk, 31 from Totma, 13 
from Vaga, 9 from Kholmogory, 8 from Viatka, 30 from Vologda, 147 
from Galich, 29 from Moscow, 18 from Iaroslavl, 8 from Kazan.40 In 1642 
P. D. Gogunin, from Solvychegodsk, came to Ustiug four times, a high 
number, whereas the most normal pattern might be a single annual 
visit. A second type of evidence is the indication of whence came the 
individual arriving in Ustiug (irrespective of his home town). As far as 
I know, this evidence has yet to be systematised. The impression is that 
the most common routes were those connecting Ustiug with Vologda, 
Kholmogory and Solvychegodsk. Lalsk, to the North of Khlynov, was an 
important stopping point on the way to the Urals. Vaga is on the list too, 
as the location of an important annual trade fair. Since the registers tell 
39  In particular, I have drawn on Tamozhennye knigi Sukhono-Dvinskogo puti XVII v., 
comp. by S. N. Kisterev and L. A. Timoshina, Vyp. 1 (St Petersburg: Kontrast, 2013); 
and Tamozhennye knigi Moskovskogo gosudarstva XVII veka. Tom 1. Severnyi rechnoi 
put′: Ustiug Velikii, Sol′vychegodsk, Tot′ma v 1633–1636 gg., ed. by A. I. Iakovlev 
(Moscow-Leningrad: Izdatel′stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1950). For details about 
their contents and observations about the challenges in studying them, see A. Ts. 
Merzon, ‘Ustiuzhskie tamozhennye knigi XVII v.’, Problemy istochnikovedeniia, 6 
(1958), 67–129.
40  A. Ts. Merzon and Iu. A. Tikhonov, Rynok Ustiuga Velikogo v period skladyvaniia 
vserossiiskogo rynka (XVII vek) (Moscow: Izdatel′stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1960), 
pp. 224–31. They also tabulate percentages for a later period, pp. 635–39. Ideally one 
might map the “connectivity” of Velikii Ustiug by plotting the locations from which 
the visitors came. One should note that the dramatic map Merzon and Tikhonov 
provide (foldout, following p. 240) illustrates not the human connections but rather 
the source of the products which came to the market in Ustiug.
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us of both arrivals and departures (recording payment of a departure or 
arrival tax and duties on goods that were being carried), it is possible to 
determine in some cases the travel time, or, if a merchant arrived and 
stayed on for a few days, the duration of the round trip that would have 
brought him back to his departure point.
In the very small sample I have tested, for December 1634 there 
were fourteen departures or arrivals in Ustiug, eight on the route to 
Solvychegodsk, three on the route to Vologda, two the route to Iaroslavl 
and one from Sysola. The iaroslavtsy Roman and his brother Petr 
Oglodaev were involved in several of these trips, Roman having arrived 
in Ustiug from Vologda apparently at the beginning of September. He 
went to Solvychegodsk on 5 December, while there (on 12 December) 
sent goods back to Ustiug, paid for other goods on 19 December and 
arrived back with them in Ustiug in what would appear to have been a 
very fast trip over the distance of seventy-seven versts (approximately 
eighty-two kilometres) on 21 December. When his brother Petr arrived 
in Ustiug from Iaroslavl on 30 December, he immediately packed up 
and went on to Solvychegodsk. Two days later on 1 January, Roman 
shipped off to Iaroslavl the goods obtained in Ustiug. On 6 January in 
Solvychegodsk, Petr Oglodaev was in a group which paid for a large 
convoy of goods being sent on some forty-five sledges (these probably 
belonged to several different merchant houses), though he himself 
stayed on. One of Roman’s agents came from Solvychegodsk to Ustiug 
on 17 January. On 19 January, Roman reported in Ustiug that he had 
received a shipment from his brother on two sledges, and the following 
day Petr himself returned. Two days after that Roman left for Iaroslavl 
with three sledges, and on 10 February, Petr followed on seven of them.
The evidence from the customs registers would seem to suggest 
some seasonal patterns of greater or less communication. Clearly 
there was a navigation season before the rivers froze. Once they were 
solidly frozen, they provided highways for most of the sledge traffic 
(in a few instances, roads through the woods and swamps were used).41 
In the seasons between the two best suited for travel, there might be 
41  In 2003 I was with a group that drove from Lalsk to the ferry landing where one 
then took the boat to Ustiug. In one or two places in this now sparsely populated 
area with its decaying villages, the dirt road showed stone paving that we were told 
by our local historian-guide dated back even as far as the seventeenth century.
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less traffic, since boats might not risk the remains or the onset of the 
winter ice, and a good hard freeze or two would be needed to firm up 
the surface for safe travel. My sampling shows relatively few entries 
for September-November, substantially more for December-March, 
but fewer again after spring arrived. Possibly, of course, other registers 
would fill gaps here, as little of what I have seen so far relates to major 
boat traffic even in the season when it was possible. Other factors in the 
frequency of travel might include the nature of the goods to be moved—
products were seasonal and may have had limits on the time they could 
be stored. Yet another consideration was the nature of the market, since 
there was, for example, a focus on travel to seasonal fairs. So one should 
not expect here a kind of predictably regular schedule of departures 
or arrivals such as became the feature of the Western postal networks. 
Communication would be opportunistic.
Granted, what we learn for Velikii Ustiug, a major node, cannot 
necessarily be generalised for the smaller, less frequented or less 
accessible towns. However, we see how the communication of news 
without significant delay would have been possible quite apart from 
any government-sponsored initiatives or institutions such as the official 
horse relay system. Of course the registers tell us about goods carried, 
not stories told or packets of letters. Even if we may never be able to 
correlate particular arrivals with the receipt of certain news, we should 
at least consider systematising the evidence of the registers to develop 
a much more concrete idea than we have had previously regarding the 
actual communications networks. Where people travelled, they brought 
with them more than the customs registers record: as our next section 
will demonstrate, those who travelled on private business in Muscovy 
might in fact have important news to communicate.
Oral Testimony and Written Reports
For my concluding example I have chosen to focus on reporting about the 
rebellion of Stepan Razin, who is the subject, with a different emphasis, 
of Maier’s Chapter 4 in this volume.42 As is well known, the rebellion 
42  See also her article co-authored with Stepan Shamin ‘“Revolts” in the Kuranty 
of March-July 1671’, and André Berelowitch, ‘Stenka Razin’s Rebellion: The 
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had major implications not only for the stability of the Muscovite state 
but for all of those who lived in the areas directly involved or in the 
path of the rebels and the government forces sent to defeat them. What 
seemed initially to be but another example of Cossack piracy on the 
lower Volga and Caspian Sea exploded with the seizure by the rebels 
of Tsaritsyn (now Volgograd) in mid-May 1670, the taking of Astrakhan 
near the mouth of the river on 22 June, and further successes. The turning 
point came when they failed to take Simbirsk. While the analysis which 
follows here includes some material from the reporting about Razin 
prior to his taking of Tsaritsyn and later into autumn, the focus will be 
on the news about his movements and successes between about mid-
May and mid-July. 
The rebellion was indeed a news sensation and as such has left a 
much richer body of documentation than have other examples examined 
above. In fact, it is possible here to probe deeply into the way the different 
“categories” of news appeared, intersected and spread—in short, to 
appreciate the complexity of what we may hope eventually to unravel 
if we are to gain a full understanding of what news was in Muscovy. 
My emphasis will be on information in the dispatches sent to Moscow 
by its military governors and others in the South and in the responses 
sent back from the central government.43 On the face of it, this was just 
government-sponsored intelligence gathering, hugely informative about 
the processes by which news was collected, communicated and checked 
for accuracy. Importantly, the evidence documents the role of ordinary 
individuals in the reporting of news and the relationship between their 
oral testimony and written communication. The way in which the news 
then was manipulated and in specific instances publicly broadcast is an 
Eyewitnesses and their Blind Spot’, both in From Mutual Observation to Propaganda 
War, ed. by Malte Griesse, pp. 181–203, and pp. 94–124 respectively. Berelowitch, 
pp. 99–106, provides a good compact summary of the rebellion’s history, and, 
passim, offers some astute observations about the domestic accounts.
43  I am relying on the extensive collection of documents in Krest′ianskaia voina pod 
predvoditel′stvom Stepana Razina. Sbornik dokumentov, comp. by E. A. Shvetsova, ed. 
by A. A. Novosel′skii et al., 4 vols in 5 (Moscow: Izdatel′stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 
1954–1976), esp. vols 1, 2. 1 and 2. 2. The editors’ notes make clear that the collection 
does not include all of the relevant material; they have selected from among many 
documents which may simply repeat what is in the ones they publish, or contain 
information they deemed peripheral. To a certain degree, the selection undoubtedly 
was influenced by the prevailing Marxist interpretations of the rebellion.
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essential part of this history. It was difficult enough to separate truth 
from unverified and in many instances inaccurate rumour, but even 
when some accurate understanding of events had been achieved, that 
in turn might be deliberately distorted and communicated as “news”. 
Several government departments were involved in news acquisition: 
the Chancery of the Kazan Court (Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa), which 
had under its purview the middle Volga region; the Military Service 
Chancery (Razriadnyi prikaz), to which Muscovite military governors 
reported and from which they received their instructions; the 
Ambassadorial Chancery (Posol′skii prikaz), charged with foreign affairs 
and involved here especially because of its concerns about relations 
with Persia, the Crimea and the Turks as well as the Cossacks of the 
lower Don; rarely, the tsar’s Privy Affairs Chancery (Tainyi prikaz), 
which was responsible for bringing important matters directly to the 
attention of Aleksei Mikhailovich. Within the Military Service Chancery 
were separate desks for the affairs of various commands, for example, 
that at Belgorod, on one of the primary defensive lines in the South. 
Coordination of the various departments occurred in meetings of the 
tsar with his boyars and key departmental secretaries. 
The seriousness of the Razin rebellion is underscored by the regular 
annotations on the news reports coming to Moscow that they had been 
read to the tsar and the boyars. Often those annotations then indicate 
an immediate decision taken in response to the latest news (e.g.: “Order 
that the Voronezhian and Nizhnii Novgorodian be interrogated in the 
Military Service Chancery”).44 Orders sent from Moscow frequently 
summarised the news about Razin (to underscore the importance of the 
order now being issued), with a specific citation of the date and source 
of a report, and might include the phrase “on the basis of that news”. 
The annotations also regularly include the indication of when a 
particular report was received and who had brought it. The messengers 
were varied—musketeers (strel′tsy), horsemen (most frequently called 
striapchei koniukh), townsmen (posadskie liudi), sometimes accompanied 
by the individual who had first brought the news in order that he be 
interrogated again in Moscow. The urgency of rapid reporting from 
the military governors was constantly stressed.45 The institutionalised 
44  Krest′ianskaia voina, vol. 1, no. 154, p. 217.
45  Ibid., no. 116, p. 170.
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service of the horse relays (iamskaia gon′ba) seems to have been largely 
irrelevant, since it was slow. For the express couriers, horses were 
provided by emergency transport (zavodnye podvody), obtained in the 
first instance on demand from small Cossack detachments posted in 
various places. One order sent back from Moscow to Korotoiak, a key 
border town in the Don region, travelled as follows: “This was sent with 
a boyar son with Ivan Shatskii on 1 August to the village of Moloda, 
and from that village, horsemen posted to the [Cossack] detachment 
were ordered to speed to Korotoiak”.46 There is no indication that the 
absence of any more formally organised communications network 
caused delays. Messages from any of the major military outposts in the 
South might take a week or less to reach Moscow, though the news they 
contained often was much older. 
While the Muscovite bureaucracy required written communication, 
the ultimate source of the news about Razin was oral testimony. Once 
the seriousness of the rebellion became apparent, Moscow issued 
strict orders to interdict any and all passage into territories under 
the control of or potentially loyal to the rebels. Anyone coming from 
the rebel areas was to be closely interrogated and the results sent on 
immediately to Moscow. A typical report might include only the results 
of a single interrogation of an informant, though there also could be 
several interrogations of individuals who had arrived in a group. 
The informants thus included a lot of townsmen or those engaged in 
economic activity for some noble or the church who had gone down 
the Volga or Don for legitimate business (the fisheries on the Don 
frequently are mentioned). Some individuals had arrived at Tsaritsyn 
unaware that it was in rebel hands, to be greeted by confiscation of their 
goods, abuse, imprisonment or execution. While there, they conversed 
with their captors, from whom they learned details of the recent events 
and speculation about what Razin’s next moves might be. Typically, 
46  Ibid., no. 165, p. 229. An instruction from the Ambassadorial Chancery to the military 
governor in Voronezh on 8 July 1670 specified that any news be sent to Moscow 
by express courier (ibid., no. 38, p. 194). In his message to Moscow of 29 July, the 
commandant in Voronezh reported the results of an interrogation, and indicated he 
was sending the informants on to Moscow by the horse relays, whereas his report 
was being taken separately (and presumably much more rapidly) by a horseman 
first to Elets. The annotation made in Moscow on its arrival on 3 August indicates 
that from there it had been carried by striapchii koniukh Ievko Voronin (ibid., no. 166, 
p. 231).
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one or more of these captives then managed to escape across the steppe 
to the Don, where often they were met with suspicion by the Don 
Cossacks, some of whom were reported as being sympathetic to Razin, 
others loyal to the tsar. In the Cossack communities, they then heard 
more talk about the news, at least some of which probably derived from 
missives Razin was sending in order to recruit adherents. Eventually 
the informants made their way North, where they were immediately 
interrogated at the nearest Russian outpost. Captured rebels and their 
sympathisers were subject to brutal interrogation, presumably under 
the assumption that they had insider information. Once tortured and 
interrogated, they were summarily executed, hanged after their limbs 
had been cut off.47
The local officials conducting the interrogations had often quite 
specific instructions.48 A standard list of questions about Razin’s 
whereabouts and the disposition of various forces had the potential, of 
course, to skew or ignore the information provided by the informants. 
Informants identified themselves, and explained why they had 
gone where they did, how long they were there, and under what 
circumstances. The testimony specifies who told them (skazal; skazyvaiut) 
a particular item of news or, somewhat more vaguely (there seems to 
have been a clear distinction), who said what (govoril) or what they 
heard (slyshali). Sometimes the particle de, indicating reported speech, 
is added. Occasionally there is an indication of particular confidence 
in something the informant heard (a slyshno de podlinno); occasionally 
too the informant indicates he actually saw something (videl). Where an 
informant did not know the answer to a question that had been posed, 
generally the response was what we assume was a quite honest: “I had 
no genuine information”; “and we do not know that […] they did not 
hear that either”; “they had no knowledge of that”. In a few instances, we 
learn specifics about deliberate efforts to obtain information by sending 
an agent who might have personal connections (po druzhbe taino) among 
the Cossacks, friends who then could elicit the intelligence in the enemy 
camp.49 One of the longer reports was obtained from merchants who 
found themselves trapped in Tsaritsyn with the rebel Cossacks and there 
47  For examples, see Krest′ianskaia voina, vol. 2. 2, nos. 19, 20, 33, 35, pp. 24–29, 42–47.
48  E.g., Krest′ianskaia voina, vol. 1, no. 129, p. 181; no. 109, p. 161.
49  Ibid., no. 179, pp. 244–46.
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had repeated conversations with them, learning, among other things, 
about the missives Razin had sent them with news of his successes and 
instructing his forces in Tsaritsyn to set out up river to Kamyshenka. Of 
course by the time that information was recorded in Tambov on 13 July, 
it would have already been too late to save Kamyshenka, to which the 
rebels had set out nearly a month earlier.50
Assessing the accuracy and value of the news so reported was a 
major concern of the Muscovite officials; even for modern historians, 
it can be difficult to determine where the informants out of ignorance 
or through deliberate deception may have garbled some part of the 
news. The frequency with which news began to arrive in from the 
South is impressive. However, since informants often arrived back in a 
Muscovite town only after a rather long peregrination, reports might be 
substantially dated and might keep coming in long after the events had 
occurred and perhaps had been well documented in other sources. On 
13 August, a Cossack from Voronezh, Timoshka Savostianov, who had 
previously been interrogated on 7 August in Voronezh, reported at the 
Military Service Chancery in Moscow how he had been fishing on the 
Don and arrived at the town of Piat Izb (“Five Huts”).51 Some twenty of 
Razin’s followers showed up there, having left Astrakhan four weeks 
earlier following its seizure by Razin. By the time of his interrogation in 
Voronezh, Timoshka’s memory of his conversation with the rebels was 
three weeks old. It had taken him some two weeks travelling secretly at 
night from the Don just to reach the Russian border post. The news of 
Astrakhan’s fall on the night of 21 June thus was was nearly two months 
old by the time it arrived in the Kremlin, delivered there by Timoshka 
himself. As it turned out, Timoshka’s was one of the first reports 
Moscow received on the event. Curiously, when the government was 
issuing important new commands in response to receiving this news, 
it cited not Timoshka’s report, but one received eleven days later on 24 
August from a minor noble (syn boiarskii) and resident of Astrakhan who 
somehow had escaped the city after, apparently, having witnessed the 
50  Ibid., no. 150, pp. 209–12.
51  Krest′ianskaia voina, vol. 2. 1, no. 8, pp. 15–16; for the Voronezh commmandant’s 
report, no. 7, pp. 14–15.
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events first-hand.52 This may have been a matter of wishing to present 
only reliable eyewitness testimony (though the two accounts seem to 
have differed little in their essentials), but perhaps, too, the government 
was reluctant to cite a report that might have been doubted, coming 
from an ataman’s son and ultimately originating in what the rebellious 
Cossacks told him, however accurate it may have been.
The consistency of many of the reports regarding the details of 
Razin’s successes is striking. Yet one cannot simply assume mutually 
supporting accounts are independent confirmation of accuracy, since 
the informants may well have heard the same stories from the same 
individuals with whom they had talked, and it is possible, given the 
way in which news was being manipulated by both the rebels and the 
Muscovite authorities, that certain standard accounts that were widely 
distributed then became part of a master narrative. How well this fact 
came to be understood in Moscow can be seen in an instruction sent from 
the Military Service Chancery to the important regimental commander 
in Belgorod, Grigorii Grigorevich Romodanovskii, on 24 September 
1670.53 He was to send on to Moscow “only the most believable 
individuals, who would relate concerning any news only the truth, with 
no embroidery, and who were eyewitnesses to it. And people who had 
not themselves seen it, and who undertake to tell re-told tales should 
not be sent to Moscow”, because, “as you yourself know […] much that 
is bad comes from news that has been embroidered or is false”. 
Oral transmission, of course, is fraught with other problems, in that 
memories may be flawed both on the part of those talking and on the 
part of those later reporting the conversations. One remarkable string 
of reports would have to give us pause about news that then arrived in 
Moscow on 21 July in a report from the dumnyi dvorianin (conciliar lesser 
noble) Iakov Timofeevich Khitrovo, commandant of the important post 
of Tambov.54 Agents (loyal Cossacks, stanichniki) he had sent off to 
Penza to gather information returned to Tambov on 17 July (probably 
the day he wrote to Moscow), bringing with them a written report from 
another commandant in the town of Lomov. In it, this commandant 
52  Ibid., no. 17, pp. 23–24; also, for a subsequent citation of the same report a few days 
later, Ibid., no. 19, p. 26.
53  Krest′ianskaia voina, vol. 2. 2, no. 36, pp. 47–48.
54  Krest′ianskaia voina, vol. 1, no. 156, p. 219. An analogous but shorter string of 
“nested” reports is in no. 178, pp. 243–44.
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related how he had received a report on 5 July from a commandant in 
another town, Insar, basing his information on a report from Saransk, 
which in turn related the arrival there on 29 June of people who were 
fleeing Saratov. They had reported in their interrogation having gone 
to Saratov to buy horses, encountering there fishermen who had come 
up the Volga, whence they had met musketeers who told them about 
how the Razin forces had taken the town of Komyshenka and burned 
it, killing its commandant. The musketeers had fled the disaster. 
Now the Razin forces, they indicated, were heading up the Volga 
to Saratov. So here we have a chain of information relayed in part 
through accidental encounters: musketeers on the Volga → fishermen 
on the Volga → fugitives from Saratov on the Volga → report from 
Saransk → report from Insar → report from Lomov → report to Moscow 
from Tambov. This is not news once or twice removed, but seven times 
removed from its source some weeks earlier. It is not as though Khitrovo 
was lax in his attempts to learn the news. He quizzed his agents on 
their return from Lomov, who reported that in the market there the 
local residents told everything about Razin—in other words, probably 
rumour, guesswork, market gossip—how he was heading to Saratov, 
how he had in fact not been at Astrakhan but instead after his victory at 
Chernyi Iar had headed toward Saratov. On hearing this, Khitrovo sent 
the same agents to Penza and Saratov to obtain more news, and he was 
now awaiting their return. Moreover, Khitrovo had sent some twenty 
of his loyal Cossacks off to Tsaritsyn to gather intelligence, but they had 
been captured by Razin’s men and were being held in Tsaritsyn. The 
Russian military authorities were not just waiting for information to 
come their way but were actively engaged in intelligence missions into 
rebel-held territory.
By 30 July 1670, Moscow had been deluged with reports about 
Tsaritsyn and Chernyi Iar; on that single day several more arrived, three 
from the diligent commandant Mikhail Oznobishin in Korotoiak. That 
tested the patience of the tsar, despite the fact that he had made it clear 
he was to be kept informed. In the annotation to one of Oznobishin’s 
reports is the remarkable indication Aleksei Mikhailovich had heard 
quite enough and knew the basic facts: 
The great sovereign listened to this report and it was read to the boyars. 
And the great sovereign disposed and the boyars confirmed [the order]: 
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write to Korotoiak to Mikhail Oznobishin and to Voronezh to Boris 
Bukhvostov, that in the future concerning the treason of the bandit 
Stenka Razin and his robber Cossacks, how they went from the Don to 
Tsaritsyn, and concerning the surrender of the town of Tsaritsyn, and 
how he went from Tsaritsyn to Chornyi Iar, they should not write to the 
great sovereign on such matters, inasmuch as the great sovereign has 
been informed by many reports regarding the one and all. Rather, having 
strenuously undertaken by all means to obtain news, they should write 
to the sovereign what other news in the future is obtained concerning 
this bandit and continue to exercise great vigilance in those towns. Also 
when news is obtained about the arrival of military men, they should 
write the sovereign about it immediately.55
This instruction notwithstanding, similar reports continued to arrive 
over the next month and more.
Care was taken to check the stories of those who were suspected 
of having willingly collaborated with the rebels. Of particular interest 
was a priest from Kursk, Nikifor Kolesnikov, who had arrived on the 
Don after spending some time with the rebels in Tsaritsyn.56 He then 
fell into the company of some musketeers who had managed to escape 
after the debacle at Tsaritsyn. The group made its way to the important 
frontier post of Belgorod, where they were interrogated, the musketeers 
accusing Kolesnikov of having collaborated with the rebels. When 
the report of the interrogation reached the Kremlin, it ordered Prince 
Grigorii Romodanovskii to send on to Moscow as quickly as possible 
the musketeers and the priest, the latter “chained and under guard”. 
The priority given to the case may well be explained by the fact that 
in his earlier career, Kolesnikov had ministered to some of the tsar’s 
regiments. Two of his sons had for some eight years worked as clerks 
in the Service Estates Chancery (Pomestnyi prikaz), the older, Naum, 
having been sent off with an embassy to Persia in 1669 which Razin’s 
troops had then detained in Astrakhan on its return. Naum therefore 
had his own account to tell about the rebels, independently of his father. 
Kolesnikov’s interrogation in Moscow on 4 August provided one of the 
55  Krest′ianskaia voina, vol. 1, no. 157, p. 220.
56  Ibid., nos. 130, 134, 171, 182, 183, pp. 182–84, 187–90, 234–38, 240–52; notes pp. 276–
77, 281–82. As the editors note, on p. 276, Kolesnikov is referred to in the documents 
as Mikifor (Nikifor) Ivanov; his surname Kolesnikov was established on the basis of 
records concerning his sons.
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most detailed eyewitness accounts about what was going on inside the 
Razin camp, including the discussions at the Cossacks’ council (krug) in 
which they were deciding on their next movements. 
The documents about the Razin rebellion suggest that in response 
to the crisis, the Muscovite government very quickly was able to 
improve its intelligence network by tightening border controls and 
by issuing to all its provincial commanders the strictest instructions 
about the gathering of information and instructing all those under their 
jurisdiction to do the same. Typical was the order sent on 13 July 1670 to 
Grigorii Romodanovskii, who was only one of several dozen recipients 
of the same instruction.57 There were but few incidents where violations 
of the border blockade and/or failure to broadcast locally the tsar’s order 
were reported.58 Most of the commanders, recognising the urgency of 
the situation, seem to have been zealous in carrying out their orders. 
As the reports accumulated, the officials in Moscow then were 
tasked with collecting the dispatches into single documents. In one of 
the earliest such examples (February 1670), the assignment was given 
to the Ambassadorial Chancery, which was to solicit a set of reports 
that had been sent to the Chancery of the Kazan Court.59 The resulting 
document was a veritable chronicle quoting reports beginning with 1667 
and ending in early 1670. The stated purpose of the collection was for it 
to be sent on by the Ambassadorial Chancery to the loyal Don Cossacks 
to warn them about Razin and (presumably) to call for their continued 
loyalty to Moscow in the face of this threat. Another factor here seems 
to have been the petition by Persian merchants who had been robbed 
by Razin that the tsar reimburse them for their losses. Presumably a 
compendium of information was needed to check their claim. That 
the compilation of such summaries was in the first instance somehow 
connected with foreign policy concerns seems to be confirmed when 
another summary was drawn up in the autumn of 1670, apparently with 
the intention that it be communicated widely in Novgorod (a significant 
centre for foreign merchant activity and the dissemination of news that 
57  Ibid., no. 149, pp. 208–09.
58  Ibid., nos. 117, 126, 175, pp. 170–71, 177–79, 240–41.
59  The instruction is ibid., no. 105, pp. 133–34; the compendium from the Office of the 
Kazan Court is no. 106, pp. 134–56.
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might go abroad).60 As Maier and Shamin have suggested, something 
like that latter compendium could have been a source for a report that 
made its way into a Dutch newspaper and which was very dated by the 
time it appeared.61 
Mere compilation of what were supposed to be accurate and carefully 
vetted intelligence reports was one thing, but there the matter did not 
rest. As is well known, the Muscovite government was very concerned 
to control the news about Razin for foreign consumption, wishing to 
undercut any idea, such as that being spread in certain foreign news 
accounts, that he was a serious problem and a major threat to the state. 
For internal consumption, the goal in manipulating the news may have 
been more complex. On the one hand, there would have been every 
reason to reinforce the impression that the tsar’s divinely sanctioned 
government was in control. On the other hand, it was essential to 
undercut any possible sympathy for Razin by portraying him and his 
actions as quintessentially evil and out of control. 
In issuing orders about vigilance, intelligence gathering, recruitment, 
and the assembling of supplies and transport, the government followed 
its usual procedure of explaining in a preamble why the particular 
order was being given. There is a certain progression in such preambles, 
with some of the earlier instructions citing more than one report. As 
events unfolded, the tendency was to focus specifically on the most 
recent news, an indication of the urgency now felt in the Kremlin and 
the rapidity with which decisions were being made in response to new 
information. Thus, once the taking of Tsaritsyn was history, the taking 
of Astrakhan might be cited; as events moved on in 1670 and some of 
Razin’s followers were captured and interrogated, what they related 
might be cited.62 As the news became more alarming in 1670, the Kremlin 
was not content simply to quote the reports but began to re-write them, 
adding horrific details and rhetoric to convince those who would read 
or hear the reports that Razin was truly godless and an instrument of the 
60  Krest′ianskaia voina, vol. 2. 1, no. 277, pp. 339–42.
61 Maier and Shamin, ‘“Revolts” in the Kuranty’, p. 198.
62  Ibid., no. 1, pp. 7–8. The orders to Grigorii Romodanovskii sent from Moscow on 26 
August cite a report received in Moscow on 24 August about the fall of Astrakhan’. 
A change in Romodanovskii’s previous orders regarding the disposition of his 
troops was a response to some of the new information obtained from captive 
Cossack rebels: Ibid., no. 53, pp. 66–68, dated after 10 October 1670.
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Devil, a threat to both the state and the Church. What had originated as 
news, necessary for the government to formulate an effective response 
to a growing crisis, morphed into ideologically charged propaganda. 
There is some reason to think that the news, so transformed into 
propaganda, then may have come full circle, when those providing 
testimony adopted some of the same rhetoric in describing the rebels. 
The tsar’s admonitions to Grigorii Romodanovskii cited earlier testify 
to a recognition that recycled “news” might feed upon itself and prove 
to be worthless (which would be true even if the message was one the 
government had tried to shape).
As we know, Razin too was engaged in the same kind of propaganda 
war, sending messages to potential supporters about his victories and 
trying to induce them to join in what he alleged would be an attempt 
to end the injustices inflicted by the boyars in Moscow. Among the 
rumours was one that Razin intended to restore Patriarch Nikon as head 
of the Russian Orthodox Church, an idea that probably originated in 
the fact that Razin does seem to have contacted the deposed Patriarch 
(who, however, refused to be drawn in).63 Once afoot, such rumours 
could escalate: a peasant testified on 7 September that Nikon was 
already on his way down the Don to join the rebels.64 We have to 
imagine that a good deal of what various Cossacks told the individuals 
who then were interrogated as they came across the border back into 
government-controlled territory was simply repetition of what Razin 
had summarised in his own missives.
The Razin materials thus provide vivid evidence of how both sides 
attempted to influence public opinion, and in the process engaged 
actively in the dissemination of “news”, however distorted some 
of it may have been. It was not merely a matter of sending letters or 
commands, but involved the often explicit instruction that they be 
read aloud to audiences assembled specifically for that purpose. Such 
occasions were orchestrated performances, from which there was 
every reason to think the listeners would take away and spread the 
information to those who had not been present. There were several 
63  Ibid., no. 22, p. 31; note on p. 552. A similar report is in no. 29, pp. 43–44, which, 
however, relates some apprehension among Razin’s followers as to what the future 
may hold.
64  Krest′ianskaia voina, vol. 2. 2, no. 19, p. 25.
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kinds of situations where such public proclamation could occur. One 
of the earliest examples, composed in Moscow on 28 May 1670, was 
sent to Grigorii Romodanovskii, indicating that on its receipt, he was 
to inform the Belgorod administrator, a stol′nik Petr Skuratov, and that 
he in turn was immediately to distribute to “all towns, to the military 
commanders and government officials” copies of this decree certified by 
scribal signatures. All those officials were in their turn to call together 
all of the military and ordinary residents of their respective towns and 
read to them aloud the sovereign’s decree.65 The annotations indicate 
that copies of the document were to be distributed to several Moscow 
offices. 
The regional commandants who received such orders dutifully 
responded about how they had carried them out. At some point in the 
first two weeks of June (the exact date has not been preserved; the report 
was received in Moscow 13 June), the commandant in Kozlov, Stepan 
Ivanovich Khrushchev, reported:
And in accordance with, lord, thy great sovereign’s order and thy great 
sovereign’s missives, I, thy servant, in Kozlov, having gathered the 
people of Kozlov, thy great sovereign’s military and civilian inhabitants 
of all ranks, read to them thy great sovereign’s beneficent word and thy 
great lord’s missive about the bandit and about the apostate and traitor 
about the Don Cossack Stenka Razin and about all of his banditry. I 
ordered that all this be read aloud. And in Kozlov district, lord, I sent to 
all of the detachments and villages and hamlets verbatim copies of thy 
great sovereign’s missive. And I ordered, lord, that in the villages and 
hamlets copies of thy great sovereign’s missive be read aloud to all the 
people, in order that they, the people of Kozlov, the people of all ranks, 
know about his, Stenka’s, banditry and treachery and, keeping in mind 
the holy conciliar and apostolic Church and thy great sovereign’s sworn 
oath on the cross, and their nature and service and blood, and for thy 
great sovereign’s reward for their service, and the eternal honour of their 
ancestors, so that no one join in his banditry.66 
Some commandants went one step farther and had the tsar’s orders 
read aloud on more than one occasion.67
65  Krest′ianskaia voina, vol. 1, no. 111, p. 162.
66  Ibid., no. 114, p. 167.
67  Ibid., no. 142, p. 200.
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The public reading of decrees seems to have been a common 
phenomenon and would have served to disseminate news even if only 
of the kind I have termed “transactional”.68 A recruitment order issued 
in Moscow on 22 August was read aloud from the porch of one of the 
chambers in the Kremlin palace to an audience that included both palace 
and court officials, lesser nobles and various ranks of the army. 
It was not enough merely to paint the rebels in dark colours by 
rhetorical excesses. Also important was to demonstrate to the public the 
inevitable and grisly fate of those who would question royal authority. 
Of course there was a long history of this in Muscovy, well before the 
Sobornoe Ulozhenie (law code) of 1649 elaborated on the seriousness of 
impugning the authority and honour of State and Church. If we believe 
all the lurid accounts passed down mainly through foreign sources, 
Tsar Ivan IV did not hesitate to orchestrate the most horrific public 
executions. As Nancy Kollmann has stressed in her recent book, though, 
we should not generalise from such examples that justice in Muscovy 
was uniformly arbitrary and harsh.69 Traitors, pretenders, and others 
who seemed to threaten the ordained political order were a special case 
that justified summary justice. And yet there were procedures to be 
followed: formal interrogation, even if under torture; for many, review 
of the testimony and evidence in Moscow even if it had first come to 
the attention of provincial authorities. The tendency seems to have been 
not to believe professions of innocence by those who claimed to have 
“served” the rebels under duress.70 Once the decision came down, at 
least nominally from the highest secular authority, the tsar himself, 
punishment was swift. The government clearly wished to have a crowd 
attend the public dismemberment and/or hanging of the rebels, and 
68  Concerning the public reading and posting of decrees, see Simon Franklin, ‘Printing 
and Social Control in Russia 2: Decrees’, Russian History, 38 (2011), 467–92 (esp. pp. 
473–75).
69  Nancy Shields Kollmann, Crime and Punishment in Early Modern Russia (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012).
70  There was a progression in the level of suspicion as the rebellion took a more 
serious turn. An annotation to a document of June 1668 indicated: “And if they 
say that they are good people and have not participated in banditry, release them 
under collective guarantee” (Krest′ianskaia voina, vol. 1, no. 75, p. 110). However, by 
July 1670, orders ran: “And as for those who undertake to say that they were with 
the bandit Cossacks unwillingly, after they have been tortured, hold them closely 
guarded and in prisons under strong guard” (ibid., no. 144, p. 203).
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prior to their execution, a formal, rhetorically-charged document listing 
the charges against them was read.71 The remains then were displayed 
in a prominent place (e.g. those of the Cossack Fedka Ageev hung on the 
Iauza Gate in Moscow through which ran the road to Vladimir). Razin’s 
execution then, the descriptions of which circulated outside of Muscovy 
and presumably with the encouragement of Muscovite officials, was 
certainly not the first or last of such spectacles.72
If ritualised public executions were intended as a moral lesson 
and deterrent to keep the population at large from straying in their 
loyalty, there also were ceremonies intending to convey a more positive 
message that successful service in suppressing the rebellion brought its 
rewards. In September 1670, the security of the upper Don region came 
under threat, with some of the local population throwing their lot in 
with the rebels. Quick action, in part by loyal local forces and backed up 
by a detachment sent by the Belgorod regiment’s commander Grigorii 
Romodanovskii, saved the threatened towns. In recognition of this, the 
Military Service Chancery sent a commendation to Romodanovskii, his 
troops, and the others who had been involved.73 The Tsar’s emissary, 
Mikhail Bogdanovich Prikonskii, was to travel to Romodanovskii’s 
regiment without delay, and having arrived, to send a message to 
Romodanovskii to assemble his “comrades” and soldiers in the tent 
which had been erected for the occasion. Once they were all there, he 
was to read aloud the citation, first of all to Romodanovskii, then in 
a separate speech to all the ranks of the infantry and cavalry. After 
addressing them, he was to commend aloud Gerasim Kondratiev, a 
colonel from Suma, and lastly, in yet another address, to commend a 
colonel from Ostrogozhskii for his having rejected the overtures of the 
rebels and having captured a number of them. These final two received 
material rewards from the tsar, since they apparently had not previously 
been in government service and on the state payroll. For the rest, the 
reward was just the recognition and praise from the ruler, not a trivial 
reward of itself.
71  For examples, Krest′ianskaia voina, vol. 2. 2, no. 33 (esp. pp. 44–45), and nos. 42, 43 
pp. 53–56.
72  See Kollmann, Crime and Punishment, pp. 289–302.
73  Krest′ianskaia voina, vol. 2. 2, no. 51, pp. 63–65.
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Conclusion
The Razin materials underscore how news in Russia in the seventeenth 
century was not a commodity only of the elite, and how, along with the 
government, the broader public (however we might wish to define it) 
played an active role in the reporting, consumption and transmission 
of news. While we presented earlier a somewhat speculative scenario 
about how the normal interactions along the Northern river routes 
could have contributed to the dissemination of news, in the South 
during the Razin rebellion we have very explicit evidence concerning 
the way in which those who travelled on personal business could and 
did acquire information and passed it on. Granted, its transmission 
there, both stimulated and hindered by the crisis, was often considerably 
delayed. There is no reason to think that what individuals reported in 
interrogations was in any way confidential: not only had they learned of 
it from others’ oral reports (whether or not the information was accurate, 
of course, is another matter), but they surely then passed on what they 
knew to others with whom they interacted. Much of the news seems to 
have derived from what was “common knowledge” amongst both the 
adherents of Razin and those in the communities that felt threatened by 
him. Of course, in an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty, any amount 
of distortion and rumour might spread. Certainly, before the rebellion 
reached crisis proportions, people were still travelling on their daily 
business. The Volga and the Don were busy thoroughfares, connected 
in various directions; not the least of those connections was that between 
the two river basins. Even when the events triggered by the rebellion 
interdicted many of the normal routes of travel and commerce, in the 
process creating shortages of food and other goods, individuals could 
find their way across the steppe, make contacts in the communities 
that they encountered, obtain transport, and eventually arrive at a 
border post if they chose to go North. A great deal of other evidence 
from the files of the Military Service Chancery concerning other regions 
and times reinforces this picture of the role ordinary people played as 
reporters of and consumers of the news. Moreover, the Military Service 
Chancery was by no means the only department which collected the 
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news in Moscow. To assess all the evidence effectively is going to take 
a lot more work.74 
Possibly a good starting point for a broader overview would be 
to examine the way news spread during the Time of Troubles at the 
beginning of the seventeenth century.75 In the various efforts to restore 
control over the central government and drive out the occupying Poles, 
the leaders of the Russian forces circulated letters outlining the history 
of the troubles to date and calling for people to join in the movement to 
re-take control of the country. Once it became possible to elect a new 
ruler, the call went out to all the provinces to send their representatives to 
the Assembly of the Land. Even before the Troubles had ended, various 
accounts representing different positions on what was happening were 
compiled and circulated. Rumour was rife.
To conclude then, when we look beyond the kuranty, we discover a 
whole new world of news in Muscovy, of news consumers and news 
purveyors. In the foregoing review I have selected but a few of the ways 
we might learn more about how well connected and well informed 
Russians were. In saying this, I am not suggesting that information which 
would interest a broad spectrum of Muscovite society is necessarily 
analogous to what might have interested a similarly broad segment of 
society in Western Europe. However, it may well be that broadening the 
perspective on what was news in the West will reveal closer analogies 
than we so far have imagined. 
74  The potential value of analysing the reports of military governors was first 
underscored in the nineteenth century by N. Ogloblin, ‘Voevodskie vestovye otpiski 
XVII v. kak material po istorii Malorossii’, Kievskaia starina, 12 (1885), 365–416. 
For some observations about the processes of news acquisition and transmission 
through Kiev, see Waugh, ‘The Best Connected Man in Muscovy?’, esp. pp. 114–21. 
Of particular importance for learning about the acquisition of foreign news and 
the ways in which it was used by the government is evidence about intelligence 
operations, where the Muscovite government had agents embedded at other 
courts. There is some very interesting information about one such agent in K. A. 
Kochegarov, Rech′ Pospolitaia i Rossiia v 1680–1686 godakh. Zakliuchenie dogovora o 
Vechnom mire (Moscow: Indrik, 2008). 
75  On the Time of Troubles, one can consult Chester S. L. Dunning, Russia’s First Civil 
War: The Time of Troubles and the Founding of the Romanov Dynasty (University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001); Maureen Perrie, Pretenders and Popular 
Monarchism in Early Modern Russia: The False Tsar of the Time of Troubles (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995). A useful documentary collection is Pamiatniki 





8. Bureaucracy and Knowledge Creation: 
The Apothecary Chancery
Clare Griffin1
In 1628, physicians in the Russian palace’s medical department were 
presented with a root, and ordered to give their opinion on it.2 The root 
in question had been taken as evidence in a witchcraft case, as possession 
of herbs and roots was commonly seen as evidence of malefic magic 
1  This chapter started life as a part of my Ph.D. dissertation, before undergoing a 
number of transformations, aided at every stage by the kindness and generosity 
of funders and colleagues, into its present state. I would like to thank the Arts 
and Humanities Research Council, who funded my graduate work, the Wellcome 
Trust and the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, Berlin, who have 
funded my postdoctoral work, for their financial support. Endless comments, 
criticisms, suggestions, revisions, and improvements to this chapter—and its 
previous incarnations—were suggested by a great number of colleagues during my 
Ph.D. work, the workshop from which this volume emerged, and the Pre-Modern 
Conversation Seminar Series at the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, 
and in particular by Sergei Bogatyrev, Harold J. Cook, Simon Dixon, Sebastian 
Felten, Lauren Kassell, Elaine Leong, Martyn Rady, and Faith Wigzell, as well as 
the three anonymous peer reviewers of the present volume. My thanks also go, 
as ever, to the staff of the Russian State Archive of Ancient Documents (RGADA), 
Moscow, for the use of their materials, and for the wonderful work they do. Finally, 
thanks also to our tireless editors, Simon and Katia, without whom this chapter 
would have been much less than it is. All remaining mistakes and deficiencies are 
entirely my own.
2  N. Ia. Novombergskii, Materialy po istorii meditsiny v Rossii, 5 vols (St Petersburg: 
M. M. Stasiulevich, 1905), 3. 1, pp. 9–12. This case is discussed in Eve Levin, 
‘Healers and Witches in Early Modern Russia’, in Saluting Aron Gurevich: Essays in 
History, Literature, and Other Related Subjects, ed. by Yelena Mazour-Matusevich and 
Alexandra S. Korros (Leiden: Brill, 2010), pp. 105–33 (pp. 117–18). For an analysis 
of how the documentary process worked in Russian witchcraft trials in general, see 
Valerie Kivelson, Desperate Magic: The Moral Economy of Witchcraft in Seventeenth-
Century Russia (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2013), pp. 38–51.
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in seventeenth-century Russia. So the medical experts—foreigners, 
and graduates of prestigious Western European universities—spoke 
in Latin on the medical and magical properties of this root, a response 
that was translated and taken down in Russian, and then sent from 
the medical department to the Military Service Chancery (Razriadnyi 
prikaz), the department handling the case, and from whom the order for 
the report had been received. This was by no means an unusual event: 
the medical experts of the Apothecary Chancery, as the seventeenth-
century Russian palace medical department was called, were commonly 
called upon to compose learned reports for their own department, the 
tsar, and other parts of the Muscovite administration. Reports covered 
a range of subjects: autopsies to establish cause of death, “physicals” 
of servitors to see if they were still fit to serve, investigations into the 
private trade in medical drugs, proposed courses of treatments, notes 
regarding unsuccessful treatments, and considerations of illnesses, 
medicines, and medical practices. In every case, Russian bureaucrats 
posed a specific, practical question; medical experts answered orally 
or in writing in Latin, drawing on their expertise and their books; 
the answer was translated into Russian and circulated to the relevant 
bureaucrats in writing, but often read aloud; the further progress of the 
case at hand was decided in part on the basis of that expert knowledge; 
and the report was then stored within the relevant case-file. Such a 
process can be seen as an information technology. This term, widely 
used yet rarely explicitly defined, is most commonly used to refer to 
modern devices such as computers, but it has also been applied to early 
modern technologies such as printing.3 Discussions of the nature of 
information technologies revolve around a device or system’s capacity 
not only to communicate a concept, but to reify it, making it storable.4 
We can thus see information technology as a device or system which 
allows the encoding, recording, communication, storage, and retrieval 
of information, a definition which applies to computers, the printing 
press, paper technologies more generally, and, most significantly 
3  See for example Jeremiah E. Dittmar, ‘Information Technology and Economic 
Change: The Impact of the Printing Press’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126 
(2011), 1133–72.
4  See Michael E. Hobart, and Zachary S. Schiffman, Information Ages: Literacy, 
Numeracy, and the Computer Revolution (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2000), especially pp. 4 and 212.
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here, the Apothecary Chancery’s reporting system. The Apothecary 
Chancery’s reports thus allows us to investigate knowledge circulation 
and information technologies in the context of seventeenth-century 
Russian administration, and in turn to see what the Russian case can 
reveal about information technologies in the early modern context. 
The Apothecary Chancery, the Chancery System, 
and Knowledge for the State
The 1628 case concerning the potentially magical root involved 
documents being passed between the regional governor in Rzhev—
where the accused witch, Andrei Loptunov, had first been arrested—
the regional governor in Toropets, Loptunov’s home town, the Moscow 
jail in which Loptunov was being held, the Military Service Chancery, 
who were investigating the case, and the Apothecary Chancery, who 
were providing expert testimony on the properties of said root. Such 
a circulation of documents was a feature of Muscovite administration. 
This administrative network, known as the chancery system, was 
composed of around sixty departments, or chanceries. Not all these 
departments were permanent fixtures, with some only lasting a matter 
of years, and yet the number of departments remained relatively 
constant across the century.5 Departments were created to deal with all 
significant areas of Muscovite life: finances and tax-collection; military 
affairs; administration of regions, especially those recently acquired; 
court life; and the Church. Where chanceries shared similar duties, close 
collaboration was necessary. For example, there were different chanceries 
responsible for general military and service activities, new formation 
regiments, and foreign mercenaries, all of whom had to cooperate to 
allow the Muscovite armed forces to function effectively. Alongside these 
central chanceries, Muscovy was also administered through the use of 
provincial governors, who communicated with the central chanceries on 
a number of issues. Chancery directors played a key role in this system, 
as conducting correspondence with other branches of the Muscovite 
governmental system was a vital part of their duties.
5  Peter B. Brown, ‘How Muscovy Governed. Seventeenth-Century Russian 
Administration’, Russian History, 36 (2009), 459–529 (p. 476).
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Figure 1. The Apothecary Chancery today.
The chancery directors were helped in their duties by the secretaries, 
another key group who undertook much of the day-to-day record-
keeping. Across the course of the seventeenth century there were 
significant changes in chancery staffing. N. F. Demidova has shown 
that the overall number of secretaries rose dramatically across the 
seventeenth century: in the 1640s, there were 837 secretaries and under-
secretaries in central chanceries; by the 1680s, this number had risen 
to 2,739.6 The growth in secretary numbers identified by Demidova is 
consistent with the figures provided by Grigorii Karpovich Kotoshikhin 
(ca. 1630–67), a former chancery secretary who defected to Poland and, 
later, Sweden, and author of the only contemporary Russian account of 
the chancery system. During the 1660s, Kotoshikhin puts the numbers 
of secretaries and governors at 100, and the number of undersecretaries 
at 1000; consideration of his numbers would suggest that the numbers 
of secretaries rose most precipitously between the 1660s and the 
1680s.7 Some departments were more reliant upon specialist staff than 
6  N. F. Demidova, Sluzhilaia biurokratiia v Rossii XVII v. i ee rol′ v formirovanii 
absoliutizma (Moscow: Nauka, 1987), p. 37.
7  G. K. Kotoshikhin, O Rossii v tsarstvovanie Alekseia Mikhailovicha (Moscow: 
ROSSPEN, 2000), p. 141.
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secretaries. The Apothecary Chancery only employed 2–3 secretaries 
at a time, with the vast majority of its staff consisting of medical 
practitioners. Like the secretaries, the numbers of medical practitioners 
employed at the Russian court rose dramatically across the seventeenth 
century. Figures compiled by Sabine Dumschat give the overall number 
of Apothecary Chancery medical staff in the period 1600–20 as 17; by 
1680–96 there were 112.8 This rise in staff numbers of both medical 
practitioners and secretaries is indicative of a general expansion of the 
chancery system across the seventeenth century. 
The expansion of the chancery system necessitated and drove an 
institutionalised form of literacy. Literacy in seventeenth-century 
Russia was commonly seen as a specialised skill, and was largely 
(although by no means exclusively) restricted to those who read and 
wrote professionally, such as the administrators and monastic copyists.9 
The chancery system, as it required the transmission of orders and 
information, relied heavily upon written documentation to perform 
its duties, leading to a proliferation of administrative documents. As 
departments communicated with one another, or with other government 
agents in Russia or abroad, written documents were used to ensure 
accurate transmission and to record those communications. 
The chancery system produced and circulated a great variety of 
documents, each with its own name: petitions (chelobitnye gramoty pl., 
chelobitnaia gramota sg.); orders from the tsar (pl. ukazy, sg. ukaz), his 
counsellors (prigovory pl., prigovor sg.), and from department heads; 
communications between department heads (pamiati pl., pamiat′ sg.); 
responses from underlings to their superiors confirming that they 
had fulfilled an order (otpiski pl., otpiska sg.); interrogation records 
(rassprossnye rechi pl., rassprosnaia rech′ sng.); torture records (pytochnye 
rechi pl., pytochnaia rech′ sng.); and reports such as those created by 
the Apothecary Chancery medical experts (skazki pl., skazka sg.).10 
8  Sabine Dumschat, Ausländischer Mediziner im Moskauer Russland (Stuttgart: Franz 
Steiner Verlag, 2006), p. 104.
9  Clare Griffin, ‘In Search of an Audience: Popular Pharmacies and the Limits of 
Literate Medicine in Late Seventeenth- and Early Eighteenth-Century Russia’, 
Bulletin for the History of Medicine, 89 (2015), 705–32.
10  On the different kinds of document, see S. O. Shmidt and S. E. Kniaz′kov, Dokumenty 
deloproizvodstva pravitel′stvennykh uchrezhdenii Rossii XVI–XVII vv. Uchebnoe posobie 
(Moscow: MGIAI, 1985); O. F. Kozlov et al. Gosudarstvennost′ Rossii: gosudarstvennye 
i tserkovnye uchrezhdeniia, soslovnye organy i organy mestnogo samoupravleniia, edinitsy 
administrativno-territorial′nogo, tserkovnogo i vedomstvennogo deleniia (konets XV veka 
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Some departments produced special kinds of document, like the Vesti-
Kuranty, a modern term for Russian translations of foreign newspapers 
produced by the Ambassadorial Chancery, and discussed elsewhere 
in this volume by Ingrid Maier and Daniel C. Waugh. A number of 
chanceries owned or produced books. The Ambassadorial Chancery 
produced a large number of translations, like Maciej Stryjkowski’s 
Polish Chronicle.11 Simeon Ushakov, who worked in the Armoury 
(Oruzheinyi prikaz), proposed (although never completed) a manual 
on icon painting.12 Nikolai Diletskii produced a textbook of music 
theory to help musicians at the Russian court understand and compose 
music.13 The Apothecary Chancery owned a library of medical, natural 
historical and other miscellaneous books.14 A number of those medical 
works were translated, and in the later seventeenth century Apothecary 
Chancery employees also composed their own texts.15 A central feature 
of the chancery system was thus its production, storage and circulation 
of documents. 
In the historiography of the chancery system as a whole, and in 
the historiography of individual chanceries, the issue of function has 
always been seen as important. Attempts have been made to classify the 
–fevral′ 1917 goda): slovar′-spravochnik, 6 vols (Moscow: Nauka, 1996–2009); Peter 
B. Brown, ‘Early Modern Russian Bureaucracy: The Evolution of the Chancellery 
System From Ivan III to Peter the Great’ (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 
1978), pp. 147–58; M. N. Tikhomirov, Rossiiskoe gosudarstvo XV–XVII vekov (Moscow: 
Nauka, 1973), pp. 364–69.
11  Christine Watson, Tradition and Translation: Maciej Stryjkowski’s Polish Chronicle 
in Seventeenth-Century Russian Manuscripts, Studia Slavica Upsaliensia XXXXVI 
(Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 2012).
12  Lindsey Hughes, ‘The Moscow Armory and Innovations in Seventeenth-Century 
Muscovite Art’, Canadian-American Slavic Studies, 13 (1979), 204–23.
13  Claudia R. Jensen, Musical Cultures in Seventeenth-Century Russia (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2009), pp. 122–23, p. 277, n. 54.
14  Katalog knig iz sobraniia Aptekarskogo prikaza, ed. by E. A. Savel′eva (St Petersburg: 
Al′faret, 2006), pp. 19–25. See also M. I. Slukhovskii, Bibliotechnoe delo v Rossii do 
XVII veka. Iz istorii knizhnogo prosveshcheniia (Moscow: Kniga, 1968), pp. 87–89; S. P. 
Luppov, Kniga v Rossii v XVII veke (Leningrad: Nauka, 1970), pp. 203–08.
15  On the translation of medical texts by the Apothecary Chancery, see 1672 translation 
of a German medical book, L. F. Zmeev, Russkie vrachebniki. Issledovanie v oblasti 
nashei drevnei vrachebnoi pis′mennosti, Pamiatniki drevnei pis′mennosti i iskusstva, 
no. 112 (St Petersburg: [n. pub.], 1896), pp. 72–73. In 1679 ten medical books were 
ordered to be translated, RGADA, coll. 143, descr. 2, file 1290. On the lack of a 
translator hampering translation work in the Apothecary Chancery: Mamonov, 
Materialy, 4, pp. 989–94. On the compilation of medical texts by the Apothecary 
Chancery staff see Griffin, ‘In Search of an Audience’.
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chanceries, by dividing them up into their relative spheres.16 Eve Levin, 
Maria Unkovskaya, and a number of historians of the chancery system 
have all proposed that the Apothecary Chancery was either exclusively 
or primarily a court institution.17 This view is particularly dependent 
upon the treatment of patients undertaken by the Apothecary Chancery: 
a substantial proportion of patients were members of court, therefore 
the Apothecary Chancery was a court institution. It should be noted, 
however, that the department also provided medical services for the 
army from at least 1632.18 Other scholars of the Apothecary Chancery have 
seen it as having a somewhat wider purview: M. B. Mirskii highlighted 
the fact that the Apothecary Chancery had some responsibility for 
the health of Muscovites outside of court circles and the army; M. K. 
Sokolovskii described the department as acting in several capacities, 
including as an Academy of Sciences, referring to both its library and its 
production of reports.19 Such approaches are in line with the views of K. 
A. Nevolin, who suggested that the Apothecary Chancery was defined 
by its function, medicine, not by its relationship to the court.20 In such 
a schema, then, the Apothecary Chancery is commonly seen as a court 
department, concerned primarily or exclusively with the medical needs 
16  For a detailed analysis of this historiographical trend, see Peter B. Brown, ‘Muscovite 
Government Bureaus’, Russian History, 10 (1983), 269–330. 
17  D. V. Liseitsev, N. M. Rogozhin and Iu. M. Eskin, Prikazy Moskovskogo gosudarstva 
XVI–XVII vv. Slovar′-spravochnik (Moscow and St Petersburg: Tsentr gumanitarnikh 
initsiativ, 2015), pp. 33–35; Eve Levin, ‘The Administration of Western Medicine in 
Seventeenth-Century Russia’, in Modernizing Muscovy: Reform and Social Change in 
Seventeenth Century Russia, ed. by Jarmo Kotilaine and Marshall Poe (London and 
New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004), pp. 363–89 (pp. 366–67); Maria Unkovskaya, 
‘Learning Foreign Mysteries: Russian Pupils of the Aptekarskii Prikaz, 1650–1700’, 
Oxford Slavonic Papers, 30 (1997), 1–20 (p. 2); N. V. Ustiugov, ‘Evoliutsiia prikaznogo 
stroia russkogo gosudarstva v XVII v.’, in Absoliutizm v Rossii XVII–XVIII vv: Sbornik 
statei k semidesiatiletiiu so dnia rozhdeniia i sorokapiatiletiiu nauchnoi i pedagogicheskoi 
deiatel′nosti B. B. Kafengauza, ed. by N. M. Druzhinin (Moscow: Nauka, 1964), 134–67 
(p. 146); Brown, ‘Muscovite Government Bureaus’, pp. 292, 94.
18  1632 provision of medicines and field surgeons to the army: RGADA, coll. 143, 
descr. 1, file 114.
19  M. B. Mirskii, ‘Aptekarskii prikaz (k 410-letiiu gosudarstvennogo upravleniia 
meditsinskimi delami v Rossii)’, Sovetskoe zdravookhranenie, 11 (1991), 72–77 (pp. 
74–76); M. K. Sokolovskii, ‘Kharakter i znachenie deiatel′nosti Aptekarskogo 
prikaza’, Vestnik arkheologii i istorii, 16 (1904), 60–89 (pp. 60–61).
20  K. A. Nevolin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii K. A. Nevolina, 6 vols (St Petersburg: Tip. 
Eduarda Pratsa, 1857–59), 6 (1859), pp. 143–44, 168.
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of the palace, with little or no competencies outside of those duties.21 
However, such an analysis excludes or undervalues certain aspects of 
the Apothecary Chancery’s work. Most importantly for our purposes 
here, the Apothecary Chancery was frequently called upon to provide 
reports to various institutions.22 What, then, does this reporting work 
tell us about the function of the Apothecary Chancery, and about the 
functioning of the chancery system as a whole?
Work on information technologies, information management, paper 
technologies, and paperwork provide useful models here. The study of 
information in early modern Western Europe has focussed on the idea of 
an ‘information overload’, that early modern Europeans had access to an 
impossibly large amount of information, hence much intellectual work 
of the period was directed towards sorting, categorising, preserving 
and managing that information. This problem was particularly acute 
for two groups: experts and bureaucrats, the same groups involved 
in the Apothecary Chancery reporting system. This literature reveals 
the great variety of ways in which early modern Europeans sought to 
organise information: Ann Blair has written about manuscript notes and 
printed reference books; Anke Te Heesen has emphasised the influence 
and various utilities of double-entry book-keeping; various medical 
historians have looked at case-books; and Staffan Müller-Wille and 
Isabelle Charmantier have looked at the great Swedish botanist Carl 
Linnaeus’s use of index cards.23 All these historians focus on the issue 
21  N. P. Zagoskin, Vrachi i vrachebnoe delo v starinnoi Rossii (Kazan: Tip. Imperatorskogo 
Universiteta, 1891), p. 5; F. L. German, Kak lechilis′ Moskovskie tsari? (mediko-
istoricheskii ocherk) (Kiev and Kharkov: F. A. Iorganson, 1895), p. 79; N. Ia. 
Novombergskii, Cherty vrachebnoi praktiki v Moskovskoi Rusi (kul′turno-istoricheskii 
ocherk) (St Petersburg: Tip. Ministerstva vnutrennikh del, 1904), pp. 53–54; N. V. 
Ustiugov, ‘Evoliutsiia’, p. 146; Brown, ‘Muscovite Government Bureaus’, pp. 292, 
94; John Appleby, ‘Ivan the Terrible to Peter the Great: British Formative Influence 
on Russia’s Medico-Apothecary System’, Medical History, 27 (1983), 289–304 (p. 290); 
Mirskii, ‘Aptekarskii prikaz’, p. 74–76; Unkovskaya, ‘Learning Foreign Mysteries’, 
p. 2; Levin, ‘Administration’, pp. 366–67; N. V. Rybalko, Rossiiskaia prikaznaia 
biurokratiia v smutnoe vremia nachala XVII v. (Moscow: Kvadriga, 2011), p. 12. 
22  Sokolovskii, ‘Kharakter i znachenie’, pp. 60–61. Nevolin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 
6, pp. 143–44, 168.
23  Ann M. Blair, Too Much to Know: Managing Scholarly Information Before The Modern 
Age (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010); Staffan Müller-Wille, and Isabelle 
Charmantier, ‘Natural History and Information Overload: The Case of Linnaeus’, 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy 
of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 43 (2012), 4–15; Anke Te Heesen, ‘Accounting 
for the Natural World: Double-Entry Bookkeeping in the Field’, in Colonial Botany: 
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of paper, manuscript and print, either singularly or in interaction. Paper 
was also vital to the Apothecary Chancery, and indeed the chancery 
system as a whole. Yet following the path of Apothecary Chancery 
reports highlights another issue: the spoken word as a meaningful part 
of how knowledge was created and circulated.24 Orders for reports to be 
made were given orally; reports were either written down immediately, 
or spoken out loud and then transcribed; they were conveyed to 
bureaucrats in speech. Oral communication was a fundamental, 
inalienable part of the system. This is an aspect of knowledge exchange 
the focus on paper tends to obscure: although orality has been discussed 
as a part of early modern scientific exchange, it is not seen as an integral 
part of early modern scientific information technologies.25 Here, then, we 
will use the term information technology, rather than paper technology, 
to highlight that it is the information—the reports—that we choose to 
follow and to highlight, and not the paper. The concept of information 
technology gives us a new way to approach the chancery system, one 
which focuses on how departments worked together, rather than what 
divided them; conversely, the Russian case highlights the interactions 
of paper with speech as a fundamental part of knowledge circulation.
Ordering Knowledge
Before the questionable root found on Loptunov in 1628 was sent to 
the Apothecary Chancery, Loptunov himself had been interrogated 
regarding his possession, where he stated 
the root he had wrapped around a crucifix was given to him by a 
passer-by on the road, and from which town [this man came] he does 
Science, Commerce, And Politics in the Early Modern World, ed. by Londa Schiebinger, 
and Claudia Swan (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), pp. 
237–51.
24  The utility of orality in Muscovy has been discussed by Christoph Witzenrath. 
See Witzenrath, ‘Literacy and Orality in the Eurasian Frontier: Imperial Culture 
and Space in Seventeenth-Century Siberia and Russia’, Slavonic and East European 
Review, 87. 1 (2009), 53–77.
25  See for example Eileen Adair Reeves, ‘Speaking of Sunspots: Oral Culture in an 
Early Modern Scientific Exchange’, Configurations, 13 (2007), 185–210; Walter J. Ong, 
‘Orality, Literacy, and Medieval Textualization’, New Literary History, 16 (1984), 
1–12.
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not know, and [the man] gave him that root because Andrei suffers from 
epilepsy [lit. black illness].26 
It was Loptunov’s claim that the root was medical, and not magical, 
that led to the involvement of the Apothecary Chancery, but it was 
not Loptunov’s decision. Counsellor Secretary Fedor Fedorovich 
Likhachev, head of the Military Service Chancery and so the man 
ultimately responsible for Loptunov’s trial, was the person who ordered 
the report, sending both root and order to the Apothecary Chancery. 
At the Apothecary Chancery, Likhachev’s order was then affirmed and 
reiterated by the director, boyar prince Ivan Borisovich Cherkasskii. 
Such a process was typical for the creation of Apothecary Chancery 
reports: their writing was ordered by a senior Russian bureaucrat, who 
was commonly a noble. 
The role of a noble official in ordering reports relates to the issue of 
boyar involvement in chancery affairs, a topic that has been controversial. 
One substantial issue is the education of Russian nobles: not all of 
them were functionally literate, and certainly none of the Apothecary 
Chancery directors had any medical training. How, then, could they have 
contributed to the administration of a literate bureaucracy, especially 
when it dealt with expert knowledge? Borivoj Plavsic has proposed that 
the boyars did little in the chanceries, with the real work being done by 
the secretaries, who worked as their assistants.27 Robert O. Crummey 
has a more positive view of the boyars’ contribution, proposing that 
they would have used their long tradition of military service to bring 
much needed leadership to chancery affairs.28 Crummey, however, does 
not think that the boyars made a practical contribution based on skill. 
Peter B. Brown has proposed a third view: looking at the organisation 
and work of the Military Service Chancery, he notes that this institution 
26  Novombergskii, Materialy, 3. 1, pp. 9–12; V. B. Kolosova, ‘Name—Text—Ritual: The 
Role of Plant Characteristics in Slavic Folk Medicine’, Folklorica, 10 (2005), 44–61 (p. 
52).
27  Borivoj Plavsic, ‘Seventeenth-Century Chanceries and Their Staffs’, in Russian 
Officialdom: The Bureaucratization of Russian Society from the Seventeenth to the 
Twentieth Century, ed. by Walter McKenzie Pintner and Don Karl Rowney (London: 
Macmillan, 1980), pp. 19–45 (pp. 25–26).
28  Robert O. Crummey, ‘The Origins of the Noble Official: The Boyar Elite, 1613–1689’, 
in Russian Officialdom, ed. by Pintner and Rowney, pp. 46–75 (p. 75).
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fulfilled its duties competently, which reflects well on the boyars.29 
Similarly, George G. Weickhardt has argued that, judging by their 
successes and failures during the seventeenth century, there was no 
clear difference in the competence of the boyars and the secretaries.30 
Apothecary Chancery directors, who before 1696 were all boyars, always 
had substantial administrative experience in other departments before 
taking up that post.31 It thus seems that boyar directors were expected 
to take active part in the administration of their departments, which, 
in the case of the Apothecary Chancery, included ordering reports. 
Indeed, as such an order could be conveyed orally, there is no reason 
that functional illiteracy would have been an issue. Russian boyars 
formed a vital, initial stage in the information technology of Apothecary 
Chancery reports.
Not all extant Apothecary Chancery reports have retained their initial 
pages, meaning it is not always known exactly which Russian official 
ordered the report. Such preliminary pages survive in enough reports 
to show that very commonly such orders came from the Apothecary 
Chancery director. Such was the case in 1643, when head of the Apothecary 
Chancery, Fedor Ivanovich Sheremetev, asked the German physician 
Belau for a report explaining his treatment of Grigorii Gorikhvostov for 
worms.32 When Sheremetev asked for the report, Gorikhvostov had been 
under Belau’s care for a month; apparently, this was considered to be too 
long, and Belau was called upon to explain why his treatment had failed 
to produce results. Here Sheremetev was evidently concerned with the 
efficiency and efficacy of patient treatment in the department, a problem 
he sought to resolve partly through the production of knowledge. Similar 
reports ordered by the Apothecary Chancery director concern cooling 
29  Peter B. Brown, ‘Military Planning and High-Level Decision-Making in Seventeenth-
Century Russia: The Roles of the Military Chancellery (Razriad) and the Boyar 
Duma’, Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte, 58 (2002), 33–43.
30  George G. Weickhardt, ‘Bureaucrats and Boiars in the Muscovite Tsardom’, Russian 
History, 10 (1983), 342–49 (pp. 347–49).
31  For an overview of the careers of Apothecary Chancery directors, see Clare Griffin, 
‘The Production and Consumption of Medical Knowledge in Seventeenth-Century 
Russia: The Apothecary Chancery’ (Ph.D. dissertation, University College London, 
2013), pp. 221–23, http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1388075/
32  Unusually for an Apothecary Chancery document, we are not given any further 
information about Gorikhvostov other than his name. Mamonov, Materialy, 1, pp. 
39–40.
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medicines (1643), and autopsies (1677, and 1679).33 Orders from the 
Apothecary Chancery head commonly dealt with strictly medical matters.
Orders for reports could come directly from the ruler. Between 
1619 and 1633, Patriarch Filaret was co-ruler with his son, Tsar Mikhail 
Fedorovich, and Filaret himself commissioned certain reports. In 1623 
Filaret launched an investigation into Mikhail Fedorovich’s former 
fiancée, Mariia Ivanovna Khlopova, in particular concerning her sudden 
sickness that had ended the engagment in 1616; the investigation included 
an Apothecary Chancery report on her health.34 In 1644 a member of 
the retinue of Count Valdemar (son of King Christian IV of Denmark 
by morganatic marriage) was killed when Valdemar attempted to flee 
Moscow to escape the stalled negotiations to marry Tsarevna Irina. As a 
result, Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich ordered an official autopsy be conducted 
on the luckless Danish servitor.35 An order from Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich 
in 1679 calls for an autopsy of boyar prince Ivan Alekseevich Vorotynskii, 
who had died suddenly shortly after a meeting with the tsar, raising the 
possibility that the tsar had been infected with a deadly disease.36 Orders 
from the tsar or his co-rulers also concerned medicine, but as a way to 
solve political problems.
Even when the order came from the Apothecary Chancery director, 
there is often direct or indirect evidence that the tsar was involved in 
the process. In 1645 Count Valdemar again came to the attention of the 
Apothecary Chancery, as he had requested some medicines from the 
department; Apothecary Chancery director Fedor Ivanovich Sheremetev 
ordered a report on which illnesses such medicines could be used to treat.37 
Given the tsar’s interest in his potential son-in-law and heir (Mikhail only 
had one son, the future Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, not a sure dynastic 
bet, and Valdemar’s parents’ morganatic marriage meant he could not 
claim the Danish throne), it is likely he was involved in this case. Another 
significant group of reports involving the tsar concern negotiations 
33  1643 report on cooling medicines: Mamonov, Materialy, 1, pp. 45–46. 1677 report on 
Blumentrost’s wife and daughter: Mamonov, Materialy, 4, pp. 908. 1679 report on 
the Patriarch’s groom: Mamonov, Materialy, 4, pp. 1161–62.
34  Sobranie gosudarstvennykh gramot i dogovorov, khraniashchikhsia v gosudarstvennoi 
kollegii inostrannykh del, 4 vols (Moscow: N. S. Vsevolozhskii, 1813–28), 3, pp. 257–66.
35  Mamonov, Materialy, 1, pp. 62–63. 
36  Mamonov, Materialy, 4, pp. 1304, 1198–99.
37  Mamonov, Materialy, 1, p. 125.
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over the purchase of unicorn horns.38 Unicorn horns, most of which 
were actually narwhal tusks, were a prized—and hugely expensive—
commodity, sought after both as ornaments and as medicaments in early 
modern Europe.39 During the course of purchase negotiations in 1657, 
the Apothecary Chancery head relayed the tsar’s order that reports be 
produced, on the specific horn in question, and on unicorn horn and 
its medical properties in general.40 Orders relayed from the tsar via the 
Apothecary Chancery director thus also commonly focus on politics, but 
sometimes also concerned expensive medicines.
The Apothecary Chancery also received orders to produce reports 
from other sections of the Muscovite administrative system. One of the 
largest groups of such documents is the examinations of soldiers and 
other servitors to assess their fitness to serve. In such cases, Apothecary 
Chancery physicians were tasked with three questions: was the servitor 
genuinely sick, injured, or otherwise incapacitated; could the ailment be 
treated; and, once treatment was completed, could the service person 
in question return to his duties. For example, in 1666 the Musketeers’ 
Chancery had a group of their servitors examined, with the Apothecary 
Chancery report detailing the bodily state of each man and how it related 
to their ability to serve.41 Notably, the document does not record any actual 
treatments, only information on the necessity and possible outcomes of 
any future treatments. The military departments thus were involved in 
ordering reports relating to the usefulness of servitors’ bodies.
As in the case with which we began, the 1628 witchcraft investigation, 
reports were also requested as a part of judicial proceedings conducted 
by various chanceries. Such reports always explicitly state the limits 
of the report, posing a specific question for the experts to answer. In 
1657, the Apothecary Chancery was sent a herb and asked “what is 
38  These reports are discussed in Robert Collis, ‘Magic, Medicine and Authority in 
Mid-Seventeenth-Century Muscovy: Andreas Engelhardt (d. 1683) and the Role 
of the Western Physician at the Court of Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich, 1656–1666’, 
Russian History, 40 (2013), 399–427.
39  On the use of unicorn horn as an objet d’art, see Aleksandr Plukowski, ‘Narwhals 
or Unicorns? Exotic Animals as Material Culture in Medieval Europe’, European 
Journal of Archaeology, 7 (2004), 291–313. On the use of the horn in medicine, see 
Brian Fotheringham, ‘The Unicorn and its Influence on Pharmacy and Medicine’, 
Pharmacy History Australia, 10 (2000), 3–7. 
40  Mamonov, Materialy, 2, p. 160.
41  Ibid., pp. 311–12.
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that herb and is it criminal (vorovskoe)?”—criminal being a common 
synonym for maleficia, or magic intended to cause harm.42 In a case from 
1703, the physicians were asked “whether that root is evil, or good, or 
good for the aforementioned illness, and is useful for medicine”.43 A 
similar set of orders concern illicit medical practice. In 1685 the head 
of the Musketeers’ Chancery, Counsellor Secretary Fedor Leontevich 
Shaklovityi, requested a report from the Apothecary Chancery on the 
herb p′ianoe zelie (lit. heady herb), which was being sold on the market 
stalls (zelenyi riad, herb row) as a medicine.44 As with the orders relating 
to witchcraft cases, Shaklovityi wanted to know if this herb had been 
licenced for sale (i poskolko ego veleno prodavat i s porukoiu l′ ili bes poruk), 
and if this herb was appropriate for use as an internal medicine. Reports 
ordered for inclusion in trials thus focus on the physical evidence upon 
which the decision of the case rested.
Non-expert, noble officials from across the Muscovite administration 
played a central role in both initiating, and determining the limits, of 
Apothecary Chancery report production. They set the questions upon 
which the reports were to be focussed and initiated  the exchange of 
documents around the administration, which was also an essential part 
of the process. The limits of expert medical reports, and the nature of 
the chancery system as an information technology, was determined by 
Russian bureaucrats, not by medical experts.
Compiling Knowledge
Returning again to 1628, the Military Service Chancery, having heard 
the testimony of both Loptunov and his master, decided on further 
tests of Andrei’s story, and his characterisation of the root as medicinal, 
by sending the root to the Apothecary Chancery for examination. The 
resulting report states,
Doctor Valentine [Bills] and his colleagues, having looked at the root, 
said that this root [is called] Goose-flesh, and is used in medicines, and 
has nothing evil in it, and [people] put that root in the mouth. And if 
someone wished to commit a crime, and [if] he used the good herb 
42  1657 witchcraft case against Andrei Durbenev: Mamonov, Materialy, 3, 676–77.
43  RGADA, coll. 143, descr. 2, file 1618.
44  1685 investigation into the sale of p′ianoe zelie: RGADA, coll. 143, descr. 3, file 172.
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badly, for criminality or witchcraft, that they do not know, [and they do 
not know] if there is a curse on that root.45
In this case, the report was created in part by an examination of a 
natural object. That examination was informed by the expertise of the 
physicians, and their ability to identify a root and to know and recount 
its properties, based on the training in botany and natural history 
that Western European university-trained physicians possessed. This 
process of selecting brief snippets of information from a much larger 
corpus of knowledge in order to give a focussed answer to a specific 
question was central to the Apothecary Chancery reporting system. 
Reports created from a combination of experience and expert 
knowledge made up a substantial proportion of such texts, with 
particular emphasis on natural objects and human bodies. All of the 
reports produced for witchcraft and medical malpractice trials involved 
such examinations, usually of herbs and roots. Interestingly, these 
were the only cases in which Russians played a role as experts rather 
than patrons. Until 1654, all medical practitioners were foreigners from 
Western Europe. After that date, the Apothecary Chancery began to 
train medical practitioners for the first time: field surgeons, to serve the 
army; and apothecaries, to prepare medicines.46 The department also 
employed Russians as herb collectors (travniki) who were expected to be 
knowledgeable in the properties of local plants. These Russian medical 
practitioners occasionally took part in report creation. In the 1685 p′ianoe 
zelie case all the examiners were foreign medical practitioners.47 With one 
exception (1703), all of the medical experts who composed testimony for 
witchcraft trials were foreign.48 In contrast, in a 1679 medical malpractice 
case two separate groups of experts were consulted, the first group 
being led by foreigners, and the second group entirely consisting of 
Russians.49 Examination of a natural object was often a central part of 
the report-creation process, and in cases involving herbs and roots, 
Russians played a role in creating knowledge, as well as ordering it.
45  Novombergskii, Materialy, 3, part 1, pp. 9–12.
46  Unkovskaya, ‘Foreign Mysteries’, p. 12; Zmeev, Vrachebniki, p. 266; V. F. Gruzdev, 
Russkie rukopisnye travniki (Leningrad: Voenno-morskaia meditsinskaia akademiia, 
1946), p. 25. 
47  1685 malpractice case: RGADA, coll. 143, descr. 3, file 172.
48  1703 witchcraft cases: RGADA, coll. 143, descr. 2, file 1618.
49  1679 malpractice case: Mamonov, Materialy, 4, pp. 1110–11. 
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A second substantial group of examination-based reports involved 
human bodies. Such was the case with post-mortems, for example that 
of the unfortunate Danish servitor killed in 1644. The report on his cause 
of death stated “that cupbearer is wounded by a harquebus [and] the 
wound is just under the right eye”.50 Unusually for post-mortems in 
Muscovy, the doctors then went on to attempt to remove the bullet by 
cutting into the body: such incisions were rarely made. In this case the 
incision was unproductive, as the bullet failed to materialise, with the 
doctors proposing that it likely had gone too deep into the skull to be 
easily retrieved. Whether a post-mortem included an internal probe, as 
in this case, or was only external, close examination of the body was key 
to creating the report. 
As well as examining natural objects and human bodies whose state 
was in question, Apothecary Chancery medical experts also referred to 
books in making their reports. In such cases, the only experts involved 
were foreigners, although the Apothecary Chancery did own Russian-
language texts. The use of books was made explicit in the 1685 report on 
the questionable herb p′ianoe zelie, as the Apothecary Chancery experts 
declared it unfit for use in internal medicine after an examination of texts 
in the Apothecary Chancery library revealed that it was not listed as 
medicinal.51 The report further added that p′ianoe zelie was a dangerous 
herb, capable of causing amnesia (zabvenie uma) and even death; such 
information may well also have been taken from a book.52 In this case, 
multiple works from the Apothecary Chancery library were apparently 
used to construct the report.
Many reports mention individual authors and authorities. Samuel 
Collins’s 1664 report on obesity cites Hippocrates.53 Andreas Lichifinus’s 
1657 report on the Indian unicorn references both Marco Polo and 
Andrea Bacci, a sixteenth-century papal physician.54 In Laurentius 
Blumentrost’s 1690 report on the education of medical graduates from 
Padua (one of whom was then seeking a position in the department), he 
praised their knowledge of Galen and humoural medicine, but railed 
50  Mamonov, Materialy, 1, pp. 62–63.
51  ‘v optekarskom prikaze v optekarskikh kn[i]gakh nigde ne napisana chtob ivo 
vnutr ch[e]l[o]v[e]komu upotrebliat’, RGADA, coll. 143, descr. 3, file 172.
52  RGADA, coll. 143, descr. 3, file 172.
53  Mamonov, Materialy, 3, pp. 787–89.
54  Mamonov, Materialy, 2, p. 160.
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against their ignorance of chemical medicine, a practice he ascribed 
not only to Paracelsus and Jan Baptist von Helmont (two of the most 
important chemical medical thinkers of early modern Europe), but also 
Hippocrates, Plato, and “other most ancient teachers, who are now 
and from ancient [times] accepted and respected”.55 In this case, like 
Collins and Lichifinus before him, Blumentrost only makes mention 
of specific elements of a huge corpus of writing and ideas, selecting 
only the parts which make sense in the context of his report. Books and 
their authoritative and expert authors were important to Apothecary 
Chancery reports, but only small pieces of information were chosen from 
a vast amount of available and relevant medical and natural historical 
thought in order to craft a direct, expert answer to a particular question.
On rare occasions, Apothecary Chancery reports even delved into 
the Bible as a form of textual authority. The Latin version of Samuel 
Collins’s report on venesection, written in 1664, contains several Biblical 
references.56 In creating an apologia for astrology as both medically 
useful and acceptable to Christianity, Collins included three Biblical 
quotations: Daniel 5. 27, Job 38. 31, and Judges 5. 20. All these quotations 
deal with God as an interventionist force in the universe, manipulating 
it according to his will and leaving signs for Christians to interpret. 
A marginal comment by Collins references the first century Roman-
Jewish scholar Flavius Josephus, on Seth, the third son of Adam and 
Eve, to whom Josephus attributes the discovery of many of the secrets 
of astronomy.57 Here Collins took on two enormous corpora—the Bible, 
and Biblical scholarship—and, like his colleagues using other learned 
authorities, selected specific elements to support his argument. In this 
he was apparently unsuccessful: the Russian version of Collins’s report 
excludes all these references, an issue dealt with below. Nevertheless, 
Collins’s attempt to include in his report quotations from the most 
authoritative of all authorities in early modern Europe, the Bible, 
demonstrates the fundamental importance of brief, selective use of 
major textual authorities to create the Apothecary Chancery reports.
55  RGADA, coll. 143, descr. 3, file 322.
56  RGADA, coll. 143, descr. 2, file 738.
57  Flavius Josephus, The Antiquities of the Jews, trans. by William Whiston (Cirencester: 
The Echo Library, 2005), p. 444.
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In all of these cases the Apothecary Chancery reports took one, 
short, aspect of a larger textual authority, and re-contextualised it. Such 
an approach was by no means typical for early modern experts when 
dealing with information; they produced and reproduced information, 
and textual authority, in a variety of fashions. In perhaps the shortest 
format, Linnaeus placed individual words on index cards.58 At the 
other end of the scale, many intellectuals produced critical editions of 
ancient world texts in their entirety, often accompanied by substantial 
glosses, which could rival the length of the original work. Florilegia, 
miscellanies, botanical works, medical recipe books and natural 
histories all reproduced shorter textual elements, ranging from a 
paragraph to several pages of a chapter.59 The Apothecary Chancery’s 
methods of dealing with textual authorities thus sat within a variety 
of approaches to such in the early modern world, which ranged from 
wholesale reproduction and even extension of the original, to the use 
of individual words. Considered in this context, Apothecary Chancery 
reports are notable for their selection of sentence-long pieces of 
information from textual authorities to be contextualised within longer 
prose compositions.
The creation of expert reports by the Apothecary Chancery was 
conducted on two bases, which often overlapped: examination of 
a natural object, and reference to established textual authorities. 
Interestingly, the only cases in which Russians worked as experts 
who created knowledge, rather than bureaucrats who ordered that 
knowledge be created, are those cases concerning examinations. It was 
the Western European, university-trained physicians who produced 
reports using textual authorities. The use of those authorities is hugely 
significant: the Hippocratic corpus, which comes up multiple times, is 
massive. Apothecary Chancery reports select only one or two elements 
from within this, and other extensive collections of writing, to create a 
selective, direct answer to a specific question.
58  Müller-Wille and Charmantier, ‘Natural History and Information Overload’.
59  Blair, Too Much to Know.
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Figure 2. An illuminated page from Josephus’s Antiquities of the Jews (1466).
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Translating Knowledge
A particular feature of knowledge circulation in the Apothecary 
Chancery was the central role of translation. The medical staff members 
were commonly native speakers of English, German or Dutch, although 
there were also occasionally French, Italian and Greek speakers present 
as well. Those trained in universities, such as the physicians, would 
have known Latin; those trained in guilds, such as apothecaries and 
surgeons, may not have done. Bureaucrats, both department heads 
and secretaries, were Russian speakers, only a few of whom knew 
foreign languages. This situation necessitated translation as a key part 
of knowledge exchange. This could take place as written translation, 
with the medical practitioners providing a Latin text, in which case the 
documents use the phrase “translated from a Latin document” (perevod 
s Latinskogo pis′ma). It could also take place as an oral interpretation, 
with the Latin being spoken aloud, interpreted into Russian, and then 
taken down. In such cases, the verb “to say” (skazat′ inf.) is used. Such 
was the case in Loptunov’s 1628 witchcraft trial, in which the document 
records: “And Doctor Valentine [Bills] and his colleagues, having looked 
at the root, said [my emphasis]…”.60 
This was common, both within the Apothecary Chancery, and 
within the chancery system more widely: the same formulation is used 
in reports on cooling medicines61 and on worms62 in 1643, a report on 
the uses of animal parts in medicine in 1664,63 and autopsies in 167764 
and 1679.65 It is notable that all of these reports were particularly brief, 
even by the standards of the Apothecary Chancery: the autopsies, and 
the 1628 report on Loptunov’s root, each run to only a few sentences; the 
other reports a couple of paragraphs. It thus seems that orally translated 
reports were made for particularly brief answers, when perhaps the 
process of composing a text and then translating it would have been 
unnecessarily time-consuming.
60  Novombergskii, Materialy, 3, part 1, pp. 9–12.
61  Mamonov, Materialy, 1, pp. 45–46.
62  Ibid., pp. 39–40.
63  Novombergskii, Materialy, 1, pp. 54–55.
64  1677 report on Blumentrost’s wife and daughter: Mamonov, Materialy, 4, pp. 908.
65  1679 report on Patriarch’s groom: Mamonov, Materialy, 4, pp. 1161–62.
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Transcription of oral reports could significantly shape the final form 
of the report. On 1 January 1658 a priest’s wife was found dead, and 
three Apothecary Chancery physicians—Lichifinus, Engelhardt and 
Graman—examined the body for signs of plague. Engelhardt said: 
“That woman had scrofula of the stomach… and that [scrofula] does 
not cause the plague”.66 Graman agreed, stating that: “That woman 
had scrofula of the stomach… and that [scrofula] does not cause the 
plague”.67 A significant feature of these two statements is the high level 
of similarity between them; they are almost identical. It likely indicates 
that these were not the exact words of Engelhardt and Graman, as 
the sole difference between them is orthographical: variant spellings 
of the word for scrofula (zolotukha and zolotik). It is probable that the 
scribe reproducing Engelhardt’s and Graman’s statements paraphrased 
their words; as noted by Daniel E. Collins, such minor adjustments are 
common in other Muscovite documents that transcribe speech.68 Despite 
the lack of an original for comparison, we can nevertheless see that oral 
reports do seem to have been subject to adjustments by scribes.
The process of translation can be traced in greater detail when both 
an original and a translation are extant, as is the case in a number of 
the written reports. Significantly, although Apothecary Chancery 
medical staff spoke many languages, and even wrote some documents 
in other languages during their time in Russia (letters relating to their 
delays by officious border guards are typically written in German), 
all extant originals of the reports are in Latin. This was likely simply a 
practical consideration: reports were most commonly composed by the 
physicians, who all knew Latin; restricting the reporting to one language 
limited the numbers of translators the department required, which staff 
group was always in high demand across the chancery system. 
The translation process was used to edit reports. As noted above, 
although Samuel Collins attempted to marshall Biblical authority 
in his defence of astrology as a useful and Christian activity, the 
sentences in which Collins references the Bible in his Latin original 
66  Mamonov, Materialy, 3, pp. 694–95.
67  Ibid.
68  Daniel E. Collins, ‘Speech Reporting and the Suppression of Orality in Seventeenth-
Century Russian Trial Dossiers’, Journal of Historical Pragmatics, 7 (2006), 265–92 (p. 
283). See also Collins, Reanimated Voices. Speech Reporting in a Historical-Pragmatic 
Perspective (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2001).
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were redacted in the Russian translation.69 A. P. Bogdanov, who first 
noted that parts of the Latin original of this text were not preserved 
in the Russian translation, calls the removed sections insignificant 
(maloznachitel′nye).70 Alternatively, Maria Unkovskaya argues that 
the edited sentences were concerned with cosmology, and were not 
translated due to the ban she proposes existed in the Apothecary 
Chancery on the discussion of medical theory or natural philosophy.71 
However, as shown in examples above, various other Apothecary 
Chancery reports do mention medical theorists, medical theories, and 
natural philosophy, often relying on works owned by the department. 
Moreover, sentences present in Collins’s original Latin that are absent 
from the Russian are all Biblical, and not cosmological or natural 
philosophical. For example, Collins wrote
There is an ancient custom among the Persians, to which the Prophecy 
of Daniel in the presence of King Belshazzar may have referred with 
the word ‘Tekel’: You have been weighed on the scales and found wanting. 
[Emphasis my own] 
The reference to Daniel’s conversation with Belshazzar remains in the 
final Russian version, but Daniel’s interpretation of the Word of God 
has been removed: you have been weighed, and found wanting (see 
Daniel 5. 13–28). In each case where sentences are removed, they were 
extracted from different parts of the text, in a way which leaves the 
remaining text comprehensible, but removes direct quotations from the 
Bible. This is likely due to concerns over heresy. In contrast to the highly 
adaptive approach to text and translation found in the Apothecary 
Chancery reports, and for that matter the Vesti-Kuranty, the text of the 
Bible and other religious works were approached entirely differently: the 
word, and the words, of God, were sacrosanct, and changing them was 
fundamentally problematic.72 This was evidenced by the problems of 
69  RGADA, coll. 143, descr. 2, file 738.
70  A. P. Bogdanov, ‘O rassuzhdenii Samuila Kollinsa’, in Estestvennonauchnye 
predstavleniia Drevnei Rusi ed. by R. A. Simonov (Moscow: Nauka, 1988), pp. 204–08. 
Bogdanov’s edition of the Russian text is published here pp. 206–08.
71  Unkovskaya, ‘Foreign Mysteries’, p. 9.
72  On adaptive translation in the Vesti-Kuranty, see Ingrid Maier, ‘Newspaper 
Translations in Seventeenth-Century Muscovy. About the Sources, Topics and 
Periodicity of Kuranty “Made in Stockholm” (1649)’, in Explorare necesse est. 
Hyllningsskrift till Barbro Nilsson, ed. by Per Ambrosiani, Elisabeth Löfstrand, 
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Patriarch Nikon’s Church reforms of the 1660s, which revolved around 
proposed changes to the service books. According to David Frick, many 
of those involved in the Muscovite religious debates were using Polish 
Bibles, but went to great lengths to conceal that fact.73 The Book of the 
Bible that Collins was citing here—Daniel—was in the Slavonic Bible, 
but Collins was not citing the Slavonic Bible; he was citing a Western 
European Bible. For Muscovites, this difference was substantial. The 
Slavonic Book of Daniel was canonical; a Western European Book of 
Daniel was heretical. Collins’s text was familiar to Russian scribes, but 
nevertheless sufficiently alien and problematic to necessitate excision. 
In this case, then, the translation process led to the deliberate removal of 
whole sentences deemed inappropriate for religious reasons.
The translation process was also used to add information to a report. 
In the 1665 text on valerian root Collins covers the physical appearance, 
properties, methods of preparation and modes of consumption of the 
plant.74 In the Russian version of the document there is an additional 
section, introduced in the report as excerpts from the herbal with 520 
chapters, an as-yet unidentified Russian-language herbal. As the text 
specifies that the origin of the additional articles is a Russian-language 
herbal, it is unlikely that Collins, who knew very little Russian, could 
have chosen those excerpts to accompany his report; they are more likely 
to have been chosen by a Russian-speaking member of the Apothecary 
Chancery staff, perhaps the scribe who prepared the final, Russian 
version of Collins’s report. The articles from the herbal complement 
Collins’s abstract description of the properties of the root by providing 
specific recipes for its use. Here, Russian scribes used their ability to 
change the text of a report to include extra material relevant to the topic. 
Close examination of the translation stage in the Apothecary 
Chancery’s reporting information technology reveals two significant 
points: the impact of translation upon the content of a report, and the 
respective roles of the spoken and written word. The Russian text of a 
report could substantially differ from the Latin original, often because 
Laila Nordquist, and Ewa Teodorowicz-Hellman (Stockholm: Acta Universitatis 
Stockholmiensis, 2002), pp. 181–90.
73  David A. Frick, ‘Sailing to Byzantium: Greek Texts and the Establishment of 
Authority in Early Modern Muscovy’, Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 19 (1995), 138–57.
74  Mamonov, Materialy, 3, pp. 791–94.
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of deliberate changes to the text undertaken by the translator, who 
either added or removed elements. Translation was thus a form of 
editing, which could have a major influence on the final content of a 
report. Alongside these written reports, reports were also spoken aloud, 
then translated and transcribed, which process also affected the final 
form of the report. In the chancery system, the spoken word was a 
fundamental part of report creation, and so of the chancery system’s 
form of information technology. The chancery system was a literate 
bureaucracy, but it also relied heavily upon the spoken word.
Figure 3. A herbal page (ca. seventeenth century).
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Circulating Knowledge 
Once an Apothecary Chancery report had been written and translated, 
it was then circulated. In the case of the 1628 witchcraft trial with which 
we began, it was sent back to the Military Service Chancery bureaucrats 
overseeing the case, and possibly forwarded to the governor of Rzhev, 
under whose authority the arrest was initially made, and, for that 
matter, the governor of Toropets, the accused’s home town, and the 
Archangel monastery in Ustiug Velikii, to which he was then sent. 
That report thus circulated not just within the Apothecary Chancery, 
or even between that department and the palace, but within the wider 
Muscovite administrative system. It is even possible that the accused 
himself, Loptunov, a peasant from a rural noble estate, and his master, 
Mikhail Polibin, who was losing a peasant, were also made aware of 
the contents of the report affecting Loptunov’s fate. That would again 
expand the circulation of this report of expert Western European medical 
knowledge, out into Muscovite society. Following the further progress 
of Apothecary Chancery expert reports thus tells us about how these 
reports circulated, and whom in Muscovite society was the end user of 
this information technology.
Commonly, the end user of a report was the man who had ordered 
it: the Apothecary Chancery head, the head of the Military Service 
Chancery or other section of the administration, or indeed the tsar 
himself. In all the cases for which such information is available, the 
orderer was at least part of the circle to whom the report was distributed. 
The head of the Apothecary Chancery was a particularly vital part of 
this distribution system. As well as receiving his own reports, reports 
written by his department for others were sent to him first and, in the 
case of reports to be passed on to the tsar, he then personally delivered 
them. Such was the case in 1655, with the report on unicorn horn, and 
the 1679 autopsy of the boyar Vorotynskii.75 Similarly, when reports 
requested by other departments were completed, they were always 
first sent to the Apothecary Chancery director before being delivered 
75  1655 report on purchase of unicorn horn: RGADA, coll. 143, descr. 2, file 147; 
Mamonov, Materialy, 2, p. 157; Mamonov, Materialy, 3, pp. 636–39. 1679 autopsy of 
Vorotynskii: Mamonov, Materialy, 4, p. 1304, pp. 1198–99.
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to the relevant chancery. Such was the case in 1679, for the autopsy of 
one of the Patriarch’s grooms on behalf of the Land Chancery (Zemskii 
prikaz).76 The head of the Apothecary Chancery was thus a vital figure 
in circulating reports created by his department to a relevant audience.
Consuming a report did not necessarily mean reading it. We know 
from other sources that reports were commonly read to the tsar and 
his advisers.77 Far from all Russian nobles were functionally literate, so 
this was an efficient system for transmitting information. Leaving aside 
the literacy issue, there are reasons that the spoken word is particularly 
helpful in exchanging information. As pointed out by more than one 
colleague during the workshop from which this chapter emerged, 
academics regularly fly around the world to speak face-to-face, even 
though we could rather more easily send a text to each other to read. 
This circumstance is (hopefully) not a statement on the literacy of the 
academics involved, but rather reflects the special role the spoken word 
can play in knowledge exchange (the opportunity to exchange that 
knowledge in chic local restaurants is merely a pleasant by-product).
There were also good reasons to use the spoken word to convey certain 
reports at the seventeenth-century Russian palace. The number of people 
holding a counsellor rank, and so who could advise the tsar, went from 
around thirty before 1645, to approximately seventy in the latter part of 
the century.78 In reality, the tsar’s council was often rather smaller, but 
he could still be in discussion with perhaps fifteen people.79 Reading the 
report aloud to such a group would be a rather more efficient way of 
conveying the information than making and circulating anything from 
sixteen to seventy-one manuscript copies, or alternatively circulating a 
76  Mamonov, Materialy, 4, pp. 1161–62.
77  Ingrid Maier and Wouter Pilger, ‘Second-hand Translation for Tsar Aleksej 
Mixajovich—a Glimpse into the “Newspaper Workshop” at Posol′skij Prikaz’, 
Russian Linguistics, 25 (2001), 209–42 (p. 215).
78  Marshall Poe, The Russian Elite in the Seventeenth Century, 2 vols (Helsinki: Finnish 
Academy of Sciences and Letters, 2004), 1, pp. 13–15; Poe, ‘Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich 
and the End of the Romanov Political Settlement’, Russian Review, 62 (2003), 537–64; 
Robert O. Crummey, Aristocrats and Servitors: The Boyar Elite in Russia, 1613–89 
(Princeton and Guildford: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 88. See also Hans-
Joachim Torke, ‘Oligarchie in der Autocratie—Der Machtverfall Der Bojarenduma 
Im 17. Jahrhundert’, Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte, 24 (1978), 179–201.
79  See P. V. Sedov, Zakat Moskovskogo tsarstva. Tsarskii dvor kontsa XVII veka (St 
Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2008), pp. 13–19.
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smaller number of copies among that many people. In such situations, 
the spoken word was a more efficient way to communicate reports.
Apothecary Chancery reports were also made available to people 
outside the chancery system. When the department produced reports 
for witchcraft and medical malpractice trials, that report may well 
have been shown to the defendant, a person who often came from 
outside the chancery system. Indeed, in 1690, one of the defendants in 
a witchcraft and blasphemy case, Perfilii Rokhmaninov, a townsman 
(posadskii chelovek) from Galich, petitioned for the herbs found in his 
possession to examined by the Apothecary Chancery, asking that “those 
herbs be examined in the Apothecary [Chancery], and those herbs are 
not magical”.80 The date of Rokhmaninov’s request is significant: in the 
late seventeenth century, former and current Apothecary Chancery staff 
members were compiling self-help medical texts aimed at literate Russian 
audiences.81 This circumstance likely raised the profile of the Apothecary 
Chancery as a centre for medical expertise in Russian society, and this 
possibly motivated Rokhmaninov’s request. Rokhmaninov knew that 
having an expert Apothecary Chancery report written for his case was 
a possibility, suggesting a significant knowledge of that department’s 
reporting activities even outside the chancery system.
There is also some evidence that Apothecary Chancery reports may 
have been made available to foreign governments. We return here to the 
1644 autopsy of Count Valdemar’s retainer.82 The servitor in question 
died from a gunshot wound to the face, which wound he received in 
front of numerous witnesses. An autopsy would then seem to serve 
little purpose here, unless it was to send on to the Danes as part of an 
official response to the incident. In 1715 an autopsy report was written 
on the death of Charlotte Christine of Brunswick-Lüneburg, Tsarevich 
Alexei’s wife. In this case, it is the language of the report that is odd: the 
file appears to be complete and undamaged, and yet it contains only 
a German and a Latin version of the autopsy, and no Russian text.83 
Charlotte Christine was the sister-in-law of the Holy Roman Emperor 
80  N. Ia. Novombergskii, Vrachebnoe stroenie v do-Petrovskoi Rusi (Tomsk: Parovaia 
tipolitografiia Sibirskogo tovarishchestva pechatnogo dela, 1907), p. 93.
81  See Griffin, ‘In Search of an Audience’.
82  Mamonov, Materialy, 1, pp. 62–63.
83  RGADA, coll. 143, descr. 2, file 1635.
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Charles VI, whom Russia hoped to count as an ally in an expected war 
against the Ottomans. It is thus very possible that the report on her 
death was prepared primarily to send to Charles VI, in which case the 
languages of the report would make perfect sense. These two cases thus 
show that the chancery system’s form of information technology could 
communicate information not only outside the chancery system, but 
potentially even outside of Russia.
The readership of Apothecary Chancery reports highlights vital 
aspects of knowledge circulation in the Russian context. Firstly, it speaks 
to the role of the Apothecary Chancery within the chancery system, and 
indeed our ideas of how the chanceries worked as a system, rather than 
merely a group of institutions. The Apothecary Chancery is commonly 
viewed as a palace instrument, as indeed it often functioned. But 
devoting attention to the flow of reports reveals the broader networks 
in which the Apothecary Chancery was involved, linking together the 
wider Muscovite administration beyond the walls of the Kremlin, some 
parts of Russian society, and even, potentially, other governments. 
Secondly, looking at circulation shows us how things circulated: the 
spoken word was as important here as the written word. Muscovites 
were as likely to find out the contents of a report by having it read to 
them as by reading it themselves. The Apothecary Chancery’s reporting 
system shows substantial circulation of medical knowledge, circulation 
that was achieved by the purposeful use of both manuscript and the 
spoken word.
Storing Knowledge
The final stage of all Apothecary Chancery documents was storage. 
In a sense though, this was a stage long in preparation through the 
very processes of creating the document. As the orders, reports, and 
responses circulated through the system, they gained a manuscript form 
of metadata, data about data. When the order for a report on Loptunov’s 
root reached the Apothecary Chancery in 1628, it did not arrive merely 
as an order, but was accompanied by a précis of the case up until the 
moment the order arrived at the department. That précis was then used 
to form a file in the Apothecary Chancery, along with a copy of the 
report; similarly, a copy of the report was also sent back to the Military 
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Service Chancery to be included in their file. In many cases, we have 
both draft versions of a document (chernovik) and the final, clean version 
(belovik). The existence of drafts and clean copies reflects the great care 
taken in creating these documents. In the seventeenth century Russia 
still imported much of its paper. Nevertheless, even the most mundane 
of documents was drafted and redrafted before a final version of the 
document could be approved, showing the meticulous construction of 
Muscovite files.
These files were stolbtsy, scrolls, which were used for the majority of 
Russian administrative documents until around the 1690s.84 This was 
a security measure: as each document was added to a file, it would be 
glued to its predecessor and an elaborate signature made across the 
back of the join, so that original documents could not be removed, nor 
fakes introduced, without someone noticing. One reason for such care 
was to ensure that one could refer back to the documents accurately. We 
have evidence that the Apothecary Chancery did just that on a number 
of occasions: several prescriptions contain a note that either they were 
created on the basis of an earlier prescription, or that a prescription was 
repeated later.85 I have not come across any such notations in the reports 
discussed here, but the careful recording and storage of these documents 
indicates that reports, like the Apothecary Chancery prescriptions, were 
kept for the possibility of such reference.
The knowledge created by the Apothecary Chancery was directed 
towards particular, limited, problems and questions, but it was not 
transitory. On the contrary, like all chancery documents, it was created 
in a secure and traceable manner, both to aid its real-time use and to 
help its storage for potential later reference. Direct evidence of such 
references only exists for prescriptions, not reports. Nevertheless, it is 
important that this was a possibility that was anticipated and allowed for 
by the system itself. The Apothecary Chancery information technology 
ensured that data, once created, could be retrieved.
84  Shmidt and Kniaz′kov, Dokumenty, pp. 21–27.
85  See for example the 1674 order to repeat a previous prescription: RGADA, coll. 
143, descr. 2, file 1093, fol. 45. 1666 prescription for I. D. Miloslavskii from earlier 
prescription by Dr Engelhardt: RGADA, coll. 143, descr. 2, file 743, fol. 46.
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Conclusion
We began this chapter in 1628, when the arrest of a man possessing a 
peculiar root set in action the massive bureaucracy of the Muscovite 
administration, allowing us to follow the process by which expert reports 
were ordered, created, translated, circulated, and stored. Examining 
these processes reveals the nature and role of information technology 
and knowledge exchange in seventeenth-century Russia, and also gives 
us a specific case of an early modern information technology to help 
us to examine that concept more closely. The Apothecary Chancery 
reporting system allowed the creation of orders for specific pieces 
of knowledge, the creation of knowledge to that particular end, the 
transformation (translation) of that knowledge into a form fit for usage 
in context, the circulation of that knowledge around a system, and 
the storage of that knowledge for potential later retrieval. This was an 
information technology. 
Looking at the Apothecary Chancery reporting system as a form of 
information technology gives us a new view on that department, the 
chancery system as a whole, and indeed the running of the seventeenth-
century Russian state. The chancery system has often been studied by 
dividing it up, with the Apothecary Chancery seen as limited to palace 
medicine. Looking at the report circulation, it is clear that, while the 
Apothecary Chancery did indeed serve the court, it fulfilled a number of 
functions beyond merely treating the sick, and also regularly provided 
expert knowledge to a number of other departments. Tracing such 
interactions shows the chancery system to be dynamic and interactive, 
with the Apothecary Chancery being far more than simply a dispensary 
for the Muscovite elite.
Most interesting is how this information technology functioned. The 
chancery system was a bastion of literacy in a culture where literacy 
was not always highly valued. Literacy and documentation played a 
substantial role in the encoding and storage of Apothecary Chancery 
knowledge. Printed texts likely played a part as reference texts in the 
Apothecary Chancery library, but it was the chancery manuscript scrolls 
which took centre stage. Orality was also a major element in this system. 
Orders were given orally; some reports were produced, and translated, 
orally before being written down; and reports were consumed orally. 
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Here, the spoken word was not subordinate to the written word, nor 
used when one could not read or write. It was used alongside writing, 
and even in preference to it, because orality has its own utility. In 
the Apothecary Chancery’s early modern information technology, 
manuscripts and the spoken word were the key mediums; this argues 
for the inclusion of oral communication in interaction with written, 
and printed, communication in histories of early modern information 
technologies. 

9. What Could the Empress Know About 
Her Money? Russian Poll Tax Revenues in 
the Eighteenth Century
Elena Korchmina1
Given the inadequate size and training of Russia’s provincial bureaucracy, 
one might ask how it managed to govern so many people and so much 
territory. The simple answer is that for the most part it could not and did 
not govern them.2
Governments have always faced the need to get sufficient operational 
information about current affairs at all social and political levels. 
As John P. Le Donne has articulated, “Without adequate revenue, 
properly accounted for, a government’s freedom of action is severely 
circumscribed, both in the conduct of foreign policy and in building 
the foundations of a civilized society”.3 The subject under discussion—
how thoroughly the Russian government in the eighteenth century was 
informed about the situation in its provinces—is often overlooked. But 
within the last few decades the concept that Russia was “undergoverned” 
1  The study was completed in the framework of the Basic Research Program at 
the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) in 2016. 
I thank the Prokhorov Foundation for supporting my research through the 
Karamzin Fellowship. I am also grateful to Vera Dubina, Nataliia Malysh and Ilya 
Voskoboynikov for invaluable research assistance and comments. 
2  Robert E. Jones, Provincial Development in Russia: Catherine II and Jacob Sievers (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1984), p. 14.
3  John P. Le Donne, Absolutism and Ruling Class. The Formation of the Russian Political 
Order, 1700–1825 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 239.
© 2017 Elena Korchmina, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0122.09
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has become more and more popular, and scholars have examined 
various aspects of the empire’s institutional development through 
this prism.4 Stephen Velychenko observes, “Although undefined in 
the specialist literature, and untranslatable into Russian, this term 
[undergoverned] includes the idea that a government which has 
successfully monopolized the use of physical violence does not have 
enough administrators per capita to carry out policies effectively 
and efficiently. From this perspective a unique attribute of the tsarist 
bureaucracy was not its bigness or pathologies but its smallness”.5 Thus, 
the number of state officials per capita is assumed to be a key indicator 
of the Russian Empire’s “undergoverning”. 
Some information does exist about the size of Russian officialdom 
at the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of eighteenth centuries. 
Calculations by Ludmila Pisarkova show that in 1698 the ratio between 
officialdom and the general population was 1:2250, and in 1726 it was 
1:3400.6 Velychenko has suggested that, until 1795, the proportion of 
state clerks in relation to the civil population in Russia and European 
countries (Austria, Britain and Prussia) was close in number (1:1375 
and 1:1833, on average, respectively).7 Nevertheless Velychenko does 
not make it clear whether the Russian Empire was “well-governed” in 
the beginning and middle of the eighteenth century,8 or what number 
of state clerks was supposed to be sufficient to let the government 
make so-called effective and sound decisions. Most historians agree 
that Russia was undergoverned in the nineteenth century.9 The present 
chapter focuses on the question of whether the Russian government 
4  Jones, Provincial Development, p. 13, Stephen Velychenko, ‘The Size of the Imperial 
Russian Bureaucracy and Army in Comparative Perspective’, Jahrbücher für 
Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge, 49. 3 (2001), 346–62 (p. 347), Boris N. Mironov, 
Rossiiskaia imperiia: ot traditsii k modern, vol. 2 (St Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2014).
5  Velychenko, pp. 347–48.
6  Ludmila F. Pisar′kova, ‘Rossiiskaia biurokratiia v epokhu Petra I’, Otechestvennaia 
istoriia, 1 (2004), 18–41. 
7  Velychenko, p. 352.
8  “Great Russia did not seem to have been undergoverned relative to its western 
neighbors”: Velychenko, p. 357. 
9  Peter Gatrell, ‘Economic Culture, Economic Policy and Economic Growth in Russia, 
1861–1914’, Cahiers du Monde Russe, 1 (1995), 37–52 (p. 42); The review of the latest 
historiography appears in Sergei V. Lyubichankovski, ‘The State of Power in the 
Late Russian Empire: The English-American Historiography of the Second Half 
of the XXth-early XXIst centuries’, Proceedings of the Samara Scientific Center of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences, 2 (2007), 342–47 (p. 343).
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in the middle of the eighteenth century had enough informational 
resources to conduct a sensible financial policy, and whether there were 
enough officials to collect taxes and report on the revenue (in this case, 
the poll tax): that is, whether or not Russia was undergoverned.
I chose the poll tax as a case study because it was a key direct tax 
in Russia, the revenue of which supplied military forces in peacetime. 
When Peter the Great introduced the new tax, he tried to organise it for 
ease of calculation and collection. The taxable base did not change for 
decades. Money collection and distribution were decentralised, so the 
cash flows never accumulated in the centre; instead they were directed 
according to the authorities’ orders right to their destination points. 
This configuration solved the most important logistical problem: money 
delivery to the consumer. The government obtained information on tax 
revenues and expenditures only from reports. The poll tax collection 
chain may therefore be split into two relatively connected procedures: 
the first, money gathering, distribution and delivery (the material layer); 
and the second, making reports on cash inflows and outflows (the 
information layer). The same officialdom—provincial, regional and local 
clerks—was in charge of both layers.10 
Was There a Required Number of Civil Servants 
for Tax Collection?
Starting from the 1730s, poll tax collection was undertaken in provincial 
clerical offices where the taxpayers (landlords, countermen, delegated 
representatives, etc.) arrived twice a year (originally three times a year) 
and handed cash to a clerk (e.g. a copyist) who made an entry on the 
tax payment in one or several accounting books; within three days a 
taxpayer had to receive a receipt from the clerk confirming his payment. 
Other officials, enumerators (shchetchiki), under the supervision of a poll 
10  The idea of a distinct informational part of poll tax collection has been expressed 
before; see Le Donne, Absolutism and the Ruling Class, p. 243: “Fiscal management 
consists of three distinct operations: collecting revenue, depositing it in a 
treasury from which it can be disbursed, and auditing both the revenue and the 
expenditures. This third operation was the most difficult and the most sensitive 
because it required reliable statistical information, which collecting agencies were 
for long both unable and unwilling to supply, and because it threatened to expose 
the fraudulent practices that everyone had an interest in concealing”.
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tax officer (ofitser pri podushnom sbore) counted the money, packed it into 
sacks and barrels, sealed them, and transported them on carts to their 
destinations, escorted by a convoy. Upon handing the money over to the 
recipients they were given delivery receipts and returned to their offices. 
In addition to the main tax, taxpayers paid a service tax of two kopeks 
per ruble for clerks’ salaries (zhalovanie) and transportation costs. If the 
individuals failed to meet payments on time and accrued arrears, a crew 
of retired soldiers was sent from the local provincial office to the village 
and stayed there for some time fully at the debtors’ expense; such an 
order was legislated.11 In cases of long-term indebtedness, peasants or 
even landlords might be imprisoned and detained on their own account 
(na svoem koshte).12
The number of officials engaged in poll tax collection was not large: 
one or a few clerks (podkantseliarist or kopiist) received the money and kept 
records, and one or two officials (the poll tax officer, the local commissar, 
etc.) supervised tax collection and signed documents (u shcheta denezhnoi 
kazny). For instance, in 1741 the Smolensk clerical office included forty-six 
“secretaries, clerks, junior clerks and copyists”, only three of whom were 
directly involved in the collection of poll tax money.13 The other forty-three 
employees compiled and distributed other payments, filled in, and kept 
other registries. In 1738 the population of the Smolensk region comprised 
about 214,000 males listed as poll tax payers.14 Examining the correlation 
between the number of civil servants and the regional population, two 
ratios come to light: 1:4652 (the correlation between the total number of 
regional officials and the adult male population), and 1:71,000 (the ratio of 
dedicated poll tax officials to the adult male population). Neither of these 
is relevant, however, as a certain number of officials were not considered: 
the detachment of soldiers tasked with money transportation and debt 
collection. Table 1 represents the number of civil servants in different 
Russian regions in 1739.
11  Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii, Series 1 (1649–1825) (hereafter PSZ 1), no. 
6674.
12  V. N. Zakharov, Y. A. Petrov, M. K. Shatsillo, Istoriia nalogov v Rossii. IX–nachalo XX 
v. (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2006), p. 97.
13  RGADA, coll. 278, descr. 1, file 6692.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The first group of officials—from a colonel down to an ensign—was 
in charge of poll tax collection supervision. Alongside them, governors 
(voevody), who acted as poll tax officers during the receipt of tax 
payments, might have had responsibility for control over the whole 
process if administrative resources were insufficient in a particular 
region. As such, governors had the right to sign all papers issued to 
record the amount of tax collected, and were responsible for shortfalls. 
The second group, estimated to be more than 80% of the whole, included 
errand crews consisting primarily of retired enlisted soldiers whose 
duties were logistical: to convey and deliver money, correspondence, 
etc. This group of clerks was responsible for the material layer of tax 
collection. The third group, about 13%, undertook the receipt of 
money and bookkeeping. This group of clerks was responsible for the 
information layer of tax collection. 
Comparing the number of taxpayers with the number of clerks gives 
an estimate of 1:150916 (or 0.66, Table 2),17 which in general corresponds 
to the ratio in European countries (Austria, Britain and Prussia).18 But the 
ratios of officials belonging to the various groups differ greatly. More 
bureaucrats of the second group were in charge of money transportation, 
but the officials of the third group, whose number was not sufficient, 
were responsible for money collection in provincial offices and, more 
importantly, for all poll tax documentary circulation. 
We can consider the data used for the estimates presented above as 
trustworthy due to the fact that, in the second quarter of the eighteenth 
century, the provincial clerical staff list was defined and approved by 
the Senate, and the process of equipping all the provincial offices with 
personnel had just begun. It is important to stress here that in practice a 
significant number of provincial clerical positions remained vacant. The 
16  This study takes into account only the male population because women were not 
on audit lists and were not subject to tax payments, or, at least, I have not found 
statements to the contrary in the sources at my disposal. Women did not participate 
in the delivery of money to the local offices, etc. At the same time, women along 
with men produced the goods, products, and materials which formed the taxable 
base.
17  But our estimation is almost three times higher than Mironov’s; this discrepancy 
could be caused by the problems of defining a “bureaucrat” in the Russian context. 
These figures are derived from the primary source. See Mironov, Rossiiskaia imperiia: 
ot traditsii k modernu, vol. 2, p. 435, Table 8.2. 
18  Velychenko, ‘The Size’, p. 93.
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following is an example of a typical situation. In 1731 the local clerkdom 
in the Nizhnii provincial office reported on the reasons why they had 
failed to follow the Senate’s directive, even though their office in 1722–
23 was staffed with 167 clerks as per the schedule requirements. By 1732 
the number of their personnel had dramatically changed. According to 
the clerks’ report, thirty-seven officials had died and sixty-two either 
were transferred to other places, had run away or had been fined; 
consequently there were only sixty-seven employees left, several of 
whom were old, sick, or mentally ill.19 The report especially noted that 
Nizhnii local authorities had previously reported to the government 
about the severe deficiency of their civil servants, but neither a resolution 
nor even a response had been received. Within ten years the number of 
clerks had decreased by almost 60%.
The calculations of the central authorities, concerning the costs of 
maintaining such state bodies as regional clerical offices, proved to be 
quite moderate, and, as mentioned above, these costs were reimbursed 
by an additional two-kopek levy to which taxpayers were subjected. 
According to the General War Commissariat’s estimates, civil servants’ 
allowances and additional expenses should have been covered by the 
amount of the levy, presumably 75,000 rubles, gathered from 5.5 million 
male taxpayers. According to the staff schedule, about 50,000 rubles per 
a year were spent on clerks’ wages, another 5,000 rubles were to be spent 
on administration expenses, and finally the difference of 20,000 rubles 
should have stayed in the budget every year.20
In cases of tax arrears a fine was imposed on the whole of the local 
officialdom; moreover, until the mid-1730s, there was a common and 
widespread practice of punishment by estate distraint and further 
confiscation. The imposition and disbursement of fines was an obscure 
and ineffective process owing to the fact that the search for the guilty 
clerk or his estate across the entire empire took significant time and was 
burdened by red tape. For this reason, huge sums of fines remained 
unpaid for years.
The extent of poll tax payments demonstrates the efficiency of state 
bodies’ performance. Researchers have proven that the level of tax 
19  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 7, file 391, fol. 236–38v. NB: these are the figures cited in 
the document; the mathematical discrepancy is present in the source.
20  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 7, file 412, fol. 117v.
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collected was over 90%.21 We can therefore safely conclude that the 
system of poll tax collection in the Russian Empire of the eighteenth 
century proved to be quite effective. At the same time, the level of tax 
acquisitions was dependent on many factors, such as the severity of the 
tax burden on taxpayers and the extent of state tax claims’ compliance 
with the legislation. As for the contribution of bureaucratic staff it is not 
easy to extract and assess their influence on the whole process of tax 
gathering and distribution, but at least, from the beginning, the system 
was organised in such a way as to ensure its fruitful operation, using the 
staff at hand to keep the population from total insolvency. That aim was 
achieved, so we may regard the bureaucratic capacities of the Russian 
Empire in that aspect as satisfactory for enabling tax circulation and 
providing the state governing system with the assets necessary for its 
functioning.22
The next example demonstrates a case in which the straightforward 
system of poll tax collection met insuperable obstacles. On 15 October 
1736 in the Military College, a man called Stepanov faced interrogation. 
Stepanov testified that, in 1722, while serving as a junior clerk in the 
Kostroma provincial office, he was sent to the Moscow Treasury Office 
with a coffer containing 7,000 rubles. In the Moscow Treasury Office, local 
clerks did not take the money but directed him to an equipment office 
(mundirnaia kantora) where only part of the load was accepted—3,000 
rubles. At the equipment office Stepanov received an additional 11,000 
rubles, so the total sum that he was to deliver to the St Petersburg 
commissariat amounted to 15,000 rubles. Escorted by the ensign 
21  See, for example: E. V. Anisimov, Podatnaia reforma Petra I (Leningrad: Nauka, 1982), 
p. 267; Arcadius Kahan, The Plow, the Hammer and the Knout: An Economic History 
of Eighteenth-Century Russia (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), p. 321; 
N. N. Petrukhintsev, ‘Tsarstvovanie Anny Ioannovny: problemy formirovaniia 
vnutripoliticheskogo kursa (1730–1740)’ (Dokt. dissertation, Moskovskii 
gosudarstvennyi universitet, 2001); Igor I. Fediukin, Elena S. Korchmina, 
‘Sobiraemost′ podushnoi podati v seredine 18 veka: k voprosu ob effektivnosti 
gosudarstvennogo apparata v Rossii v istoricheskoi perspektive’, Ekonomicheskaia 
istoriia. Ezhegodnik 2013, ed. by L. I. Borodkin, Iu. Petrov (Moscow: Rossiiskaia 
politicheskaia entsiklopediia, 2014), pp. 89–127.
22  For another example that uses the Urals as a case study for assessing the effectiveness 
of the local administration by analysing the tax burden, see Mikhail Kiselev, ‘State 
Metallurgy Factories and Direct Taxes in the Urals, 1700–50: Paths to State Building 
in Early Modern Russia’, Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, 16. 1 
(Winter 2015), 7–36.
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Kalashnikov, he set out for the Russian capital. In the commissariat, an 
expense-recorder, Akim Poletaev, received the money, but Stepanov did 
not get a delivery receipt because he had fallen ill. After recovering, he 
could not return to his service in the Kostroma office due to the absence 
of the receipt and his reasonable fear of possible imprisonment. Until all 
the circumstances were elucidated, Stepanov was taken into custody.23 
After a scrupulous investigation it was revealed that the revenue 
register kept by Poletaev did not contain a record of the 11,000 rubles 
received from Stepanov, but it did have a record dated February 1722 
that Kalashnikov together with six enumerators (including Stepanov) 
delivered 128,000 rubles from the Moscow equipment office. Based on 
that evidence it was decided to let Stepanov return to the Kostroma 
provincial office.
This episode demonstrates that the reasons for financial “losses” 
could have been logistical problems and a crude system of accounting. 
Thus, on the one hand, the financial transactions were posted in ledgers 
thoroughly enough to enable outside users to reconstruct the cash 
flows in detail twelve years later; but, on the other hand, ordinary life 
incidents such as illness made it impossible to keep records correctly. In 
this situation, since a written confirmation (receipt) was never issued, 
and the province from which the payments had come was not posted 
in the ledger, 4,000 rubles were actually calculated as a shortfall from 
the Kostroma provincial office, despite the sum in question having been 
collected in Kostroma, sent, and delivered to its destination. 
Officials as “Schreibmaschine”?24
A study of provincial clerical reports reveals a phrase which reoccurs 
in most of them stating that the poll tax was being collected and sent to 
the proper destinations on time—in accordance with instructions—but 
that the locals were not able to make and submit financial reports at 
23  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 7, file 412, fol. 757–757v.
24  I use this term metaphorically; for more on this metaphor, see Peter Becker, 
‘“Kaiser Josephs Schreibmaschine”: Ansätze zur Rationalisierung der Verwaltung 
im aufgeklärten Absolutismus’, Jahrbuch für europäische Verwaltungsgeschichte, 12 
(2000), 223–54.
298 Elena Korchmina
the same time owing to the lack of clerks.25 “According to the report of 
the Zaraisk provincial office the accounts about poll tax and the two-
kopeck levy are being composed, but we cannot finish them on time and 
send them to their destinations because we do not have enough staff; 
at the moment there is only one scribe (podkantseliarist)”.26 Our ability 
to evaluate the truth of the proferred excuse requires knowledge of the 
volume of the turnover of financial documents in a provincial clerical 
office. They may be divided into two types: internal documentation of 
the office and external reporting. 
Documentary Turnover in a Provincial Clerical Office
At the level of provincial offices, a significant number of financial 
documents must have been issued and kept. Moreover, from the 
imposition of the poll tax until 1736 (when an institute of poll tax 
collection officers and a unification of the reports on tax acquisition and 
distribution was implemented) the territory of a region might have been 
divided into several districts, and each district would have issued its 
own set of financial papers.
For instance, in January 1731 a governor, Dmitrii Mikhailovich 
Novokshchenov, delivered files from the Vladimir office to Captain 
Terentii Bogdanovich Mozovskii of the Estliandskii regiment.27 The set 
of files included: a leather-bound alphabetical register sealed by Colonel 
Korobov; list registers sealed by Major General Chernyshov and Colonel 
Korobov; printed bills; the colonel’s and the commissar’s instructions; 
tables and sample accounting books; poll tax receipts issued in previous 
years sealed by a commissar; three capitation fee revenue registries from 
the current year sealed by the governor; one capitation fee expenditure 
registry also sealed by Novokshchenov; printed and written edicts 
received from senior authorities; orders and memos; inventories and 
notebooks; and finally, drawings and dispatches of the location of the 
headquarters by commissar Petr Mitkov. 
25  M. Bogoslovskii, Oblastnaia reforma Petra Velikago. Provintsiia 1719–27 gg (Moscow: 
Universitetskaia tipografiia, 1902), p. 273.
26  RGADA, coll. 438, descr. 1, file 24, fol. 34.
27  RGADA, coll. 423, descr. 2, file 136, fol. 10–11.
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A similar set of documentation was passed to an infantry captain of 
the Narvskii regiment,28 Ivan Ivanovich Drozdov, in a district clerical 
office of Vladimir province. In addition it contained the following books: 
a register of forty-kopek fee revenues as of the current year (1731); and 
a register of forty-kopek fee distribution. 
Starting from 1736, the list of books and registries it was compulsory 
to keep in a provincial office was standardised, as was the process of 
their completion. But the problems with record-keeping did not cease. 
Annually in the provincial offices on average seven ledgers were kept 
in which transactions were regularly posted, as we see in a typical 
situation drawn from the Oboian regional office in Belgorod province 
in 1753: there were seven accounting books kept on a permanent basis, 
and four of them as a rule lay on a clerk’s desk.29
Ledger completion was allegedly not a problem in itself, but storing 
and finding archived files caused much inconvenience, as we see in the 
following episode which deals with the search for the proper poll tax 
office allocation in Moscow in 1754.30 Due to the absence of a spare room 
in the Metal Mining and Manufacturing College, the poll tax collection 
was arranged in the basement of a provincial office where there was 
only one window and very little space, and which was stuffed with 
chests and boxes (in total amounting to thirty), placed on top of one 
another up to the ceiling, containing poll tax accounting audit books 
and expenditure receipts. The civil servants were supplied with only 
one desk because there was no room for another, and they worked 
with candles lit even in the summer, as the sunlight did not reach 
their basement office. It is no surprise that under those circumstances 
it was difficult for them to identify counterfeit coins. Another concern 
dealt with the storage of the collected money. On any given day up to 
a hundred sacks and barrels full of coins might have been delivered 
from different provinces simultaneously, so it was obviously difficult 
to find places to store this money and to find room for its conveyors. 
This last group might have amounted to more than fifty people who 
would have arrived at the same time. Officials frequently worried that 
28  RGADA, coll. 423, descr. 2, file 136, fol. 12–13v.
29  RGADA, coll. 304, descr. 1, file 374, fol. 13v. 
30  RGADA, coll. 248, bk. 2887, fol. 158–59.
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documents might rot or be eaten by mice.31 In such conditions, the main 
complexity was not in preparing financial documents, which demanded 
only the basic skills of reading, writing and counting, but in archiving 
and accessing the stored documentation.
Originally it was planned that all the basic documentation would be 
audited in the central state offices and, on this basis, central government 
clerks would make final financial reports. That scheme, however, did 
not last for long. Its implementation began with Peter the Great’s 
Law (Plakat), which introduced a new rule of sending accounting 
books signed by staff- (shtab) and chief- (ober) officers directly to the 
Auditing Office for an annual audit and inspection. But soon, in 1728, 
it was reported to the Senate that the local financial document audit 
had failed. The reason, which transformed a well-intended idea into a 
fiasco, was banal: the audit could not be completed due to a lack of 
staff.32 According to new rules introduced in 1728 the people who had 
to gather the tax money under the supervision of governors were zemskii 
commissars. They were to pass the collected imposts to governors who 
in turn sent revenues to the heads of the provincial authorities. The 
latter spread the poll tax that had been collected among staff officers 
to be delivered to the proper destinations as appointed in the Military 
College’s edicts. The new rules also prescribed that regimental books 
and invoices should be inspected and audited in a commissariat first, 
and only afterwards sent to the Auditing Office where the reports 
totaling the figures for all Russian regions were prepared. But the very 
next year (1729) disclosed the weakness of the new arrangements: 
there were complaints sent to the Military College from a commissariat 
notifying them that the commissariat’s staff was not sufficient for the 
audit of invoices, that they lacked the human resources to fulfill that 
task, and that at the same time the Auditing Office was reluctant to help, 
not wishing to take over someone else’s duties. Obviously the point at 
issue was not the basic accounting books audit, but the precise invoices 
(annual and half-yearly). From that period onwards the completion 
of financial reports gradually developed into the main occupation of 
provincial clerical offices. Local clerks were to keep records of the basic 
documentation and compose reports.
31  Ibid.
32  RGADA, coll. 248, file 393, fol. 466–67.
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Provincial Clerical Offices’ Reports
A significant number of reports were supposed to be compiled at local 
clerical offices. Lists of poll tax shortfalls were prepared for annual, 
half-yearly, monthly or fortnightly periods. The most frequently 
encountered are the ones for annual, half-yearly and monthly 
intervals. By 1736 the format and the structure of compulsory financial 
statements had been established and passed down to the local offices, 
where provincial executives were in charge of filling in the necessary 
forms and sending them back to the higher authorities. The lists were 
arranged as handwritten tables presenting the information about the 
yearly arrears of poll tax payments of three types—seventy-kopek fees, 
forty-altyn fees, and forty-kopek fees—since the latest audit, i.e. within 
the five- to ten-year period before the current one. In practice the data 
on shortfalls referring to the same year, i.e. 1736, and the same territory, 
would differ in several lists, not only for the current year (1736), but for 
all the previous years as well. This difference occurred due to the fact 
that tax debts for any previous period might have been disbursed in 
the current year without adjustments being made; it took too much of 
a clerk’s time to check all the documents dated later than the last audit 
each time a debt was paid out.
The process of report preparation was neither easy nor flawless. The 
first problem was the shortcomings of basic financial documentation. 
Originally, the tables in the documents did not have totals. Thus, I 
suggest that every time a reference to a document was needed its sums 
were recalculated. Moreover, instructions about the reports’ format 
and content changed from time to time, so, in accordance with altering 
requirements, cumbersome tax books, registers and other documents 
had to be audited, recalculated, and their structure renovated. The 
government demanded scrupulous accounting of tax payment receipts 
and shortfall; the high level of detail required obviously slowed the 
whole system of reporting considerably. Simon Dixon notes that Ivan 
Pososhkov was critical of “unnecessarily complex accounts” as early as 
1724 in his Book of Poverty and Wealth, one of the first Russian economics 
texts.33
33  Simon Dixon, The Modernisation of Russia, 1676–1825 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University press, 1999), p. 67.
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The second problem impacting the composition of the reports 
stemmed from the peculiarities of provincial state servants’ modes of 
thinking. Though difficult to prove, it should nevertheless be considered. 
At first glance the task of filling in a form seems simple, In practice, 
reports which were sent to the central authorities were composed with 
a free hand and their comprehensive analysis reveals a wide variety of 
ways in which the data in report tables were presented. Governmental 
offices sent many complaints and directives to follow the standards for 
report structures, but all in vain.
In fact a note from the Military College to the Senate in 1738 stated 
that: “[…] accounts from the counting board (shchetnaia kantora) do not 
accord with the regulations of the Auditing Office; as a result there will 
be only pointless obstacles and correspondence, but we cannot audit the 
accounts […]”.34 
Officials of the central authorities, as well as some historians, 
regarded such behaviour by provincial clerks as sabotage. In 1768 Privy 
Counsellor Ivan Ivanovich Iushkov, governor of the Moscow province, 
received this dispatch from a Commissariat Head Office: “The Moscow 
provincial office did not do their best to compose and send accounts, 
and spent the whole time in useless writing”.35
It was probably an excruciatingly difficult task for bureaucrats to 
compile the data on the various impost payments for different segments 
of the population. According to the first audit, the number of population 
groups amounted to forty, as stated in a list dated 1737 and adjusted to 
the tables’ columns, but this was not observed everywhere. On the one 
hand, in the central part of the Russian Empire, where the process of the 
main social groups’ (landlords, state and court peasants and merchants) 
self-identification had been almost completed, the task of arranging the 
information on shortfalls in correlation with each group’s indebtedness 
did not cause much difficulty. On the other hand, in the outlying 
regions of the empire, that process had only just begun, so the task of 
over-detailed data presentation led to the incorrect allocation of figures 
in reports. It is no wonder that all the lists dated in the second and third 
quarters of the eighteenth century contained very long and elaborate 
34  Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv, coll. 21, d. 12, sv. 14, d. 1, 
fol. 28–29v.
35  RGADA, coll. 400, descr. 11. file 295, fol. 100.
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comments which interpreted and often altered the meaning of the data 
shown in the tables. The “local material” resisted easy adaptation and 
insertion into tables whose patterns had been worked out for central 
state bodies’ usage. There remains, however, the unresolved issue of 
interpreting the local clerks’ chosen method of allocating figures in lists. 
The government’s position on that question was clear: information was 
to be presented in a precise and very detailed manner. Such an approach 
paradoxically contributed to the fact that provincial reports’ tables were 
actually prepared arbitrarily. 
The first two problems—the shortcomings of basic financial 
documentation and the peculiarities of provincial state servants’ modes 
of thinking—could be summarised as follows: provincial officials 
genuinely wanted to fulfill their tasks, but were simply prevented from 
doing so. A third possible problem is, like the previous one, difficult 
to prove, but should not be disregarded: provincial officials may not 
have wanted to obey the wasteful requirements of the authorities.36 The 
local clerks collected and distributed money in a proper manner, so 
their task was fulfilled completely, but they could have considered the 
government’s desire to have scrupulous reports as just a whim. This 
was not sabotage in its direct meaning, but their knowledge of financial 
flows gave them a (false) sense of authority.
The three problems I have delineated reflect the statement that the 
bureaucratic processes were stalled “for want of people”.37 However, the 
reason for poor information acquisition by the state’s central authorities 
was not only a lack of clerks, but also the fact that regional office workers 
were underqualified and could not satisfy the state’s desire for updated, 
relevant financial data. Unfortunately for locals, a severe punishment 
was introduced in order to extract the necessary information from 
provincial offices: clerks were chained to their working places until the 
reports were completed.38
A further obstacle that inhibited the flow of information to the 
government was the delay in the delivery of reports. Summaries of tax 
collections regularly include marginal notes indicating which provinces 
had not yet submitted their reports. For instance, the Military College 
36  I would like to thank Andrei Zorin for this suggestion.
37  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 7. file 393, fol. 81.
38  See e.g. Petrukhintsev, ‘Tsarstvovanie Anny Ioannovny’, p. 461. 
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sent a dispatch to the Senate stating that within the last few years—1735, 
1736 and 1737—they had sent many directives requiring information 
about the number of delivery workers (rassyl′shchiki). The required 
reports had not been delivered from the following areas, however: the 
Sviazhsk province of the Kazan region, Penza province, Viatka province, 
various towns of the Voronezh region, Eletsk, Tambov, Solikamsk, and 
Bakhmut provinces.39 In fact the central official bodies’ demands for 
timely fulfillment and delivery of local reports were numerous: “the 
first ones—on 2 December, 1735; the second—on 10 February, 1736; 
the third—on 24 February, 1736; the fourth—on 15 March, 1736; the 
fifth—on 20 April, 1736; the sixth—on 4 May, 1736; the seventh—on 13 
May, 1736; the eighth—9 June, 1736; the ninth—on 14 September, 1736; 
the tenth—on 15 October, 1736; the eleventh—on 31 November, 1736; 
the twelfth—on 21 December, 1736; the thirteenth—on 11 January, 1736 
[sic]”.40
Consequently, the clerks of the central offices faced two contradictory 
problems: they were burdened with piles of local reports that had been 
filled in improperly, which were difficult to summarise and incorporate 
into cumulative lists, and simultaneously those office workers did not 
receive any registers at all from many regions. As Dixon observes, “[…] 
growing sophistication in bookkeeping methods was more often a 
barrier than an aid to understanding”.41
The Constant Deficiency of Information in the 
Russian Government
Clearly the governmental bodies in the capital received irregular and 
hardly comparable information on the state’s finances.42 Thus, the 
government had to make decisions under the oppressive conditions of 
a constant lack of operable updated information, as described in the 
following episode.
Direct government regulation of poll tax collection had not been 
properly implemented across almost all of the Russian Empire until a 
39  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 7, file 387, fol. 522–23.
40  See, for example, RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 7, file 387, fol. 454.
41  Dixon, The Modernisation of Russia, 1676–1825, p. 67.
42  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 7, file 387, fol. 1604.
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new law was promulgated which reformed the whole system of poll 
tax fee gathering. On 16 February 1731, a new order was put into effect 
that prohibited enumerators who were soldiers from collecting the poll 
tax; thenceforth town scribes (pod′iachie) were in charge of it.43 The story 
behind the appearance of such a directive was prosaic.44 According to 
the Plakat, taxpayers were to give the fees to specially assigned soldiers, 
enumerators, who took the money under their own responsibility and 
packed it into sacks; the sealed sacks were then put into barrels and 
a colonel in charge fixed seals to the latter. Apparently the barrels 
were to be opened only in the presence of the enumerator, who held 
full responsibility for tax payments he had accepted. The performance 
and results of this scheme became evident within a few years and 
were described in a dispatch from the Military College to the Senate in 
October 1730 as follows: “[…] the work of the enumerators (shchetchiki) 
included a number of shortcomings so enumerators were condemned 
to the galleys […]”.45 In the meantime, while engaged in solving the 
problem mentioned above, state authorities bore in mind the edict of 
1714, which stated that merchants were prohibited from engaging in the 
collection of imposts and levies, and that, instead, clerks were obliged 
to carry out that function. Finally, in February 1731, a new edict was 
published introducing a revised procedure for the gathering of tax fees, 
according to which provincial clerical offices had to begin conveying 
four representatives of their office staff to the appointed regiments for 
the purpose of counting the poll tax revenues. The directive was aimed 
at resolving the issue of the military forces’ financing, and in general 
it was rational, but from the very beginning its implementation was 
impossible for basic logistical reasons. Moreover, the government had 
already been informed about the impossibility of the new order, but 
either neglected that data or did not realise its existence. 
At almost the same moment that the new edict was announced to 
provincial offices, people began sending dispatches directly to the 
Senate explaining why it was impossible to follow the new instructions. 
A report dated 16 March from Vologda provincial office, as well as the 
next one dated 21 July, stated that, according to the February edict, 
43  PSZ 1, no. 5697.
44  I wish to thank Maia Lavrinovich for noting this law.
45  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 7, file 390, fol. 330.
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their office was to send fourteen people to the regiments, but the whole 
office staff amounted to only twenty-seven clerks among whom “[…] 
clerk Iakov Sumorokov was a decrepit old man […] Osip Mikhailov 
was severely ill so he often lost consciousness […] zemskii scribe (pisar′) 
Ivan Goriachichnikov was not counted yet […] junior office clerks 
(podkantseliaristy) Vasilii Savin, Vasilii Fedorov, Aleksei Galaktionov 
had been set fines […] Stepan Stepanov was a decrepit old man, Ivan 
Sumorokov was in decline and deaf […] young copyists could not be 
trusted because of their youth”.46 The governor’s conclusion clearly 
stated that fulfillment of that edict would have led to all operations in 
the provincial office ceasing. Consequently, the edict’s requirements 
had been left unfulfilled. The same happened in other provinces 
(Novgorod,47 Archangelsk,48 Simbirsk,49 etc.) because the same situation 
existed in those clerical offices. In the Tver office, after sending a zemskii 
scribe, a podiachii, and two young clerks to the Koposr regiment, there 
remained only ten clerks, and among them three were drunkards.50
It is important to specify that dispatches reporting on an inability 
to perform as the directive demanded were sent repeatedly (for 
instance, from the Belozersk province on 20 May51 and on 16 July52). 
In the Pereslavl Zalesskii local office’s report it was stressed that they 
had already sent reports that they did not have enough clerks: twice to 
the Board of Revenue (Kamer Kollegiia) and three times to the Moscow 
provincial office.53
Obviously in the Russian Empire’s provinces a controversial 
situation had been growing into a serious conflict. On the one hand, the 
local clerical offices proclaimed the edict’s implementation to be beyond 
their capacities, but on the other hand, the regiments’ headquarters, 
where the clerks who arrived were supposed to count the collected 
tax fees, found themselves in bizarre circumstances: while there were 
significant sums of taxes collected at the regiments’ disposal, there were 
46  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 7, file 391, fol. 209–12, fol. 239–40.
47  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 7, file 391, fol. 214–15.
48  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 7, file 391, fol. 216–17.
49  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 7, file 391, fol. 228–228v.
50  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 7, file 391, fol. 213–213v.
51  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 7, file 391, fol. 218–20.
52  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 7, file 391, fol. 233.
53  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 7, file 391, fol. 225–225v.
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no enumerators to calculate and pack them. So the troops’ authorities 
in their turn commenced reporting to the centre. Thus, the Iamburg 
Dragoon regiment’s dispatch contained descriptions of the following 
misfortune: despite their repeated urgent demands that the Tambov and 
Voronezh provincial offices should send clerks to their headquarters, 
none had arrived, and, as a result, there were great arrears in the poll 
tax.54 A similar situation occurred in the Nizhegorodskii regiment 
where an enumerator did not have time to take money from taxpayers.55 
As for the Russian government, it supported the regiments.56 In fact the 
implementation of the edict would have inflicted either a breakdown 
in the local offices’ routine activities or a compelled stoppage of the 
receipt of tax imposts in the regiments’ headquarters. It is therefore no 
surprise that the nominal shortfall was posted simply because of the 
lack of clerical workers to count and register tax payments. The weak 
system was reformed within a couple of years and an institution of poll 
tax officers was introduced. Apparently this solution was successful, as 
clerical workers were moved from central state bodies out to provincial 
regiments’ locations and regional clerical offices, instead of the local 
clerks shifting from local offices to central ones. 
In sum, for most of this period, the main task of provincial clerks, 
to ensure that information flowed to the government by means of 
reports, statements, and other basic documentation, was not performed 
satisfactorily, either due to a lack of local staff or for deeper reasons. I 
want to stress that the local staff may have been the only people who 
were aware of the state of financial affairs at the provincial level. 
What Could the “Higher Spheres” Really Know? 
The short answer to this complicated question is “almost nothing”. 
The difficulties mentioned above greatly impeded the government’s 
ability to manage its finances—unless, of course, we agree with Dixon’s 
statement that “the Russian old regime’s problem was not that it 
governed harshly but that it scarcely governed at all”.57 The Russian 
54  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 7, file 391, fol. 229–229v.
55  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 7, file 391, fol. 242–242v.
56  RGADA, coll. 248, descr. 7, file 391, fol. 244v.
57 Dixon, The Modernisation of Russia, p. 139.
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government wanted to rule and it desperately needed information to 
do so. 
The rank-and-file officials of central offices were very well aware that 
they did not have enough information and that they could not obtain it. 
Nikolai Chechulin notes, “From the very beginning there were many 
cases when the Board of Revenue thought that there should have been 
much more money than the Board of Expenditure, and neither Senate 
nor Supreme Privy Council could bring them into accord”.58 
The budgeting was almost blocked. There were too many reports. 
In the 1760s the Board of Expenditure complained that every year it 
received about 20,000 different reports, and most of the reports had been 
unsupervised for decades. It was impossible to match accounts from 
different provinces, because other central and provincial offices did not 
put their primary reports into a total account as they ought to have done 
according to the law; instead they sent the basic documentation to the 
main state financial offices.59 
Top bureaucrats of the central government did not know the state 
of the empire’s finances, so it is not surprising that the monarch also 
did not know how much money she had. Catherine II wrote that, after 
her accession to the throne, the Senate gave her a general account of 
empire revenues. Their total number reached 16 million rubles. After 
two years, she put Prince Aleksandr Viazemskii and Aleksei Melgunov, 
the president of the Board of Revenues, in charge of recalculating the 
revenues. It took them several years and they had to write to each 
provincial governor at least seven times. Finally they found an additional 
28 million rubles,60 but it remains unclear whether they discovered all 
the revenues.
Contemporary scholars knew very well that no available statistics 
could demonstrably be proved to be true. In the 1820s a famous 
statistician, Karl German, told the students of Petersburg University 
that “the government does not know even the most basic items. I do 
not know exactly even the number of cities in Russia. Nowhere is there 
58  N. D. Chechulin, Ocherki po istorii russkikh finansov v tsarstvovanie Ekateriny II (St 
Petersburg: Senatskaia tipografiia 1906), p. 23.
59  Chechulin, Ocherki po istorii russkikh finansov, pp. 39, 38.
60  A. N. Kulomzin, ‘Finansovye documenty tsarstvovaniia Imperatritsy Ekateriny 
II’, Sbornik Rossiiskogo Imperatorskogo Obshchestva, vol. 28 (St Petersburg: tip. V. 
Bezobrazova i Komp., 1880), p. 22.
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indicated a reliable number […] The official statistical data, published 
by the Government, leave a great deal to be desired”.61
Modern historians are unanimous in their opinion that the condition 
of Russian finances in the eighteenth century was a puzzle. Le Donne 
writes, “The state of auditing in the 1760s was such that one may safely 
assume that it had become a forgotten science”.62 Janet Hartley observes, 
“The poor methods of accounting, the lack of a central treasury, the 
complexities of expenditure on the armed forces (divided into ordinary 
and extraordinary expenditure) meant that it is almost impossible to 
make sense of Russian financial records”.63 Peter Waldron states, “The 
Russian state did not have the bureaucratic capacity to maintain accurate 
records of its finances during this period and the budget-making process 
was still rudimentary”.64 As a result, as Dixon argues, “economic policy 
long relied more heavily on a priori social assumptions than on economic 
data, despite a dawning recognition that carefully digested information 
was a prerequisite of successful policy-making”.65 
Finally, I would like to introduce a further suggestion, the proof and 
evidence for which is beyond the scope of the present chapter, but which 
is closely linked with its content. As I mentioned earlier, provincial clerks’ 
activities can be divided into two levels: material (tax payment collection 
and distribution to the consumers) and informational (keeping records 
and preparing reports). In the present chapter, I have demonstrated that 
Russian local clerkdom succeeded at the first level, as poll tax collection 
resulted in high revenues; at the same time they failed to perform well at 
the second level—making and submitting the required reports in time. 
In dispatches and other reports the clerks divided their daily duties as 
I explained, and thus we may surmise that the office workers regarded 
these activities as different ones. Moreover, they treated tax collection as 
a more important obligation than composing reports. The government’s 
attitude, however, differed from that of its subordinates. Seemingly the 
role of information collection was more important because the state 
61  Mironov, ‘Rossiiskaia imperiia: ot traditsii k modernu’, vol. 2, p. 437.
62  Le Donne, Absolutism and Ruling Class, p. 243.
63  Janet Hartley, Russia, 1762-1825: Military Power, the State and the People (Westport: 
Praeger, 2008), p. 69.
64  Peter Waldron, ‘State Finances’, in The Cambridge History of Russia, vol. 2 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 484.
65  Dixon, The Modernisation of Russia, 1676–1825, p. 227.
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budget was decentralised and the entire volume of gathered taxes 
was never accumulated in the centre, but instead was distributed from 
provinces directly to its appointed destinations. For the government, 
trustworthy and updated reports were therefore as valuable as the sums 
of the imposts collected.66 The urge for organised and accurate financial 
information even led, as I mentioned earlier, to the legalisation of such 
cruel punishments as chaining a clerk to his desk until the work was 
completed.
To conclude, the Russian government lived in a chaos of paperwork, 
and the fact that it did not go bankrupt as a civil body in the eighteenth 
century was probably due to the decentralisation of the relationship 
between the capital and the provinces, which co-existed, to a certain 
extent, in parallel worlds. Now, we, as historians who have access to 
archives and, more importantly, to modern technologies, can calculate 
the level of tax collection in eighteenth-century Russia, but clerks from 
that period could not, because of internal problems of information flow. 
The task set them by the Russian government was beyond their means. 
The question remains: does this imply that Russian clerks were not 
effective?
66  It was even more noticeable at the end the eighteenth century and in the nineteenth 
century. See Galina Orlova, ‘Biurokraticheskaia real′nost′’, Obshchestvennye nauki i 
sovremennost′, 6 (1999), 96–106.
10. Communication and Official 
Enlightenment: The Journal of the Ministry of 
Public Education, 1834–1855
Ekaterina Basargina1
Government bureaucracies are institutional mechanisms of com-
munication. They exist in part in order to gather, process, store and 
(perhaps less willingly) disseminate information. Some of the information 
that they gather consists of the hard administrative data required for 
core functions such as taxation or conscription. Some of the information 
that they disseminate consists of governmental pronouncements, laws, 
or decrees. However, some modes of communication can be less direct, 
more oblique. The Ministry of Public Education and its journal provide 
a case study in such institutional communication in the interests of the 
cultural policies of the state.
Russia’s nineteenth century began with a palace coup. On the night 
of 11 March 1801, a group of conspirators brutally murdered the “mad 
tsar Paul”.2 The next morning, St Petersburg was overcome with riotous 
exaltation: people wept and embraced one another at home and in the 
street. The future was unclear, but for the moment the end to the terror 
1  This research was conducted with the support of the Russian Science Foundation 
(grant no. 14–18–00010 ‘The Interaction of Science and Power: Sketches of 
Institutional History of the Imperial Academy of Science, from the Eighteenth to 
the Early Twentieth Centuries’). The chapter was translated by Thomas Rowley.
2  D. Davydov, Sochineniia (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel′stvo khudozhestvennoi 
literatury, 1962), p. 471.
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and stress of Paul’s reign seemed an occasion for relief and celebration 
as the twenty-three-year-old Alexander I ascended the throne.3 Liberally 
educated and an enthusiastic follower of French Enlightenment 
thought, Russia’s young tsar quickly announced the new era of his rule 
with a series of decrees and manifestos. Among his first actions was an 
amnesty for those who had suffered exile and imprisonment without 
trial under Paul. The Secret Expedition, which carried out interrogations 
under torture, was destroyed. Thus Alexander I aimed to prove that he 
would not continue the harsh and unpredictable rule of his father. The 
new tsar made a grandiose promise to rule his people “according to the 
laws and the heart” of his grandmother Catherine the Great, declaring 
that he would “follow her most wise intentions”.4 
The new tsar’s initial moves gave Russian society hope for future 
change. People expected a new form of governance, one that would 
replace arbitrary rule and violence with the rule of law and justice. 
Alexander’s initial measures seemed to justify such expectations. The 
intense activity in the first part of his reign left a deep impression 
on many of his contemporaries. Aleksandr Pushkin would later call 
this period “the wondrous beginning of Alexander’s days” (Dnei 
Aleksandrovykh prekrasnoe nachalo) in his “Epistle to the Censor” (1822).
Russia’s new tsar was enthused by plans to reform the country 
from top to bottom and completely reorganise the state structure. He 
intended to put in place a series of measures that would eventually 
lead to the abolition of serfdom, and he dreamt of crowning his work 
with a new constitution modelled on the best examples of the period in 
Western Europe. However, before Russia could receive a constitution, 
Alexander had to educate and prepare the population for the coming 
reforms. Crucially, the tsar had to prepare those able to make his plans a 
reality—Russia’s public officials. Thus, education was made the highest 
priority in this programme of wide-ranging transformations in order 
to guarantee Russia’s successful Europeanisation; it was seen as the 
quickest means of distributing European ideals and values. 
3  See Allen McConnell, Tsar Alexander I: Paternalistic Reformer (New York: Crowell, 
1970); Marie-Pierre Rey, Alexander I: The Tsar Who Defeated Napoleon (DeKalb: 
Northern Illinois University Press, 2012).
4  Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii, Series 1 (1649–1825) (hereafter PSZ 1), no. 
19779.
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Initially, Alexander put Catherine-era officials in charge of the 
government. He dismissed Count Petr Pahlen, who had led the 
conspiracy against Paul and who now aimed to guide the young tsar. 
However, Alexander managed quietly but firmly to avoid being thus 
guided, and selected advisers who shared his own outlook. He came to 
rely on a small circle of personal friends, his Private Committee, which 
had formed while he was still a prince. This group—which included 
Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski and Counts Viktor Kochubei, Nikolai 
Novosiltsev and Pavel Stroganov—had no official powers, but made 
decisions on all matters of state. Liberal to a man, this group dreamt 
of large-scale reforms to the operations of the Russian state, and the 
Private Committee was behind the highly important projects carried out 
during the first years of Alexander’s reign. The tsar’s “young friends” 
gathered privately in the imperial palace, discussing state business 
informally in lively and friendly conversation. The group’s motto was 
“to stand above any personal interest and accept neither preferment, 
nor reward”.5 The tsar sometimes jokingly referred to this circle as the 
Comité du salut public (Committee of Public Health). 
The Private Committee’s most important works consisted of 
transforming Russia’s central state institutions. The first project was 
to change the collegiate system of governance, which dated back to 
Peter I, into a ministerial one that would preside over all the state’s 
administrative work, an important step in centralising Russia’s 
governance.6 On 8 September 1802, Alexander signed a decree “On the 
Institution of Ministries” to form eight ministries with remit over the 
army, navy, foreign affairs, judiciary, internal affairs, finance, commerce 
and public education, respectively.7 A Committee of Ministers was 
also established to facilitate the joint discussion of state affairs; the tsar 
himself often attended this committee’s meetings. 
Russia’s new system of rule placed the principle of personal authority 
and responsibility at its core. Each minister alone was responsible for all 
the actions of his ministry. Each minister had a deputy and chancery, 
5  Adam Chartorizhskii, Memuary (Мoscow: Terra, 1998), p. 184.
6  See N. P. Eroshkin, Istoriia gosudarstvennykh uchrezhdenii dorevoliutsionnoi Rossii 
(Moscow: Vysshaia shkola, 1968); Vysshie i tsentral′nye gosudarstvennye uchrezhdeniia 
Rossii, 1801–1917, 4 vols (St Petersburg: Nauka, 1998–2004), vol. 3; M. A. Prikhod′ko, 
Podgotovka i razrabotka ministerskoi reform v Rossii (Moscow: Sputnik, 2002). 
7  PSZ 1, no. 20406.
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and the ministries were subdivided into departments, which were 
headed by directors; departments were divided again into sections with 
section chiefs; and sections were divided into desks with individuals in 
charge of each desk. Ministers answered to the monarch and the Senate. 
The establishment of a Ministry of Public Education was part of 
this grandiose reform of Russia’s executive.8 For the first time, the 
administration of Russia’s public education was concentrated in a single 
independent ministry, which aimed at “the education of youth and the 
dissemination of learning”. The new ministry was formed not only to 
bring order to the administrative sphere and establish a single system 
of education: it aimed to create an intellectual elite and a spiritual 
leadership within society. 
In order to position this new education policy as a successor to 
Catherine’s reforms, Alexander made Count Petr Zavadovskii (1739–
1812) his first minister of public education, who had “once been famed 
for both his beauty and his intellect, and Catherine appreciated him not 
only for the latter”.9 The tsar’s “young friends” were not particularly 
sympathetic to Zavadovskii, whom they regarded as intellectually 
crude. They derided him for what they claimed was “his inflexibility 
in both mind and body”.10 Nevertheless, they appreciated his kindness 
and his fair-mindedness. Alexander foresaw that “Catherine’s old man” 
would not always be open to following progressive ideas. 
The Ministry of Public Education, in contrast to other ministries, 
kept its collegiate features due to its inclusion of the Commission on 
Educational Institutions (from 1803, the Chief Directorate of Educational 
Institutions). Alexander counterbalanced the elderly Zavadovskii’s 
indifference with the energy of his assistants. The members of the Chief 
Directorate of Educational Institutions were educated public officials: 
the trustees of Russia’s education boards, members of the Academy 
of Sciences, or members of the church hierarchy. The Commission on 
Educational Institutions took up the task of developing a model for 
8  S. V. Rozhdestvenskii, Istoricheskii obzor deiatel′nosti Ministerstva narodnogo 
prosveshcheniia, 1802–1902 (St Petersburg: Ministerstvo narodnogo prosveshcheniia, 
1902).
9  F. F. Vigel′, Zapiski (Moscow: Zakharov, 2000), vol. 2, p. 108.
10  Chartorizhskii, Memuary, p. 230. 
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educational reform. Its main aim was to establish new universities that 
would form the core of a system to administer education in Russia. 
In the course of this reform, Russia was divided into six regional 
education boards (Moscow, St Petersburg, Kazan, Kharkov, Vilnius 
and Dorpat (Tartu)), each of which had directors permanently based 
in Petersburg. The reform introduced a single system of education 
that encompassed primary school through to university. Thus, all the 
different stages of public school fitted together in a vertical system: 
each course of study provided complete training to a certain level 
and, at the same time, served as a preparatory stage for the next, 
higher level. The universities comprised the final link of the chain in 
the whole system and, beyond their traditional teaching and research 
functions (“the teaching of sciences to the highest degree”11), they also 
served as administrative centres for the regional education boards. 
All the education establishments of a given region—parish, district, 
and province-level gymnasiums—were subordinate to a university. 
This period saw the establishment of universities in Kazan (1805) and 
Kharkov (1805), and the reform of the universities in Dorpat (1802) and 
Vilnius (1803). In 1804, the universities in Dorpat and Vilnius received a 
charter granting them broad autonomy and freedom in teaching. 
The general plan for education reform and its main principles were 
laid out in the “Preliminary Rules of Public Education”, which became 
law on 24 January 1803.12 Paragraph 41 of these rules read: “Under 
the authority of the Chief Directorate of Educational Institutions, a 
periodical publication will be issued so as to disseminate information 
about the successes of public education”.13 The Journal of the Ministry 
of Public Education was Russia’s earliest ministerial periodical.14 It was 
11  ‘Ob ustroistve uchilishch’, PSZ 1, no. 20597, p. 438.
12  ‘Ob ustroistve uchilishch’, PSZ 1, no. 20597.
13  Ibid., p. 441. 
14  Other ministries also established periodicals. For instance, during the period 
1804–09, the Ministry of Internal Affairs published the St Petersburg Journal (Sankt-
peterburgskii zhurnal), and, from 1829, The Journal of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
(Zhurnal ministerstva vnutrennikh del). The Ministry of Transport published its own 
journal, initially under the title The Journal of the Ministry of Transport (Zhurnal 
putei soobshcheniia), which was then titled The Journal of the Central Аdministration 
of Transport and Public Buildings (Zhurnal glavnogo upravleniia putei soobshcheniia i 
publichnykh zdanii) from 1845, and later The Journal of the Ministry of Transport 
(Zhurnal Ministerstva putei soobshcheniia). See Russkaia periodicheskaia pechat′ (1702–
1894) (Moscow: Politicheskaia literature, 1959).
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issued under various titles: in 1803–17 it was called simply the Periodic 
Publication of the Successes of Public Education. The journal’s first editor 
was the academician Nikolai Ozeretskovskii (1750–1827), who was a 
member of the Chief Directorate of Educational Institutions.15
Ozeretskovskii was a prominent figure in the reform of Russia’s public 
education, and possessed an influential voice in the Chief Directorate 
of Educational Institutions. He was involved in creating charters for 
universities, gymnasiums, district and parish schools, as well as the draft 
of a censorship charter. Ozeretskovskii believed in judicious freedom 
of the press. “Restrictions on the press”, Ozeretskovskii observed, “are 
hard to keep within their proper boundaries. When taken to excess 
they are frequently ineffectual and always harmful. It is unquestionable 
that excessive severity in such matters almost invariably has damaging 
consequences. It obliterates sincerity, weakens the intellect and, 
extinguishing the holy flame of love for truth, inhibits the spread of 
enlightenment”.16 In ambiguous cases where various interpretations 
might be possible, the censor should interpret the author’s ideas and 
intentions “in the way most favourable to the author”; the censorship 
committee was instructed to respect works that included “modest and 
well-meaning pursuit of any truth”.17 The 1804 Charter on Censorship 
was Russia’s most liberal such charter throughout the nineteenth 
century.
Ozeretskovskii carried the principles of academic freedom into the 
Ministry of Public Education. He edited the Periodic Publication from 
its inception in 1803 to its final issue in 1817. Aside from the journal’s 
official section, useful information and translations were also published 
and a section of criticism and bibliography was also included. 
From the very beginning of the journal’s life as the Periodic 
Publication, Ivan Martynov (1771–1833), the director of the Department 
of Public Education and the head of the Chief Directorate of Educational 
Institutions, as well as a botanist and translator of ancient texts, had 
proposed that is should be transformed into the Journal of the Ministry 
15  ‘Zhurnal Glavnogo uchilishch Pravleniia za mesiats aprel′ 1803 goda’, RGIA, coll. 
732, descr. 1, file 1, fol. 39. 
16 M. I. Sukhomlinov, Istoriia Rossiiskoi akademii, 8 vols (St Petersburg: Tip. Imp. Akad. 
nauk, 1874–1887), vol. 2 (1875), p. 373. 
17  ‘Ustav o tsenzure’, PSZ 1, no. 21388. 
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of Public Education.18 According to Martynov’s proposal this new 
incarnation was to take on the character of an official journal with an 
emphasis on scholarship. The journal was to include news of meetings 
held by the Chief Directorate of Educational Institutions, the Academy 
of Sciences, and the Russian State Academy. It would publish scholarly 
articles and the reflections of members of both academies, as well as 
regulatory decisions and other measures relating to the six regional 
education boards. Concurrently, Martynov presented a new publication 
proposal for a separate semi-official journal, The Northern Messenger 
(Severnyi vestnik).19 The Chief Directorate of Educational Institutions 
approved the plan for The Northern Messenger, and Martynov published 
it during the course of 1804–05. 
The Northern Messenger was closely linked to the reformist policies 
of Alexander I, and articles on issues of state and societal structure, on 
legislation and on education took a central place in the journal, alongside 
translations of classical and contemporary European authors. In 1806, 
Martynov’s journal Lyceum (Litsei), with its expanded literary section, 
continued the work of The Northern Messenger. 
The Chief Directorate of Educational Institutions did not reject 
Martynov’s idea for a journal for the ministry, but also did not take any 
steps towards implementing it. In effect, then, the Periodic Publication 
remained on its former footing. The journal came out 4 times a year, 
and 44 issues were published from 1803 to 1817. The journal’s print run 
of 1200 copies was subsidised by the Chief Directorate of Educational 
Institutions, and 605 copies were sent free of charge to universities, 
academies, gymnasiums and district schools.20
The production of Periodic Publication stopped in 1817. By the time the 
war with Napoleon had come to an end Alexander’s views and domestic 
policy had undergone a significant shift—one that reflected the general 
crisis in the political and cultural life of Europe. In Russia, disillusion 
with European values set in, and the liberal innovations that had marked 
the beginning of Alexander’s reign began to encounter intense criticism. 
18  E. Ia. Kolbasin, Literaturnye deiateli prezhnego vremeni: Martynov, Kurganov, Voeikov 
(St Petersburg: Knizhnago magazina A. I. Davydova, 1859). 
19  ‘Zhurnal Glavnogo uchilishch Pravleniia za mesiats oktiabr′ 1803 g. Zasedanie 3 
oktiabria 1803 g.’, RGIA, coll. 732, descr. 1, file 2, fol. 135–135. 
20  RGIA, coll. 732, descr. 1, file 1, fols. 64–65; file 2, fol. 164.
318 Ekaterina Basargina
Barely established, the universities found themselves under attack, and 
piety was declared the basis of true education. This new ideology was 
reflected in the creation of a unified Ministry of Religious Affairs and 
Public Education in 1817, which Nikolai Karamzin called the “ministry 
of the eclipse”.21 Ozeretskovskii and Martynov were sacked from this 
new ministry. 
At the same time, it was decided to continue publishing the 
ministry’s journal under a new title, The Journal of the Department of 
Public Education. A plan for the new publication was drawn up in 1820, 
and its first issue was published in January 1821. To preserve continuity 
with the former publication, the first issue included all the imperial 
decrees issued after 1817. The new journal was published monthly, and 
contained ministry orders, news of research and teaching institutions, 
and academic, literary, and bibliographic sections. From 1820–24, the 
writer Nikolai Ostolopov (1783–1833) ran the journal, receiving a salary 
of 2500 rubles per year. Ostolopov had made a name for himself as the 
author of the 1821 Dictionary of Ancient and New Poetry (Slovar′ drevnei i 
novoi poezii). In this new journal, Ostolopov published the essay “A Key 
to the Works of Derzhavin with a Short Description of the Life of this 
Famous Poet” (1822), which is considered one of the first attempts at 
literary commentary in Russia. 
In 1824, Admiral Aleksandr Shishkov took over the direction of 
the ministry. Shishkov, a writer and critic, was known for using his 
philological essays as instruments to serve his nationalist agenda.22 For 
many years, Shishkov had been president of the Russian Academy, the 
research institute dedicated to Russian language and culture set up by 
Catherine the Great in 1783, and had spared no efforts in transforming 
it into a centre of Russian spirituality and patriotism. 
Under Shishkov, the united Ministry of Religious Affairs and 
Public Education was dissolved due to the significant replication of 
its functions by the Synod, and the Ministry of Public Education was 
restored. The ministry’s journal also changed once again. It was renamed 
21  N. M. Karamzin, Neizdannye sochineniia i perepiska (St Petersburg: Tipografiia N. 
Tiblena i Komp., 1862), vol. 1, pp. 11–12. 
22  In 1812, moved to patriotic fervour, Shishkov wrote several manifestos; the most 
striking of them concerned the loss of Moscow. Dmitrii Bludov, an imperial official, 
commented that Moscow had to burn for Shishkov to write something beautiful. 
See N. I. Grech, Zapiski o moei zhizni (Moscow: Kniga, 1990), p. 210. 
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Notes of the Department of Public Education (Zapiski Departmenta narodnogo 
prosveshcheniia), lost its status as a periodical and instead was published 
only when enough material had been gathered to merit an issue. 
Editorial work was assigned to Petr Sokolov (1764–1835), a member of 
the Chief Directorate of Educational Institutions. The author of a work 
on Russian grammar, Sokolov was a diligent employee of the Russian 
Academy, and suited Shishkov, who made him his closest aide in both 
the Academy and in the Ministry.23 Under Sokolov’s direction, three 
large editions of Notes of the Department of Public Education were issued 
in 1825, 1827, and 1829, respectively. After Sokolov was dismissed in 
1829, publication ceased. 
The Ministry’s official print organ was restored on the initiative 
of Minister of Public Education Count Sergei Uvarov (1786–1855).24 
Uvarov held broad views on the role of education in public life and 
defended the concept of education as a means of progress.25 A godson of 
Catherine the Great, Uvarov was a favourite at aristocratic gatherings. 
He built his reputation as a leading autodidact of his time, and made 
a career even from an early age. He had been drawn to culture in his 
early years, and had the ability to find a common language with people 
of opposing views. Uvarov was acquainted with representatives of the 
23  Sokolov had been actively incolved in the compilation of the Academy’s dictionary 
(Slovar′ Akademii Rossiiskoi), and was awarded a gold medal for his efforts. Sokolov’s 
Basics of Russian Grammar (Nachal′nye osnovaniia rossiiskoi grammatiki) of 1788, a 
condensed version of Lomonosov’s Rossiiskaia grammatika, was published in seven 
editions before 1829, with a combined print run of more than 200,000 copies. For 
more details, see Sukhomlinov, Istoriia Rossiiskoi Akademii, vol. 7 (1885), pp. 387–97; 
M. P. Lepekhin, ‘P. I. Sokolov’, Slovar′ russkikh pisatelei XVIII veka (St Petersburg: 
Nauka, 2010), vol. 3, pp. 147–50.
24  ‘O vozobnovlenii izdaniia Zhurnala departmenta narodnogo prosveshcheniia’, 
Zhurnal ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia (hereafter ZhMNP) 1834, Ch. 1, 
viii–ix. For more details, see E. Basargina, ‘Aus der Geschichte der Zeitschrift des 
Ministeriums für Volksaufklärung (Žurnal ministerstva narodnogo prosveščenija)’, 
Russische klassische Altertumswissenschaft in der Zeitschrift des Ministeriums für 
Volksaufklärung, ed. by Anatolij Ruban and Ekaterina Basargina (St Petersburg: 
Bibliotheca Classica Petropolitana; Nestor-Verlag, 2012); idem, ‘Iz istorii “Zhurnala 
Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia”’, in Klassicheskaia drevnost′ v Zhurnale 
Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia (ZhMNP). Annotirovannyi ukazatel′ statei 
1834–1917 gg., ed. by A. Ruban (St Petersburg: Bibliotheca Classica Petropolitana, 
2015), pp. 7–40.
25  For more on Uvarov, see C. H. Whittaker, The Origins of Modern Russian Education: 
An Intellectual Biography of Count Sergei Uvarov, 1786–1855 (DeKalb: Northern 
Illinois University Press, 1984).
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new trends in literary taste such as the poet Vasilii Zhukovskii and the 
writer and historian Nikolai Karamzin, yet simultaneously maintained 
friendly relations with the literary traditionalists from the society that 
called itself the “Colloquy of Lovers of the Russian Word” (Beseda 
liubitelei russkogo slova). Uvarov was among the co-founders of the 
Arzamas literary society and belonged to what Aleksandr Herzen later 
called the “Arzamas geese”, those members who devoted themselves to 
state service rather than literary activity.26 
Figure 1. Count Sergei Uvarov (1786–1855).
Uvarov was highly articulate and wrote with ease on historical and 
literary topics in French, German and, eventually, in Russian. His 1810 
project to create an “Asiatic Academy” in Russia stimulated serious 
public discussion.27 This project reflected the growing interest of the 
26  A. I. Gertsen, Byloe i dumy, in Sobranie sochinenii, 30 vols (Moscow: Izdatel′stvo 
Akademii nauk SSSR, 1956), vol. 8, p. 304.
27  S. Ouvaroff, ‘Projet d’une académie asiatique’, Études de philologie et de critique 
(St Petersburg: L’Académie Impériale des Sciences, 1843); Sergei Semenovich 
Ouvaroff and Louis-Antoine Léouzon Leduc, Esquisses politiques et littéraires (Paris: 
Gide et Cie, 1848).
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Russian state in its Eastern neighbours, as well as the need for academic 
study of the East. Uvarov’s proposal made an impression in academic 
circles, particularly abroad. J. W. Goethe, having received a copy of 
the proposal from Uvarov, was intrigued by the broad conception of 
the research and wrote to him several times about the issue.28 In 1811, 
Uvarov was elected an honourary member of the Academy of Sciences 
and of the Göttingen academic society. 
Recognising the importance of the Orient in the history of civilisations, 
Uvarov nevertheless ascribed particular significance to Russia’s cultural 
connection to Western Europe. He believed that Russia and Western 
Europe shared a common source of education and civilisation which 
could be traced back to antiquity, especially to the Hellenic world, and 
that this was important for the study of Russian history and literature. 
In his early years, Uvarov embraced the principles of neohumanism, 
which aimed to restore the lost ideal of humanitas. He assimilated the 
neohumanists’ faith in the educational ideal of antiquity, and viewed 
classical philology as the path to a comprehensive knowledge of the 
ancient world. The neohumanists believed that only education in its 
classical form could lead to the complete and holistic realisation of man’s 
spiritual potential. Learning ancient languages was an individual’s 
best path to a rounded formation of personality, and the aim of such 
instruction was to encourage independent interpretation of the cultural 
achievements of the peoples of antiquity. The neohumanists tried to 
direct school education towards a creative perception of antiquity, 
not as a norm or as a model for blind imitation, but as the seed from 
which the principal cultural values of Western civilisation had emerged. 
Understanding ancient culture opened the way to asserting one’s own 
national culture. 
Uvarov enthusiastically accepted the call of the neohumanists, 
“Educate yourself in the Greek way” (“Bilde dich griechisch”), and was 
ready to learn to follow the spirit of the Greeks, to feel, think and act as 
a Greek. He respected Goethe, the recognised leader of neohumanism 
and romanticisim, and admired Friedrich Wolf, the pillar of classical 
28 Goethe und Uwarow, und ihr Briefwechsel, ed. by G. Schmid, special off-print of 
Russische Revue 28. 2 (St Petersburg : R. Hammerschmidt, 1888); S. N. Durylin, 
‘Drug Gete’, Literaturnoe nasledstvo (Moscow: Zhur.-gaz. ob”edinenie, 1932), vols 
4–6, pp. 186–221.
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philology. Uvarov was inspired by the ideas of Wilhelm von Humboldt, 
who reformed the Prussian education system by placing ancient 
languages at the centre of study.29 Indeed, it was in no small part thanks 
to Uvarov that Nikolai Gnedich made the first attempt at a Russian 
translation of The Iliad into hexameter verse, as evidenced by the 
translator’s letter to the minister in the foreword to the 1829 translation. 
In 1816, Uvarov was appointed an honourary member of the Institut de 
France. 
Borrowed from German scholars, Uvarov’s sense of Greek 
classicism’s fundamental importance for Russia’s cultural development 
formed the core of his entire educational policy. However, if in the 
1810s Uvarov had slavishly followed Western models, then by the 
1830s, under the influence of the revolutionary events spreading 
across Europe, he changed his views and began to doubt whether the 
Western model of societal development and education was universally 
applicable. On the whole, however, German philhellenism had a 
profound influence on Russian education, shaping the development 
of the humanities until 1917.
A large part of Uvarov’s life was connected to the Ministry of Public 
Education. A turning point in his career came in 1810 when, at the 
age of 24, under the protection of his father-in-law, Minister of Public 
Education Count Aleksei Razumkovskii, Uvarov received the post of 
trustee of the Petersburg Regional Board of Education (1810–22). In 1818 
he became the President of the Academy of Sciences. Towards the end 
of Alexander I’s reign Uvarov found himself out of favour, and moved 
into the Ministry of Finances. However, with the accession of Nicholas I 
Uvarov re-entered the larger political arena. 
When Nicholas I (1796–1855) came to the throne in December 1825, 
shooting broke out on Senate Square.30 Although the Decembrist revolt 
was quickly suppressed and five of its leaders were executed, the 
uprising left a deep impression on the new tsar, fostering distrust and 
29  John Edwin Sandys, A History of Classical Scholarship, 3 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1908), vol. 3, pp. 47–87. 
30  A. E. Presniakov, Emperor Nicholas I of Russia: The Apogee of Autocracy, 1825–1855, ed. 
and trans. by J. C. Zacek (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1974); W. 
Bruce Lincoln, Nicholas I: Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 1978); Richard S. Wortman, Scenarios of Power: Myth and 
Ceremony in Russian Monarchy from Peter the Great to the Death of Nicholas I (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1995).
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fear towards any manifestation of free thinking. Throughout the rest of 
his life, Nicholas wasted no effort in trying to eliminate “revolutionary 
infection”. In the tsar’s manifesto of 13 July 1826 informing Russia of 
the result of the Decembrists’ trial, the spirit of rebellion was attributed 
“not to enlightenment, but to an idleness of mind” and “the destructive 
luxury of half-knowledge”.31 In this new age, Nicholas suggested, Russia 
needed to reform its now degraded educational system and foster an 
educated elite, loyal to the government. As part of this modernisation 
process, the government had to increase the number of educated people, 
and prepare a new generation of educated teachers, professors, doctors, 
and public officials.32
Uvarov was the kind of enlightened public servant who understood 
the breadth of his remit and was prepared to fulfil it. In 1832, he was 
appointed Deputy Minister of Public Education. In March 1833, Uvarov 
took on the duties of Minister of Public Education, and a year later his 
position was confirmed.33 Uvarov carried out state educational and 
academic policies in Russia until 1849. As Russia’s Third Department 
put it in their 1839 report: “No minister acts so autocratically as Uvarov. 
The name of the tsar is constantly on his lips”.34
As Minister of Public Education, Uvarov saw his role as the 
promoter of the historical principles of Russian culture and statehood. 
In the name of maintaining the health and power of Russia, Uvarov 
tried to unite European Enlightenment with Russian national spirit 
(narodnost′) and to establish this on the basis of Russia’s historic qualities 
of “autocracy, Orthodoxy, and narodnost′”, which formed, according to 
him, the “anchor of our salvation”. This triad became the core of official 
ideology, a “theory of official nationality”.35
31  ‘O sovershenii prigovora nad gosudarstvennymi prestupnikami’, PSZ, Series 2 
(1825–1881), no. 465.
32  N. V. Riasanovsky, A Parting of Ways: Government and the Educated Public in Russia, 
1801–1855 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977).
33  Nicholas A. Hans, History of Russian Educational Policy, 1701–1917 (London: P. 
S. King and Son, 1931); Patrick L. Alston, Еducation and the State in Tsarist Russia 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969).
34  Rossiia pod nadzorom. Otchety III otdeleniia, 1827–1869, ed. by M. V. Sidorova and E. I. 
Shcherbakova (Moscow: Rossiiskii arkhiv, 2006), p. 211.
35  For more on the meaning of the triad, see Uvarov’s five-year report on his work 
as Minister of Public Education in S. S. Uvarov, ‘Obozrenie istekshego piatiletiia’, 
ZhMNP, 1, 1839, Ch. 21, 7–8. See also Riasanovsky, A Parting of Ways.
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Uvarov proposed this triad as a formulation for the core principles of 
public education for the first time in his 1832 report on the inspection of 
Moscow University. Here he defined two aspects of teaching in Russia’s 
universities: first, the scholarly and educational aspect, and second, a 
moral and political aspect. Uvarov intended to give higher education 
in Russia a national character, combining the benefits of the European 
Enlightenment with the advantages of narodnost′. The requirement was, 
as he phrased it, “to be a Russian in spirit before attempting to be a 
European in education”.36 
Recognising the growing influence of the periodical press on society’s 
consciousness, Uvarov was sharply critical of the state of contemporary 
journalism. He argued forcibly that “the path to the corruption of 
morals begins with the corruption of taste” and condemned the “brazen 
attempts” of journalists “to go beyond the limits of decorum”, which 
brought serious harm to unformed minds and had a negative influence 
on the atmosphere of the university.37
In 1832, Uvarov took aim at Nikolai Polevoi, the publisher of the 
highly successful Moscow Telegraph (Moskovskii telegraf) for getting 
drawn into “journalistic polemics”, for daring to print satirical sketches 
of high society, and for opining against Karamzin, whose scholarly 
authority had hitherto been reckoned unimpeachable. In 1834, Uvarov 
managed to shut down the Moscow Telegraph, and banned Polevoi from 
working in journalism. 
Uvarov, who was responsible for censorship as Minister of Public 
Education, closed two other journals in addition to Moscow Telegraph 
during his ministerial duties, including The Telescope (Teleskop) in 
1836 for publishing Petr Chaadaev’s “First Philosophical Letter”. 
Uvarov was outraged by Chaadaev’s expression of bitter regret at the 
spiritual stagnation reigning in Russia, which was cut off from the 
“global education of the human race”.38 Chaadaev was accused of a 
lack of patriotism and officially declared insane; Nikolai Nadezhdin, 
36  ‘4 dekabria 1832. S predstavleniem otcheta tainogo sovetnika Uvarova po obozreniiu 
im Moskovskogo universteta i gimnazii’, Sbornik postanovlenii po Ministerstvu 
narodnogo prosveshcheniia (St Petersburg: Tip. V. S. Balasheva, 1875), vol. 2, column 
512. 
37  Ibid., column 513.
38  Piotr Iakovlevitch Tchaadaiev, Lettres philosophiques, adressées à une dame, présentées 
par François Rouleau (Paris: Librairie des Cinq Continents, 1970). 
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the editor of The Telescope, was exiled. The severity of the punishment 
was explained with reference to the fact that Nadezhdin’s position as a 
professor at Moscow University set the Ministry of Public Education in 
a poor light. 
Uvarov clearly understood that restricting journalists by bans alone 
would not work. Thus, he proposed to the “educator class” (soslovie 
obrazovatelei), as he referred to the professors, that they publish their 
own journal, which would contain only serious articles “without 
political news and literary squabbles” and give the reading public 
(and particularly young people) “pure nourishment, mature and 
protective”.39
When Uvarov became the Minister of Public Education in 1834, 
he had an ideological scheme already prepared. On the day of his 
appointment, Uvarov addressed his subordinates through a circular 
in which he repeated his tripartite formula, requesting that public 
education “be carried out in the united spirit of Orthodoxy, autocracy, 
and narodnost′”.40 Understanding the importance of state propaganda, 
Uvarov—without a hint of embarrassment—took on the role of 
ideologue of the Russian Empire. But in order to inculcate his cultural 
policies in society, he needed an official mouthpiece for his ministry, 
rather than an academic journal. With this in mind, Uvarov renewed 
the ministry’s defunct journal, but with a broader remit and a more 
ambitious programme. The publication again received a new title, 
Journal of the Ministry of Public Education. In it Uvarov hoped to converse 
directly with educated society, manage culture, direct minds and shape 
public opinion in a direction supportive of the government. 
The journal aimed not only to serve as the ministry’s official 
mouthpiece—the “echo of the government”, as Uvarov’s put it—
which would contain government instructions on teaching as well as 
reports from the ministry, but to become a kind of Russian equivalent 
of the French Journal des savants, allowing its readership to follow the 
progress of all branches of science and learning. In Uvarov’s conception 
the journal was intended to reflect the status of academic life in the 
empire and, insofar as it was possible, become a replacement for foreign 
39 Sbornik postanovlenii po ministerstvu narodnogo prosveshcheniia, vol. 2, column 516.
40  ‘Tsirkuliarnoe predlozhenie g. Upravliaiushchego MNP nachal′stvam uchebnym 
okrugov, o vstuplenii v upravlenie ministerstvom’, ZhMNP, 1, 1834, xlix-l. 
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scholarly journals, which were inaccessible to a majority of the public. 
It was also meant to report news of academic life in Russia and abroad, 
and to cover the history of education and enlightenment in different 
countries. 
As Uvarov was to write in his report of ministry activities for 1833–
34, the journal’s principal aim consisted of 
publicising the measures undertaken by the government in relation 
to the successful development of the sciences and of public education, 
reporting new useful methods to teachers, and disseminating information 
about the growth of Enlightenment in Russia in comparison with its 
development in other lands. In the past five years, twenty issues of this 
journal have been published. The teachers of young people who live 
close to the capital, as well as those who live in the remote steppe and 
in distant territories of the empire, are equipped with reading material, 
from which they can see what the government expects of them in the 
great work of public education: without being in Moscow, Petersburg, 
or Kiev, they can, as it were, attend the lectures of the universities there, 
become acquainted with all the fruits of our educated classes, and the 
lecturers at higher education institutions can compare their own thoughts 
and the observations of their fellow teachers in other towns. At the same 
time, teachers, knowing the direct intentions of the government in full, 
can bring their actions into line with it, without any need for direction 
from outside.41
Uvarov took on the general directorship of the journal, intending to turn 
it into the country’s leading Russian-language academic journal. He 
personally developed a plan for the publication, defined its structure, 
and proposed rubrics that would guide the distribution of content.42 The 
journal was organised as follows: 1) “Acts of government”; 2) “Literature, 
science, and the arts”; 3) “News of scholars and educational institutions 
in Russia”; 4) “News of foreign scholars and educational institutions”; 
5) “The history of Enlightenment and public education” in different 
countries, particularly in Russia; 6) “News and miscellaneous”.
The journal appeared monthly. Its publication required the joint 
efforts of many people, and Uvarov personally supervised the creation 
of an editorial board. This consisted of an editor, four staff members, and 
additional freelance employees. The board was located in St Petersburg, 
41  S. S. Uvarov, ‘Obozrenie istekshego piatiletiia’, ZhMNP, 1, 1839, Ch. 21, 31–32. 
42  RGIA, coll. 733, descr. 2, file 87, fol. 4. 
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where it occupied a single, dimly lit, low-ceilinged room with a semi-
circular window—more like a kennel than a ministerial office—in the 
building of the Ministry of Public Education by Chernyshev bridge 
(today, Lomonosov bridge).43
Konstantin Serbinovich (1797–1874), who had previously worked 
as secretary to Karamzin, was the journal’s first editor.44 For Uvarov, a 
devotee of Karamzin’s work, Serbinovich’s previous employer was the 
best recommendation possible. Serbinovich was neither a scholar nor 
a writer, but he was an intelligent editor, and a good administrator.45 
Serbinovich diligently carried out all Uvarov’s orders, who summoned 
him almost daily for various explanations and instructions.46 Serbinovich 
read the third (i.e. the final) proofs of the journal and was supposed 
to make sure the dictates of the censor were followed, and that all the 
texts were in tune with the government’s thinking. He gave Uvarov the 
final proofs to check, and after receiving his approval, the journal was 
published. Serbinovich made no serious errors in his work, and Uvarov 
valued his obliging editor, demanding of him little more. Serbinovich 
served as the journal’s editor for twenty years, combining that position 
with duties as director of the Chancery of the Ober-Prosecutor of the 
Holy Synod, where he played a prominent role in attempts to re-unite 
the Uniate (Eastern-Rite Catholic) Church with the Orthodox Church. 
The journal’s editorial assistant role was demanding, and for many 
years Ivan Galanin (1817–73) occupied this position, managing the 
general work, an extensive correspondence with authors, the delivery 
of the journal to its subscribers, and other such administrative tasks. 
Galanin drew up the first, official section of the journal, covering the 
actions of the government. A ministry department, the Chancery of the 
Minister, and the Chancery of the Main Censorship Administration 
43  A. V. Starchevskii, ‘Vospominaniia starogo literatora’, Istoricheskii vestnik, October 
1888, vol. 34, 110. 
44  ‘O naznachenii nadvornogo sovetnika Serbinovicha redaktorom zhurnala 
departmenta narodnogo prosveshcheniia, 8 aprelia 1833 g.’ RGIA, coll. 733, descr. 
2, file 87, fol. 2. For Serbinovich’s views of editorial work, see ‘Ob izdanii zhurnala 
pri Ministerstve narodnogo prosveshcheniia’, RGIA, coll. 1661, descr. 1, file 245, 
fols. 16–17. 
45  Compare the views of Serbinovich’s background and beliefs in Starchevskii, 
‘Vospominaniia’, 110 and the entry for 11 June 1843 in A. A. Nikitenko, Dnevnik, 3 
vols (Moscow: Zakharov, 2005).
46  Starchevskii, ‘Vospominaniia’, 110.
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presented the necessary information (decrees, decisions, instructions, 
and accounts of the ministry’s work) to the editorial board. Aside from 
that, Galanin read the first and second proofs of the journal. 
However, Uvarov considered that his main assistants in this work 
were Russian scholars, his subordinates: university and lyceum lecturers 
employed by the Ministry of Public Education, as well as members of the 
Academy of Sciences (Uvarov had served as President of the Academy 
since 1818). He counted on their assistance and hoped to receive the 
majority of the scholarly material for his journal from them. To facilitate 
a steady flow of articles, Uvarov used the administrative levers of 
influence he already had. For example, in a circular to the directors of 
regional education boards on 9 September 1833, Uvarov simply ordered 
the professors of universities to deliver one article a year to the journal.47 
The professors’ texts were supposed to be “evidence of their talents and 
knowledge, and of the level to which they had raised the subject they 
taught”.48 
Thus, participation in the journal was seen as tantamount to a 
qualification required of the professors, while the journal itself became 
a means for control and oversight of the efficiency of academic work 
undertaken by employees of the Ministry of Public Education. When 
the council of the University of Dorpat refused to deliver articles at 
the minister’s behest on the grounds that they were too busy, Uvarov 
modified his peremptory tone. He hastened to assure the Dorpat 
scholars that he was inviting them to write, but was not in any way 
forcing them to collaborate with the ministry’s journal.49 The professors 
of other universities, as well as members of the Academy of Sciences, 
readily agreed to take part in the journal. Before long, scholars had 
become the mainstay of the publication. Thanks to them, two of the 
journal’s six sections, “Literature, science, and the arts” and “News of 
foreign scholars and educational institutions”, were always saturated 
with scholarly material. 
Uvarov supported the journal with an annual subscription of 2,000 
to 3,000 rubles from the ministry’s administrative funds. This went to 
pay the honoraria of the authors, which Uvarov set himself. The amount 
47  RGIA, coll. 733, descr. 2, file 87, fols. 10–11. 
48  Ibid.
49  Ibid., fols. 25–28, fol. 33.
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depended on the length of the composition, so the minister warned 
his authors against “superfluous productivity”, requesting extreme 
clarity in exposition. For a composition of less than 1 “author’s sheet” 
(i.e. around 40,000 characters), a contributor would receive 50 rubles; 
for between 1 and 2 “author’s sheets”—100 rubles; for 2 “author’s 
sheets”—150 rubles; for 3 or more—200 rubles. 
The first issue of the Journal of the Ministry of Public Education was 
published in January 1834, and continued to appear once a month until 
1917. In total, 434 volumes were published, each of which included 
several issues.50 The first issue opened with the grand declaration that 
the “era of unconditional imitation” had finished in Russia, and that the 
country “could apply the fruits of education to its own needs better than 
its foreign teachers and clearly distinguish good from evil in the rest of 
Europe; it used the former, and was not afraid of the latter”.51 Uvarov’s 
ideological programme was based on the bold assumption that Russia 
had already reached maturity, had transformed itself into a developed 
state and in some areas was already superseding its Western neighbours. 
The very concept of narodnost′, in which there was “something fresh 
and, so to speak, unworn out” to the contemporary ear, was meant to 
testify to Russia’s maturity, its ability to move forwards on a par with 
the nations of Europe.52
Petr Pletnev, a professor of St Petersburg University, took it upon 
himself to support the doctrine developed by Uvarov. He showed 
the importance of the national principle in literature with reference 
to ancient Greek literature. According to Pletnev, the fruits of Greek 
literary culture, in all its richness and variety, merge into a “single 
image reflected in several mirrors”, which is united by the common 
idea of civic consciousness.53 However, Pletnev decided not to apply 
that measure to the history of Russian literature, referring instead to 
its national distinctiveness.54 Uvarov’s programme, which affirmed the 
unity of monarchy, the Orthodox faith, and national distinctiveness, had 
nothing in common with the Slavophiles’ understanding of narodnost′. 
50  The journal can be accessed online at http://www.runivers.ru/lib/book7643/450649/.
51  ZhMNP, 1, 1834, v–vi. 
52  P. A. Pletnev, ‘O narodnosti v literature. Rassuzhdenie, chitannoe v torzhestvennom 
sobranii Imp. SPB universiteta ord. prof. onogo Pletnevym’, ZhMNP, 1, 1834, 2.
53  Ibid., 3.
54  Ibid., 18, 29.
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Although the official ideology and the Slavophiles’ views proclaimed 
the same principles, the spirit and meaning of the official programme 
and the Slavophiles’ system were opposed to one another. The theory 
of official narodnost′ was aimed at reinforcing state power; its main 
principle was autocracy, to which the principles of Orthodoxy and 
narodnost′ were subordinated. By contrast, for Slavophiles who were not 
statists, the principles of true Orthodox faith and true narodnost′ were 
definitive. 
In a period of increased debate about what the national principle 
meant in Russia’s culture and history, Uvarov had no intention of 
turning the ministry’s official mouthpiece into a platform for discussions 
of society and politics.55 It is therefore unsurprising that the works of 
Slavophiles such as Aleksei Khomiakov, the religious philosopher Ivan 
Kireevskii, and the brothers Ivan and Konstantin Aksakov, as well as 
others, failed to appear in the journal. 
According to Uvarov’s plan, the Journal of the Ministry of Public 
Education was to become an exemplary model of its kind for Russian 
journalists. It appealed to a wide audience, although it was first and 
foremost destined for the scholarly milieu—lecturers at institutions 
of higher education, teachers in gymnasiums and district schools—
allowing them to follow successes in science and practical pedagogy in 
Russia and abroad in their own language. The print run in these years 
was 1,200 copies, and the number of compulsory subscribers reached 
600.56 The names of the voluntary subscribers were printed in the final 
issue of the year. From year to year the number of voluntary subscribers 
increased, and this served as the best evidence that Uvarov had managed 
to make the journal popular.57 
55  For Uvarov’s relationship to polemics, see his letter to Mikhail Pogodin on 18 
December 1840. M. Pogodin, ‘Dlia biografii grafa Sergеia Semenovicha Uvarova’, 
Russkii arkhiv, 12 (1871), column 2082.
56  Ten exclusive copies were bound separately from the main print run and presented 
to the tsar, members of the imperial family, the Minister of Public Education and 
the head of department. See RGIA, coll. 1661, descr. 1, file 245, fol. 3. For Uvarov’s 
circular obliging all educational institutions to subscribe to ZhMNP, see RGIA, coll. 
742, descr. 2, file 1, fol. 76. There was a variable level of compulsory subscription: 
gymnasia took two copies, lyceums—three, and universities—four. 
57  The cost of an annual subscription was 30 rubles in St Petersburg, and 35 in all other 
cities of the Russian Empire.
 33110. Communication and Official Enlightenment
In the 1830s and 1840s, different spheres of knowledge were 
represented in the journal, although the humanities were predominant, 
with history, philosophy, religion, Oriental studies, philology and 
jurisprudence taking pride of place.58 The journal brought together 
works by the best lecturers of the Ministry of Public Education, who 
published their independent research in it: the most important lectures 
on their topics, works on the history of various disciplines, general 
reflections on the state of scholarship in Russia and Europe, accounts 
of research trips, reports on Russian and foreign scholarly publications, 
and so on. 
Where possible, the Journal of the Ministry of Public Education 
aimed to review all scholarly books in the humanities published in 
Russia, as well as publishing regular thematic overviews of Russian 
and foreign periodicals. These periodicals came either from the 
publishers themselves or from the Chancery of the Main Censorship 
Administration, and served as a source of varied information on the 
state of education in Russia. These overviews were produced by the 
journal’s employees, who were chosen personally by Serbinovich. As 
a rule, the journal’s staff were capable young men who had recently 
completed university. People who knew several or rare languages were 
in particular demand. Contributors included the future editor of Notes 
of the Fatherland (Otechestvennye zapiski), Andrei Kraevskii, the publicist 
and education organiser Ianuarii Nemerov, the historian Ivan Tarnava-
Borichevskii and Albert Starchevskii, a journalist and polyglot. 
The editorial office received foreign newspapers and journals from 
Uvarov himself. The staff used all material from these publications that 
they found appropriate, sending it for translation or critical review. 
Every three months, the Journal of the Ministry of Public Education 
published detailed overviews of newspapers and journals broken 
down by category: general and Russian history, belles lettres, criticism, 
theory and history of literature and art, mathematics, natural sciences 
and medicine, and military science. These reviews were thorough and 
extensive, and were examined in detail by the editor. According to one 
of the journal’s staff members, the reviews were written “expansively, 
58  See the thematic indexes of Ukazatel′ k povremennym izdaniiam Ministerstva narodnogo 
prosveshcheniia s 1803 po iiun′ 1864 goda (St Petersburg: Ministerstvo narodnogo 
prosveshcheniia, 1865). 
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because Serbinovich had a penchant for pruning, and would delete a 
lot”.59
The Journal had a particularly important role as a means for 
disseminating information about cultural life abroad. Although this was 
not stated explicitly at the time, it provided one of the few means of 
bypassing the normal obstacles imposed by the censors. According to 
the procedures laid down in the 1828 Statute on censorship, all printed 
materials from abroad were to be inspected by the Foreign Censorship 
Committee. The chairman of the Committee was the ultra-vigilant A. 
I. Krasovskii, who gave instructions to inspect even the printed scrap 
paper in which foreign books were packaged. Almost every time that 
one of the censors recommended approving a work for distribution 
in Russia, a supplementary annotation countered that “the chairman 
considers it more prudent to refuse”. The Committee received foreign 
newspapers and journals by regular subscription, but very few of them 
made their way into the hands of Russian readers. The Journal provided 
its own channel for information from abroad, which it made still more 
accessible through rendering it in Russian.
The section on belles lettres, which reviewed literary works published 
in journals, was the least successful. At the end of the 1830s, literary 
reviews were sent to Boris Fedorov (1794–1875) for review: Serbinovich 
had complete faith in Fedorov’s literary taste. A mediocre writer, and 
the object of mockery and epigrammes, Fedorov was a “retrograde and 
a true scourge of modern Russian literature, which he hated”.60 The 
journal’s staff knew that Fedorov would edit and rewrite their reviews 
from start to finish. 
Beginning in 1837, the Journal of the Ministry of Public Education 
printed advertisements and announcements for books published at 
home and abroad. Gradually, the bibliographic review content grew to 
the point that the editors created a separate section, “Reviews of books 
and journals”. Reviewing all academic books in the humanities printed 
in Russia was painstaking work, and a thorough review could take up 
to six months to write. Books for review were given to specialists, but 
in the rare case when the author of a book under review happened to 
be on the journal’s staff, he would review his own work: it was often 
59  Starchevskii, ‘Vospominaniia’, 107.
60  Ibid.
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difficult to find another specialist in the same narrow field. Starchevskii, 
for instance, had to write a “self review” on his two-volume Historiae 
Ruthenicae Scriptores exteri saeculi XVI (1841–42). The article was 
published under the surname of an acquaintance who had not even 
seen Starchevskii’s work.61 
The section “News and Miscellany” was notably diverse in its 
contents. It published bibliographic surveys, announcements of new 
foreign books, journalism, as well as information on new discoveries and 
inventions, or on travels, or on noteworthy developments in classical 
philology. Thanks to the Journal of the Ministry of Public Education, the 
Russian reader could become better acquainted with, for example, 
aspects of British life and history across a broad spectrum ranging from 
Newton to railways.62 
Uvarov greatly valued his journal both for itself and for the uses to 
which it could be put. In his capacity as “education tsar”, the Journal 
served as his means of promoting his education reforms. When he was 
appointed Minister of Public Education, a new university charter was 
in preparation, and Uvarov devoted considerable efforts to university 
reform. His “General Charter of Imperial Russian Universities”, 
confirmed in July 1835, was an attempt to unify research and teaching, 
and to raise both the level of teaching and the quality of scholarly 
research.63 Uvarov used the Journal of the Ministry of Public Education to 
show how his charter derived from the tradition of Western universities’ 
legislative acts. Original and translated articles regularly appeared in 
the “News of foreign educational institutions” section. These articles 
were dedicated to the history and current state of university education 
in European countries. Particular attention was paid to the state of public 
education in Prussia, the structure of Prussian universities, and new 
61  Ibid., 105. 
62  See, for example, ‘Tsennost′ gornoi proizvoditel′nosti Anglii’, ZhMNP, 1841, 
86–91; ‘Zheleznye dorogi v Anglii’, 1856, Ch. LXXXIX, otd. VII, 122–24; ‘Sravnenie 
anglichan s rimlianami’, ZhMNP, 1846, XLIX, otd. VI, 222–24; D. Perevoshchikov, 
‘Otkrytiia N′iutona’, ZhMNP, 1841, Ch. XXXII, otd. II, 1–68. For more detail see the 
Ukazatel′ k povremennym izdaniiam Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia, pp. 9–10. 
63  ‘Obshchii Ustav imperatorskikh rossiiskikh universitetov’, ZhMNP, 8, 1835, XLIX–
LXXXVII; ‘Shtaty imperatorskikh rossiiskikh universitetov Sankt-Peterburgskogo, 
Moskovskogo, Khar′kovskogo i Kazanskogo’, ZhMNP, 8, 1835, LXXXVIII–XCVII. 
For a list of articles, see ‘Universitety otechestvennye’, Ukazatel′ k povremennym 
izdaniiam Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia, pp. 236–39.
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forms of teaching in France. Several articles took English universities as 
their subject, in particular the history of Oxford.64
In the year leading up to the publication of the new charter, and 
continuing after it was implemented, Uvarov waged a campaign in 
support of disciplines that had previously seemed “dangerous” and 
subversive to the state. Relying on the authority of scholars, Uvarov 
tried to dispel fears about philosophy as a discipline of dubious 
reliability, and to highlight the benefits of studying law.65 When Uvarov 
announced narodnost′ as a cornerstone of education for the first time in 
1832, he was trying not only to create a certain didactic effect, but also to 
attract students to study the history of their own country. Uvarov hoped 
that “harmless and thorough” lessons in Russian history would furnish 
young people with a kind of mental buttress “against the influence of 
so-called European ideas, which threaten us perilously”.66 The university 
charter of 1835 aided the institutionalisation of these areas of study, 
making Russian history a separate department for the first time, and 
establishing a new department dedicated to the history and literature 
of Slavonic dialects. 
The pages of the Journal of the Ministry of Public Education presented 
historical research not only by university professors, but also by 
members of the Archeographic Commission, which was created by 
Uvarov in 1834 to extract from the archives and publish a full corpus 
of documents on Russian history. Historical articles took pride of place 
64  ‘Universitety zagranichnye’, Ukazatel′ k povremennym izdaniiam Ministerstva 
narodnogo prosveshchenii, pp. 239–40. K. Morgenshtern, ‘Sravnenie angliiskikh 
universitetov s nemetskimi’, ZhMNP, 11, 1835, Ch. 8, otd. IV, 327–54; N. D. 
Brashman, ‘Ob angliiskikh universtitetakh’, ZhMNP, 4, 1843, Ch. XXXVIII, 1–30; 
‘Kratkaia istoriia Oksfordskogo universiteta i Oksforda kak goroda’, ZhMNP, 10, 
1844, Ch. XLIV, otd. IV, 1–18.
65  See, for example, A. A. Kraevskii, ‘Sovremennoe sostoianie filosofii vo Frantsii i 
novaia sistema sei nauki, osnovyvaemaia Botenom’, ZhMNP, 3, 1834, 317–77; A. 
S. Fisher, ‘O khode obrazovaniia v Rossii i ob uchastii, kakoe dolzhna prinimat′ v 
nem filosofiia’, ZhMNP, 1, 1835, 28–68; V. Androsov, ‘O predelakh, v koikh dolzhny 
byt′ izuchaemy i prepodavaemy pravo politicheskoe i narodnoe’, ZhMNP, 12, 1834, 
367–85; K. O. Nevolin, ‘O soedinenii teorii s praktikoiu v izuchenii zakonov i v 
deloproizvodstve’, ZhMNP, 12, 1835, 445–75. 
66  ‘S predstavleniem otcheta tainogo sovetnika Uvarova po obozreniiu im 
Moskovskogo universiteta i gimnazii, 4 dekabria 1832’, Sbornik postanovlenii po 
Ministerstvu narodnogo prosveshcheniia, vol. 2, col. 517. 
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in the journal, and patriotism was no impediment to serious scholarly 
work.67
Uvarov’s classicism also aimed to serve national interests. By 
insisting on the introduction of the Greek language into gymnasiums 
and universities, for instance, Uvarov aimed to highlight the Byzantine 
roots of Russian culture and hence to aid understanding of Russia’s 
particular position in relation to Western cultures. Professors of the 
universities of Dorpat, Kharkov, and Moscow published articles in 
support of classical disciplines in the journal, explaining why studying 
the ancient past was useful.68
The permanent secretary of the Academy of Sciences, Pavel Fus, 
collected news of Russia’s scholarly and educational establishments.69 
The journal’s first issue included accounts of the work carried out by 
the Ministry of Public Education in 1833, and by two of the capital’s 
higher research institutes: one about the activities of St Petersburg 
University for 1833–34 and a “Review of works by the Imperial St 
Petersburg Academy of Sciences, 1827–1833”. In its second issue, the 
journal presented a “Review of works of the Russian Academy since 
its establishment up to 1833” by Fedorov. Apart from such reports, the 
journal also often published extracts from the minutes of meetings of 
the Academy of Sciences. This was a prime opportunity for President-
cum-Minister Uvarov to present the Academy he had fostered in all 
its glory to the readers of the Journal—which meant to the whole of 
educated society.
67  See, for example, P. M. Stroev, ‘Khronologicheskoe ukazanie materialov 
otechestvennoi istorii, literatury, pravovedeniia, do nachala XVIII stoletiia’, 
ZhMNP, 1834, Ch. 1.2, 152–88; N. G. Ustrialov, ‘Skazaniia kniazia Kurbskogo’, 
ZhMNP, 1834, Ch. 3, 82–85; idem, ‘Predpolozhenie ob izdanii russkikh letopisei i 
gosudarstvennykh aktov’, ZhMNP, 1837, Ch. XIII, otd. II, 338–52; M. P. Pogodin, 
‘O vseobshchei istorii’, 1834, Ch. 1, 31–44; idem, ‘Otryvok iz rossiiskoi istorii dlia 
narodnykh uchilishch’, ZhMNP, 1834, Ch. IV, otd. II, 386–400; idem, ‘Povestvovanie 
o Moskovskikh proisshestviiakh po konchine tsaria Alekseia Mikhailovicha’, 
ZhMNP, 1835, Ch. V, otd. II, 69–82; N. V. Gogol′, ‘Plan prepodavaniia vseobshchei 
istorii’, ZhMNP, 1834, Ch. 1, 189–209. For a complete list of articles see Ukazatel′ k 
povremennym izdaniiam Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia, pp. 90–95.
68  M. Rozberg, ‘Glavnye svoistva grecheskoi i rimskoi slovesnstoi’, ZhMNP, 7, 
1834, 1–26; I. Kroneberg, ‘Ob izuchenii slovesnosti’, ZhMNP, 11, 1835, 253–89; I. 
M. Snegirev, ‘O predmete i tseli drevnostei rimsikh i posobiiakh inostrannykh i 
otechestvennykh dlia izucheniia onykh’, ZhMNP, 11, 1835, 301–13. 
69  For a complete list of articles, see ‘Uchebnye zavedeniia’, Ukazatel′ k povremennym 
izdaniiam Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia, pp. 242–46. 
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In 1835 the intellectual life of Russian universities was enlivened by 
the return of a group of young scholars from Germany, where they had 
been sent to finish their education, Uvarov was personally involved in the 
allocation of candidates to university departments, taking advantage of 
his right, as Education Minister, to appoint professors. Prior to departing 
for their new posts, each of these young scholars gave a lecture pro venia 
legendi (the lecture which demonstrated their professional credentials). 
These lectures took place publicly in the Academy of Sciences, and the 
Journal of the Ministry of Public Education published a detailed account of 
the events as well as the text of several lectures in full.70
The new university charter facilitated the rotation of personnel, since 
it limited the term of service to twenty-five years, and introduced the 
title of “emeritus professor”, which allowed the ministry to retire older 
professors who had ceased to be active in scholarship, and to replace 
them with fresh cohorts, thus aiding the renewal and revival of Russian 
universities. The dismissal of nearly a quarter of the total number of 
professors was a painful process, and university bodies cautiously 
awaited the arrival of the new, younger guard. Thus Uvarov thought it 
wise to use the ministry journal to present this new generation to their 
senior colleagues. He used the Journal as an instrument with which to 
draw society’s attention to the outcome of his policy: an improvement 
in the level of learning and scholarship in Russia. 
The ministry’s journal acted as a rich, living chronicle of the 
development of education and learning in Russia until Uvarov’s 
retirement, which came soon after the revolutionary upheavals in 
Germany and Austro-Hungary in 1848–49. These events shook the 
Russian government, forcing it to change its priorities in state education 
policy. Uvarov’s life’s work was crushed before his eyes. With every 
means at his disposal he tried to protect the development of Russian 
education and learning from the harsh demands of the time, but he 
lacked the resources necessary for a serious struggle. According to 
Uvarov, he “was in the position of a man who, fleeing from a wild beast, 
throws pieces of clothing, one after another, to distract it, and is glad 
70  ‘O probnykh lektsiiakh universtitetskikh vospitannikov, nedavno 
vozvrativshikhsiia iz-za granitsy’, ZhMNP, 9, 1835, 507–33.
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that he remains whole”.71 With the onset of a period of political reaction 
in 1849, there was nothing left to throw, and Uvarov retired. 
In 1850, Platon Shirinskii-Shikhmatov (1790–1853), who saw “real 
enlightenment [prosveshchenie]” only in the light of the icon-lamp, 
became Minister of Public Education.72 Under Shirinskii-Shikhmatov, 
the main emphasis of education policy was on religious education. The 
universities, so recently invigorated, were ostracised. The change of state 
education policy was reflected in the ministry’s journal. Its annual State 
subsidy of 3,000 rubles was withdrawn, and this led to a deterioration 
of its contents. The journal shed its best authors and gradually fell into 
decline. It lost the “respect and trust of the reading and thinking public” 
which came to see it merely as “official drivel”.73
71  B. N. Chicherin, Vospominaniia, 4 vols (Moscow: Izd-vo Abashnikovykh, 1929), 
vol.1, p. 28.
72  P. M. Kovalevskii, ‘Vlasti prederzhashchie. U Chernysheva mosta’, Russkaia starina, 
2 (1909), 301. 
73  ‘Otvet K. D. Ushinskogo na predlozhenie ministra E. V. Putiatina o vozvrashchenii 
k prezhnei programme zhurnala’, Arkhiv K. D. Ushinskogo, vol. 1 (Moscow: 
Izdatel′stvo Akad. ped. nauk. RSFSR, 1959), p. 52. 

V.  
INFORMATION AND  
PUBLIC DISPLAY

11. Information in Plain Sight:  
The Formation of the Public Graphosphere
Simon Franklin
The “graphosphere” is the space of the visible word, the sum of the 
places where words are to be seen.1 The graphosphere is therefore a 
multi-faceted, multi-functional phenomenon of culture. It is dynamic, 
both in its physical properties and in its interactions with its viewers and 
inhabitants. It can permeate many locations: domestic and institutional, 
official and informal, urban and rural. Over time it may change its size, 
its shape, its composition, its relative density, and its configuration of 
functions. It is a complex, multi-dimensional field of information and 
communication. The present chapter focuses on one set of its locations: 
public spaces, which here means places which are out of doors and 
openly accessible: streets, squares, external surfaces, but not interior 
spaces with public uses, such as public rooms. We will consider when, 
how, and to some extent why a public graphosphere emerged in Russia, 
the types of institutions and activities that facilitated or shaped (or 
inhibited) its formation, and the functions that its various components 
were intended to serve, as well as some of the ways in which it was 
perceived. 
It is characteristic both of antiquity and of modernity that urban 
public spaces are saturated with visible words: signs, inscriptions, and 
1  Further on this concept see Simon Franklin, ‘Mapping the Graphosphere: Cultures 
of Writing in Early 19th-Century Russia (and Before)’, Kritika, 12. 3 (Summer 2011), 
531–60. 
© 2017 Simon Franklin, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0122.11
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so on. By contrast, the medieval city, across Europe, was outwardly 
mute. This was a difference in the very idea of the city. In the ancient 
city, visible writing was part of the fabric of the urban experience. 
Streets and squares were lined with inscriptions: formal and informal, 
funerary, commemorative, legislative, commercial, triumphal or 
devotional. The medieval city was more inward-facing. In medieval 
Rus, Byzantium, or early Muscovy, the space for the display of words 
was inside a church, with its inscribed wall-paintings and panel icons, 
its Gospel books in jewelled bindings, the wordily embroidered textiles 
covering the liturgical vessels or hanging beneath the sacred images, or 
draped over royal tombs.2 Ecclesiastical interiors could be filled with 
visible words, but their graphospheric density did not extend into the 
streets. A few signs of writing might have been found clustered around 
church walls: on the occasional exterior wall paintings,3 or, in a more 
transient context, on the icons, banners, and ceremonial vestments 
briefly paraded on feast-day processions. For the most part, however, 
public, open spaces were free of the visible words.
When, how, and why did signs of writing spread into the cityscape 
and, indeed, into the wider landscape? In Russia the transformation of 
the public graphosphere took place far later than in much of Europe. 
In the Renaissance city the stones spoke once more.4 In Russia we only 
begin to see the faintest hints of a beginning of a process from the late 
fifteenth century, but little fundamental change—despite some vigorous 
attempts—until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. By 
the second half of the nineteenth century, in Jeffrey Brooks’s evocation, 
“the city, with its shop signs and street names, window displays and 
price tags, newspapers and kiosks, announcements and bookstalls 
2  See, e.g., Charlotte Roueché, ‘Written Display in the Late Antique and Byzantine 
City’, in Proceedings of the 21st International Congress of Byzantine Studies. London, 
21–26 August 2006. vol. 1. Plenary Papers, ed. by E. Jeffreys (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2006), pp. 235–53.
3  M. A. Orlova, Naruzhnye rospisi srednevekovykh khramov. Vizantiia. Balkany. Drevniaia 
Rus’, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Severnyi palomnik, 2002); esp. pp. 193–250.
4  On public inscriptions in the Renaissance see Armando Petrucci, Public Lettering. 
Script, Power, and Culture, transl. by Linda Lappin (London, Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1993), esp. pp. 16–51. 
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exhibited the written word to all who walked its streets”.5 How did such 
transformations come about? The question here is not about literacy. 
Obviously there may be links between graphospheric density and rates 
of literacy, but literacy rates are by no means the only variables, and, for 
present purposes, are not the most important variables.
Between the mid-fifteenth century and the mid-nineteenth century, 
the formation of the Russian graphosphere was not an evenly paced 
process. One can distinguish three phases. The first phase, roughly from 
the late fifteenth century to the late seventeenth century, is characterised 
by sporadic, uncoordinated and not widely conspicuous graphospheric 
activity on behalf of the Church and the state. The second phase, over 
the late seventeenth century and the early eighteenth century, was a 
period of fairly intense graphospheric initiatives by the state. The 
dynamics and the aims were, so to speak, top-down, as visible writing 
was introduced to further the causes of ideology, public information, 
and, to some degree, public education. The third phase began towards 
the middle of the eighteenth century but was not fully developed until 
the early nineteenth century. One of the principal actors was again the 
state, though now the purposes were largely administrative and fiscal. 
However, the crucial new catalyst for the spread of public writing 
was not an institution taking “top-down” decisions on the means of 
communication, but a “bottom-up” activity which generated its own 
powerful graphospheric demands: trade, commerce, private business. 
The three phases are not entirely distinct chronologically. In their 
movement and interrelations they are perhaps more like successive 
waves—linked at their troughs but separable at their peaks.
Phase One: Sporadic Inscription
Public inscription began to appear in Muscovy from the late fifteenth 
century, and for almost two hundred years was almost entirely restricted 
to three contexts: inscriptions on gravestones; inscriptions marking 
the completion or dedication of public buildings; and inscriptions on 
monumental bronze-cast cannons and bells.
5  Jeffrey Brooks, When Russia Learned to Read. Literacy and Popular Culture, 1861–1917 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 12.
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For half a millennium after the first official conversion in Rus, 
Christian East Slavs were apparently content to bury their dead in 
unlabelled graves. In the early centuries the articulate lapidary marking 
of grave-sites, while not wholly unknown, was a rare exception.6 
A practice of producing inscribed commemorative stone crosses is 
suggested by a few survivals from the mid- to late fifteenth century.7 As 
for grave-slabs themselves, a continuous tradition of their inscription 
begins from the 1490s. Over the following couple of centuries the 
practice became fairly widespread in major monastic cemeteries (and in 
church interiors) both in Moscow and elsewhere.8 From the initial bare 
record of names, the inscriptions, on horizontal slabs, went through 
phases of increasingly informative formulae, adding the date according 
to the calendar of church festivals, the year, sometimes even the hour 
of death, as well as the lifespan and the social standing of the deceased. 
Eighteenth-century cemeteries adopted the whole range of rhetorical 
funerary genres that befitted an enlightened empire, including a rich 
variety of inscriptional forms and genres, and, from the latter part of the 
century, sculpted figurative monuments.9
What prompted the change in practice? The sources do not 
explain themselves.10 Here we simply note that the proliferation of 
6  See Simon Franklin, ‘On the Pre-History of Inscribed Gravestones in Rus’, 
Palaeoslavica, 10 (2002), 105–21.
7  A. V. Sviatoslavskii, A. A. Troshin, Krest v russkoi kul′ture. Ocherki russkoi 
monumental′noi stavrografii (Moscow: Drevlekhranilishche, 2000), pp. 158–63. (On 
the cross of Stepan Borodatyi: G. V. Popov, ‘Belokamennyi krest 1462/1467 goda 
iz Borisoglebskogo monastyria v Dmitrove’, in ΣΟΦΙΑ. Sbornik statei po iskusstvu 
Vizantii i Drevnei Rusi v chest′ A. I. Komecha (Moscow: Severnyi palomnik, 2006), pp. 
325–46.
8  See L. A. Beliaev, Russkoe srednevekovoe nadgrobie. Belmennye plity Moskvy i Severo-
Vostochnoi Rusi XIII–XVII vv. (Moscow: MODUS-GRAFFITI, 1996); Russkoe 
srednevekovoe nadgrobie, XIII–XVII veka: materialy k svodu. Vypusk 1, ed. by L. A. 
Beliaev (Moscow: Nauka, 2006).
9  T. S. Tsarkova, S. I. Nikolaev, ‘Epitafiia peterburgskogo nekropolia’, in Istoricheskie 
kladbishcha Sankt-Peterburga. Spravochnik-putevoditel′, ed. by A. V. Kobak and Iu. M. 
Piriutko (St Petersburg: Izd. Chernysheva, 1993), pp. 111–29; S. O. Androsov, ‘O 
pervykh figurativnykh nadgrobiiakh v Rossii’, in idem, Ot Petra I k Ekaterine II. Liudi, 
statui, kartiny (St Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2013), pp. 240–52.
10  Daniel H. Kaiser, ‘Discovering Individualism Among the Deceased: Gravestones 
in Early Modern Russia’, in Modernizing Muscovy: Reform and Social Change in 
Seventeenth-Century Russia, ed. by Jarmo Kotilaine and Marshall T. Poe (London 
and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), pp. 433–59.
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funerary inscriptions in cemeteries was one of the first processes as 
the graphosphere spread out from under the roof of the church or the 
scriptorium or the chancery, into the open air, exposed to the public 
gaze. However, cemeteries were “public” only in a limited sense. 
Though open to the elements, a cemetery was still enclosed, bounded: 
a designated, delineated space for the display of writing. This is still a 
very long way from the late antique lapidary inscriptions which lined 
the streets and addressed their civilised epigrams to any passer-by who 
cared to pause and contemplate.
The occasional practice of placing outward-facing inscriptions on 
buildings likewise dates from the end of the fifteenth century. The 
earliest known example was—and still is—on the Kremlin itself. The 
Kremlin’s massive brick walls were built between 1485 and 1495 by a 
team of Italian architects including Antonio Gilardi, Marco Ruffo, and 
Pietro Antonio Solari. Above the main entrance to the Kremlin from 
Red Square, under the Frolov Tower (renamed the Spasskaia Tower in 
1658), were two inscriptions carved on stone tablets, one on the inner 
façade (i.e. in effect above the exit from the Kremlin), the other on the 
outer façade (above the entrance from Red Square). Both recorded, in 
almost identical wording, the construction of the tower in 1491 by Solari 
on the orders of the Grand Prince Ivan III. Though the tablets agree 
on the year, they differ on the month: March in the outer inscription, 
July in the inner inscription. The exit inscription was in Slavonic, 
but the entrance inscription—the first and most publicly visible 
inscription—was in Latin.11 For Solari this was normal, in the manner 
of equivalent inscriptions in contemporary Italy.12 In Muscovy it was 
wholly exceptional. To a limited extent, the practice became naturalised. 
Several other equivalent inscriptions, in Slavonic, date from the early 
11  D. A. Drboglav, Kamni rasskazyvaiut… Epigraficheskie latinskie pamiatniki XV-pervaia 
polovina XVII v. (Moskva, Serpukhov, Astrakhan′) (Moscow: Izdatel′stvo Moskovskogo 
universiteta, 1988), pp. 12–16. See, however, D. A. Petrov, ‘Monumental′nye nadpisi 
P′etro Antonio Solari v Moskve’, Voprosy epigrafiki, 5 (2011), 322–34, for a different 
reading of the sequence of months.
12  See O. A. Belobrova, ‘Latinskaia nadpis′ na Frolovskikh vorotakh Moskovskogo 
Kremlia i ee sud′ba v drevnerusskoi pis′mennosti’, in Gosudarstvennye muzei 
Moskovskogo Kremlia. Materialy i issledovaniia. Novye atributsii. Vypusk V (Moscow: 
Iskusstvo, 1987), pp. 51–57.
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sixteenth century.13 Nor was the acquired custom restricted to the state, 
or to Moscow. Over the first half of the sixteenth century, carved stone 
or ceramic inscriptions marking the foundation or construction of 
churches can be found in the provinces, even in quite small settlements.14 
The tradition of ceramic inscriptions seems to have originated in Pskov 
in the late fifteenth century; several Moscow examples date from the 
seventeenth century.15
To treat bronze bells and cannon in the same context as buildings 
may seem incongruous, but they are brought together in the public 
graphosphere. Bells in a Russian bell-tower are somewhat liminal 
between exterior and interior. They are within the bell-tower, but 
Russian bell-towers were often little more than elaborate open-sided 
frames, in which the bells were visible. Although bells had been cast 
in Rus in earlier centuries, the proliferation of elaborately inscribed 
Muscovite bronze-cast bells dates from the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries.16 Whether they were the grand, multi-ton monumental bells 
with details of their donors cast in quite large and visible bands of 
lettering around the shoulder and/or rim, or the smaller bells for market 
sale and subsequent inscription, they added to the thickening clusters 
of signs of writing on display on and around, rather than exclusively 
inside, the church.
The technology of casting cannons in bronze was brought to Moscow 
by Italian craftsmen in the late 1480s. Chronicles record the casting 
of a “great cannon” by the friazin Pavlin (Paolo), an event considered 
memorable enough to be recorded pictorially in the official, prestigious 
13  A. V. Grashchenkov, ‘Plita s latinskoi nadpis′iu so Spasskoi bashni i titul gosudaria 
vseia Rusi’, Voprosy epigrafiki, 1 (2006), 16–25; A. G. Avdeev, ‘Utrachennaia nadpis′ 
1530 g. o stroitel′stve kremlia v Kolomne: Opyt rekonstruktsii soderzhaniia’, 
Voprosy epigrafiki, 2 (2008), 178–89.
14  G. G. Donskoi, ‘Proklamativnaia funktsiia nadpisi na kolokol′ne Novospasskogo 
monastyria’, Voprosy epigrafiki, 7. 2 (2013), 199–205; V. B. Girshberg, ‘Nadpis′ mastera 
Poviliki’, Sovetskaia arkheologiia, 2 (1959), 248–49; A. G. Avdeev, ‘Khramozdannye 
nadpisi XVI–XVII vv. Kostromy i kraia’, Kostromskaia zemlia, 5 (2002), 158–65.
15  I. I. Pleshanova, ‘Pskovskie arkhitekturnye keramicheskie poiasa’, Sovetskaia 
arkheologiia, 2 (1963), 212–16; S. I. Baranova, Moskovskii arkhitekturnyi izrazets XVII 
veka v sobranii Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo ob″edinennogo muzeia-zapovednika 
Kolomenskoe-Izmailovo-Lefortovo-Liublino (Moscow: MGOMZ, 2013), esp. e.g. pp. 
75–77.
16  On inscribed bells, A. F. Bondarenko, Istoriia kolokolov v Rossii XI–XVII vv. (Moscow: 
Russkaia panorama, 2012).
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and elephantine Illustrated Chronicle of the late sixteenth century.17 The 
earliest surviving local cannon, by the master Iakov, dates (like the 
Kremlin tower inscriptions) from 1491. The mid-sixteenth century saw 
the casting of a series of enormous cannons which became, in effect, 
public monuments: in the 1550s by Kaspar Ganusov (over 19,000 kg) 
and Stepan Petrov (nearly 17,000 kg). These giants served on military 
campaigns in the early 1560s, but were later put on public display in 
Red Square, near the Frolov Gates (which bore Solari’s inscription of 
1491). Here they were joined by the most monstrous gun of all, Andrei 
Chokhov’s “Tsar Cannon” (as it has come to be known) of 1586, weighing 
over 38,000 kg.18 Chokhov’s cannon was not even made to be fired. Its 
internal workings were never completed. Its function was to impress, 
and part of its impressive display was the eloquent cast decoration on 
its barrel, which included an equestrian representation of the Muscovite 
ruler, and two inscriptions (in Russian) declaring the patronage of the 
tsar and his wife, and the date of the cannon’s manufacture by Chokhov. 
On the occasions that inscribed cannons were used in the field or on 
parade, they might be joined by an altogether more flimsy form of 
inscribed object: banners. Particularly grand and elaborate was Ivan IV’s 
“Great Banner”, commissioned in 1559–60.19
Few meaningful conclusions can be drawn from this period 
of sporadic public inscriptions. The functions seem to me mainly 
declarative or commemorative, noting a death, or the commissioning 
of the relevant structure or object. Some of the state inscriptions formed 
a graphospheric cluster around (and on) the entrance to the Moscow 
Kremlin. However, here and elsewhere we should make a distinction 
between visibility and legibility. Accessibility and ease of reading does 
17  E.g. Ioasafovskaia letopis′ (Moscow: Izdatel′stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1957), p. 126 
(fol. 134v of the MS); Litsevoi letopisnyi svod XVI veka. Russkaia letopisnaia istoriia. 
Kniga 17 1483–1502 gg. (facsimile edition; Moscow: AKTEON, 2010), p. 73 (fol. 410 
of the ‘Shumilov’ manuscript of the original).
18  E. L. Nemirovskii, Andrei Chokhov (okolo 1545–1629) (Moscow: Nauka, 1982); Sergei 
Bogatyrev, ‘Bronze Tsars: Ivan the Terrible and Fedor Ivanovich in the Décor of 
Early Modern Guns’, Slavonic and East European Review, 88. 1–2 (January/April 
2010), 48–72. 
19  Sergei Bogatyrev, ‘The Heavenly Host and the Sword of Truth: Apocalyptic 
Imagery in Ivan IV’s Moscow’, in The New Muscovite Cultural History. A Collection in 
Honor of Daniel B. Rowland, ed. by Valerie Kivelson, Karen Petrone, Nancy Shields 
Kollmann, and Michael S. Flier (Bloomington: Slavica, 2009), pp. 77–90.
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not seem to have been a criterion for those who commissioned and made 
many of the inscriptions. Few Muscovites would have been able to read 
Solari’s Latin; but, equally, without exceptional eyesight, few would 
have been able to see distinctly the lettering on the bells in their bell-
towers. And even if they had access to the towers, or if they bought one 
of the smaller portable bells, few would have found the bands of highly 
ornamental, quasi-cryptographic viaz′ lettering simple to decipher. 
The presence of an inscription was plainer than its contents; as if that 
presence had its own eloquence, a visual communication irrespective of 
the individual’s ability to decode its verbal information.
Phase Two: State Projects, Projections of the State
In May 1682 an uprising of the Moscow musketeers (the strel′tsy) 
installed Sofiia Alekseevna, elder half-sister of the nine-year-old future 
Tsar Peter I, as regent. As part of the settlement, Sofiia issued a decree, 
one of whose stipulations was that the actions of the strel′tsy were to be, 
in effect, retrospectively legitimised, and that they were not to be deemed 
rebels. The text of this decree was embossed onto two large brass plates, 
which were then fixed to what was described as a “pillar”—actually a 
kind of four-sided plinth or pedestal—on Red Square.20 Whether or not 
this monumental decree-stand was intended to be permanent, it only 
survived for a few months. It was demolished with the next twist in 
political fortunes. However, the precedent did not go unnoticed, and 
was revived in the late 1690s by Peter, already as tsar. In March 1697 
Peter set up another pedestal on Red Square, on which to display the 
heads of a group of failed (obviously) conspirators.
We do not know whether this graphic (in another sense) display 
was accompanied by a written text, but there is no doubt about the 
graphospheric function of Peter’s next such monument, set up two 
years later, in 1699. The catalyst, as it had been in 1682, was a revolt 
of the strel′tsy, but on this occasion the revolt was catastrophically 
unsuccessful, the tsar’s reprisals were harsh, wide-reaching, and 
prolonged, and the setting up of plinths with texts was an important 
20  A. V. Lavrent′ev, ‘Stareishie grazhdanskie monumenty Moskvy 1682–1700 gg’, in 
idem, Liudi i veshchi. Pamiatniki russkoi istorii i kul′tury XVI–XVIII vv., ikh sozdateli i 
vladel′tsy (Moscow: Arkheograficheskii tsentr, 1997), pp. 177–202.
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device for promulgating the fate of the rebels. After the suppression of 
the revolt, Peter placed such plinths not only in Red Square, but in ten 
other locations around the city. Each column was four-sided, and to 
each side was fixed a cast-iron plate displaying lists of the names of the 
traitors. In the absence of any other free-standing public monuments, 
this was a major incursion into the Muscovite cityscape. Moreover, 
the “pillars” of 1699–1700 proved more durable than their predecessor 
from 1682. They stood throughout Peter’s reign before being removed 
in 1727, before the coronation of Peter II. One of the cast iron plates 
survives to this day.21
These late-seventeenth-century structures were, in effect, 
monumental public notice boards. The monumental display of 
legislation was not unusual in the graphosphere of the antique city.22 In 
Russia the monumentality turned out to be transient, but the function 
met what was increasingly felt by the authorities to be a regular need. 
In the second half of the seventeenth century, government decrees 
quite often specified the means by which they were to be promulgated. 
Traditional devices included public proclamation, and the distribution 
of handwritten copies to the relevant offices and regions. From the 
1690s, the texts of some decrees begin to stipulate that, in addition to 
oral declamation and internal distribution, copies should be made for 
public display, to be posted on, for example, gate-posts, walls, and 
church doors.23 These were, in a sense, a kind of official newspaper 
before newspapers.24 From 1714 Peter decreed that all decrees of general 
applicability must be printed, not handwritten, and it became common 
for the texts to be produced in two formats: what one might call book-
size, and poster-size. The book-sized versions, printed on both sides of 
the sheet, were for internal use, while the poster-sized versions, printed 
on one side only (i.e. as broadsides), were for display. The metallic 
messages on the plinths set up in Moscow in the wake of successive 
uprisings of the strel′tsy can be seen as early experiments in the visual 
21  In the collections of the museum of the Novodevichi Monastery: see Lavrent′ev, 
‘Stareishie grazhdanskie monumenty’, p. 178.
22  Also a widespread function of public inscriptions in the ancient world: see e.g. 
Roueché, ‘Written Display’, pp. 251–52.
23  Simon Franklin, ‘Printing and Social Control in Russia 2: Decrees’, Russian History, 
38 (2011), 467–92 (esp. pp. 473–76).
24  On newspapers in Russia see Chapters 3 and 6 in the present volume.
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projection of the authoritative word. However, although purpose-
built monuments might have been felt to convey the importance of the 
message, public pronouncements generated by current events rarely 
retain their aura of urgency and currency. Paper, print and existing 
surfaces proved more effective (and, surely, more cost-effective) over 
time. The posting of paper copies of decrees from the late seventeenth 
and, especially, the early eighteenth century was perhaps the first 
device through which the word of the state contributed in a systematic 
and sustained way to the formation of a public graphosphere: initially 
in Moscow, then in St Petersburg, then throughout the empire. 
As in the case of the earlier inscriptions, one might well wonder who, 
among a largely illiterate populace, was expected to read such notices. 
This was not the authorities’ concern. The purpose was to make the text 
of decrees available, and to stress repeatedly in the texts themselves the 
principle that ignorance of the law would not be counted as an excuse. 
The expectation, presumably, was that further dissemination would still 
be oral. Those who could not read still had access to the text via those 
who could. And all could (or should) understand that words posted in 
public—especially printed words, since the technology of print was a 
state-controlled monopoly—carried the voice of authority. They were, 
indeed, the principal visible devices by which the tsar communicated 
information to his subjects.
For legislative announcements, the monumental form was 
abandoned, but the fashion for monumental public inscriptions 
persisted. It developed in different directions, for different purposes.
The monuments with the most dramatic effect on the cityscape and its 
graphospheric density were the towers, arches, gates and the like which 
Peter (and then several of his successors) ordered to be erected for festive 
occasions: for firework displays, or for triumphal entries of the tsar and 
his troops after military victories.25 The earliest in the sequence were 
the fireworks and triumphal arch to mark the Azov campaign in 1696. 
The most elaborate were the multiple arches constructed in Moscow 
25  D. D. Zelov, Ofitsial′nye svetskie prazdniki kak iavlenie russkoi kul′tury kontsa XVII–
nachala XVIII veka. Istoriia triumfov i feierverkov ot Petra Velikogo do ego docheri 
Elizavety (Moscow: Editorial URSS, 2002), pp. 122–94; E. A. Tiukhmeneva, Iskusstvo 
triumfal′nykh vrat v Rossii pervoi poloviny XVIII veka. Problemy panegiricheskogo 
napravleniia (Moscow: Progress-Traditsiia, 2005). 
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to mark the victory at Poltava in 1709. All of them were prominently, 
and often copiously, inscribed, sometimes in Latin, sometimes in 
Cyrillic, sometimes in both scripts. These were very major projects for 
the projection of imperial prestige, both to an internal audience and 
to visitors. Rhetorical and explanatory descriptions of such festivities 
were written out in manuscript and printed as pamphlets, many of 
which included full details of all the inscriptions.26 Engravings were 
commissioned, showing images of the triumphal and festive structures, 
including (in several cases) scrupulous renditions of the inscriptions.27
So, were public spaces in Moscow, and then in St Petersburg, thereby 
irrevocably transformed, turned into graphospheric simulacra of their 
counterparts in antiquity? No. The problem is that these structures were 
mostly temporary. They were erected quickly, for special occasions, 
generally in wood and with papier-mâché ornamentation, though 
painted to resemble marble. Then they disappeared. They were, in 
a sense, monumental ephemera, part of the decorations for one-off 
performances on a public stage. They served imperial ceremonial, not 
urban design. We know of them mostly by their reflection in other media: 
through printed descriptions and in engravings. Paper turned out to 
be more permanent than wood. A saturated public graphosphere was 
part of the aesthetic of urban space for Peter’s engravers. They helped to 
create and to disseminate the image, but it was largely an illusion.
Such monumental ephemera, or ephemeral monuments, were not 
peculiarly Russian. Their transience should not be taken to imply that 
ceremonial graphospheric structures in Russia were uniquely or even 
unusually flimsy. On the contrary, ephemeral-monumental epigraphy 
(the oxymoronic phrase is suggested by Armando Petrucci)28 was 
characteristically Western European. That was partly the point. In this, 
as in so many of his presentational initiatives, Peter was following 
European custom. Equivalent ephemeral monumental writing was 
common throughout Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
26  For texts see Tiukhmeneva, Iskusstvo triumfal′nykh vrat, pp. 154–275. For a list of 
printed accounts see Zelov, Ofitsial′nye svetskie prazdniki, pp. 140–48.
27  See the extensive illustrations in Tiukhmenova, Iskusstvo triumfal′nykh vrat, between 
pp. 96 and 97; also M. A. Alekseeva, Graviura petrovskogo vremeni (Leningrad: 
Iskusstvo, 1990), pp. 72–75, 117–22; M. A. Alekseeva, Iz istorii russkoi graviury XVII–
nachala XIX v. (Moscow, St Petersburg: Al′ians Arkheo, 2013), pp. 142–51, 188–94.
28  See Petrucci, Public Lettering, pp. 53–55.
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as, indeed, was the concern to issue texts to record and explain the 
spectacle. The most immediate exemplars were probably Dutch. Among 
Russian translations from Dutch in the 1690s was a version of the detailed 
account of the triumphal entry of William of Orange into The Hague on 
5 February 1691, including the translation of some 140 Latin inscriptions 
on the various ceremonial monuments.29 William’s parade was also 
captured in engravings by, among others, the physician Govert Bidloo, 
whose nephew Niclaas became physician to Peter. The early engravings 
of the Petrine festivities were made by Peter’s Dutch engravers Adriaan 
Schoonebeck and Piter Pickaert and by their Russian pupils. Indeed, 
Schoonebeck’s engraving of the firework spectacle following the Azov 
campaign of 1696 was most likely made while he was still in Holland, 
on the basis of the accounts of Russian envoys.
Peter’s triumphal arches were durable in one respect. They set 
a fashion among Russia’s rulers which lasted until the end of the 
eighteenth century, not just at parades to mark military victories but on 
more peaceable occasions such as coronations.30 As for the inscriptions, 
their graphospheric functions were integral to the “top-down” 
creation of a quasi-classical urban aesthetic (once more, irrespective 
of whether viewers could read the Latin), but they also had more 
specific associations. They derived from the pan-European culture of 
emblems—illustrations with edificatory mottoes and captions—which 
Peter embraced and which retained popularity in Russia for much of 
the eighteenth century.
Peter’s other initiative in the commissioning of inscribed 
monuments—antique statuary—was likewise both elegant and 
edificatory, though less bombastic and more solid. Peter worked on 
plans for his Summer Gardens from 1704. Antique statuary, ordered 
from abroad, was integral to the concept, and remained a characteristic 
feature of the gardens throughout many subsequent redesigns and 
29  Yu. K. Begunov, ‘“Opisanie vrat chesti…”: a Seventeenth-Century Russian 
Translation on William of Orange and the “Glorious Revolution”’, Oxford Slavonic 
Papers. New Series, 20 (1987), 60–93. Begunov attributes the translation to Il′ia 
Kopievskii.
30  See e.g. A. N. Voronikhina, ‘Triumfal′nye vorota 1742 g. v Sankt-Peterburge’, in 
Russkoe iskusstvo barokko. Materialy i issledovaniia, ed. by T. V. Alekseeva (Moscow: 
Nauka, 1977), pp. 159–72; also Paul Keenan, St Petersburg and the Russian Court, 
1703–1761 (Basingstoke, New York, 2013), pp. 66–75.
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remodellings.31 Mostly the inscriptions were simply labels identifying 
the figures represented in the sculptures, sometimes also the maker. 
Some, however, were more elaborate. Jacob von Stählin tells the story 
of a conversation between Peter and his Swedish garden designer. Peter 
said that he wished the garden to be educative, to “convert this place of 
mere amusement into a kind of school”. The Swede assumed he meant 
that books—suitably protected—were to be left on the benches. Peter 
laughed, and explained his idea. One area was to consist of four fountains 
joined by alleys, and the fountains and the alleys were to be ornamented 
with figures from Aesop’s fables. Moreover, “as the Czar knew that few 
people would be able to find out the meaning of these figures, and that a 
still smaller number would comprehend the instruction conveyed in the 
fables, he ordered a post to be placed near each of them: on these posts 
a sheet of tin was fastened, on which the fables and their morals were 
written in the Russian language”.32
Stählin’s source for the story of Peter and the garden designer 
was apparently Aleksandr Lvovich Naryshkin (1694–1746), who was 
Director of the Imperial Buildings and Gardens from 1736—that is, more 
than a decade after Peter’s death. This account may or may not reflect an 
actual conversation. However, it does catch one aspect of Peter’s known 
intentions: that his parks and gardens should be places of education and 
edification as well as pleasure and contemplation, and that inscriptions 
were integral to this vision.33
Among those who paid attention to the inscriptions was no less a 
commentator than Giacomo Casanova, who recorded his impressions 
of a visit in 1765. Casanova waxed supercilious not only about the poor 
quality of the statues but expressly about the ineptitude of the labelling: 
“As I walked about I marvelled at the statuary, all the statues being 
made of the worst stone, and executed in the worst possible taste. The 
names cut beneath them gave the whole the air of a practical joke. A 
31  S. O. Androsov, ‘Raguzinskii v Venetsii: priobretenie statui dlia Letnego sada’, 
in idem, Ot Petra I k Ekaterine II., pp. 44–78; James Cracraft, The Petrine Revolution 
in Russian Imagery (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1997), pp. 
220–31.
32  J. Stählin, Original Anecdotes of Peter the Great, Collected from the Conversation of Several 
Persons of Distinction at Petersburgh and Moscow (London and Edinburgh: J. Murray, 
J. Sewell, W. Creech, 1788), pp. 249–52 (anecdote no. 75). 
33  See e.g. D. S. Likhachev, Poetika sadov. K semantike sadovo-parkovykh stilei. Sad kak 
tekst, 2nd ed. (St Petersburg: Nauka, 1991), pp. 126–28.
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weeping statue was Democritus; another, with grinning mouth, was 
labelled Heraclitus; an old man with a long beard was Sappho; and 
an old woman, Avicenna; and so on”.34 Most likely, Casanova was 
exaggerating for effect, but behind the specific points there perhaps 
lies a broader condescension regarding the use of such inscriptions 
in general, for he demonstrates that no self-respecting Venetian needs 
labels to help him identify the figures of antique statuary. Whether or 
not Casanova regarded inscriptions as, in principle, educative, he made 
it clear that he regarded the Russians as being in need of education.
Antique statuary, often inscribed, became a common feature of 
the grand parks that proliferated throughout the century: first the 
royal parks, then their aristocratic followers. Sometimes the intended 
educative function of inscriptions was further developed. For example, 
on Aleksandr Borisovich Kurakin’s estate at Nadezhdino in Saratov 
province, the park itself, laid out in the 1790s, became the subject of an 
elaborate set of signs and captions. Kurakin explained that “on each 
path one will find several posts with placards of its name, so that visitors 
will be overwhelmed by ideas and corresponding sensations”.35 This 
was not just a matter of displaying evocative names. Kurakin’s signs 
showed four-line iambic hexameter verses explaining how he wished 
each temple and path to be interpreted and experienced.36
Regarding the Petrine period of state-promoted expansion of the 
public graphosphere, two points are clear. In the first place, Peter shared 
and promoted a new—for Russia—sense of visible writing as intrinsic to 
urban public spaces. This is apparent both in the consistency with which 
he sponsored the public display of writing, and in the reflections of this 
graphospheric aesthetic in other media: the booklets that described and 
explained public inscriptions, the engravings that reproduced them on 
paper. Even book illustrations with no direct relation to urban space 
might use the trope of the inscribed building, such as the architectural 
34  From the start of chapter 21 of the section ‘In London and Moscow’ in Casanova’s 
Memoirs; cited from Arthur Machen’s translation available at http://ebooks.adelaide.
edu.au/c/casanova/c33m/index.html; see I. V. Riazantsev, Skul′ptura v Rossii XVIII–
nachala XIX veka (Moscow: Zhiraf, 2003), pp. 412–18; and more broadly ibid., pp. 
396–451 on park statuary.
35  Cited in Andreas Schönle, The Ruler in the Garden. Politics and Landscape Design in 
Imperial Russia (Oxford, Bern, Berlin etc.: Peter Lang, 2007), p. 185.
36  Schönle, The Ruler in the Garden, pp. 185, 193–205.
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allegory of mathematics created as a headpiece for Russia’s first printed 
scientific textbook: Leontii Magnitskii’s Arifmetika, printed in 1703.37 
Indeed, the idea of the inscribed city permeated many areas of elite 
culture. Peter subscribed to it and promoted it, but it did not begin 
with him. For example, the latter part of the seventeenth century saw 
the appearance, in Russia, of genres of “epigraphic” poetry. This was a 
literary conceit: verses that were ostensibly designed to be inscriptions, 
whether or not there was in fact anywhere for them to be inscribed.38 
Secondly, and in contrast, Peter did not complete the transformation, 
or even the formation, of the public graphosphere. The vision may 
have been there, but its translation into the urban landscape tended to 
be partial, transitory, or delayed. His most visible constructions—the 
inscribed celebratory and festive edifices—were temporary. His most 
stable and permanent innovations—park statuary—were, like inscribed 
gravestones, both open and enclosed, not fully part of the everyday city. 
Other projects were idiosyncratic and unrepeatable, such as his decision, 
in 1722, to turn one of his early boats into a public monument, by setting 
it on a pedestal with appropriate inscription and ensuring that its image 
as a monument was recorded in engravings.39
The tradition of inscribed monumental statuary in fully accessible 
public spaces began only towards the end of the century, with Peter 
as its subject rather than its patron: Falconet’s “Bronze Horseman”, 
unveiled in 1792 and inscribed in Latin and Russian; and the contrasting 
equestrian statue set up by the Tsar Paul in 1800. The latter is a curious 
temporal palimpsest. It had been commissioned from Carlo Rastrelli 
by Peter himself, and was cast under the direction of his son Francesco 
Rastrelli in the 1740s, but remained in storage until retrieved by Paul, 
who set it up on its pedestal, with a pointedly monolingual Russian 
inscription, outside his own newly built palace.
37  T. A. Bykova and M. M. Gurevich, Opisanie izdanii, napechatannykh kirillitsei. 
1689-ianvar′ 1725 g. (Moscow and Leningrad: Izdatel′stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 
1958), no. 25; reproduced in e.g. Alekseeva, Graviura petrovskogo vremeni, p. 65.
38  See L. I. Sazonova, Literaturnaia kul′tura Rossii. Rannee Novoe vremia (Moscow: Iazyki 
slavianskikh kul′tur, 2006), pp. 320–27.
39  Alekseeva, Graviura petrovskogo vremeni, pp. 86–89, 96.
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Phase Three: Signs and the Shaping of  
Public Space
The second phase in the formation of the public graphosphere had been 
marked by a succession of acts of “top-down” communication, whether 
informative, celebratory or edificatory and educative. In the third phase, 
from the mid-eighteenth century, the state’s interventions in the public 
graphosphere were of a very different type. Instead of communicating 
information from the ruler to those who frequented the relevant spaces, 
they focused on communicating information on and about the spaces, 
partly as aids to orientation for the users of those spaces, but partly 
also for the practical administrative purposes of the state itself. In their 
purposes and functions these graphospheric initiatives addressed 
some of the issues of information and communication that are already 
familiar from previous chapters in the present volume: postal routes, 
cartography and surveying, taxation. The particular inscriptions are 
varieties of what might loosely be termed signage: mileposts, street 
signs, house signs.
“Mileposts” here renders the Russian verstovye stolby, which mark 
not miles but versts. A verst (Russian versta) is 500 sazhens, which, in 
the system in place from the early eighteenth century, comes to almost 
exactly a kilometre (1.067 km). Some kind of route marking was essential 
and existed from ancient times, especially given the conditions in winter 
when snow obliterates so many features of the landscape. However, 
with specific regard to their inscriptions, the trail of legislation begins 
in the 1720s. The initiatives, therefore, are again Petrine, though some of 
the tasks and problems identified by Peter continued to be worked out 
subsequently for at least a hundred years.
On 7 August 1722 Peter instructed the Senate that they should arrange 
to measure the distance of the direct route from Moscow to Tsaritsyn (now 
Volgograd), and to set up “posts with inscriptions” (stolby s nadpisiami) 
along the way, “as has been done on the Novgorod and other roads”. 
In addition, at the onset of winter, they were to arrange to measure the 
Moskva, Oka, and Volga rivers along the ice, and set up posts showing 
the distance between towns on the banks.40 The measurements were 
40  Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii, Series 1 (1649–1825) (hereafter PSZ 1), no. 
4071. 
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done in connection with the tsar’s forthcoming journey to Azov. Route 
measurements and their markings became a recurrent theme in imperial 
legislation. Successive rulers accepted that mileposts were a necessity 
for the efficient administration of the empire. They were needed not for 
the convenience of curious travellers, but for the movement of people 
and goods on official business (and Russia’s rulers strongly discouraged 
the movement of goods and people on unofficial business). However, 
mileposts were also a cause of administrative headaches. Stone posts 
were expensive to install; wooden posts, in Russia’s climate, were 
expensive because of the need for regular maintenance and repair, and 
in the inscriptions it was difficult to sustain accuracy and consistency.
Such are the concerns and frustrations that are reflected in successive 
decrees. On 23 August 1739 the Senate complained that many of the 
mileposts around St Petersburg were rotted and their inscriptions had 
become illegible. New posts were to be set up in coordination with the 
Iamskaia kontora—the Office of Posts (in a different sense).41 Here, and 
again in a series of decrees of the mid-1740s, we also find reference 
to the problem of inaccuracy as roads changed their courses, so that 
surveyors need to be sent to re-measure the roads and reposition the 
posts and recalibrate the inscriptions.42 This was about money as well as 
time. On 16 August 1744 the empress complained to the Senate that the 
posts along the road from Moscow to Kiev indicated a total distance of 
856 versts, but the charge for transport assumed a distance of 969 versts. 
On 27 November the Senate reported that their delegated surveyor had 
measured the route at 890 versts and had repositioned the posts.43
The inscriptions, too, were a recurrent theme: the techniques used 
to make them, their forms, information, shape, and location. Paint was 
the obvious medium, but in 1740 the Senate decided that in the long 
term it would be more economical to burn the lettering into the posts 
with specially made branding irons. In 1744 the inscriptions were to be 
painted again. In 1746 the Senate even specified the colours of the oil 
paints—scarlet and ochre. In 1760 it was decreed that inscriptions should 
be written on a triangular metal plate to be affixed to each post.44 In the 
41  PSZ 1, no. 7881.
42  PSZ 1, nos. 8909, 9016, 9031, 9073, 9092, all from 1744.
43  PSZ 1, nos. 9016, 9073.
44  PSZ 1, nos. 8147, 9348, 11127.
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early nineteenth century Alexander I expressed periodic irritation with 
the state of the mileposts. In detailed legislation of 1803, 1817, and 1819 
he specified their height, their design according to official drawings, 
and the exact wording and arrangement of the inscriptions: when they 
should state the distance from Moscow or St Petersburg, and when they 
should only give the distance between post stations. He complained 
not just of inconsistency, but of excess verbiage. His 1817 decree on 
roads is particularly informative, not just about mileposts, but about a 
wide range of roadside signage: labelled pointers at crossroads, border 
signs at administrative boundaries stating which region (guberniia) or 
district (uezd) one was entering or leaving; signs stating the tariff at toll 
bridges or ferries; and, at the entrance to every settlement, a post with a 
signboard stating the name of the settlement, who it belonged to, and the 
number of “souls” in its population, “as is the custom in Little Russia”.45 
Alexander’s “striped mileposts” (versty polosaty) became embedded in 
the Russian cultural imagination through their appearance in one of 
Pushkin’s best known poems, “The Winter Road”.46
Mileposts extend the graphosphere into the countryside; in long 
ribbons they inscribe the empire: in real space for the efficient operations 
of the post roads, in imagined and reconstructed space for the accurate 
reduction onto paper by cartographers.
Labelling of the city itself began later. On 8 May 1768 Catherine II 
instructed the St Petersburg police chief, Nikolai Chicherin, to “order 
that, at the end of every street and alley, signs (here doski) are to be 
attached bearing the name of that street or alley in the Russian and 
German languages; if any streets and alleys are as yet unnamed—please 
name them”.47 Catherine’s street signs—only two of which survive to 
45  PSZ 1, nos. 21963 (article 4), 27180 (articles 15–23, 32–33), 27787 (articles 30, 31). For 
the approved drawings of the respective types of milepost see the supplement to 
PSZ 1: Chertezhi i risunki k sobraniiu, p. 50.
46  A. S. Pushkin, Sobranie sochinenii v desiati tomakh, ed. D. D. Blagoi et al. (Moscow: 
Gosudarstvennoe izdatel′stvo khudozhestvennoi literatury, 1959–1962), vol. 2, p. 
159, http://rvb.ru/pushkin/01text/01versus/0423_36/1826/0428.htm 
47  Cited in D. Iu. Sherikh, Peterburg den′ za dnem. Gorodskoi mesiatseslov (St Petersburg: 
‘Peterburg–XXI vek’, 1998), pp. 117–18. See also Ia. N. Dlugolenskii, Voenno-
grazhdanskaia i politseiskaia vlast′ Sankt-Peterburga, 1703–1917 (St Petersburg: 
Zhurnal ‘Neva’, 2001), p. 278; S. Lebedev, Nomernye znaki domov Peterburga. Zametki 
i nabliudeniia (St Petersburg, 2010), http://www.liveinternet.ru/users/zimnyi/
post285701342/ 
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the present—were in marble. Thus began the process through which 
the very streets and houses became frames for the urban graphosphere. 
First the streets were inscribed, then the houses themselves: according 
to Catherine’s Charter for the rights and privileges of the towns of the Russian 
Empire (Gramota na prava i vygody gorodam Rossiiskoi imperii), published 
on 21 April 1785, each building was to be allocated a street number, 
in order to facilitate the administrative task of drawing up lists of 
inhabitants,48 though nothing is said here about the public display of 
such numbers. Finally, in 1804, in order to facilitate the administration 
of a new property tax, the authorities in St Petersburg required that 
the identifying information be made visible: above the entrances to all 
non-governmental buildings there were henceforth to be metal plaques 
stating not only the number and the district but the owner’s name.49 
This sequence of measures on the systematic numbering of houses is 
roughly consistent with the chronology of equivalent legislation in parts 
of Western Europe. In France, for example, a requirement for universal 
house numbering was introduced in 1791, also for tax purposes.50
As in the case of mileposts, this process of inscribing the city with 
indications of its own physical and human geography, though 
undertaken for administrative reasons, also facilitated wider 
interactions and benefits. The city was now visibly indexed in the public 
graphosphere, and this “real space” index, too, could be transferred to 
paper, through the compilation of printed directories. St Petersburg’s 
first address book was published in 1809 and was issued more or 
less simultaneously (by different publishers) in German, French and 
Russian. Its author, Heinrich Christoph von Reimers, acknowledged in 
his introduction the importance of the recent fact that, over the course 
of 1804, signs had been fixed on every house.51 And, also like mileposts, 
48  PSZ 1, no. 16187, in an annotation to article 63.
49  Heinrich von Reimers, St. Petersburg am Ende seines ersten Jahrhunderts. Mit 
Rückblicken auf Entstehung und Wachsthum dieser Residenz unter den verschiedenen 
Regierungen während dieses Zeitraums, vol. 2 (St Petersburg: F. Dienemann & Co., 
1805), pp. 285–86.
50  David Garrioch, ‘House Names, Shop Signs and Social Organization in West 
European Cities, c. 1500–1900’, Urban History, 21 (1994), 37–38.
51  Heinrich von Reimers, St.-Peterburgische Adress-Buch auf das Jahr 1809 (St Petersburg: 
A. Pluchart [1809]); idem, Dictionnaire d’adress de St.-Pétersbourg pour l’anné 1809, 
avec un plan et guide des étrangers a St-Pétersbourg (St Petersburg [1809]); idem, 
Sanktpeterburgskaia adresnaia kniga na 1809 god (St Petersburg: Schnoor [1809]), p. iii. 
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the reach of these street and house signs stretched beyond factual 
information, beyond documentation and into culture. For example, 
the writer Evgenii Grebenka, in a “physiological” sketch published in 
1845, treats the house signs on the “Petersburg side” (the district on 
the unfashionable side of the Neva river) first as sources for the social 
composition of the population: “The Petersburg Side fell into decline and 
became a refuge for the poor”, he writes. “If one seeks proof of this, one 
need only read the inscriptions on the gateposts of the houses”. Many 
of the owners were civil servants of the fourteenth (i.e. the lowest) to the 
eighth grade, others were non-commissioned officers, clerks, firemen, 
court lackeys, retired musicians. Then, however, Grebenka digresses 
into an anecdote of the man who apparently chose to designate himself, 
on the sign at the entrance to his residence, as a “retired blackamoor”—a 
claim which the utterly fair-skinned resident justified on the grounds 
that it brought him a higher pension.52 The sign thus becomes a locus of 
invention, a means of creative self-expression (despite periodic attempts 
to impose uniformity).53
Not that house signs yet met all practical demands. Once a letter had 
successfully reached St Petersburg along the network of long-distance 
post roads, how did it find its addressee within the city? Signage on 
streets and houses and flats ought to help, perhaps. However, one 
visiting Englishman was left frustrated. Edward Thompson, who 
published his Life in Russia; or, the Discipline of Despotism in 1848, 
complained that, when he tried to deliver a letter to a resident of a 
building just off Nevskii Prospekt, he was unable to do so, for there was 
no directory of residents of the 170 flats (though there may well have 
been names on the individual doors).54 Even the government recognised 
the problem, and around the same time devised a bureaucratic solution. 
In 1851, in the second, expanded edition of All Petersburg in Your Pocket 
Note that Reimers had recognised the usefulness of the measure as early as 1805; for 
statistical tables of Petersburg buildings and inhabitants that he published as part of 
his history of the city: von Reimers, St. Petersburg am Ende seines ersten Jahrhunderts, 
p. 318.
52  E. Grebenka, ‘Peterburgskaia storona’, in Fiziologiia Peterburga (Moscow: Sovetskaia 
Rossiia, 1984) pp. 109–110
53  One such attempt at regulation is cited by F. Distribuendi, Vzgliad na moskovskie 
vyveski (Moscow: I. Smirnov, 1836), pp. 61–62.
54  See A. G. Cross, St Petersburg and the British. The City through the Eyes of British 
Visitors and Residents (London: Frances Lincoln Ltd., 2008), p.146.
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by Aleksei Grech, readers were informed that now, if they wanted to 
find out where anybody lived, they had only to go to the “Bureau of 
Addresses” (adresnyi stol): “a new and highly useful institution, which 
can be used by private individuals who wish to find out anybody’s 
place of residence”.55
Important and resonant though it undoubtedly was, the state’s 
administrative contribution to the formation of the urban graphosphere 
came to be massively overshadowed by the proliferation of a different 
kind of sign, generated not by an institution, but by an activity: not 
“top down”, but “bottom up”. The activity was trade. Its graphospheric 
contribution was in the spread of shop signs. 
The spread of trade signs and shop signs cannot be mapped 
precisely either in time or space. The process can be approximately 
imagined through a succession of three types of evidence: legislation, 
illustration, and description. The trail of legislation seems to start 
towards the middle of the eighteenth century. Illustrations become 
informative from approximately the second and third decades of the 
nineteenth century, while in the 1830s and 1840s such signs became 
objects of documentary description, literary evocation, and even quasi-
philosophical contemplation.
The trail of legislation about commercial signage begins in the 1740s 
and 1750s, and it relates both to the location of signs and to aspects of 
their contents. Where trade spilled over from its designated locations 
(markets, trading rows), the signs of its presence were not always 
welcome. On 2 December 1742, Empress Elizabeth issued a decree on 
the construction of railings on the canal embankments. And, while 
on the subject of urban orderliness and sightliness (this was the same 
day on which she ordered the expulsion of all Jews from the empire), 
Elizabeth added to the decree an instruction that inns and taverns 
should be banned from the main embankments, and that in the same 
locations fruit traders should be prohibited from setting up stalls under 
55 Aleksei Grech, Ves′ Peterburg v karmane: spravochnaia kniga dlia stolichnykh zhitelei i 
priezzhikh, s planami Sanktpeterburga i chetyrekh teatrov, 2nd expanded and corrected 
ed. (St Petersburg: N. Grech, 1851), pp. 3–4. The first edition had been published in 
1846. Note that Grech was aware that such directories needed constant updating: 
three supplements were published in 1852 alone (to 20 January, 25 May, and 15 
November).
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awnings at the ground-floor or basement street entrances to buildings.56 
Ten years later Elizabeth returned to the topic. In a decree of 14 October 
1752 she reaffirmed the restrictions of 1742, and she further specified, 
significantly for our purposes, that she took exception not merely to 
signs of trade but to trade signs. The new decree stipulated that “along 
these streets there should be no signs (vyveski); lots of such signs, of 
various trades, are now visible even opposite the court of Her Imperial 
Majesty; signs are permitted on the street along the Moika”.57 This is 
the first legislation about trade signs, indicating that they were already 
becoming quite numerous and prominent, and for the empress a 
nuisance when they cluttered her view.
Also in the late 1740s we find the first legislation on wording. 
It relates to establishments which sold alcohol and tobacco. On 8 
November 1746 the Senate ordered that hostelries (kabaki) in Moscow 
and St Petersburg must not display boards with the words “official 
drinking house” (kazennyi piteinyi dom). There was no objection to the 
designation “drinking house”; it was the word “official” that was to 
be deleted.58 Clearly this was not enough to rein in the self-promoting 
commercial imagination, and in 1749 the Board of Revenue (Kamer 
Kollegiia) issued an order banning all excess graphic elements from 
signs advertising hostelries and tobacco shops. Henceforth they were 
to use only the prescribed wording: “In this house drinks are sold”, “in 
this house tobacco is sold”.59
Catherine II took a different approach. She accepted that a zonal 
restriction, with a blanket ban in specified areas, was damaging to trade, 
so in March 1770 she rescinded Elizabeth’s decree of 1752. However, 
she did not thereby abandon all attempts to impose her own sense of 
civic decorum. Instead of a general ban, she regulated the form. In a 
decree which was to be generally applicable to both St Petersburg 
and Moscow, she stipulated that trade signs made of wood or canvas 
56  PSZ 1, no. 8674, articles 3–5.
57  PSZ 1, no. 10032. Note also the slightly earlier decree of Anna Ioannovna, dated 
9 November 1739, allowing merchants to build permanent shops in specified 
locations, but forbidding unauthorised trading from houses and basement stalls: 
PSZ 1, no. 7940.
58  PSZ 1, no. 9350.
59  G. V. Esipov, Tiazhelaia pamiat′ proshlogo. Rasskazy iz del Tainoi Kantseliarii i drugikh 
arkhivov (St Petersburg: A. S. Suvorin, 1885), p. 307.
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were permissible either when fixed flat to walls, or when suspended 
from a protruding arm not exceeding one arshin in length.60 Decency 
required that there should be no signs advertising men’s underwear, or 
funeral services, and there were to be no paper or leather signs attached 
to fences or shutters (that is, “proper” fixed signs were acceptable, 
random posters were not).61 This is consistent with Catherine’s broadly 
facilitative legislation on urban trade. For example, in successive decrees 
of 28 June and 8 July 1782 she overturned previous restrictive legislation 
and permitted merchants throughout the empire to trade from shops in 
their houses rather than just in designated markets and trading rows. 
In principle these decrees all but abandoned a restrictive principle of 
urban zoning for retail trade in favour of facilitating the autonomous 
spread of private shops.62
The implication of this sequence of decrees is that on-street painted 
trade signs became increasingly familiar features of the urban landscape 
during the third quarter of the eighteenth century. For this early period, 
however, we have little direct evidence regarding what was actually 
displayed on such signs. The likelihood is that they were principally 
pictorial, rather than verbal: pictures on boards representing the type 
of goods sold, or the type of services offered.63 The presence of some 
inscriptions is plausible. By the time that signs became objects of 
illustration and description, pictorial and verbal elements were mixed 
and matched to taste. 
Paintings, drawings and engravings of the cityscape, by both Russians 
and foreigners, are a feature of the first half of the nineteenth century. 
Their coverage is neither consistent nor systematic, but in some cases 
60  On restrictions on protruding or hanging signs in various Western European 
countries see Garrioch, ‘House Names, Shop Signs and Social Organization’, 37.
61  PSZ 1, no. 13421.
62  PSZ 1, nos 15451, 15462; 28 June and 8 July 1782; on earlier decrees forbidding 
merchants to trade from their houses see e.g. PSZ 1, no. 7940, of 9 November 1739. 
Broadly on Catherine’s policies on trade and merchants see Isabel de Madariaga, 
Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981), pp. 
299–303, 470–77.
63  See Alla Povelikhina and Yevgeny Kovtun, Russian Painted Shop Signs and Avant-garde 
Artists (Leningrad: Aurora Art Publishers, 1991), pp. 11–26; also the summary of the 
early history of signs in Sally West, I Shop in Moscow: Advertising and the Creation of 
Consumer Culture in Late Tsarist Russia (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 
2011), pp. 21–25; A. V. Sazikov and T. V. Vinogradova, Naruzhnaia reklama Moskvy. 
Istoriia, tipologiia, dokumenty (Moscow: Russkii Mir, 2013), pp. 11–18.
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the contrasts between consecutive depictions of the same or equivalent 
spaces is sufficient to serve as evidence for a rough chronology of 
graphospheric change. With regard to the main thoroughfares of St 
Petersburg, they suggest that the decisive proliferation of inscribed shop 
signs took place over the first couple of decades of the century. We can 
compare, for example, the views of Nevskii Prospekt around 1800, by 
the Swedish artist Benjamin Patersen, with scenes from the panorama of 
Nevskii Prospekt in the mid-1820s by Vasilii Sadovnikov, which in the 
early 1830s was turned into an influential and much-celebrated series 
of lithographs. Patersen’s St Petersburg is not completely sign-free; his 
view of Palace Square from the bottom end of Nevskii Prospekt shows a 
red sign in French in the right foreground. However, his long perspective 
view down the central part of Nevskii Prospekt, from Gostinyi Dvor on 
the left, is utterly wordless.64 This is in stark contrast with the equivalent 
scenes in Sadovnikov’s panorama.65 By the 1820s Petersburg’s most 
fashionable street had become saturated with signs.
To what extent did such signs spread beyond St Petersburg’s most 
fashionable street? To follow them further we have to move beyond 
legislation and illustration. From the 1830s onward, street signs 
became objects of description in several genres: articles and essays, 
correspondence, and literature.
A vivid account of what one might call “off-street” signs is given in a 
sketch called “Nooks and Crannies of Petersburg” (Peterburgskie ugly), by 
Nikolai Nekrasov, which appeared in a collection of essays and stories 
about the city published in 1845 under the general title The Physiology of 
Petersburg. In search of accommodation, Nekrasov’s narrator turns into 
the inner courtyard of a large building, where his “eyes encountered 
a patchwork of signs, which had been attached to the building just as 
carefully on the inside [i.e. in the courtyard] as on the outside [i.e. facing 
the street]”. The signs advertised anything from coffins to tin plates to 
the services of a certified midwife. Each sign displayed three things: 
the relevant designation in words (the narrator is amused by some 
64  Sankt-Peterburg v akvareliakh, graviurakh i litografiiakh XVIII–XIX vekov: iz sobraniia 
Gosudarstvennogo Ermitazha, compiled by G. A. Miroliubova, G. A. Printseva, and 
V. O. Looga (St Petersburg: Arka, 2009), pp. 67–69 (from the engraving by Gabriel 
Ludvig Lory), 189–191.
65  See the detailed analysis by Katherine Bowers in Chapter 12 of the present volume.
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idiosyncratic phraseology, here in non-standard Russian rather than in 
French); a hand pointing towards the entrance to the relevant apartment 
or stall; and an explanatory picture, such as a boot, scissors, a samovar 
with a broken handle, a sausage, an item of furniture, and so on.66
Shop signs seem to have proliferated in central Moscow over roughly 
the same period as in St Petersburg. On 27 August 1833 Aleksandr Pushkin 
wrote a letter from Moscow to his wife, Natalia, in St Petersburg. It was 
her birthday, and the poet was chatty and upbeat. “Important news”, he 
wrote, “the French shop signs, destroyed by Rostopchin in the year that 
you were born, have reappeared on Kuznetskii Most”.67 Count Fedor 
Rostopchin had been the military governor of Moscow at the time of 
Napoleon’s invasion of 1812.68 However, in Moscow during the early 
1830s, shop signs were by no means limited to Kuznetskii Most. The 
first (to my knowledge) attempt at systematic description is an engaging 
pamphlet about Moscow signs, published in 1836, whose author used 
the unlikely-sounding name of Fedor Distribuendi.69 Distribuendi 
describes twenty-five varieties of what he calls “ordinary” signs, with 
brief information on their design and on their usual inscriptions. With 
the exception of clothes shops, most of the signs noted by Distribuendi 
are in Russian.
Shop signs appear quite regularly in essays and stories of the period. 
For some they are simply the background to the bustling life of the city, 
others are rhetorically indignant at what they regard as the culturally 
demeaning prominence of French.70 One strand of such descriptions 
relates to signage in general, as an urban phenomenon. Curiously (in 
view of the evidence for the actual spread of signs), according to this 
66  Fiziologiia Peterburga, p. 132.
67  Pushkin, Sobranie sochinenii v desiati tomakh, vol. 10 (1962), p. 135.
68  For a satirical allusion to brash signs on foreign shops on Kuznetskii Most on the eve 
of the Napoleonic invasion see Konstantin Batiushkov’s ‘Stroll through Moscow’ 
(‘Progulka po Moskve’) written in late 1811 or early 1812, in K. N. Batiushkov, 
Sochineniia v dvukh tomakh, vol. 2 (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1989), p. 
288.
69  Distribuendi, Vzgliad na moskovskie vyveski.
70  For Moscow in this perspective see e.g. I. T. Kokorev, ‘Publikatsii i vyveski’, in idem, 
Moskva sorokovyh godov. Ocherki i povesti o Moskve XIX veka (Moscow: Moskovskii 
rabochii, 1959), pp. 61–76 (esp. pp. 73, 74). On St Petersburg: E. I. Rastorguev, 
Progulki po Nevskomy prospektu (St Petersburg: Tipografiia Karla Kraiia, 1846), 
repr. in Chuvstvitel′nye progulki po Nevskomu prospektu, ed. by A. M. Konechnyi (St 
Petersburg: Petropolis, 2009), esp. pp. 138–40.
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view, signs—street signs, house signs, shop signs—are sometimes 
taken as a distinguishing feature of the graphosphere of St Petersburg, 
by contrast with that of Moscow. Indeed, the two cities are even 
characterised in terms of this contrast. In an article entitled “Petersburg 
Notes for 1836”, Nikolai Gogol wrote: “Moscow is a warehouse. It piles 
bale upon bale. It is completely oblivious to the ordinary customer. 
Petersburg has spread itself piecemeal, has dissipated into stalls and 
shops to lure the ordinary customer. Moscow says ‘if the buyer needs 
something, he’ll find it’. Petersburg thrusts its signs in one’s face. […] 
Moscow is one big market; Petersburg is a well lit shop”.71 Vissarion 
Belinskii picked up this theme in his essay “Petersburg and Moscow”, 
with which The Physiology of Petersburg opens. Moscow looks inwards 
on itself; St Petersburg faces outward. Moscow is for Muscovites and 
their families; St Petersburg is for the public and for visitors. Moscow 
is uninterested in helping you find your way around. To find a flat in 
Moscow is “pure torment”, whereas in St Petersburg the doors will 
often display “not only the number but also a bronze or iron plaque 
with the name of the occupant”.72 Thus, for Gogol and Belinskii, the fact 
that St Petersburg was a city of visible words was taken to be indicator 
of an aspect of its urban modernity.
In a way, the communicative dynamic of the graphosphere had 
been reversed. In the initiatives of Peter I the public graphosphere was 
created as a means of projecting information and images from and about 
the state. By the mid-nineteenth century, the public graphosphere had 
expanded as a set of reference points for orientation within and across 
the spaces themselves. In the early eighteenth century the translations 
of graphospheric phenomena into other media (engravings, printed 
explanations) were complementary devices to amplify and explain 
the message. By the mid-nineteenth century, the translations of the 
graphospheric phenomena into other media—in maps and plans, 
tax registers, urban directories of businesses and residents—served 
practical purposes both for the state administration and for private 
convenience. Under Peter I the graphosphere was, at least in part, 
formed to project cultural ideas of public space. By the mid-nineteenth 
71  N. V. Gogol, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii v 14 tomakh, ed. by N. F. Bel′chikov and B. V. 
Tomashevskii (Moscow and Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1952), 8, p. 179.
72  Fiziologiia Peterburga, p. 56.
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century, cultural ideas of public space were being formed to reflect 
perceptions of the graphosphere. Most of the earlier initiatives were 
either deliberately transient (the “ephemeral monuments”) or they 
faded with the fashions that had engendered them. By the mid-
nineteenth century the public graphosphere had taken on many of the 
features that it retains to the present.

12. Experiencing Information:  
An Early Nineteenth-Century Stroll Along  
Nevskii Prospekt
Katherine Bowers1
Nevskii Prospekt has long been St Petersburg’s famous boulevard; 
it was where Imperial Russian high society went to see and be seen, 
as well as home to all the best shops: confectionaries, vintners, 
haberdashers, bootmakers, swordmakers, modistes, milliners. Thanks 
to the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century mania for urban depiction, 
in artists’ renderings and writers’ sketches we have “snapshots”—in 
a sense—of the street’s life, giving insight into its appearance before 
the development of photography. In the 1820s work of artist Vasilii 
Sadovnikov, for example, Nevskii Prospekt is celebrated; its stately 
buildings, grand monuments, and bridges depicted elegantly under 
an idyllic pale blue sky. His remarkable watercolours painstakingly 
1  This research was made possible through support from the University of Cambridge 
and the Hampton Fund at the University of British Columbia. An earlier version 
of this chapter was presented at the Humanities and Social Sciences seminar at 
Darwin College, Cambridge, in October 2014 and I am grateful to those present for 
their helpful feedback. I am indebted to Connor Doak, Tatiana Filimonova, Simon 
Franklin, and Alexander M. Martin for their constructive comments on earlier 
drafts of this chapter. Additionally, I wish to thank Viktoria Ivleva, with whom I 
consulted on several research queries about nineteenth-century Russian trade cards 
and shopping arcades. The images from Panorama that illustrate this chapter appear 
with permission from the State Russian Museum, St Petersburg, and I thank Yulia 
Khodko for her assistance in obtaining them.
© 2017 Katherine Bowers, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0122.12
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reproduce every building along each side of the famous street, from 
the Admiralty to the Anichkov Bridge.2 In 1830 and 1835, respectively, 
publisher and art patron Andrei Prévost commissioned two masters who 
shared a common surname, Ivan and Petr, both Ivanov, to lithograph 
Sadovnikov’s watercolours. The monochromatic lithographs were then 
coloured by hand with watercolour paint and published in a collection 
called Panorama of Nevskii Prospekt (Panorama Nevskogo Prospekta).3
Panorama is made up of two continuous lithographed scrolls mounted 
on bands of linen: “The Left, Sunny Side of Nevskii Prospekt” (P. Ivanov, 
1835), and “The Right, Shady Side of Nevskii Prospekt” (I. Ivanov, 
1830). Beginning at Palace Square, the scroll records buildings along 
the “sunny” side of the street, crosses the thoroughfare at the Anichkov 
Bridge, and records buildings along the “shady” side back to the Square. 
By rolling the scroll, nineteenth-century viewers could “walk along” the 
street, pausing as often as they liked to study each individual building 
and monument. The quality of the images is high, given Sadovnikov’s 
noted precision and Panorama’s immense dimensions of approximately 
7.1 metres by 26.4 centimetres per street side.4 
Writing in the 1830s, one reviewer called it a “masterly lithographic 
scroll” and another commented, “This is, so far, the best likeness of 
our beautiful Nevsky Prospekt”.5 St Petersburg’s noted architects 
Carlo Rossi and Auguste de Montferrand praised Panorama, and many 
residents bought copies of the scroll, despite its ungainly length, to use as 
2  Only two fragments of the original watercolour scrolls exist, one in the National 
Library of Russia, St Petersburg, and the other in the National Pushkin Museum, 
St Petersburg. Together they comprise only about a fifth of the complete Panorama. 
Additionally, Sadovnikov’s preparatory sketches in ink have been preserved in the 
State Russian Museum, St Petersburg, and in the State Museum of the History of St 
Petersburg.
3  When describing Sadovnikov’s work here and throughout, I refer to V. S. 
Sadovnikov, Panorama of Nevsky Prospect: From the Collection of the Russian Museum, 
ed. by Nataliia Shtrimer (Leningrad: Aurora Art Publishers, 1993). This edition 
consists of a good quality reproduction of the scroll broken up into coloured plates. 
The 1974 edition, also published by Aurora Art Publishers, is a smaller scale black 
and white reproduction of the original lithographs and some of the image details 
are difficult to make out.
4  In the original announcement, in Literaturnaia gazeta, no. 15 (1830), the dimensions 
are noted: “around ten arshins long and six vershoks wide” (okolo 10 arshin dlinoiu i 
6 vershkov shirinoiu).
5  I. Kotel′nikova, ‘Introduction’, in Panorama of Nevsky Prospekt (Leningrad: Aurora 
Art Publishers, 1974), p. 8.
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decorations or gifts.6 The work caused a stir both because of its precision 
and the unique visual look at the city it provided. Early nineteenth-
century feuilletons and physiological sketches enabled readers to 
“experience” urban space, taking them on verbal “strolls”.7 The scroll’s 
depiction of the famous street was based on a similar concept; it allowed 
viewers in St Petersburg and elsewhere in the Russian Empire to “visit” 
and “take in” its notable perspectives, fashionable façades, and famous 
monuments, as well as its service class, consumer culture, and popular 
storefronts, from their homes in a uniquely visual way which omits 
many of the aspects of urban experience including smells, sounds, and 
bustle. 
The word Panorama in the title, deliberately chosen by Prévost, is 
a commercial gimmick, meant to evoke the popular entertainment 
of the panorama, a handheld device that enabled viewers to traverse 
a rendered landscape.8 Contemporary scholars have connected the 
material experience of viewing the Panorama with a kind of virtual 
reality, an imagined journey along the fashionable thoroughfare. Art 
historian Tatiana Senkevitch suggests that Sadovnikov’s Panorama 
could also “be pushed simultaneously through two special boxes with 
glass windows—the viewer was situated between them… [giving] an 
impression of simulating an imaginary carriage ride through the city”.9 
Julie Buckler observes that the inclusion of objects like shop signs 
and the “chance encounters and particulars of dress and posture” of 
recognisable members of St Petersburg society “rendered the Prospect 
very much of its moment”.10 Buckler views the material form of the 
6  Kotel′nikova, ‘Introduction’, p. 32.
7  Julie A. Buckler describes several of these works in the context of the Nevskii 
Prospekt literary tradition in Mapping St. Petersburg: Imperial Text and Cityshape 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 83–88.
8  For more information about the development of both the panorama and 
Sadovnikov’s Panorama, see Tatiana Senkevitch, ‘The Phantasmagoria of the City: 
Gogol’s and Sadovnikov’s Nevsky Prospect, St Petersburg’, in The Flâneur Abroad: 
Historical and International Perspectives, ed. by Richard Wrigley (Newcastle upon 
Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014), pp. 171–74. Senkevitch’s study uses 
Sadovnikov’s Panorama of Nevskii Prospekt and Gogol’s story ‘Nevskii Prospekt’ to 
explore notions of vision, perception, spatial dynamics, architectural and urban 
planning history, and the imagined city.
9  Senkevitch, ‘The Phantasmagoria of the City’, p. 176.
10 Buckler, Mapping St. Petersburg, p. 84.
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scroll as instrumental in creating “a more ‘local’ sense of street life”.11 In 
this sense, Panorama provides an intriguing case study of the nineteenth-
century public graphosphere as it was visualised contemporaneously. In 
this chapter—and in the spirit of Panorama’s original use—I will embark 
upon a visual “stroll” down Nevskii Prospekt, but I will focus not on 
imperial monuments or elegant palaces, but on commercial enterprise 
and, in particular, on shop signs. 
In the previous chapter, Simon Franklin introduced the 
graphosphere and gave a broad overview of its formation and many 
functions. In this chapter, I will use Sadovnikov’s Panorama as a case 
study that enables close observation of the minutiae of shop signs, 
their placement, arrangement, contents, and aesthetic. Shop signs 
had been regulated by a series of imperial decrees throughout the 
eighteenth century, as Franklin describes. Initially, official regulations 
were restrictive, but eventually urban zoning laws were relaxed, 
which allowed for mixed commercial and residential spaces and, as 
a result, flourishing small enterprise. As trade grew, so too did the 
proliferation of shop signs. Eventually, by the 1820s, as can be seen in 
Panorama, signs were a regular feature of urban space. Franklin draws 
the distinction between signs generated by state institutions and those 
generated by commercial activity; as he notes, this proliferation was 
“not ‘top down’ but ‘bottom up’”.12
Scholars typically date the decline of St Petersburg’s “purity” in 
architecture to the moment when Nicholas I broke with convention 
and allowed the rapid construction of plain buildings to house the 
growing imperial bureaucracy.13 However, even before the proliferation 
of “bureaucratic classicism” in the 1830s and its destabilisation of the 
ideological power inherent in imperial structures, growing commercial 
enterprise encroached on the neoclassical purity of the seat of power. 
Buckler observes that Sadovnikov’s work, in its representation of “high 
and low, distanced and near”, is able to provide “a sense of urban 
space as a whole”.14 The tension between trade and authority comes 
11  Ibid.
12  See Simon Franklin’s chapter in the present volume.
13 Buckler, Mapping St Petersburg, p. 29.
14  Ibid., p. 84.
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to the fore in Sadovnikov’s watercolours precisely because Nevskii 
Prospekt is so grand—it is a space that reflects imperial vision with 
its monuments and palaces—but, at the same time, is host to intense 
commercial enterprise, which necessarily aims mainly to communicate 
with potential customers. 
The urban public graphosphere present along Nevskii Prospekt, 
as seen in Sadovnikov’s watercolours, sheds light on the complicated, 
often conflicting relationship between commercial enterprise and 
imperial authority in the first half of the nineteenth century. While 
the graphosphere portrayed is limited to a single notable street and, 
therefore, by no means gives a comprehensive overview of urban 
space, it nonetheless proves productive. This captured graphosphere 
demonstrates how commercial enterprise and imperial authority are 
juxtaposed through their representation in information technologies. 
Sadovnikov’s Perspective
V. S. Sadovnikov was a serf born on the estate of Princess Natalia 
Golitsyna in 1800; both he and his older brother Petr were educated 
from childhood through the Golitsyn family’s patronage. Vasilii 
became a landscape painter known for his attention to detail while Petr 
became a celebrated architect. While studying as a child in the studio 
of architect Andrei Voronikhin, Sadovnikov met landscape painters 
Maksim Vorob′ev and Aleksei Venetsianov, who exerted influence on 
his development as an artist. In the 1820s he had a series of popular 
successes with his watercolours, Views of St Petersburg and Surrounding 
Areas (Vidy Peterburga i okrestnostei) (1823–27) and the series of late 1820s 
watercolours that became Panorama (1830–35); these works emerged 
with the help of the Imperial Society for the Encouragement of Artists 
(Obshchestvo pooshchreniia khudozhnikov), which supported the work of 
talented serfs. Notably, the society’s salon is visible on our “stroll”, and 
we will see it when we come to figure 12 of the present chapter; the salon 
sign prominently features the year of its founding, 1826, and its name 
in both French and Russian. In the 1830s, the Panorama scroll could be 
purchased in this building! 
In 1838 Sadovnikov received the title “svobodnyi neklassnyi 
khudozhnik” (free unclassed artist) from the Academy of Arts and also 
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his freedom from bondage.15 At the time, he was already a well-known 
artist thanks to his two watercolour series, Views and Panorama. In the 
announcement of the publication of Panorama in 1830, he is referred to 
as “g Sadovnikov” (Mr Sadovnikov), a title atypical for a serf. At his death 
in 1879, Sadovnikov was widely considered a master of both landscape 
and genre painting.16
Sadovnikov’s training as an artist comes through in the spatial 
composition of Panorama. The central element of the scroll is the line 
of buildings; these draw the viewer’s attention first. Above them is 
the limpid blue sky, below, the street, populated by small figures. In 
comparison to the figures, however, the architecture dominates. In this 
sense, the scroll demonstrates the result of the imperial project that 
began in the first half of the eighteenth century, the transformation of 
Nevskii Prospekt into “an unbroken chain of related ensembles”.17 Yet, 
these watercolours do not just depict imperial pomp; they also show 
glimpses into the life of the street.
Sadovnikov’s experience of aristocratic society as an outsider may 
inform Panorama in that its population includes passers-by from all 
classes. From high-ranking noblemen wearing dress uniforms and 
fashionable society ladies to members of the lower classes such as 
tradesmen, peddlers, servants, and labourers, all can be seen along 
Sadovnikov’s Nevskii. Even some specific, recognisable individuals 
(including Pushkin) stroll along Sadovnikov’s boulevard. Similarly, 
Sadovnikov focusses on the commercial aspects of the street, particularly 
its residents’ gastronomic and sartorial pursuits. Fashionable artists of 
the time such as T. A. Vasiliev, A. Martynov, K. P. Beggrov, and many 
others depicted St Petersburg’s neoclassical façades, grand squares, 
15  The designation of “free unclassed artist” was granted with a small silver medal 
from the Imperial Academy of Arts and could be given to artists unaffiliated with 
the Academy. In Sadovnikov’s case, his medal was granted for being self-taught 
and practicing perspective landscape painting independently. The designation of 
“classed”, “unclassed”, or “free unclassed” artist from the Academy was required 
at that time to work professionally as an artist. For more information on serf artists’ 
classifications during this period, see Richard Stites, Serfdom, Society, and the Arts in 
Imperial Russia: The Pleasure and the Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 
pp. 325–27.
16  For more on Sadovnikov’s life and works, see O. Kaparulina, Vasilii Semonovich 
Sadovnikov (St Petersburg: Palace Editions, 2000).
17  Yuri Egorov, The Architectural Planning of St Petersburg, trans. by Eric Dluhosch 
(Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1969), pp. 204–05.
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and elegant bridges as grand architectural studies; in comparison, 
Sadovnikov’s St Petersburg has a striking energy. His scenes invite the 
viewer to experience urban space, to “feel the spirit of the age”.18 
Shop Signs Along the Sunny Side
Our stroll begins with a view of Palace Square; Rastrelli’s grand Winter 
Palace is visible behind the immense Alexander Column. The Column, 
a monument to the victory over Napoleon in 1812, was designed by 
architect Auguste Montferrand and does not appear in Sadovnikov’s 
original watercolours; it was raised between 1830 and 1834. Throughout 
the scroll, there are some chronological discrepancies as the lithographers 
updated the original rendering of the street to reflect new noteworthy 
sights and businesses. Notable, too, is the sense of movement given by 
populating the street scene with individual figures going about their 
business. Here, a company of soldiers marches across the square while 
passers-by look on, ladies stroll, boys chase each other at play, and a 
group of dogs frolicks. This vibrancy sets the Panorama apart from the 
static engraved images of urban space that had become popular in the 
eighteenth century.
This initial introduction to Nevskii Prospekt is saturated with the 
emblems of empire: grand displays of wealth, power, and glory, as 
well as attention to the square’s ensemble of palace and monument. 
St Petersburg itself represents a grand imperial building project, an 
exercise in authority in the sense of the moderation and control of public 
space. Here, in the home of the tsar and the headquarters of the military 
forces, the empire’s might is apparent not only in the company of 
soldiers marching past, but also in the neoclassical façades and spatial 
composition of the square. As historian William Craft Brumfield has 
succinctly articulated, “The architecture of St Petersburg—grandiose, 
overpowering at times, obsessed with rational design—remains 
the clearest statement of purpose that Imperial Russia ever made: to 
measure, to build, to impose order at any cost”.19
18  Kotel′nikova, ‘Introduction’, p. 32.
19  William Craft Brumfield, ‘St Petersburg and the Art of Survival’, in Preserving 
Petersburg: History, Memory, Nostalgia, ed. by Helena Goscilo and Stephen M. Norris 
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As we move down Nevskii Prospekt away from Palace Square along the 
left, sunny side of the street in the perpetual afternoon of Sadovnikov’s 
watercolours, commercial displays such as shop signs and storefronts 
begin to appear. Senkevitch argues that moving along Nevskii activates 
“the kinesthetic command of the observer by imposing on him/her a 
certain hegemony of visual order enforced by the rhetoric of architectural 
spaces”.20 However, the commercial spaces that confront us sharply 
contrast with the stately ensemble of the Square, and interrupt the 
“hegemony of visual order” that the imperial architecture imposes. 
While still neoclassical and grand, the façades here host a proliferation 
of shop signs mixing languages, scripts, and images. Signs spell out 
names in both Cyrillic and Latin scripts—for example: “Formann/
Форманъ” or “Elers/Елерсъ”. Images, too, begin to appear in addition 
to the words. 
In his 1858 travel account, Théophile Gautier remarks on the wonders 
of the multilingual and image-rich signage on Nevskii Prospekt:
But perhaps you don’t know Russian, and the form of the characters 
means nothing more for you than an ornamental design or a piece 
of embroidery? Here to the side is the French or German translation. 
You still haven’t understood? The obliging sign pardons you for not 
recognising any of these three languages; it even assumes that you 
might be completely illiterate, and presents a lifelike depiction of the 
goods for sale in the shop it is advertising. Sculpted or painted bunches 
of golden grapes indicate a wine merchant; further along glazed hams, 
sausages, tongues, tins of caviar designate a food shop; high boots, ankle 
boots, naïvely presented galoshes, say to feet that don’t know how to 
read: ‘Enter here and you will be shod’; crossed gloves speak an idiom 
intelligible to all.21
The mix of Russian, French, German, Italian and even English and 
Dutch is not surprising, given Nevskii’s typically elite and cosmopolitan 
clientele.22 Nearly all the signs are at least bilingual.
20  Senkevitch, ‘The Phantasmagoria of the City’, p. 169.
21  Théophile Gautier, Voyage en Russie, Vol 1 (Paris: 1867), pp. 124–25. The translation I 
use appears in Alla Povelikhina and Yevgeny Kovtun, Russian Painted Shop Signs and 
Avant-Garde Artists, trans. by Thomas Crane and Margarita Latsinova (Leningrad: 
Aurora Art Publishers, 1991), p. 23. 
22  On Russian elites, luxury, and Western European connections, see Alexander M. 
Martin, Enlightened Metropolis: Constructing Imperial Moscow, 1762–1855 (Oxford: 
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The images that appear in addition to the words lend decoration, but 
also have a utilitarian purpose. The literate minority of St Petersburg 
could frequently read all three languages, and lower-level monolingual 
literacy existed at this time as well, but, as Gautier observes, shopkeepers 
took no chances of missing out on potential customers, and therefore 
often included visual depictions.23 These could be aimed at illiterate 
servants, for example, sent to pick up or purchase goods. 
Along Nevskii, shop signs are typically mounted flush to the 
buildings, and include images as well as text as in, for example, a 
storefront with images of scissors denoting a tailor or a craftsman’s 
shop sign showing an array of canes and umbrellas or mathematical 
instruments. This style of signage was the result of mingling and 
exchange between eighteenth-century Western European merchants 
and Russian merchants in the capital. In antiquity, shop signs had been 
emblematic (as we know from those found in Pompeii, for example).24 In 
medieval Western Europe, signs in the form of frescoes and murals gave 
way to painted shop signs as secular art developed.25 In Jean Fouquet’s 
1458 illuminations, for example, painted shop signs can already be seen 
(fig. 3). However, scholars have not found literary or pictorial evidence 
of signboards in fifteenth-century Russia, even as late as the seventeenth 
century. One of the earliest known examples of Russian advertising 
appears in a late seventeenth-century wood cut print depicting Moscow 
that shows goods were hung outside the shop so customers would see 
them (fig. 4).26 Commercial signs in Russia continued to develop visually 
23  On advertising and the development of guild and shop signs in eighteenth- and 
early nineteenth-century Russia, see Eleonora Glinternik, Reklama v Rossii XVIII–
pervoi poloviny XX veka (St Petersburg: Avrora, 2007), pp. 12–51. On advertising in 
Imperial Russia, see Sally West, I Shop in Moscow: Advertising and the Creation of 
Consumer Culture in Late Tsarist Russia (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 
2011).
24  On advertising in antiquity, see V. V. Uchenova and N. V. Starykh, Istoriia reklamy: 
detstvo i otrochestvo reklamy (Moscow: Smysl, 1994), pp. 9–20.
25  On the development of signs in Western Europe, the classic study is Jacob Larwood 
and John Camden Hotten, The History of Signboards from the Earliest Times to the 
Present Day (London: John Camden Hotten, 1867), especially pp. 1–44. See also 
Uchenova and Starykh, Istoriia reklamy, pp. 21–37 for a history of advertising in 
medieval Western Europe more broadly.
26  Adam Olearius, Vermehrte Newe Beschreibung Der Muscowitischen vnd Persischen 
Reyse, So durch gelegenheit einer Holsteinischen Gesandschafft an den Russischen Zaar 
vnd König in Persien geschehen (Schleswig: Johan Holwein, 1656), p. 224. Olearius 
describes merchant culture and trade in seventeenth-century Moscow.
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rather than textually until the influx of German, Dutch, French and 
English merchants in the eighteenth century, and the Western European 
commercial traditions they brought with them.
Figure 3: Jean Fouquet, Boccace écrivant le De Casibus (1458).
Figure 4: A bootmaker’s stall, from Adam Olearius’s Vermehrte Newe 
Beschreibung Der Muscowitischen vnd Persischen Reyse (1656).
The signs on Nevskii Prospekt appeal to a clientele with a taste for the 
fashionable and elegant, and are a far cry from what you would see on 
a typical Russian urban street at this time. The Nevskii signs project 
information about the quality or exclusivity of the businesses they 
advertise. Reassuring to consumers, signs featuring a single glove or boot 
in profile are common, and modelled after guilds’ Western European-style 
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heraldic banner signs.27 Introduced into Russia during the reign of 
Peter the Great, but based on the medieval Western European model, 
merchant and craft guilds stood for quality and consistency of goods.28 
During Catherine II’s reign, guilds began using their signs as advertising. 
Consumers would have recognised the form of guild signs in these shop 
signs, meant to assure them of good service. One of the most famous of 
these banner signs is that of the guild of German bakers, symbolised by a 
golden pretzel held aloft by two lions (fig. 5). We see its echo in the shop 
signs along Nevskii, a golden-coloured pretzel appears several times over 
the course of our stroll, but without its lions; the guild’s heraldic image 
has come to represent a bakery, generally (fig. 6). These images visibly 
demonstrate that the importation of Western culture was not confined 
to the neoclassical architecture that lined St Petersburg’s streets, but also 
played a significant role in the development of commerce.
Figure 5: Symbol of the Bakers’ Guild, East Frisian Island of Juist 
(Lower Saxony, Germany).
27  Povelikhina and Kovtun, Painted Shop Signs and Avant-Garde Artists, pp. 16–17. 
Povelikhina and Kovtun’s work is not a history of shop signs, but a study of the 
ways nineteenth-century and earlier painted shop signs influenced Russian avant-
garde artists. Their introduction to the volume gives a history of the development 
of the shop sign in Russia.
28  For more information about the introduction and development of guilds in 
Russia, see Roger P. Bartlett, Human Capital: The Settlement of Foreigners into Russia 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 147–49. For information about 
St Petersburg guilds, specifically, see George E. Munro, The Most Intentional City: St 
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Storefronts with signs featuring only images tend to represent goods that 
speak for themselves. A dry goods merchant has no sign, only enormous 
gleaming sugar loaves in his windows. Similarly, a vintner has hung 
a bunch of grapes above his door and includes no other decoration. 
These examples are much more reminiscent of earlier signs, which tend 
towards universal emblems. Similarly, some specialty shops include 
signs that describe the variety of goods for sale in one store. A musical 
instrument dealer features a wide array of musical instruments on his 
shop sign (fig. 8), while a scientific instruments dealer includes images 
of his specialised stock: abacuses, rulers, compasses and protractors, 
and other instruments (fig. 7). These enormous signboards seem merely 
decorative at first glance, but have a utilitarian function. Art historians 
Alla Povelikhina and Yevgeny Kovtun suppose that, “For a Russian, a 
detailed and evocative depiction of the complete choice of merchandise, 
instruments, or goods for sale in a shop was especially understandable, 
for he preferred seeing the actual product to hearing about it or, even 
more, to reading about it, since he may have been illiterate or unwilling 
to take the trouble”.29 Whether or not their claim that these pictorial lists 
are a particularly Russian tendency is accurate, there can be no doubt 
about their efficacy as information technology. These image-only signs 
convey information to a broad audience, seeking to advertise and sell to 
as many passers-by as possible.
A dedicated advertising campaign can be seen in the decoration of 
Rode’s large store (fig. 9), located at the corner of Nevskii Prospekt and 
Malaia Millionnaia (a name used to refer to the top of Bolshaia Morskaia 
until the middle of the nineteenth century). Whereas other buildings we 
have passed feature a proliferation of signs placed with little system to 
proclaim and advertise the many businesses housed within and tucked 
away in their courtyards, this storefront features a uniform façade with 
large windows with lamps between each, multiple entrances, and signs 
neatly spaced, symmetrically arranged, and placed with some view to 
neoclassical aesthetics. Rode’s signs are a variety of shapes: diamonds, 
rectangles, and some half-circle, half-square. Some are in French, some 
in Russian, and some feature images of the goods within: gentlemen’s 
frock coats, hats, and dress swords. A large, ornate sign above the main 
29  Povelikhina and Kovtun, Russian Painted Shop Signs and Avant-Garde Artists, p. 17.
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entrance on the corner of Nevskii and Malaia Millionnaia proudly 
displays RODE/РОДЕ in enormous capital letters. The careful placement 
of signs here echoes the “grand spatial composition” of the building’s 
location on the corner of two major avenues, while no one can be in 
doubt of either what goods are for sale or their quality. 
Advertising using images was common, but signs featuring only 
text tended to be for more exclusive locales along Nevskii, those where 
representative images would either be superfluous or considered vulgar. 
Continuing our “stroll”, just before Police Bridge,30 the first cast iron 
bridge in the city, an elegant confectioner’s shop has wide windows and 
broad steps, and presents a good prospect of the canal (fig. 10). Its signs 
wrap around, proclaiming, on the Nevskii Prospekt side, “С. Волфъ 
и Т. Беранже”, then over the door at the corner “Café Chinois”, and 
on the far side “S. Wolf et T. Béranger”. This particular confectionary 
was famous at the time as a favourite café of Petersburg literary society; 
Pushkin would eat his last meal at Wolf and Béranger before setting off 
to his fatal duel in January 1837, and the premises would become part of 
the legend surrounding the famous poet. Notably, for passers-by unable 
to read, this building offers no picture to show what it contained. Its 
façade features elegant iron railings and stonework; its signs display the 
name prominently in multiple languages, but only the “Café Chinois” 
sign on the building’s corner offers a clue, and, to get it, one must 
understand French, that tea comes from China, and that one has cakes 
with tea. In their signage, Wolf and Béranger make a statement about 
their elite premises, further demonstrated by their use of only “tasteful” 
advertising—no gauche signs picturing food here! For the same reason, 
the elite hotels we have passed—the Hotel London and Hotel Demuth—
feature little to no signage, and that with text only, when present.
Bookshops, presumably presupposing literacy in their clients, tend 
to feature text-only signs. Across the Moika, on the corner of Nevskii and 
Bolshaia Koniushennaia, there is another large commercial operation: 
that of early nineteenth-century publishing mogul Aleksandr Smirdin 
(fig. 11). The lithographs depict Smirdin’s thriving business, with large 
signs declaring the offices of the innovative Library for Reading (Biblioteka 
dlia chteniia). 

















































Sadovnikov’s watercolours could not have depicted Smirdin’s shop 
and printing house in the 1820s as it did not yet exist, but by 1835, as 
P. Ivanov was creating the lithographed scroll, the business’s omission 
would have been a glaring one, and the scroll has been updated 
accordingly. I. Kotelnikova suggests that the 1820s watercolours from 
the “sunny” side of the street were updated to reflect notable sights, but 
the “shady” side watercolours—closer in time to Sadovnikov’s original 
watercolours—were not.31
The first mass-circulation journal, The Library for Reading had a 
subscription base of 5000 by its second year, 1835. The journal was a 
monthly publication aimed at a broad middle-class readership, not just 
at the elite. Similarly, Smirdin’s bookshop on Nevskii Prospekt catered 
to a broad clientele, reflecting his business model.32 Large placards wrap 
around the building’s corner, with text in French and Russian. On the 
structure’s façade, most signs only give information in Russian. Signs 
wrap the building just under its balcony, and also appear in a second 
row, on either side of the central balcony. Below, a basement shop also 
has its own sign. On the other side of the building, just before the church, 
signs again wrap around the corner.
The contrast with Bellizard’s bookshop, passed earlier, is obvious. 
Smirdin’s operation occupies the majority of the building and includes 
multiple imprints of his business; their various signs mark and advertise 
the bookshop and the journal, but, also, as an ensemble give off a 
united sense of activity and industry. Bellizard’s sign simply labels his 
bookshop, showing its location to passers-by,33 but we must consider 
that Bellizard operates a relatively small bookshop and does a limited 
amount of publishing. Smirdin, on the other hand, is one of the most 
successful and influential of the St Petersburg publishers. 
31  Kotel′nikova, ‘Introduction’, p. 65.
32  For more about The Library for Reading and Smirdin’s publishing model, see V. 
G. Berezina et al., Istoriia russkoi zhurnalistiki XVIII–XIX vekov (Moscow: Vysshaia 
shkola, 1963), pp. 169–74, p. 295. Melissa Frazier has analysed the journal’s impact 
on readers and writers of its era with a focus on its editor, Osip Senkovskii; see 
Frazier, Romantic Encounters: Writers, Readers, and the ‘Library for Reading’ (Palo Alto, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2007). For a literature review of sources on various 
aspects of Smirdin’s business, see George Gutsche, ‘Dinner at Smirdin’s: Forces in 
Russian Print Culture in the Early Reign of Nicholas I’, in The Space of the Book: 
Print Culture in the Russian Social Imagination, ed. by Miranda Remnek (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2010), pp. 74–75.
33  As I mentioned earlier, the Panorama’s most famous passer-by is Pushkin, who can 


















His premises’ use of signage, like Rode’s, tells a great deal about his 
business. Smirdin’s profusion of signs renders his operation unmissable 
and unmistakable. His large building, its prominent location, and the 
fact that multiple businesses operate under its auspices (publishing, 
book selling, editing, journalism, etc.) all promote a sense of confidence 
and durability, something that many other publishers operating in 
Petersburg at the time did not have.
Shopping Arcades from the Shady Side
As we complete the stroll to the Anichkov Bridge and cross Nevskii 
to head back towards Palace Square, let us pause for a moment to 
reflect on the avenue’s history. The stroll along Nevskii so far has 
been characterised by a profusion of signs and goods, however, this 
informational deluge was not always characteristic of the street. In the 
city’s original plan, Nevskii Prospekt was not designated as a main 
shopping thoroughfare; rather, it was planned as a route for travellers 
entering the city by land, a main artery linking the wooden Admiralty—
the heart of the city—with the Aleksandr Nevskii Monastery. However, 
it remained largely unbuilt into the eighteenth century. A plan in 1739 
to construct a central market—the unrealised Mytnyi dvor—in the area 
shows the neighbourhood’s shift to a more commercial and utilitarian 
design. However, Nevskii’s prospects changed in the 1740s when a 
period of building activity transformed the street.
Empress Elizabeth chose the avenue for two building projects. Right 
now, from our position at the Anichkov Bridge, we stand before the 
first, the Anichkov Palace, built to commemorate her ascension to the 
throne, constructed between 1741 and 1754. The second was her own 
timbered Winter Palace, a temporary residence located back towards 
the present-day Palace Square that the empress inhabited while the 
now-famous stone Winter Palace designed by Rastrelli was constructed. 
Similarly, along the Fontanka in the neighbourhood near Nevskii, 
Elizabeth constructed her splendid summer palace.34 While neither 
Elizabeth’s winter nor summer palace survived even to the end of her 
34 Buckler, Mapping St Petersburg, p. 82.
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successor’s reign, their location, as well as that of the Anichkov Palace, 
resulted in an increase in the street’s value for both residents and those 
seeking commercial enterprise. 
Figure 13: Elizabeth’s summer palace, 1756.
Anxious to preserve the baroque complex she had become so fond of, in 
the 1740s and 50s Elizabeth passed several decrees affecting businesses 
and their shop signs in St Petersburg.35 Franklin goes into detail about 
decrees in his chapter in this volume, so I mention them only briefly 
here. In December 1742, she decreed that taverns and unsightly fruit 
and vegetable stands should be removed from the city’s main streets.36 
In October 1752, she went on to order that no shop signs of any kind 
should remain on main streets,37 complaining, “There are a multitude 
of them for various trades, visible right opposite Her Majesty’s very 
35  For a somewhat subjective version of this narrative, see P. Antonov, ‘Vyveski’, Neva, 
4 (1986), 183–88 (p. 186).
36  Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskii imperii, Series 1 (1649–1825) (hereafter PSZ 1), no. 
8674. For more details about these decrees, see Franklin’s discussion in Chapter 11 
of the present volume.
37  PSZ 1, no. 10032.
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courtyard”.38 These decrees had a significant impact on the appearance 
of St Petersburg’s streets. The result was the opulent look the empress 
desired on the capital’s grand boulevards (in decrees made later 
in October 1752, for example, she includes detailed descriptions of 
neoclassical monuments and canals she desires to construct). At the same 
time, however, these decrees reduced revenue for the many businesses 
along them. Shop signs seemed distasteful, markers of commerce and 
trade, which Elizabeth saw as vulgar. 
Possibly as a result of this, Elizabeth spearheaded the planning 
and construction of Gostinyi dvor, one of the earliest closed shopping 
arcades in the world (fig. 14). While closed shopping structures had 
existed in the Roman Empire, and the sixteenth-century Grand Bazaar in 
Constantinople provides a good example of them, Gostinyi dvor set out 
to enclose “avenues” lined with shops and stalls within a single façade, 
thus isolating commercial enterprise to certain areas and controlling 
the graphic display along Nevskii Prospekt. Gostinyi dvor—the 
“merchants’ yard”, which literally includes the word “gost”, meaning 
“guest” or, then, “foreign merchant”, in its name—was intended for 
foreign merchants, as were the so-called Nuremberg Stalls, one of the 
original shopping arcades along Nevskii, a row of stalls within the 
architectural arches of St Catherine’s Church dating from the 1780s 
(although designed from the 1760s onward), which we passed on our 
way to the Anichkov Bridge and can spy looking North and across the 
street from where we stand. From the words “guest” and “Nuremberg” 
we infer they host non-Russian merchants, although in practice both 
Russian and non-Russian tradesmen sold goods in them. Walking back 
up Nevskii, this time on the shady side of the street, we pass another 
planned commercial arcade, the Privy Cabinet Building. Dating from the 
early nineteenth century, it was planned with commercial space below 
and residential space above. Compared to the earlier façades we passed 
along Nevskii Prospekt, these are strangely empty of commercial signs, 
more closely tied into the neoclassical aesthetic vision.















While Elizabeth’s distaste for public signs and obstructed façades no 
doubt shaped the cityscape and helped spearhead the grand shopping 
arcade in Russia before many Western European countries adopted 
the model (the Gostinyi dvor predates even most Parisian arcades!), 
her decrees regulating commercial space did not stay in effect for long. 
Possibly recognising the difficulty of convenient trade if shops could not 
advertise their wares on their storefronts and artisans were consigned 
to the alleys and courtyards, Catherine II revoked Elizabeth’s decrees 
in March 1770. She added the stipulation, however, that the text and 
images on the signs meet the standards of “pristoinost′” (decency).39 
Signs that suggested topics that polite conversation did not allow were 
forbidden: for example, depictions of men’s undergarments or funeral 
accoutrements. Catherine’s reversal of Elizabeth’s decrees resulted in the 
increased proliferation of shop signs on the capital’s main boulevards 
in the last decades of the eighteenth century. In this narrative we see 
a good example of the tension between the neoclassical aesthetics that 
represent authority in Elizabeth’s eyes and the need for information 
technology for trade.
Figure 15: Passazh exterior, 1848.
Looking back across the street from the Privy Cabinet Building, a fairly 
typical Nevskii view of neoclassical palace façades can be seen. In fact, 
these were demolished in 1848 to make way for another commercial 
building project. In their place, the Passazh shopping arcade was 
constructed. Whereas, in the Nuremberg Stalls, or the shopping arcades 
39  PSZ 1, no. 13421.
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across the street, goods would have been largely lined up for view 
and sold that way, a more traditional model dating back to bartering, 
in the Passazh elite stores advertised their wares with signs, just as 
they did along Nevskii Prospekt itself. However, by the middle of 
the nineteenth century, the shopping arcade had become popular not 
because of imperial decree, but because of its benefits for merchants and 
consumers. Intriguingly, while some of the earliest shopping arcades 
feature on Nevskii Prospekt, the structures are much more closely 
associated with London and Paris, where they had their heyday in 
the 1820s and quickly passed out of fashion with the rise of the new 
department stores.40 In Russia, where department stores did not appear 
until the second half of the nineteenth century, the shopping arcade 
continued to thrive. While the old Gostinyi dvor was cramped, dark, 
and packed with crowds of people, the new Passazh allowed for a more 
pleasant shopping experience. 
Figure 16: Passazh interior, 1850s.
Here, passing the many public buildings along the right, shadowed 
side of Nevskii Prospekt—for example the Public Library or the 
Grand Theatre—there is little in the way of signage, aside from 
40  Anneleen Arnout, ‘Something Old, Something Borrowed, Something New: The 
Brussels Shopping Townscape, 1830–1914’, in The Landscape of Consumption: 
Shopping Streets and Cultures in Western Europe, 1600–1900, ed. by Jan Hein Furnée 
and Clé Lesger (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 172.
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images representing imperial power or simply a chiselled name. A 
statue of Minerva, Roman goddess of wisdom, adorns the library 
roof, overlooking the theatre square, a referential nod to the activity 
within the building. These institutions do not need to advertise; they 
all assume knowledge on the part of those seeking them out. Similarly, 
the construction of Gostinyi dvor, which we are just approaching now, 
also represents imperial authority: the attempted regulation of both 
commercial enterprise and its attendant array of signs and advertising. 
Those using the shopping complex would expect and need signs to 
understand what is for sale, but these are confined entirely within. The 
side facing Nevskii was known as the “Cloth Line” for the types of 
goods sold there, but only two small signs around the building’s corner 
suggest this activity. The sole sign that appears on the outer façade is 
the imperial eagle. 
All along Nevskii Prospekt, the imperial double-headed eagle 
adorns pharmacies and notary public offices. In these examples we see 
the manifestation of authority as information technology, in the form of 
the imperial crest. This symbol of empire above a business marks that 
these premises are part of a state monopoly and carry the weight of legal 
authority behind them. However, they also underscore the proliferation 
of imperial power throughout the city, visibly demonstrating authority 
while asserting control over some commercial enterprises.
While the lack of shop signs in some areas exposes the tension between 
authority and the development of the commercial graphosphere, 
authority vis-à-vis information technologies is most clearly seen just 
beyond Gostinyi dvor, in the tower built onto the arcade housing silver 
traders, Silver Row. In Panorama, the tower looks like mere architectural 
embellishment, but it too had its function. On the next block, in the 
distance, the outline of the optical telegraph can be seen atop a building. 
The Silver Row tower was also part of this semaphore line, which 
represented cutting edge information transfer in the early nineteenth 
century. Brought into regular use by Napoleon, the optical telegraph 
was operated by manipulating the two antennae into a series of signs. 
An operator used a telescope to observe the signs, reproduced them at 
his own station, and thus passed the message on to the next station. The 
system worked well, enabling message transmission over hundreds of 
kilometres in minutes. By 1839, the network stretched from St Petersburg 
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to Warsaw, and a message could be sent along the entire route and 
decoded in under an hour.41 The silhouette of the optical telegraph 
spied from Nevskii Prospekt is as telling as the imperial eagles over the 
notary public and apothecaries’ doors; it enforces authority and imperial 
omnipotence on a grand scale. Designed purely for official, bureaucratic 
use, the optical telegraph represents information technology as authority 
controlling the most efficient means of communication. 
As we complete the stroll, we end on the steps of the Hotel London, 
overlooking Palace Square once more, the gold spire of the Admiralty 
shining above a troop of marching soldiers and several perambulating 
ladies wearing colourful hats and cloaks. The optical telegraph has 
taken us far afield from the public graphosphere, but it emphasises the 
importance of Nevskii Prospekt not just as a grand boulevard featuring 
imperial façades, fashionable shops and cafes, and public monuments, 
but as an information conduit, an encapsulated graphosphere. As 
the optical telegraph’s presence emphasises Nevskii’s role as a grand 
boulevard, so too does it emphasise the limitations of Sadovnikov’s 
watercolours as a source for capturing urban experience.
Looking Beyond Nevskii Prospekt
While Panorama projects a precise view of the street’s buildings populated 
with lively and whimsical characters, as a piece of urban representation 
it also has its limitations. Common aspects of St Petersburg life are 
omitted: chilly and inclement weather, the gloomy darkness of winter, 
the dirt of the streets, the noise of urban bustle, and the strong smells. 
Some omissions would be difficult to convey in two-dimensional 
printed format, of course, particularly those of an auditory or olfactory 
nature. Sadovnikov’s additions of carriages, animals, goods, and people 
do suggest motion, noise, and smells, and invite the viewer to imagine 
these omnipresent elements of urban life. However, the experience of 
Nevskii Prospekt without the rattle of carriages, the noise of the crowds, 
the sound of horse hoofs on the street, or the pungent and intense smells 
of urban space is already an incomplete, partially imagined one. 
41  On the optical telegraph in Russia, see D. I. Kargin, ‘Opticheskii telegraf Kulibina’, 
Arkhiv istorii nauki i tekhniki. Trudy instituta istorii nauki i tekhniki. Seriia 1. Vypusk 
3 (Leningrad: Izdatel′stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1934), pp. 77–103.
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More important than the limitations of medium, however, is 
Panorama’s inherent limitation: its scope. On our stroll, we turned back 
at the Fontanka, and for good reason: even just across the river, still 
in view of the Anichkov Palace, the street’s grandeur deteriorates. 
Astolphe de Custine observes in his 1839 Letters from Russia, 
A little below the bridge of Aniskoff […] The superb city created by Peter 
the Great, and beautified by Catherine II and other sovereigns, is lost 
at last in an unsightly mass of stalls and workshops, confused heaps of 
edifices without name, large squares without design.42
Custine’s view of the city is one that serves as a counterpoint to 
Sadovnikov’s. Custine’s travel memoir praises some aspects of St 
Petersburg, but his overall impression is unfavourable. Sadovnikov’s 
watercolours, on the other hand, deliberately omit less than pleasing 
urban scenes; an “unsightly mass” would not be in keeping with the 
scroll’s aesthetic. And, indeed, Sadovnikov’s gaze turns back at the 
Anichkov Bridge. While Nevskii Prospekt—or at any rate its fashionable 
section—is meticulously documented by artists like Sadovnikov, the 
little we know about street signs elsewhere paints a very different image 
of the experience of the public graphosphere. 
Most of the information scholars have about off-boulevard 
street signs from this period comes from physiological writing. One 
anonymous author, writing in Literaturnaia gazeta in 1845, notes: “I 
would go out to see other signs beyond the gate […] where […] they just 
say ‘En trence to eatery’ or ‘To restrunt’, while above it the painter had, 
with a free hand, shown a ham with a paper frill, a suckling pig, a plate 
full of meat pies, fresh eggs, huge cutlets, tea with a Chinese figurine, 
i.e. whatever you might want”.43 These misspellings and the freedom 
of the signmakers off the grand boulevards shows both the potential of 
the public graphosphere—the sign’s message is more important than its 
grammar or language—and its relative freedom. Intriguingly, there are 
misspelled signs apparent in Sadovnikov’s Panorama as well—in some 
cases French is misspelled, and in some cases Russian is—but the artist 
documents them by rote. The Literary Gazette writer, on the other hand, 
revels in them as a unique expression of free spirit.
42  Astolphe de Custine, Letters from Russia, the 1843 translation edited and introduced 
by Anka Muhlstein (New York: New York Review Books Classics, 2002), p. 215.
43  Anonymous, Аppendix to ‘Zapiski dlia khoziaev’, Literaturnaia gazeta (1845), quoted 
in Povelikhina and Kovtun, Russian Painted Shop Signs and Avant-Garde Artists, p. 23. 
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It is within this atmosphere that the tradition of wordplay and folk 
painting in shop signs developed, sidestepping the grand boulevards 
and augmenting the previously largely graphic examples. In his Tales of 
Belkin, in “The Undertaker” (Grobovshchik, 1830), Pushkin, for example, 
gives an example of a street sign: 
Over the gate hung a sign depicting a plump cupid with a downturned 
torch in his hand and bearing the inscription: ‘Plain and painted coffins 
sold and upholstered here. Coffins also let out for hire and old ones 
repaired’.44 
Pushkin’s imagined sign is nothing like the signs on Nevskii. Its image is 
not utilitarian, but more suggestive. The language of the sign is playful, 
and intended to be so—Pushkin ironises it in his story, but this kind of 
playful language was prized on street signs off the grand boulevards at 
this time.
One of the best records of street signs from this period appears in the 
journal Illustration (Illustratsiia) in 1848, in the article “Petersburg Shop 
Signs” by an anonymous contributor known only by the initial “T”.45 
This admirer of street signs from the non-affluent areas of the capital 
extols their “primitive character”, and points out the humour and folk 
traditions that frequently crop up among them. In one example, the 
anonymous author relates:
The sign of Smekayev’s tobacco shop depicted the following scene: on 
one side a gentleman was sitting at a small round table holding a glass 
in his hand, on the other a lady was handing the man a pipe and trying 
to take his glass away. Underneath was the quatrain clearly showing a 
knowledge of folk ways: 
Have a smoke instead of wine, 
A pipe will make you feel so fine, 
I guarantee you’ll get so stewed, 
You’ll swear you’d drunk a pint or two. 
In the windows of hairdressers and barbershops, ladies and men’s busts 
were displayed with a sign saying: ‘We cut hair, and comb and shave—
have yourself bled according to the latest journal’.46
44  Alexander Pushkin, ‘The Undertaker’, Tales of Belkin and Other Prose Writings, trans. 
by Ronald Wilks (London: Penguin Classics, 1998), p. 33. 
45  ‘T’, ‘Peterburgskie vyveski’, Illiustratsiia, 30. 4–7 (28 August 1848), 81–82.
46  ‘T’, ‘Peterburgskie vyveski’, p. 81. Translation adapted from that in Povelikhina and 
Kovtun, Russian Painted Shop Signs and Avant-Garde Artists, p. 28.
402 Katherine Bowers
The irony of these snippets—“you’ll swear you’d drunk a pint or two” or 
“have yourself bled according to the latest journal”—recalls Pushkin’s 
fictional shop signs, which play on fashion and good-natured humour. 
This inventive language evokes the tradition of lubok, woodcuts which 
predate the influx of Western European models of shop signs found 
on the grand boulevards.47 It is these so-called “eccentric” signs that 
fascinate this anonymous physiological voyager-author, and they 
provide a different set of information about urban life and experience 
than the neoclassical façades and fashionable, elegant signs we see in 
Sadovnikov’s watercolours. 
“T” gives a short history of shop signs in Russia, which aligns with 
the graphosphere observed along Nevskii in Panorama. According to 
“T”, signs originally captured the act of trading in addition to images of 
the goods for sale themselves. He observes:
Thus, over a fabric shop there would be a picture of a merchant standing 
in front of a pretty purchaser. Inn signs often show Russian men sitting 
in orderly fashion at a table laid with a tea set or with zakuski (savoury 
snacks) and decanters; painters paid particular attention to the figure, 
making them pour out and drink tea in very grand poses which were 
not, of course, usual to the habitués of such places.48 
For a physiological writer, the history of signs is of interest as it is a 
history of urban communication. “T” stresses the central role of 
information transfer, commenting:
Now the figures were replaced simply by objects which speak for 
themselves—the tea set, snacks and decanters; fabric shops have 
signs which depict various kinds of material, and others give only the 
merchants name.49 
These “speaking” signs sound very similar to those found along Nevskii.
“T”, however, is less interested in these standard signs. His passion 
is for the “eccentric” signs—not just the misspelled ones, or those 
47  For an overview of lubok as advertising material, see Uchenova and Starykh, 
Istoriia reklamy, pp. 52–53. Iurii Lotman also provides insight on the folk tradition 
of the lubok within the commercial realm in ‘Khudozhestvennaia priroda russkikh 
narodnykh kartinok’, in Narodnaia graviura i fol′klor v Rossii XVII–XIX vv., ed. I. E. 
Danilova (Moscow: Sovetskii Khudozhnik, 1975), pp. 257–58.
48  ‘T’, ‘Peterburgskie vyveski’, 81.
49  Ibid.
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featuring folk humour. Some of those collected in the article show his 
bonhomie: he takes pleasure in the small details of signs, treating them as 
artworks (“Beer-stalls had signs with bottles of beer, foaming as the cork 
pops”50), while emphasising their communicative meaning (“We also 
find the inscription ‘Sale for consumption on the premises’, indicating 
that beer, porter, and honey could be drunk in the shop itself”.51). 
Depicted through “T”’s marvelling eyes, the signs come whimsically 
to life: a coachman in a blue kaftan doffs his cap to passers-by; grocery 
shops have exotic views of China taken from tea chests, evoking distant 
lands; and, perhaps most amazing of all, “Meat shops showed not 
only bulls, rams, and chickens eating lush grass, but also the slaughter 
itself. On one sign of this type (in Spassky Lane) the artist painted all 
the letters of the inscription from different cuts of meat”.52 These signs 
clearly demonstrate the creative liberty that emerged in advertising 
as merchants worked to discover ways to outstrip competition and 
communicate their message to customers in the most attractive way 
possible—even if that way involves spelling out your business name 
with different meat cuts. 
The signs we have seen on Nevskii in Sadovnikov’s watercolours 
seem to show a definite progress along Western European models, 
but these off-boulevard signs seem derived from folk traditions or 
pre-eighteenth-century depictions of goods for sale. From these 
descriptions, we can see the limitations of using a resource such as 
Sadovnikov’s scroll exclusively to gain an understanding of the scope 
of the public graphosphere, which sprawled well beyond Panorama’s 
bounds. While Sadovnikov’s watercolours do provide some insight, 
one must go off-boulevard like the anonymous physiological author to 
sketch in additional details and strands, and, even then, the experience 
remains incomplete. 
In 1835, a reviewer was inspired by the scroll to proclaim, “Nevsky 
Prospekt is without a doubt the finest street in the world, for its regularity 
and its remarkable length and breadth, as well as for the beauty and 





Prospekt the soul of St Petersburg”.53 This reading of Panorama emerges 
from the work’s inherent aristocratic point of view. The “regularity, 
remarkable length and breadth, beauty and majesty of buildings” all 
toe the imperial line. Furthermore, these remarks resemble Custine’s 
comment on St Petersburg architecture, “The line and rule figure 
well the manner in which the absolute sovereigns view things”.54 The 
public graphosphere, however, resists categorisation and containment, 
and, similarly, complicates the imperial perspectives and rectilinear 
prospects typically associated with St Petersburg’s planned design. 
Refractions and Reflections
For those who viewed Panorama of Nevskii Prospekt in 1835, the scroll 
provided a new way of sharing urban life with others, of capturing 
a slice of the elegant street, featuring neoclassical façades, modish 
shops and even a glimpse of cutting edge technology such as the 
optical telegraph or celebrities like Pushkin. An anonymous visitor to 
St Petersburg in the 1840s called Nevskii Prospekt “a kind of picture 
gallery”,55 conflating city with artistic object, just as the scroll creates art 
out of urban experience. Viewers at the time would have been conscious 
of this way of seeing the city; just before the optical telegraph, the scroll 
itself includes the “Rotunda”, the home of Madame la Tour’s Panorama 
(recognisable by its distinctive lantern). This popular attraction on 
Bolshaia Morskaia Street was one of the first panoramas, on display here 
in the 1820s. Madame La Tour’s allowed visitors to experience cutting-
edge nineteenth-century optical entertainment such as panoramas, 
cosmoramas, and an attraction called the “theatre of light”—early 
forerunners of the cinematograph.56
53  A review of Panorama of Nevksii Prospekt that appeared in Severnaia pchela. Quoted in 
Kotel′nikova, ‘Introduction’, p. 8.
54  Custine, Letters from Russia, p. 213.
55  Quoted in West, I Shop in Moscow, p. 23, who cites Povelikhina and Kovtun, Russian 
Painted Shop Signs and Avant-Garde Artists, p. 23, who provide no citation.
56  See Nataliia Shtrimer’s annotations to Panorama of Nevsky Prospekt (1993), ‘The Left, 


































In another account of Nevskii Prospekt from 1835, Nikolai Gogol writes 
of the street as a “great mixer” in his story that bears the street’s name. His 
subject matter is grittier than Sadovnikov’s idealised cityscapes, dealing 
as it does with prostitution, poverty, suicide, and crime; he begins his 
story with an ironic exclamation that echoes that of the anonymous 
Panorama reviewer: “Nothing could be finer than Nevsky Prospect, at 
least not in St Petersburg; it is the be-all and end-all. It positively gleams 
and sparkles—the jewel of our capital!”57 Gogol’s characters’ urban 
experience differs from that of the figures in Sadovnikov’s watercolours: 
Gogol’s “Nevskii Prospekt” features a grotesque ultimate scene in which 
the devil lights the lamps along the avenue, surrounded by darkness, 
with occasional dim lights illuminating the dull yellow fog. Gogol 
knew of Panorama, and even sent a copy to his mother, although his 
representation of the city differs greatly from Sadovnikov’s limpid blue 
skies. Still, in giving his mother the scroll, Gogol not only sent home a 
souvenir of his life in the capital, but also passed along one experience 
of Nevskii Prospekt, enabling his mother, too, take a “stroll”.
For us, viewing the scroll nearly two hundred years later, Panorama 
provides a rare visual account of Russian urban space in the 1820s. 
However, for our discussion of Sadovnikov, Nevskii Prospekt, and the 
public graphosphere, it is prudent to mention the limitations of using 
works like Panorama to draw conclusions about early nineteenth-
century shop signs. The information we glean from our “stroll”, 
is constrained by the fact that, typically, only beautiful, grand, or 
historical urban spaces were subjects of artworks during this period. 
Sadovnikov does illustrate a deeper perspective at cross streets, 
allowing the viewer to look beyond the famous boulevard, which 
suggests the city beyond Nevskii Prospekt, but the street remains the 
central focus. Some works existed that depicted street life if not street 
signs, like, for example, the monthly anthology “Magic Lantern”, 
which came out at the same time as Panorama. The full title is “Magic 
Lantern, or a Spectacle of St Petersburg’s Travelling Sellers, Masters, 
and Other Folk Craftsmen, Depicted with a True Brush in their Real 
Clothes and Presented Conversing with One Another, Commensurate 
57  Nikolai Gogol, ‘Nevsky Prospect’, Plays and Petersburg Tales, trans. by Christopher 
English (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 3.
 40712. An Early Nineteenth-Century Stroll Along Nevskii Prospekt
With Each Person and Title”.58 This detailed description’s emphasis on 
veracity (“a True Brush”, “their Real Clothes”) and the lower classes 
going about their daily business anticipate the trend of physiological 
depictions of slums and lower class areas, demonstrating the relatively 
new notion that representations of the lower classes were necessary 
for a complete and authentic picture of urban life. In the next decades, 
as the technology of photography developed alongside physiological 
writing, a much broader and more intricate picture of the public 
graphosphere becomes possible.
58  For more information about ‘Magic Lantern’, see Solomon Volkov, St Petersburg: A 
Cultural History (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), pp. 60–61.
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